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ADVAITĀMODA

(A STUDY OF ADVAITA AND VIŚIṢṬĀDVAITA)


A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
of The Australian National University

July, 1986

by

Michael Comans

This thesis is the result of my own
research carried out while enrolled
as a Ph.D. candidate at The Australian
National University, 1983 - 1986.

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Michael Comans". The signature is written in dark ink and has a long, sweeping underline that extends to the right.

Michael Comans

ABSTRACT

This work consists of (a) a translation of the Sanskrit text Advaitāmoda and (b) my own supplementary comments to the discussion contained in the text. The work is divided into four chapters, corresponding to the Ānandāśrama publication of the text. The Sanskrit text has been further divided into sections with the translation following directly under each section in double spacing. My comments upon the text are in 1.5 spacing and have been placed under the translation of the relevant section.

The first chapter: "the teaching of Advaita" (Advaitamatam) gives a detailed overview of the philosophy of the Advaita Vedānta. The second chapter: "the teaching of Viśiṣṭādvaita" (Viśiṣṭādvaitamatam) outlines the philosophical view of the Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta. At the conclusion of the second chapter, the author summarizes what he considers to be the fundamental differences between Advaita and Viśiṣṭādvaita. The third chapter: "the logical untenability of the Viśiṣṭādvaita teaching" (Viśiṣṭādvaitamatānupapattiḥ) and chapter four: "the logical tenability of Ignorance" (avidyopapattiḥ) constitute the major part of the text. These chapters consist of a detailed reply to Rāmānuja's critique of Advaita in the Laghusiddhānta and the Mahāsiddhānta portions of his Śrībhāṣya 1.1.1. The procedure followed in these chapters is that the author firstly cites the Śrībhāṣya passage and then takes up that passage for discussion. In this manner, the major part of the above sections of the Śrībhāṣya are systematically discussed.

Dedication

FOR MY PARENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

A list of acknowledgements indicates, quite rightly, that no piece of work is a creation ex nihilo. On the contrary, a completed work is the result of a number of causes -instrumental as well as material- and I now have the welcome opportunity to acknowledge these "causes", which took the form of the assistance I received during the course of my studies.

Firstly, I wish to thank my principal supervisor, Professor J. W. de Jong, who allowed me the freedom to pursue my interests while guiding my research with an expertise derived from his vast experience. If I have completed my studies under his supervision by developing a value for textual precision and scholarly detail, then I think he will consider his task satisfactorily accomplished. I wish to thank my supervisor Dr Tissa Rajapatirana who kindly read through the entire work -Sanskrit and English- in its final stages and eliminated many of my errors of commission and omission.

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yair ime gurubhiḥ pūrvaṃ padavākyapramānataḥ /
vyākhyātāḥ sarvavedāntās tān nityaṃ pranato'smy aham //

I would like to thank Dr R. Balasubramanian of the Dr S. Radhakrishnan Institute for Advanced Study in Philosophy, University of Madras, for initially suggesting Advaitāmoda for translation and for reading some passages of the Śrībhāṣya with me, in spite of his heavy schedule. I wish to express my thanks to Mr Mahādev Āpte of Ānandāśrama Publications for his permission to incorporate the text of Advaitāmoda along with the translation. I would like to express my

appreciation to Mr G. K. Abhyankar for assisting me with the biographical details of his grandfather Śrī Vāsudevaśāstrī Abhyankar. I would also like to thank Dr and Mrs Ashok Tulpule for assisting me with the Marāṭhī biography of Vāsudevaśāstrī Abhyankar.

Apart from my supervisors whom I mentioned above, I would like to thank the other members of the South and West Asia Centre: Dr Luise Hercus, Dr Richard Barz and Mr Yogendra Yādav, for the friendliness and help which they showed daily. Also, I would like to acknowledge the assistance of the other Ph.D. students, all scholars of Buddhism, with whom I had the good fortune to share an office at various times: Akira Saito, Yasuo Tsukada and Richard Stanley. They all proved themselves to be kalyānamitras' in one way or another. I wish to thank Miss Betty Kat, venerated secretary of the South and West Asia Centre, for her patience, consistent good humour and constant willingness to be of assistance. I, like all previous Ph.D. students of this department, will remember her fondly.

Finally, I would like to thank the Faculty of Asian Studies for providing a pleasant environment conducive to work and The Australian National University for the use of the excellent facilities and also for the material support.

विद्यादेव्युपनामकं

दयानन्दमहद्गुरुम् ।

हृल्लण्डदेश्यविद्वांसं

श्रीनिवासं च वन्दे त्रयम् ॥

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INTRODUCTION

VĀSUDEVAŚĀSTRĪ ABHYANKAR (1863-1942)

Vāsudevaśāstrī was born into a family prominent in the field of Sanskrit scholarship. His grandfather, Bhāskaraśāstrī Abhyankar (1783-1871), was a student of Nīlakaṇṭhaśāstrī Thatte of Pune who had studied Sanskrit grammar at Vārāṇasī. Bhāskaraśāstrī founded a school of traditional learning (pāṭhaśālā) at his home at Sātārā in Mahārāṣṭra. When Vāsudevaśāstrī was less than two years old his father died and Bhāskaraśāstrī became responsible for the welfare of his grandchildren. Living in the home of Bhāskaraśāstrī and surrounded by his grandfather's students, by the age of seven Vāsudevaśāstrī had memorized such texts as: Amarakośa, Rūpāvalī and the Aṣṭādhyāyī of Pāṇini.¹

After the death of Bhāskaraśāstrī, the education of Vāsudevaśāstrī was continued by Rāmaśāstrī Godbole, a principal student of Bhāskaraśāstrī. Each day, Rāmaśāstrī would travel from his own residence at Mahooli, some three miles from Sātārā, to teach at the pāṭhaśālā in his teacher's home. He did not receive a salary for teaching and the pāṭhaśālā was funded through grants. Rāmaśāstrī taught at the pāṭhaśālā from 1871-1906. He generally taught about twenty-five students at any time and classes were conducted in the mornings from 9 until 11 o'clock and in the afternoons from 1 until 4. Vāsudevaśāstrī studied under Rāmaśāstrī from the age of eight until he was twenty-four. His education was traditional; he primarily studied Sanskrit grammar for twelve years beginning with Siddhāntakaumudī and concluding with portions of the Mahābhāṣya. The remaining four years were devoted to the study of the Taittirīya Saṁhitā and Brāhmaṇa, Advaita Vedānta and works on poetic composition. He received no "secular" education and he studied subjects such as mathematics, history and geography on his own. His course of study with Rāmaśāstrī was as follows:

| <u>Age</u> | <u>Principal Studies</u> | <u>Complementary Studies</u> |
|------------|---|---|
| 8-11 | <u>Siddhāntakaumudī</u> , <u>Raghuvamśa</u> ch.2. Some portions of the work of Māgha. | |
| 11-13 | <u>Manoramā-śabdaratna</u> (<u>kārakānta</u>). | <u>Tarkasaṅgraha</u> with <u>Dīpikā</u> , <u>Muktāvalī</u> . |
| 13-14 | <u>Śabdakaustubha</u> (ninth section). | <u>Mathuranāthī-pañcalakṣaṇī</u> , <u>Gadādhari-śvalakṣaṇa</u> , |
| 14-16 | <u>Paribhāṣenduśekhara</u> . | <u>Kuvalayānanda</u> , |
| 16-20 | <u>Śabdenduśekhara</u> and <u>Laghumañjūṣā</u> (important chapters). | <u>Mahābhāṣya</u> , the ninth section and the <u>aṅgādhikāra</u> . |
| 20-23 | <u>Taittirīya-Saṁhitā</u> and <u>Brāhmaṇa</u> (by heart). | <u>Kāvya prakāśa</u> , <u>Pañcadaśī</u> , <u>Vedāntaparibhāṣā</u> , <u>Brahmasūtra-</u> <u>bhāṣya</u> . Also, teaching other students. |
| 23-24 | <u>Advaitasiddhi</u> (Fifth portion). | Teaching, writing commentaries: "Tattvādarśa" on <u>Paribhāṣendu-</u> <u>śekhara</u> and "Gūḍhārthaprakāśa" on <u>Laghuśabdenduśekhara</u> . |

After completing his formal studies, Vāsudevaśāstrī married and, in 1891, he travelled to Pune to gain employment. He carried with him a letter of recommendation from Rāmaśāstrī to Justice M.G. Ranade. He began his teaching career at a Sanskrit pāṭhaśālā founded in 1885 by Viṭṭhalaśāstrī, a former student of Bhāskaraśāstrī. He continued to teach at the pāṭhaśālā until 1942, a career which spanned more than half a century. In 1892, upon the recommendation of M.G. Ranade and Namdar Gokhale, he was appointed a śāstrī at Fergusson College when the Sanskrit department was depleted by the death of V.S. Apte in that same year. He taught at Fergusson College until 1927. His daily routine was to teach at the pāṭhaśālā from 7.30 until

9.00 am., and at Fergusson College from 11.00 until 2.00 pm.

Vāsudevaśāstrī was connected with the Bhandarkar Institute from the time of its foundation and he served on its Regulating Council for more than two decades. In 1921 he was awarded the title of Mahāmahopādhyāya by the Imperial Government.² The publications of Vāsudevaśāstrī are listed below:

1. Tattvādarśa. (1886) Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute. A grammatical work. It is a commentary upon Nāgojībhaṭṭa's Paribhāṣenduśekhara based upon notes Abhyankar made while he was tutoring the text.
2. Gūdhārthaprakāśa. (1888) A grammatical work. It is a commentary upon Nāgojībhaṭṭa's Laghuśabdenduśekhara. It is not available in its complete form.
3. Brahmasūtraśāṅkarabhāṣya. (1900) Advaita Vedānta. It is a Marāṭhī translation of Śāṅkara's commentary upon the Brahmasūtras.
4. Samāsokti. (1904) Saṁskṛta-pāṭhaśālā, Pune. Viśiṣṭādvaita. A brief commentary upon the Śrībhāṣya-catussūtrī. It paraphrases Sudarśanasūri's Śrutaparakāśikā in a lucid manner.
5. Prakāśa. (1906) Ānandāśrama. Viśiṣṭādvaita. A commentary upon the Viśiṣṭādvaita text Yatīndramatadīpikā.
6. Śrībhāṣya-prathamasūtra. A commentary, prepared for students, upon the first sūtra of the Śrībhāṣya.
7. Viśiṣṭādvaitamata. Saṁskṛta-pāṭhaśālā, Pune. An original work in Marāṭhī, of approximately thirty pages, explaining the teachings of Viśiṣṭādvaita.
8. Kāvya prakāśa of Mammaṭa. (1911) Ānandāśrama. Alaṅkāra. This is a work of six hundred pages containing an edition of the Kāvya prakāśa with the commentaries Udyota by Nāgojībhaṭṭa and Pradīpa by Govindaṭhakkur.
9. Śrībhāṣya-vivṛtti. (1914) Bombay Sanskrit Series. Viśiṣṭādvaita. This work is in two parts. The first contains an edition of the Śrībhāṣya and the second part contains an explanation of difficult portions of the text.

10. Pātañjalayogasūtrāṇi. (1917) Bombay Sanskrit Series. A large work of four hundred and fifty pages bringing together commentaries on the Yogasūtras by Vyāsa, Vācaspatimīśra and Nāgojībhaṭṭa. For the preparation of this critical edition, Abhyankar used eight manuscripts of Vyāsa's commentary, five of Vācaspati's commentary and three manuscripts of Nāgojī's commentary.
11. Advaitāmōda. (1918) Ānandāśrama. Advaita and Viśiṣṭādvaita. In this original work, Abhyankar firstly portrays the teachings of Advaita and Viśiṣṭādvaita and he then gives a detailed critique of the Laghu and Mahāsiddhānta portions of the Śrībhāṣya from the standpoint of Advaita.
12. Kāvyaṭprakāśa of Mammaṭa. (1921) Ānandāśrama. Alaṅkāra. An edition containing the commentary Saṅketa by Māṅikyaçandra.
13. Sūtrāntaraparigrahavicāra. (1922) Ānandāśrama. Dharmaśāstra. This work attempts to resolve differences between the followers of the Rgveda and followers of the Kṛṣṇayajurveda concerning the recitation of certain texts during the performance of yajña.
14. Darśanāṅkura. (1924) B.O.R.I. This work is a commentary on Sāyaṇa-Mādhava's Sarvadarśanasāṅgraha.
15. Saṁskārapaddhati. (1924) Ānandāśrama. A work on dharmasāstra, dealing with the karmakāṇḍa.
16. Nyāyakośa. (1928) B.O.R.I. A dictionary of technical terms used in Indian philosophical traditions. Abhyankar revised and re-edited this work.
17. Binduprapāta. (1928) B.O.R.I. Advaita. A commentary upon the Siddhāntabindu of Madhusūdanasarasvatī.
18. Dharmatattvanirṇaya. (1929) Ānandāśrama. Dharmaśāstra. This work deals with topics such as changes in social and religious customs which relate to inter-religious marriages, widow remarriage etc.
19. Kuṇḍārkodayā. (1931) Ānandāśrama. Dharmaśāstra. This work is a commentary upon the treatise Kuṇḍārka which deals with the

mathematical proportions of a Vedic altar.

20. Prabhā. (1937) B.O.R.I. Mīmāṃsā. A commentary upon the Mīmāṃsā-nyāya-prakāśa of Āpadeva.
21. Advaitāṅkura. (1938) Ānandāśrama. A commentary upon the first two chapters of the Bhagavadgītā.
22. Vyākaraṇa-mahābhāṣya. (1938 onwards) Deccan Education Society. Grammar. A Marāṭhī translation, in six volumes, of Patañjali's Vyākaraṇamahābhāṣya.
23. Vyākaraṇa-mahābhāṣya. (1938) Deccan Education Society. Grammar. A Hindī translation of the ninth section of Patañjali's Vyākaraṇamahābhāṣya.
24. Kāyapariśuddhi. (1939) Ānandāśrama. Vedānta. A discussion about liberation from the "three bodies", i.e. the physical (sthūla), subtle (sūkṣma) and causal (kāraṇa) bodies.

ADVAITĀMODA

Abhyankar published five works dealing with the philosophical tradition known as Viśiṣṭādvaita. After the publication of one such work, Viśiṣṭādvaitamata, it is said that:

...some of the śāstrī's friends started saying jokingly that his views have changed and he has become a follower of Viśiṣṭādvaita...to clear the misunderstanding that he had changed his views to that of Rāmānuja, in 1918 he wrote Advaitāmoda ...in which he put a very strong case in favour of the teachings of Śaṅkara. After this book, the misunderstanding was cleared.³

The word "Advaitāmoda" can be resolved as a Karmadhārya², a Bahuvrīhi, or as a genitive Tatpuruṣa compound. The latter is most likely, in which case the word means: "the fragrance of Advaita". The work can be conveniently divided into four chapters. The first and second chapters

are useful descriptions of the Advaita and Viśiṣṭādvaita philosophy respectively. In the first chapter: "the teaching of Advaita", the author has based his exposition largely upon the Vedāntaparibhāṣā though he has also drawn upon a number of sources which I have tried to identify where possible. The second chapter: "the teaching of Viśiṣṭādvaita", closely follows the Viśiṣṭādvaita manual of instruction, Yatīndramatadīpikā, upon which the author had written a commentary. At the conclusion of this chapter, Abhyankar lists what he considers to be the major differences between Advaita and Viśiṣṭādvaita; these are arranged as thirty three points.

Chapter three: "the logical untenability of the Viśiṣṭādvaita teaching" and chapter four: "the logical tenability of Ignorance (avidyā)" constitute the major part of the work. These chapters attempt to refute Rāmānuja's criticisms of Advaita as expressed in the "Small Conclusion" (Laghusiddhānta) and the "Great Conclusion" (Mahāsiddhānta) of the Śrībhāṣya 1.1.1. Abhyankar's method is to firstly cite a passage from the Śrībhāṣya and then to direct his arguments against statements contained in that passage. The text proceeds in a systematic manner and the most important parts of the Laghu and Mahāsiddhānta are quoted in their due order and then discussed. Abhyankar has sometimes paraphrased the Śrībhāṣya text and such occasions have been noted. However when he has done so, there has been no compromise with the original meaning.

As far as I am aware, Advaitāmoda is the first Advaita work to discuss the Laghu and Mahāsiddhānta portions of the Śrībhāṣya in such a detailed manner. Rāmarāya Bellarikoṇḍa's Śrīsaṅkarāsaṅkarabhāṣyavimarsaḥ is a later work (1953) which masterfully discusses Rāmānuja's and Sudarśanasūri's arguments as presented in Śrībhāṣya 1.1.1. and the commentary Śrutaparakāśikā. However it does not follow the text of the Śrībhāṣya as closely as Abhyankar does in Advaitāmoda. A Viśiṣṭādvaitin's

reply to Advaitāmoda : Paramārthaprakāśikā by U. Vīrarāghavācārya, was published in 1940. I have occasionally consulted the latter text, which is of a comparable size to Advaitāmoda, in the preparation of this work. However the limitations of time and the size of this work have meant that the Paramārthaprakāśikā could not be utilized to any significant extent and I must leave the analysis of the counter arguments to Advaitāmoda to another student of the subject.

At this juncture, it is necessary to make some remarks about the contents of the first chapter which are, I feel, open to some criticism. Firstly, the author has devoted considerable attention to a topic of relatively minor importance like the combination of the five elements (pañcīkaraṇa) at the expense of more significant matters in Advaita teaching such as the analysis of the three states of experience: waking, dream and deep sleep. Nor does Abhyankar devote sufficient consideration to the discrimination of the real meaning of "I", a topic which is of such importance to Advaita that it forms the subject matter of Śaṅkara's celebrated introduction to Brahmasūtra 1.1.1. Secondly, there is an inadequate presentation of how the sacred texts, i.e. the Upaniṣads, operate as the means of knowledge (pramāṇa) for Brahman. The author does not discuss the usage of essential definition (svarūpalakṣaṇa), such as Tai. 2.1.1., for ascertaining the nature of Brahman. Nor does he explain the use of implication (lakṣaṇā) in the comprehension of the mahāvākya: "tat tvam asi" (Ch.6.8.7.). Such omissions can perhaps be accounted for by the fact that Abhyankar was trained primarily as a grammarian, by teachers who were themselves essentially grammarians and not Advaita preceptors. While the study of logic and grammar are certainly helpful for understanding all disciplines of knowledge (Kāṇādaṁ Pāṇinīyaṁ ca sarvaśāstropakāraṇam) it does not necessarily mean that other disciplines can be fully understood without undergoing instruction from within the

methodological framework established by their respective traditions.

Thirdly, his description of the various views concerning the nature of māyā (1.23-25.) cannot be clearly associated with particular Advaita authors. Finally, his discussion of the theory of a single individual soul (ekajīvavāda) (1.29-30.) should be treated with circumspection as it contains a factual error and it is given undue emphasis in relation to the style of the rest of the chapter, which is a useful compendium of Advaita philosophy.

In chapter one, I have added a fairly extensive commentarial portion with the object of supplementing the main text with a more detailed portrayal of certain facets of the Advaita teaching. I have drawn upon a number of well known Advaita texts but have kept the writings of Śaṅkara as my primary source. The comments to the second chapter again attempt to provide a more detailed supplement to certain parts of the main text. The comments are principally drawn from the Yatīndramatadīpikā and sections of the Śrībhāṣya and Siddhitraya. In chapters three and four, the commentarial portions have a twofold purpose: (a) to explain some of the more difficult passages in Abhyankar's writing and (b) to supplement the discussion. In order to do the latter I have chiefly drawn upon the writing of Rāmarāya Bellaṅkoṇḍa in the Śrīśaṅkarāśaṅkarabhāṣyavimarśaḥ.

The arguments contained in Rāmānuja's Śrībhāṣya and Abhyankar's responses to them form the bulk of the subject matter of Advaitāmoda. Rāmānuja, writing in the twelfth century A.D., and Abhyankar in the twentieth century, illustrate the subtlety of argument and depth of scholarship which characterize much of the philosophical literature composed in Sanskrit. It is hoped that the translation and study of Advaitāmoda provide a glimpse of the richness which is the Sanskrit philosophical tradition.

NOTES TO THE INTRODUCTION.

1. S.V. Sahasrabuddhe and M.D. Sathe, Mahāmahopādhyāya Vāsudevaśāstrī Abhyankar Caritra va Kārya. Pune. 1963. p.12.
2. "Obituary Notice", Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute. Vol. XXIV. 1943.
3. Sahasrabuddhe and Sathe, op-cit., p.45, 46.

EDITIONS OF THE PRINCIPAL TEXTS CITED.

- (1) Śāṅkara. Page and line numbers refer to the editions of Śāṅkara's commentarial works published by Motilal Banarsidass. (a) Ten Principal Upaniṣhads with Śāṅkarabhāṣya. First edition: Delhi, 1964. Reprinted 1978. (b) Bhagavadgītā with Śāṅkarabhāṣya. First edition: Poona, 1929. Reprinted: Delhi, 1978. (c) Brahmasūtra-Śāṅkarabhāṣyam. With the Commentaries: Bhāṣyaratnaprabhā of Govindānanda, Bhāmatī of Vācaspatimiśra and Nyāya-Nirṇaya of Ānandagiri. First edition: Delhi, 1980. References to the Upadeśasāhasrī follow the edition prepared by S. Mayeda, A Thousand Teachings. The Upadeśasāhasrī of Śāṅkara. Tokyo: Uni. of Tokyo Press, 1979.
- (2) Other Advaita Texts. References to the Naiṣkarmyasiddhi follow the edition prepared by M. Hiriyanna, The Naiṣkarmya-Siddhi of Sureśvara. With the "Candrikā" of Jñānottama. Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Fourth Ed. 1980. References to the Vedāntaparibhāṣā follow the edition by S.S. Suryanarayana Sastri, Vedāntaparibhāṣā. Madras: The Adyar Library and Research Centre, Reprint 1971. References to the Vedāntasāra follow the edition by M. Hiriyanna, Vedānta-Sāra (a work on Vedānta Philosophy by Sadānanda). Poona: Oriental Book Agency, Second Ed. 1962.
- (3) Rāmānuja. Page and paragraph numbers of the Vedārthasaṅgraha refer to the edition by J.A.B. van Buitenen, Rāmānuja's Vedārthasaṅgraha. Poona: Deccan College, 1956. Page and paragraph numbers of the Śrībhāṣya refer to the edition by R.D. Karmarkar, Śrībhāṣya of Rāmānuja. Poona: Uni. of Poona, 1959-64. (Three Volumes)

NOTES ON THE TRANSLATION.

- (1) Sanskrit authors employ the word "knowledge" (jñāna) in a number of different senses. In the translation, the initial letter of the word "knowledge" is not capitalized when the word stands for the object of knowledge (jñāyate iti jñānam), or when it refers to the means whereby an object is known (jñāyate anena iti jñānam) such as in the case of perceptual or inferential knowledge etc. When knowledge is used in the sense of cognition (jñaptir iti jñānam), I have capitalized the initial letter. Even in regard to cognition, or Knowledge, the Advaitin makes a distinction between cognition occurring as a mental function (vṛttijñāna) and awareness per se (svarūpajñāna) which is the essence of the individual soul and identical with Brahman. Both the latter meanings are rendered as "Knowledge" and the distinction between them will be made evident through the context.
- (2) When the Advaitin employs the word "ignorance" (avidyā / ajñāna) to denote the power which brings about the appearance of the world, I have capitalized the initial letter.
- (3) With regard to the Advaita conception of the self, I have not capitalized the initial letter of the word "self" when the word refers to the individual soul (jīva). When the word refers to the "essential Self", I have capitalized the first letter. On one or two occasions such a distinction has been difficult to maintain since, for the Advaitin, the essence of the individual soul is nothing but the supreme Self.
- (4) With regard to the Viśiṣṭādvaita conception of the self, I have not capitalized the initial letter when the word "self" refers to the individual soul. I have capitalized the initial letter when the word refers to the Lord i.e. the supreme Self.
- (5) Sanskrit words are cited in their stem (prātipadika) form. However the word "karman" is more familiar in its nominative singular form: "karma" and it has been cited in this way. When the word "karma" stands for "ritual action" it has been translated as such. When it has the moral sense of the result produced by previous good or bad actions, I have not translated the word and it appears in the text as "karma".

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

| | |
|-----------|---|
| Ai. | .. Aitareya Upaniṣad |
| Amara. | .. Amarakośa |
| Aparokṣa. | .. Aparokṣānubhūti |
| Ātma. | .. Ātma Upaniṣad |
| B.S. | .. Brahma-Sūtra |
| B.S.Ś. | .. Brahma-Sūtra-Śāṅkarabhāṣya |
| B.S.Si. | .. Brahma-Sūtra-Siddhāntadarśana |
| Bhā.P. | .. Bhāṣāpariccheda |
| Br.B. | .. Brahmabindu Upaniṣad |
| Brh. | .. Brhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad |
| Brh.B.V. | .. Brhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad Bhāṣyavārtika |
| Brh.Ś. | .. Brhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad Śāṅkarabhāṣya |
| Ch. | .. Chāndogya Upaniṣad |
| Ch.Ś. | .. Chāndogya Upaniṣad Śāṅkarabhāṣya |
| Cū. | .. Cūlikā Upaniṣad |
| De.Gī. | .. Devī Gītā |
| G. | .. Bhagavad-Gītā |
| G.Ś. | .. Bhagavad-Gītā Śāṅkarabhāṣya |
| Gauḍ.Kā. | .. Gauḍapāda Kārikā |
| Īśa. | .. Īśāvāsya Upaniṣad |
| Īśa.Ś. | .. Īśāvāsya Upaniṣad Śāṅkarabhāṣya |
| J.S. | .. Jaimini-Sūtra |
| Kaṭha. | .. Kaṭha Upaniṣad |
| Kaṭha.Ś. | .. Kaṭha Upaniṣad Śāṅkarabhāṣya |
| Ke. | .. Kena Upaniṣad |
| Ke.Ś. | .. Kena Upaniṣad Śāṅkarabhāṣya |
| M.Nā. | .. Mahānārāyaṇa Upaniṣad |
| Mā. | .. Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad |
| Mā.Ś. | .. Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad Śāṅkarabhāṣya |
| Maitri. | .. Maitri Upaniṣad |
| Manu. | .. Manu-Smṛti |
| Mbh.Ā. | .. Mahābhārata Āraṇyaka-Parva |
| Mbh.Śā. | .. Mahābhārata Śānti-Parva |
| Mu. | .. Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad |
| Mu.Ś. | .. Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad Śāṅkarabhāṣya |
| Mukti. | .. Muktikā Upaniṣad |
| N.S. | .. Naiṣkarmyasiddhi |

| | |
|---------------|--|
| Nṛ.Pū. | .. Nṛsiṃhapūrva Tāpanīya Upaniṣad |
| Nyā.Ku. | .. Nyāyakusumāñjali |
| P.D. | .. Pañcadaśī |
| P.S. | .. Pāṇini-Sūtra |
| Pr. | .. Praśna Upaniṣad |
| Pr.Ś. | .. Praśna Upaniṣad Śāṅkarabhāṣya |
| Ṛ.V. | .. Ṛg-Veda |
| S.B. | .. Siddhāntabindu |
| Ś.Brā. | .. Śatapathabrāhmaṇa |
| S.Ś. | .. Saṅkṣepa-Śārīraka |
| S.T. | .. Siddhitraya |
| Sam.Si. | .. (Siddhitraya) Saṁvit-Siddhi |
| Sarvatantra. | .. Sarvatantrasiddhāntapadārthalakṣaṇasaṅgraha |
| Śisū. | .. Śisūpālavadha |
| Śrī.B. | .. Śrī-Bhāṣya |
| Śrutisāra. | .. Śrutisārasamuddharāṇa |
| Śv. | .. Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad |
| T.S. | .. Tarka-Saṅgraha |
| Tai. | .. Taittirīya Upaniṣad |
| Tai.Ā. | .. Taittirīya Āraṇyaka |
| Tai.B.V. | .. Taittirīya Upaniṣad Bhāṣyavārtika |
| Tai.Brā. | .. Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa |
| Tai.Ś. | .. Taittirīya Upaniṣad Śāṅkarabhāṣya |
| Tejo. | .. Tejobindu Upaniṣad |
| U. | .. Upadeśasāhasrī |
| V.P. | .. Vedānta-Paribhāṣā |
| Vā.P. | .. Vāyu Purāṇa |
| Vai.Bhū.Sāra. | .. Vaiyākaraṇa-Bhūṣaṇa-Sāra |
| Varā. | .. Varāha Upaniṣad |
| Ved.S. | .. Vedārtha-Saṅgraha |
| Veṅīsam. | .. Veṅīsamhāra |
| Viṣ.P. | .. Viṣṇu Purāṇa |
| Viveka. | .. Vivekacūḍāmaṇi |
| Vs. | .. Vedāntasāra |
| Y.S. | .. Yoga-Sūtra |
| Y.S.B. | .. Yoga-Sūtra-Bhāṣya |
| Yatī. | .. Yatīndramatadīpikā |

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- 3.132. Reply to the objections: (a) a mirror does not manifest a face etc., (b) in the absence of the "I-notion", consciousness could not be established as "inner".
- 3.133. "I-ness" is not the Self because it is absent during deep sleep.
- 3.134. The statement: "I did not know anything" demonstrates that the "sense of I" is not cognized during sleep.
- 3.135. During deep sleep the Self remains as the witness of Ignorance.
- 3.136. In the state of liberation while living, the "sense of I" appears and actions continue according to the prārabdha karma.
- 3.137. (a) Expressions of "I-ness" in the statements of sages are because they transact according to the understanding of the people. (b) In liberation free from the body (videhamukti), there is no appearance of "I-ness".
- 3.138. Verse no. XV.
- 3.139. Though the scripture does not have absolute reality, it reveals the truth.
- 3.140. Continuation of the topic.
- 3.141. Though depending upon unreal difference, the scripture does not communicate what is false as being true.
- 3.142. The method of communication in the Upaniṣad texts.
- 3.143. The scripture removes the false view of difference and then negates the difference centred upon itself.
- 3.144. What is required is only that the instructor is not in error concerning the thing to be taught.
- 3.145. Scripture has no defect concerning what is to be taught. Perception has a possible defect.
- 3.146. The knowledge of the non-dual Brahman is not subsequently negated..
- 3.147. Criticism of Rāmānuja's view that the dream-knowledge is not false since it is not negated.
- 3.148. Continuation of the topic.
- 3.149. Continuation of the topic.

- 3.150. The knowledge of the real from what is unreal can be illustrated by the knowledge of a real letter from particular printed lines.
- 3.151. Criticism of Rāmānuja's view that, in the case of the letter and a line, the real arises only from what is real.
- 3.152. Reply to the objection; if the scripture is false, its object, i.e. Brahman, would also be false.
- 3.153. Continuation of the topic.
- 3.154. Reply to the statement; if the knowledge of fire is false, then the fire -which is the object of that false knowledge- is also false.
- 3.155. Continuation of the topic.
- 3.156. Criticism of Rāmānuja's statement; it is incorrect to say that the knowledge of the non-dual Brahman is not subsequently negated. Because it is negated by the statement: "reality is emptiness".
- 3.157. Does the sentence: "reality is emptiness" negate itself or not? Reply to the first alternative.
- 3.158. There is no fault even though the scripture operates in itself.
- 3.159. Reply to the second alternative, i.e. "reality is emptiness" does not negate itself.
- 3.160. Verse no. XVI.
- 3.161. The meaning of the text: "My dear, this was existence alone in the beginning..." (Ch.6.2.1.).
- 3.162. The word "existence" in this text means the Self.
- 3.163. Reply to the Viśiṣṭādvaitins statement; texts which teach Brahman as the material cause must be interpreted in a figurative sense.
- 3.164. The contradiction in the Viśiṣṭādvaitins interpretation of: "My dear, this was existence alone" (Ch.6.2.1.) and "In the beginning, this was indeed the Self" (Ai.1.1.).
- 3.165. Difficulties in upholding the view that "existence" and "Self" have the meaning that the Self is qualified by a body.
- 3.166. Difficulties in upholding the view that the words "existence" and "Self" refer to the Self without connection to a body.
- 3.167. Continuation of the topic.
- 3.168. In the sentence: "By which what is unheard becomes heard..." (Ch.6.1.3.), the word "by which" refers to the object i.e. the Self.
- 3.169. Objection that; in the sentence "By which what is unheard becomes heard...", is the knowledge to be gained something

different from the Self or not?

- 3.170. Reply to the objection.
- 3.171. Criticism of Rāmaṇuja's interpretation of "...this was existence alone..." (Ch.6.2.1.).
- 3.172. Interpretation of the text according to Advaita.
- 3.173. Refutation of the view that the word "existence" (sat) refers to the subtle primary matter (pradhāna).
- 3.174. Explanation of the text: "The wise behold that which cannot be seen..." (Mu.1.6.).
- 3.175. Continuation of the topic.
- 3.176. Explanation of the text: "Brahman is real, Knowledge, limitless" (Tai.2.1.1.).
- 3.177. Continuation of the topic.
- 3.178. Continuation of the topic: the meaning of the word "real".
- 3.179. Continuation of the topic: the meaning of the word "Knowledge".
- 3.180. The use of the three words "real", "Knowledge" and "limitless" in the definition of Brahman.
- 3.181. Grammatical apposition (sāmānādhikarānya).
- 3.182. Verse no. XVII.
- 3.183. Criticism of Rāmaṇuja's explanation of the word "without a second" in Ch.6.2.1.
- 3.184. The word "through which" (yena) in Ch.6.1.3., must signify only a single entity.
- 3.185. The use of the example of the pot and clay (Ch.6.1.4.).
- 3.186. The meaning of the text: "My dear, this was existence alone..." (Ch.6.2.1.).
- 3.187. Continuation of the topic.
- 3.188. Continuation of the topic: the meaning of the word "without a second" (Ch.6.2.1.).
- 3.189. The teachings of (a) Emptiness, (b) that there is solely an efficient cause, (c) that there are multiple material causes, or (d) the cause possesses distinction, cannot establish the proposition: "through the knowledge of the one, there is the knowledge of everything".
- 3.190. Summary of the topic concerning the proposition: through the knowledge of the one, there is the knowledge of everything.

- 3.191. Verse no. XVIII.
- 3.192. Brahman is in reality free from distinction.
- 3.193. Critique of Rāmānuja's interpretation of the text: "...whose desire is true, whose resolve is true" (Ch.8.1.5.).
- 3.194. Continuation of the topic.
- 3.195. Critique of Rāmānuja's interpretation of the text: "He who knows the bliss of Brahman" (Tai.2.9.1.).
- 3.196. Critique of Rāmānuja's interpretation of the text: "He attains all desires, together with the wise Brahman" (Tai.2.1.1.).
- 3.197. Continuation of the topic.
- 3.198. Interpretation of the text: "For whom [Brahman] is not thought..." (Ke.2.3.).
- 3.199. Critique of Rāmānuja's interpretation of the text: "From which words return..." (Tai.2.4.1.).
- 3.200. Critique of Rāmānuja's interpretation of the text: "You cannot see the seer of seeing" (Brh.3.4.2.).
- 3.201. Rāmānuja's view is that the sacred texts do not deny real diversity. Criticism of this view by means of an explanation of what is meant by the word "different" (bhinna).
- 3.202. Continuation of the topic. Seeing oneness in diversity is possible only when there is a single material cause.
- 3.203. Continuation of the topic with reference to the text: "He who sees diversity, as it were, here..." (Brh.4.4.19.).
- 3.204. Critique of Rāmānuja's interpretation of the text: "All this is indeed Brahman...Thus being peaceful, may one contemplate" (Ch.3.14.1.).
- 3.205. Critique of Rāmānuja's interpretation of the text: "For when he makes the slightest interval (antara)..." (Tai.2.7.1.).
- 3.206. Continuation of the topic.
- 3.207. Explanation of B.S.3.2.11: "There is no twofold characteristic for the supreme, even on account of place, because everywhere [it is taught otherwise]".
- 3.208. The purport of the Bhagavadgītā is that Brahman is free from distinction.
- 3.209. The purport of the Viṣṇupurāṇa is that Brahman is free from distinction.
- 3.210. The falsity of the world is taught in the Viṣ.P.
- 3.211. The Viśiṣṭādvaitin position that the etymological derivation of

- the word "bhagavat" shows that Brahman is an object of speech.
- 3.212. Criticism of the above view. Distinctions are admitted only in the sphere of ordinary relations (vyavahāra).
- 3.213. Discussion of the meaning of the verse: "The nature of Knowledge..." (Viṣ.P. 1.2.6.).
- 3.214. Explanation of the questions in Viṣ.P. 1.1.9. concerning the nature and cause of the world and the explanation of the reply, in Viṣ.P. 1.1.35., to those questions.
- 3.215. Rāmānuja's interpretation of Viṣ.P. 1.1.9. and 1.1.35.
- 3.216. Criticism of Rāmānuja's interpretation of the above two verses. The word "from what" (yataḥ) in Viṣ.P. 1.1.9. cannot refer to both the efficient and the material cause.
- 3.217. Continuation of the criticism of Rāmānuja's interpretation of these verses.
- 3.218. Critique of Rāmānuja's objections to the Advaita interpretation of these verses.

Chapter Four: AVIDYOPAPATTIḤ

- 4.1. Rāmānuja's seven objections to the Advaitins conception of Ignorance (avidyā).
- 4.2. Verse no. XIX.
- 4.3. Reply to the first objection concerning the locus of avidyā.
- 4.4. Reply to the second objection concerning the concealing by avidyā.
- 4.5. Reply to the third objection concerning the nature of avidyā.
- 4.6. Continuation of the topic.
- 4.7. The statement: "I am ignorant" refers to avidyā which is something positive in nature (bhāvarūpa). This is a partial reply to the fifth objection concerning a means of proof for avidyā.
- 4.8. The meaning of the negative particle in the statement: "I am ignorant" (aham ajñāḥ).
- 4.9. Reply to the fourth objection concerning the indeterminable nature of avidyā.
- 4.10. Brahman as such does not have the experience of avidyā.
- 4.11. Reply to the objection: if unreal error is based upon an unreal avidyā, there is the possibility of error without a real substratum and the result would be Emptiness.

- 4.12. Reply to the fifth objection concerning a means of proof for avidyā.
- 4.13. Rāmānuja's objection to the use of inference as a means of proof for avidyā. The first interpretation of Rāmānuja's objection.
- 4.14. Reply to the objection.
- 4.15. The second interpretation of Rāmānuja's objection and the reply.
- 4.16. The applicability of the example in the inference under discussion.
- 4.17. Rāmānuja's nine counter-inferences against the concept of avidyā.
- 4.18. Critique of the nine counter-inferences.
- 4.19. The destruction of a positive entity can occur through knowledge.
- 4.20. Reply to the objection: since Knowledge is momentary, upon the apprehension of fear there would be the cognition of multiple fears.
- 4.21. Continuation of the topic concerning the use of inference in regard to avidyā.
- 4.22. Verse no. XX.
- 4.23. The material cause of the false world can only be false.
- 4.24. Discussion of the objection: only what is perceived is the object of cognition, error and sublation.
- 4.25. The apprehension of the indeterminable (anirvacanīyakhyaṭi).
- 4.26. There is no appearance of one thing in another manner.
- 4.27. Criticism of Rāmānuja's mode of refuting the Advaitin.
- 4.28. Reply to the objection: why does a thing having an indeterminable reality become an object of the idea and the word "silver" and not something else?
- 4.29. Criticism of the apprehension of the real (satkhyāṭi).
- 4.30. Continuation of the topic.
- 4.31. Continuation of the topic.
- 4.32. Criticism of Rāmānuja's view that in dream the Lord creates the dream objects for each soul.
- 4.33. Continuation of the topic centred upon the discussion of the sūtra: "But [the dream creation] is mere māyā..." (B.S.3.2.3.).
- 4.34. Further criticism of satkhyāṭi.
- 4.35. Criticism of satkhyāṭi through a discussion of the examples of the crystal and the China rose and the yellow conch-shell.

- 4.36. Discussion of the examples of the circle caused by the turning of a fire-brand and the appearance of a face in a mirror.
- 4.37. Discussion of the example of the confusion of direction.
- 4.38. Rāmānuja's explanation concerning the sight of a double moon.
- 4.39. Criticism of Rāmānuja's explanation.
- 4.40. The relation of negated and negating.
- 4.41. Verse no. XXI.
- 4.42. The text: "enveloped by the untrue (anṛta)" (Ch.8.3.2.) is a means of proof about avidyā being positive in nature.
- 4.43. The meaning of the word "ṛta" in Kaṭha.1.3.1.
- 4.44. Continuation of the topic.
- 4.45. The nāsadāsīya hymn (Tai.Brā.2.8.9.3,4.) is a means of proof about avidyā whose nature is indeterminable as real or unreal.
- 4.46. Criticism of Rāmānuja's explanation of the nāsadāsīya hymn.
- 4.47. Continuation of the topic, with reference to Rāmānuja's use of the words "sat" and "tyat" (Tai.2.6.1.).
- 4.48. Sāyaṇācārya's commentary upon the nāsadāsīya hymn.
- 4.49. Continuation of Sāyaṇa's commentary.
- 4.50. The meaning of the word "māyā".
- 4.51. The nature of māyā as described in the Devīpurāṇa, Pañcadaśī and the Viṣṇupurāṇa.
- 4.52. Explanation of the texts cited in the Śrī.B. with reference to māyā.
- 4.53. The text: "you are That" (Ch.6.8.7.) is a means of proof about an indeterminable avidyā.
Question: does the word "you" refer to Brahman (a) as qualified by the individual soul, or (b) as an attribute of the soul?
Criticism of the first view.
- 4.54. Criticism of the second view.
- 4.55. Criticism of Rāmānuja's view that all words finally denote the supreme Self.
- 4.56. Continuation of the topic.
- 4.57. Quotations from the Vāyupurāṇa and the Devīgītā.
- 4.58. The Viṣ.P. text: "The stars are Viṣṇu...what exists and what does not exist" (Viṣ.P.2.12.38.).

- 4.59. Reply to the objection; identity statements such as "The stars are Viṣṇu" refer to the relation of body and the one embodied (śarīrasarīribhāva).
- 4.60. Further criticism of the concept of śarīrasarīrin.
Interpretation of words such as "body" occurring in the Viṣ.P.
- 4.61. Explanation of the words; "...what exists and what does not exist" (Viṣ.P.2.12.38.).
- 4.62. Criticism of Rāmānuja's interpretation of the words; "what exists", "what does not exist".
- 4.63. Explanation of the Viṣ.P. verse: "Because the Lord is of the nature of Knowledge" (Viṣ.P.2.12.39.).
- 4.64. Criticism of Rāmānuja's interpretation of the above verse.
- 4.65. Rāmānuja's interpretation of the Viṣ.P. verse: "But when Knowledge is pure..." (Viṣ.P.2.12.40.) and the critique of that interpretation.
- 4.66. Continuation of the topic.
- 4.67. Viṣ.P.2.12.41 and 42.
- 4.68. Interpretation of the Viṣ.P. verse: "Therefore...other than Knowledge there is no collection of objects whatsoever..." (Viṣ.P.2.12.43.) and the criticism of Rāmānuja's interpretation.
- 4.69. Interpretation of the Viṣ.P. verses: "Knowledge is completely pure..." (Viṣ.P.2.12.44.) and "I have thus told you what is reality..." (Viṣ.P.2.12.45.).
- 4.70. Criticism of Rāmānuja's interpretation of these verses on the grounds that he has connected the subject of some verses with the predicate of others.
- 4.71. Criticism of Rāmānuja's statement that these verses do not denote Brahman as free from distinction, or māyā, or a world superimposed by māyā.
- 4.72. Further criticism of Rāmānuja's interpretation of these verses.
- 4.73. Reply to the sixth objection concerning an agent for the cessation of avidyā.
- 4.74. Verse no. XXII.
- 4.75. Reply to the seventh objection concerning the cessation of avidyā.
- 4.76. Viṣ.P.2.6.47 and 48, with the commentary of Śrīdharasvāmin.
- 4.77. The subject-object distinction occurring in the text: "...the Self should indeed be seen" (Bṛh.2.4.5.) must pertain to a limiting adjunct because non-difference is explicitly taught by the text: "you are That" (Ch.6.8.7.).

- 4.78. The nature of avidyā.
- 4.79. Illustration with reference to the above explanation.
- 4.80. Avidyā is immediately dispelled by knowledge.
- 4.81. Brief concluding statement.

विज्ञप्तिः ।

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परमकारुणिको भगवान्परमेश्वरः स्वस्वकर्मानुगुण्येन सुखदुःखभाजः संसाराम्बुधौ निमग्नाञ्जनानुद्दिधीर्षुरनेका विद्याः प्रवर्तयामास । ईशानः सर्वविद्यानामिति श्रुतेः । विद्यासु च प्रतिविद्यं प्रतिपाद्यविषयभेदेन यद्यप्यापाततः कासुचिद्विरोधो भासते तथाऽप्यधिकारिभेदेन स निवारणीयः । तथा च तत्तद्विद्यास्तुतिस्तत्तदधिकारिप्रवृत्तये । कस्याश्चित्कचिद्दृश्यमाना निन्दाऽपि च तदनधिकारिणस्तत्राप्रवृत्तये । नैतावता कस्या अपि विद्याया अप्रामाण्यमाशङ्कनीयम् । नास्त्यकृतः कृतेनेति कर्मनिन्दाया अप्येतदेव तात्पर्यम् । अत एव निन्दितमपि कर्म कुरु कर्मैव तस्मात्स्वमित्येवमर्जुनाय तस्याधिकारमालक्ष्य भगवतोपदिश्यते । अधिकारी चानुभूततत्पूर्वावस्थः । यथा कृतचौलसंस्कार उपनयनेऽधिकारी । अनधिकारी च द्विविधः—अननुभूततत्पूर्वावस्थः, अनुभूततदवस्थश्च । यथाऽकृतचौलः कृतोपनयनश्चोपनयनेऽनधिकारी । तत्र द्वितीयमनधिकारिणं प्रति पुनस्तत्राप्रवृत्तये विशेषतो निन्दोपयुज्यते ।

Introductory Communication

The supremely compassionate Lord, desirous of saving the people immersed in the ocean of worldly existence experiencing pleasures and sorrows in accordance with their own individual actions, set forth various knowledges. For there is the sacred text: "the Lord of all knowledges". In regard to those knowledges, each particular knowledge is on account of the difference of the subject matter to be taught. Although at first glance a contradiction appears to exist among some, nevertheless that can be removed because there is a difference among those who are qualified [for each knowledge]. And so the praise of a particular knowledge is for the engagement of the respective person who is qualified. Even the condemnation seen somewhere about a certain [knowledge] is for the non-engagement there of a person who is not qualified for that [particular knowledge]. Just because of this [condemnation] it should not be suspected that a particular knowledge has no validity. This alone is the purport of even the condemnation of action: "what is uncreated is not [gained] through an action". For this very reason, even though

action has been condemned, the Lord taught it to Arjuna having observed his qualification: "therefore you must certainly perform action".

A qualified person is one who has experienced the condition prior to that. For example, a person qualified for investiture with the sacred thread is one who has undergone the purificatory rite of tonsure. A person who is not qualified is of two types: one who has not experienced the condition prior to that and one who has experienced that condition [i.e. the end result itself]. For example, a person who is not qualified for investiture with the sacred thread is one who has not undergone tonsure or one whose investiture with the sacred thread has already been done. With regard to the second person who is not qualified there, the condemnation is specifically employed for the non-engagement there once again.

विद्याश्च यद्यपि 'अङ्गानि वेदाश्चत्वारो
मीमांसा न्यायविस्तरः । धर्मशास्त्रं पुराणं च विद्या ह्येताश्चतुर्दश' इति विष्णु-
पुराणे चतुर्दश प्रतिपादितास्तथाऽपि मुख्यतो द्वैविध्यमेव दृश्यते । द्वे विद्ये वेदि-
तव्ये परा चैवापरा चेति श्रुतेः । तत्र ऋग्वेदो यजुर्वेद इत्यादिनाऽपरां प्रदर्श्य
'अथ परा यया तदक्षरमधिगम्यते.' इति परा विद्या प्रदर्शिता । परविद्याप्रा-
प्त्यस्त्यं च परशब्देनैव सूच्यते । इयं परविद्यैव ब्रह्मप्राप्तिरूपपरमपुरुषार्थसाधन-
त्वादितराभ्यः प्रशस्ततरा । मुण्डकोपनिषदि चाथ परेत्युपक्रम्य परविद्यास्वरूप-
प्रदर्शनात्प्रागेव यया तदक्षरमधिगम्यत इत्यादिना ब्रह्मप्राप्तिरूपं फलं प्रतिपादि-
तम् । यतो विदितफलमहत्त्वस्य स्वरूपालोचने सविशेषं प्रवृत्तिर्भवेदिति ।

Although the knowledges have been taught as fourteen in the

Viṣṇupurāṇa :

Indeed, these knowledges are fourteen: the [six]
limbs [of the Veda], the four Vedas, the mīmāṃsā
[divided into two] which is an elaborate system,
the treatises concerning dharma and the Purāṇas
still, only a twofold grouping is primarily seen. For there is the sacred
text: "there are two knowledges which should be known, the higher and the
lower". Having shown there the lower [knowledge] by: "the Ṛg-Veda, Yajur-

Veda" etc., the higher knowledge is shown: "Then there is the higher [knowledge], by which that Imperishable is attained". The pre-eminence of the higher knowledge is indicated just by the word "higher" (para). This higher knowledge is certainly more esteemed than the others because it is the means for the highest human goal which is the attainment of Brahman. In the Mundakopaniṣad, having commenced with: "Then there is the higher", the result -which is the attainment of Brahman- is taught by: "...by which that Imperishable is attained" etc. certainly prior to showing the nature of the higher knowledge. Because there would especially be an engagement towards seeing the nature of something when the greatness of the result is already known.

माता-

पितृसहस्रेभ्योऽप्यधिकवात्सल्येनेयं श्रुतिः परविद्यायां जनान्प्ररोचयति तत्रैति-
 कर्तव्यता च कीदृशीत्याकाङ्क्षायां श्रीशंकराचार्या आहुः—ब्रह्म वेद ब्रह्मैव
 भवतीत्यादिश्रुतयो ब्रह्मविद्यान्तरं सद्य एव मोक्षं दर्शयन्त्यो मध्ये कार्यान्तरं
 वारयन्तीति । रामानुजाचार्यास्तु ज्ञानोत्तरमुपासनायाः कर्तव्यतां ब्रुवते । अन-
 योर्दर्शनयोर्मुख्यं वैलक्षण्यं चैकत्र मायावादाश्रयणमपरत्र तदनङ्गीकारः । अत्र
 च कतरद्ग्राह्यं कतरन्नेति संदिहानो यावत्तत्त्वबुभुत्सुरभूवं तावदेव पुरः स्फुरन्त्या
 मोक्षप्राप्तये च कर्तव्यलेशस्यापि नावसर इति प्रदर्शयन्त्या नास्त्यकृतः कृतेनेति
 श्रुत्यैव संवोधितो यत्प्रपञ्चस्य परमार्थत्वे तन्निवृत्तये किञ्चित्कर्तव्यमवश्यमापतितं
 भवेदतस्तस्यापारमार्थ्यमेवेति । तच्च मायावादमन्तरेण दुर्वचमिति मायावादस्यैव
 ज्यायस्त्वं श्रुत्यभिप्रेतमाकलयतः कथमयं लोकानां भ्रमो दूरी भवेदिति चिन्तया
 च पुरस्कृतस्य मे मानसमद्वैतामोदग्रथने प्रावर्तत । मतेस्तीक्ष्णतरतावैकल्येन च
 किञ्चित्परावृत्तमप्यन्तरुद्वयया श्रीमच्छंकराचार्यचरणप्रेरणया पुनस्तसाहाधि-
 क्येन संप्रवृत्तमासीत् । त एवाऽऽचार्यचरणाः सद्गुरुकृपा चात्र साहाय्यकं दास्य-
 न्तीति श्रद्धां वदूध्वाऽस्मिन्कर्मणि कृतपदविन्यासं दुस्तराम्बुधावन्तराऽन्तरा निम-
 ज्जदपि श्रद्धातरणिसमारूढं कथं कथमपि पारमगात् ।

This sacred text attracts people toward the higher knowledge with more affection than even thousands of parents. In the expectation: "and what is the mode of procedure there?", Śrī Śaṅkarācārya says sacred texts such as: "the one who knows Brahman becomes Brahman indeed", which show that liberation is at that very instant following the knowledge of Brahman,

remove [the notion] that something else must be done in between [the knowledge of Brahman and the gain of liberation]. But Rāmānujācārya says that devotional meditation has to be performed after knowledge.

The primary difference between these two teachings is the acceptance of the teaching of māyā on the one side and, on the other, the non-acceptance of it. And in this matter, being uncertain as to which of the two should be accepted and which of the two should not, as soon as I was desirous of knowing the truth, at that very time I was instructed by the sacred text: "what is uncreated is not [gained] through an action" flashing before the eyes and revealing that: to attain liberation there is no scope for even a trace of something to be done. For if the manifest world is absolutely real, something would have to necessarily be done in order to bring about its cessation. Therefore that [world] is certainly without absolute reality. And that is difficult to be stated without the teaching of māyā. Thus the mind of myself -who was considering that the intended meaning of the sacred texts is that the teaching of māyā alone is superior and who was accompanied by the thought: "how can this error of the people be removed?"- engaged in writing Advaitāmoda.

Although the mind turned back a little due to its deficiency in being very sharp, it proceeded again with an abundance of enthusiasm due to the urging of the venerable Śrī Śaṅkarācārya which was awakened within it [the mind]. Having become bound to the faith that the very feet of the teacher [Śaṅkara] and the grace of a true preceptor will provide the assistance here, [the mind] placed his feet in this work and even though sinking now and then into an ocean difficult to cross, it somehow or other reached the further shore mounted upon the raft of faith.

यैश्चाऽऽचार्यचरणैरेतत्कार्यं
संपादितं त एव चात्र प्रेक्षावत्प्रवृत्तिं संपादयन्तु । यथा यथा चाद्वैतिनां दर्शन-
मनूय तत्खण्डने प्रयत्नः श्रीभाष्यकृतां दृश्यते तथा तथा तदनुसारेणैव तदुद्धा-

रार्थोऽयं मदीयो यत्न इत्येकस्यैव विषयस्य पुनः पुनर्विवेचनं क्वचित्कर्तव्यता-
मापातितम् । अतः पुनरुत्तयादिदोषदूषितेक्षणैः प्रेक्षावद्भिर्न भवितव्यम् । अमुमा-
मोदमाजिघ्रद्भिश्चाभिनिवेशवशीकृतस्वान्तैर्न भवितव्यम् । दोषाश्च मानुषसुलभा
एवेत्यत्र ये केचित्स्युस्तेषूदासीना अपि गुणैकप्रेमशीलाः सहृदया दोषान्प्रदर्शय-
न्त्वित्याशासे-

पुण्यपत्तनै-
श्रावणकृष्णद्वितीयायां
मन्दवासरे शके १८४०

}

अभ्यंकरोपाह्वासुदेवशास्त्री

This work was accomplished due to the feet of the teacher [Śaṅkara] and they alone can bring about the engagement of the learned people here. In whatever manner the author of the Śrībhāṣya, having restated the view of the Advaitin, is seen to make an effort in refuting that, in that manner, my own effort -which has the removal of that [refutation] as its object- is only in accordance with that [refutation]. Hence it has happened that a repeated investigation of the very same subject has to be done at some places. For this reason, the learned people must not regard it as affected by the defect of repetition etc. And those whose minds are controlled by clinging [to a certain view] cannot smell that fragrance. My wish is that among those [who say]: "faults are certainly easily acquired by a human being", some critics who are disposed to love only good qualities, though they are impartial, will point out the faults.

Vāsudevaśāstrī Abhyankar
Pune, 1840.
(1918. Christian era.)

1.1.

इह खलु जगति प्राणिभिर्मुख्यत्वेन पुरुषार्थप्राप्तय एव प्रयतितव्यम् । यद्यपि धर्मार्थकाममोक्षरूपेण पुरुषार्थाश्चत्वारस्तथाऽपि तेषु मोक्ष एव परमपुरुषार्थः । नेतरे । तेषामनित्यत्वात् । अर्थकामयोरनित्यत्वं मोक्षस्य नित्यत्वम् प्रत्यक्षेणैवावगम्यते । धर्मोऽप्येवम् । तद्यथेह कर्म-चित्तो लोकः क्षीयत एवमेवामुत्र पुण्यचित्तो लोकः क्षीयते (छा० ८ । १ । ६) इति श्रुतेः । मोक्षस्तु न तथा । न स पुनरावर्तते (छा० ८ । १५ । १) इति श्रुत्या तस्य नित्यत्वावगमात् । भगवद्गीतायामपि “ मामुपेत्य तु कौन्तेय पुनर्जन्म न विद्यते ” (गी० ८ । १६) इति ।

1.1. Indeed here in the world, people should primarily endeavour only to obtain the goals of mankind. Although the human goals are fourfold, consisting of religious and social values (dharma), worldly prosperity (artha), satisfaction of legitimate desires (kāma) and liberation (mokṣa), nevertheless, among those, liberation alone is the ultimate human goal. The other are not, because they do not last. The transience of worldly prosperity and of the satisfaction of desires is understood just by direct perception. [The result gained from] religious and social values is also in the same manner, for there is the sacred text:

Just as here, the world which is acquired by action perishes, in just the same way the other world which is acquired by merit perishes (Ch. 8.1.6.).

However, liberation is not like that, for it is understood to be eternal on account of the sacred text: "he does not return again" (Ch. 8.15.1.). In the Bhagavadgītā also [liberation is understood to be eternal]: "but having reached Me, O Kaunteya, there is no further birth" (G. 8.16.).

comment

The introduction to Advaitāmōḍa is based upon that of the Vedāntaparibhāṣā.

1.2.

प्रत्यक्षागोचरविषये च वेद एव प्रमाणम् । तत्र च ब्राह्मणग्रन्थे यज्ञादि-
कर्मणां विस्तरेण प्रतिपादनादीदृशी लोकानां मतिः
उपनिषदुद्देशः स्याद्यत् “ यज्ञादि कर्म कृत्वा स्वर्गादिफलसंपा-

दनमेव मुख्यः पुरुषार्थः" इति । तन्निरासाय
श्रुतानुपनिषदामभिव्यक्तिः । उपनिषत्सु च लोकानां ब्रह्मज्ञानाय यथाशक्ति
विधिमुखेन निषेधमुखेन चेति प्रकारद्वयेन ब्रह्म वर्णितम् ।

1.2 In matters which are not within the scope of sense perception the Veda alone is the means of knowledge. And there [in the Veda], because of the elaborate teaching of ritual actions such as sacrifice in the Brāhmaṇa section, the understanding of the people would be like this: "having performed ritual action such as sacrifice, obtaining the result such as heaven is alone the primary human goal". The manifestation of the Upaniṣads in the sacred text is for the removal of that [false belief]. In the Upaniṣads, Brahman is revealed by a twofold method according to the capacity of people for the knowledge of Brahman: by means of positive statements and by means of negative statements.

comment

The scope of the Veda is delineated to be the revelation of what cannot be ascertained through the operation of an ordinary means of knowledge (pramāṇa). Perception and such perceptually based means of knowledge as inference require the relationship between sense data and the respective sense organ. According to the orthodox (āstika) view metaphysical truth falls outside this relation:

for this entity [i.e. Brahman] is not an object of perception since it is without form etc. And since it has no inferential mark etc., it is not an object of inference, etc. But like dharma, this entity can only be attained through the scriptures [i.e. the Veda] alone.¹

Thus there are two orders of knowledge: concerning ordinary relations (vyāvahārika) and metaphysical truth (pāramārthika) and two corresponding levels of pramāṇa.² The Veda is solely a means of knowledge for "matters which are not within the scope of sense perception".³

The Advaita analysis of the Veda distinguishes sharply between the karmakāṇḍa such as the brāhmaṇa portion dealing with ritual observances and the jñānakāṇḍa, specially the Upaniṣads, which reveal the nature of reality, Brahman. In his introduction to the Rg Veda, Śāyana specifies that:

dharmā and Brahman are, respectively, the subject matter of the prior and later portions in the Veda... the knowledge of them both is directly the purpose of the Veda.⁴

To the Advaitin both portions of the Veda are a valid pramāṇa. They differ, however, in that the karmakāṇḍa is within the world of "becoming" (saṃsāra) while the jñānakāṇḍa teaches the liberating knowledge of Brahman. Śāṅkara held the view that:

it is reasonable that just as [the scripture] teaches the true means such as the agnihotra sacrifice for a person desirous of heaven etc., so too it teaches the Self in its real nature to the person desiring liberation (through texts like) "That is the Self. You are That, O Śvetaketu."⁵

The perceptually based means of knowledge and Vedic revelation each relate to a separate domain and as a consequence it is held that they do not conflict.⁶ They do, however, appear to come into contradiction because Advaitins consider that the śruti reveals the falsity of perceptual plurality:

there is no diversity whatsoever here [in Brahman].
He who sees diversity here, as it were, goes from death to death.

The Advaitins then argue that Vedic testimony possesses greater validity than perceptual experience.⁸ The śruti does not negate the cognition of duality (dvaitapratīti) but it sublates (bādha) by knowledge the assumption of reality which is based upon that cognition. The position of the Advaitins is that the perceptually based means of knowledge are, and continue to remain, valid within their own sphere of operation though that sphere is sublated by knowledge from Vedic revelation:

the mere validity pertaining to ordinary relations is not negated by the scripture dealing with non-duality, but their validity as pertaining to reality is negated.⁹

Abhyankar mentions a "twofold method" of the Upaniṣads: the use of positive statements (vidhi) and the use of negative statements (niśedha). By the word vidhi, the author refers to various forms of meditation (upāsana) prescribed in the sacred texts and passages which present Brahman as possessing attributes. The subsequent negation of the ultimacy of upāsana and attributive statements is niśedha.¹⁰ Śāṅkara considered that in the Upaniṣads:

Brahman is understood to have two aspects - qualified by the limiting adjuncts which are different modifications of name and form and, contrary to that, being free from all limiting adjuncts ... There are texts by the thousand showing that Brahman has two aspects according to the difference between the sphere of knowledge and ignorance.¹¹

Advaitins see in the śruti a deliberate method of revealing Brahman, taking into account the different degrees of understanding on the part of the student. Śaṅkara and Maṇḍana both refer to this method (adhyāropāpavādābhyām niṣprāpañcam prapañcate, i.e. "[Brahman] free from the manifest world is explained by means of superimposition and negation")¹² which is the false ascription of attributes (avastvāropah) upon Brahman (vastuni)¹³ followed by the negation (apavāda) of those attributes to reveal Brahman as free from all duality. This method can be illustrated by the arundhatīpradarśananyāya¹⁴ which describes how the tiny star known as Arundhatī is indicated by firstly pointing out larger, nearby stars as Arundhatī and then successively negating them until the eye is able to apprehend the more subtle form of the real Arundhatī. In his commentary towards the end of the Bṛhadāraṇyaka, Śaṅkara makes a significant statement concerning the application of the method of adhyāropāpavāda. While explaining the sentence: "Brahman is indeed free from fear. The one who knows in this manner certainly becomes Brahman free from fear", he states:

The one who knows the Self described above to be Brahman which is free from fear, he certainly becomes Brahman free from fear. What has been told is the compressed meaning of the whole Upaniṣad. For the correct understanding of this very meaning, the idea of origination, maintenance, dissolution, etc., and the superimposition of action, its factors and results have been brought about on the Self. And again, in the negation of those, by means of the elimination of the superimposed distinctions [by the process of] "not this, not this", the truth is communicated.¹⁵

1.3.

श्रुतिश्चात्यन्तं दुरवबोधा यतः श्रुतिवाक्यं संक्षिप्तं संगतिप्रदर्शकवाक्यैः प्रायो विरहितं च । भाषा चातिपुरातनी । लोकाश्चोत्तरोत्तरं मन्दबुद्धयः । श्रुतिप्रदर्शिते मार्गे श्रद्धालूनां विश्वासेन प्रवृत्तावप्यन्येषां लोकानां ज्ञानमार्गे कर्ममार्गे च प्रवृत्तिः शिथिला समजनि । अमुष्मिन्नवसरे नास्तिकाः प्रादुरभूवन् । ततो वेदार्थज्ञानाय ऋषयस्तपश्चेरुः । तपःप्रभावाच्च लब्धसामर्थ्या ऋषय एन्द्रादीनि व्याकरणानि निरुक्तं प्रातिशाख्यानि च प्रणिन्युः । कियता कालेन च तथैव पाणिनिनाऽष्टाध्यायी प्रणीता । तथा पदार्थज्ञानं समजनि । यतस्तस्यां शब्दानां प्रकृति-

प्रत्ययविभाग उपदर्शितः । जैमिनिना च द्वादशाध्यायी प्रणीता । तया वाक्यार्थज्ञानं समजनि । यतस्तस्यां वाक्यार्थयोजनोपयोगिनोऽनेके न्यायाः संगृहीताः । पदार्थवेत्ता वैयाकरणः । वाक्यार्थवेत्ता मीमांसकः । ततो लोकानां

वेदार्थज्ञाने जाते सति कर्मस्वादरेण प्रवृत्तिरासीत् ।

मीमांसकमतोत्पत्तिः उत्तरोत्तरं च परां काष्ठां गता । यया च “ उप-
निषद्भागोऽयं न श्रुतिशिरोभूतः । किंतु जीवात्म-

नोऽविनाशित्वप्रतिपादनेन स्वर्गादिपारलौकिके सुखे विश्वासोत्पादनद्वारा यज्ञादि-
कर्मकाण्डस्यैवोपोद्बलकस्तदङ्गभूतः ” इत्येवं लोकानां मत्तिरासीत् । उपनिषत्प्रद-
र्शितो मोक्षमार्गश्च कण्टकानुविद्ध इव लोकानामगन्त्योऽभूत् । नास्तिका इव वेदा-
न्तिनोऽपि मीमांसकतीक्ष्णकटाक्षैकलक्ष्या अभूवन् । तदुक्तम्—

मीमांसका हि वाक्यार्थविचारे प्रस्तुते सति ।

लोकदृष्टीः प्रतिघ्नन्ति वचनव्यक्तिपांसुभिः ॥ इति ॥

अमुष्मिन्नवसर उपनिषदनभिव्यक्तिकाल इव पुनरपि “ यज्ञादिकर्म कृत्वा
स्वर्गादिफलसंपादनमेव मुख्यः पुरुषार्थः ” इत्येवं लोकानां प्रत्ययो दृढः संजज्ञे ।

1.3. The sacred texts are exceedingly difficult to understand because the sentence of the sacred text is concise and it is generally bereft of sentences supplying a connection. And the language is very ancient. And people are successively of mediocre intelligence. Even though the faithful were confidently engaged upon the path shown by the sacred texts, among other people there was a slackening in enthusiasm for the path of knowledge and the path of action. At that juncture, disbelievers appeared. Then the sages performed austerities to know the meaning of the Veda. Because of the strength of their austerities the sages gained the capacity [to comprehend the meaning] and they composed grammatical treatises beginning with Aindra,¹⁶ etymology and the rules concerning phonetic changes.¹⁷ Later, in just the same way, Pāṇini composed the Aṣṭādhyāyī and because of that there arose the knowledge of the meaning of words, for the division of words into the stem (prakṛti) and the terminal affix (pratyaya) was shown in it. And Jaimini composed the Dvādaśādhyāyī¹⁸ and because of that there arose the knowledge of the meaning of a sentence, for many rules were contained in it which

were useful in determining the meaning of a sentence. A grammarian is one who knows the meaning of a word and a Mīmāṃsaka is one who knows the meaning of a sentence. Then, when the people gained the knowledge of the meaning of the Veda, there was an attentive engagement in the ritual actions. And successively [the engagement in ritual] occupied the supreme position. Accordingly, the thought of the people was in such a manner: "this Upaniṣad portion is not the pinnacle of the sacred texts. On the other hand, by teaching that the individual self has an imperishable nature and thus by means of generating faith in the other worldly happiness such as heaven, it only confirms the ritual portion dealing with sacrificial offerings etc. and so it is subsidiary to that." The path to liberation shown by the Upaniṣads became impassable to people, like it was full of thorns. Even the Vedāntins came to be looked upon with sharp glances of the Mīmāṃsakas as the disbelievers [were looked upon]. It has been told that:

when an inquiry into the meaning of sentences is begun, the Mīmāṃsakas thwart the understanding of the people as they impede the sight of the people with the dust in the form of deceptively clever statements.

At that juncture, it was as though a time of the non manifestation of the Upaniṣads and once again the firm opinion of the people was recognised as: "having performed ritual action such as sacrifice, obtaining the result such as heaven is alone the primary human goal."

1.4.

एतं लोकप्रत्ययं निराकुर्वन्मोक्षमार्गं च लोकानां प्रवृत्तिं जनयन्भगवान्वाद-
 रायणो ब्रह्मसूत्राणि प्रतिपाद्य । जैमिनिप्रतिपादिताश्च वाक्यार्थोपयोगिनो
 न्यायाः सर्वे वादरायणस्य संमता एव । उपनि-
 सूत्रकृद्देशः पञ्चागः कर्मकाण्डस्याङ्गभूत इत्येतावानंशः परं
 वादरायणस्यासंमतः । वादरायणश्च जैमिनिप्रति-
 पादितैरेव न्यायैरुपनिषदर्थं प्रतिपाद्य तस्य च श्रुतिशिरोभागत्वं प्रस्थाप्य मोक्ष-
 द्वारमप्रतिबन्धं चकार । उपनिषत्प्रदर्शितो मोक्षमार्गश्च निष्कण्टकः संजज्ञे ।

1.4. The revered Bādarāyaṇa, refuting this common opinion and engendering an enthusiasm on the part of the people for the path of liberation, composed the Brahmasūtras. All the logic, [i.e. syllogistic reasoning] taught by Jaimini which was useful [for understanding] the meaning of a sentence was certainly accepted by Bādarāyaṇa. But the part which comprised this much: the Upaniṣad portion is subsidiary to the ritual portion, was not accepted by Bādarāyaṇa. Having taught the meaning of the Upaniṣads only through the methods taught by Jaimini and having established that [the meaning of the Upaniṣads] to be the portion which is the pinnacle of the sacred texts, Bādarāyaṇa made the door to liberation free from obstruction. And the path to liberation shown by the Upaniṣads became free from thorns.

1.5.

एवं काले बहुतिथे गते पुनरपि विषमकाल उपस्थितः । अश्रद्धया लोकानां
मनः समाक्रान्तम् । ज्ञानमार्गिणः कर्ममार्गिणश्च नामशेषा अभूवन् । पूर्ववत्पु-
नर्नास्तिकाश्चार्वाकपदवाच्याः मादुर्वभूवुः । ते
नास्तिकोत्पत्तिः हीत्थमूचुः—“ न जीवो नाम देहादन्यः कश्चि-
दस्ति । न मोक्षः । न परलोकः । न श्रुतिः
प्रमाणम् । नेश्वरो नाम नियन्ता कश्चित् । स्वभावात् एवेदं जगदुत्पद्यते विली-
यते च ” इति ।

1.5. After a long time had passed in this way, once again a difficult time was at hand. The mind of the people was assailed by a lack of faith. Only the name remained of the followers of the path of knowledge and the path of ritual. Just as before, once again disbelievers, known as "materialists" (cārvāka), appeared. For they spoke in this manner: "there is no one known as an individual soul distinct from the body. There is no liberation. There is no other world. Revelation is no means of knowledge. There is no one known as the Lord who is the ruler. This world arises and perishes out of its own nature."

1.6.

चक्रगतिन्यायेन पुनरपि कालपरिवृत्तौ कर्ममार्गीयैस्तात्कालिकराजलब्ध-
साहायकैश्चार्वाकमतप्रचारोऽत्यन्तापकर्षं नीतः । मण्डनमिश्रप्रभृतयो मीमांस-
काग्रेसराश्च राजसंसादि लब्धोत्कर्षाः पण्डितमन्या-
मीमांसकमतप्रचारः स्तदानीं नास्तिकानिव ज्ञानमार्गीयानपि मूर्खानि-
वाकलयांचक्रुः । उपनिषदनभिव्यक्तिकाल इव
सूत्रप्रणयनात्प्राक्तने काल इव च सर्वत्र परिस्थितिर्दृष्टिगोचरतां ययौ ।

1.6. According to the maxim of the turning of the wheel, once again in the course of the revolution of time the prevalence of the materialist view was reduced to complete disgrace by the followers of the path of ritual with assistance obtained from the king of that time. Beginning with Maṇḍana Miśra, the leaders of the Mīmāṃsakas gained eminence in the assembly of the king and fancying themselves to be learned, they then regarded even the followers of the path of knowledge to be fools as they did the disbelievers [as fools]. Conditions were observable everywhere like at the time of the non-manifestation of the Upaniṣads and like at the time prior to the composition of the sūtra.

1.7.

अस्मिन्नवसरे लोकानुद्धिधीर्पुर्भगवान् श्रीशंकरः शंकराचार्यरूपेणावतीर्य
ब्रह्मसूत्रव्याख्यारूपं शारीरभाष्यं विरच्य सूत्र-
श्रीमच्छंकराचार्याव- कारवत्पुनरपि मोक्षद्वारमप्रतिबन्धं चकार । वेदा-
तारः न्तशास्त्रपुनरुज्जीवनायैवायं श्रीशंकराचार्यावतारः ।

1.7. At this juncture, Lord Śiva, desirous of saving the people, descended in the form of Śaṅkarācārya and having composed the Śārīrabhāṣya in the form of an exposition of the Brahmasūtra, like the author of the sūtras (Bādarāyaṇa) he made the door to liberation once more free from obstruction. This incarnation as Śri Śaṅkarācārya was solely for reviving once again the Vedānta scriptures.

comment

Abhyankar follows traditional hagiography in portraying Śaṅkara to be an incarnation of the god Śiva.¹⁹

1.8.

श्रीशंकरजगत्पूज्यपादा नित्यं जयन्ति ते ।
ये प्रस्थानत्रये भाष्यं मायावादेन तेनिरे ॥ १ ॥

1.8. Śrī Śaṅkara, whose feet are worthy of veneration throughout the world, composed a commentary on the basis of the teaching of māyā upon the Upaniṣads, the Bhagavadgīta and the Brahmasūtras. He is ever pre-eminent. 1.

1.9.

अथ सुखबोधाय शंकरदर्शनं लिख्यते ।
नित्यं सर्वगुणावधूननपरा नैर्गुण्यवादाः श्रुतौ
गौणार्थाः सगुणोक्तयः शुभगुणारोपात्परे ब्रह्मणि ॥
अद्वैतश्रुतयः सदर्थविषया भेदोक्तिरौपाधिकी
तत्सर्वश्रुतिसंगतं विजयते श्रीशंकरं दर्शनम् ॥ २ ॥

1.9. Now, the teaching which has come from Śaṅkara is being portrayed for easy understanding.

In the sacred texts, the statements of freedom from qualities always aim at discarding all qualities. Expressions of the possession of qualities have a figurative meaning because of the superimposition of auspicious qualities on the supreme Brahman. The sacred texts [teaching] non-duality refer to what is the fact. An expression of difference relates to limiting adjuncts. Therefore the teaching which has come from Śrī Śaṅkara, being in harmony with all the sacred texts, is supreme. 2.

comment

The validity of the Vedas as a means of knowledge is contingent upon the pre-supposition of the internal consistency of their teaching. Yet there are passages which describe Brahman as possessing qualities (saguna), while passages also denote Brahman to be free from qualities (nirguna). Some passages portray Brahman as "other" while some teach that there is "nothing other". If Vedāntins are unable to explain these contradictions the status of the Vedas as a pramāna cannot be upheld. Vedāntins, however, refuse to admit inherent contradiction in the Vedic texts and expend immense exegetical effort in demonstrating the mutual concord (samanvaya) of all passages.²⁰

Śaṅkara recognises a seeming contradiction in the texts and he argues that a solution cannot be found by granting saguna and nirguna statements equal status:

the supreme Brahman cannot logically have, of itself, both characteristics. Because one and the same thing cannot be ascertained as naturally possessed of qualification such as form and as the opposite of that on account of the contradiction.²¹

Therefore an order of primary (mukhyārtha) and secondary, figurative (gaunārtha) texts must be determined:

when there is a contradiction, this is the principle for a decision between the two alternatives: those that have that [formless Brahman] as their object are more authoritative than those which do not have that [formless Brahman] as their object.²²

According to Śaṅkara, the purport of the Upaniṣads is contained in those statements which denote Brahman to be free from quality and non-dual. However contrary passages which teach the possession of qualities or the distinction between Brahman and the soul are not without meaning, since:

it is not correct to admit some sentences of the Veda as having meaning and some as meaningless, because the status of a means of knowledge is common.²³

Rather, the passages which present Brahman as saguna are with reference to a limiting adjunct (upādhi)²⁴; they are for the purpose of worship and meditation (upāsana)²⁵ and are subsequently negated by the texts teaching non-duality.²⁶

If the question is raised as to why nirguna statements such as "not this, not this" (neti neti)²⁷ are more authoritative than saguna passages, Śaṅkara answers that the nirguna statements negate the saguna passages.²⁸ In order for there to be negation, a relationship of prior (pūrva) and posterior (apara) must exist between the two types of texts. A negative statement such as "neti neti" pre-supposes the presence of its counter correlate, in this case the saguna statement, and then only it is able to negate. The nirguna statement is more authoritative precisely because it is logically subsequent to the saguna passages.²⁹ Śaṅkara maintains that texts denoting difference (bheda) and qualities can be interpreted as a preparation for teaching the ultimate truth whereas the nirguna texts do not lend themselves to another meaning.³⁰ Moreover Śaṅkara considers that the texts which reveal unity convey a knowledge which is complete in itself (nirākāṅkṣa) but saguna and bheda statements do not have the capacity to put an end to further seeking.³¹

1.10.

प्रत्यक्षादिप्रमाणेषु शब्द एव तावदादौ ब्रह्म बोधयितुं मुख्यतः प्रभवति । ततः पश्चात्तदनुसारेण प्रमाणान्तराण्यपि तद्बोधयितुं प्रवर्तन्ते । शब्दश्च 'सदेव सोम्येदमग्र आसीदेकमेवाद्वितीयम्' (छा० ६ । २ । १) इत्यादिः परमात्मरूपमेकमेव तत्त्वमिति स्पष्टमेवाभिधत्ते । सच परमात्मा दृशिरूपः । यद्यपि द्रष्टा दृश्यं दृशिश्चेति पदार्थत्रितयमावालवृद्धमसंदिग्धं सर्वैरप्यनुभूयते तथाऽपि दृश्याश्रयीभूतो द्रष्टा दृशिविषयीभूतं दृश्यमिति तयोर्द्रष्टृदृश्ययोर्दृशिसापेक्षत्वेन तत्स्वरूपस्य दृशिनिरूपणाधीननिरूपणत्वाद्दृशिरेव वस्तुतस्त-
आत्मरूपमेकमेव तत्त्वम् च । द्रष्टृदृश्ययोस्तु कल्पितत्वमेव । दृशिर्ज्ञानम् । सा च दृशिर्द्रिधा निरुपाधिका सोपाधिका च । तत्र निरुपाधिका दृशिर्निराश्रयं निर्विषयं सन्मात्ररूपं ज्ञानम् । सा च निरुपाधिका दृशिः स्वरूपलाभे न किमप्यपेक्षते । इयमेव ब्रह्मशब्देन परमात्मशब्देन चाभिधीयते । साश्रयं सविषयं यत्कौकिकं प्रमाणादिजन्यं ज्ञानं तद्रूपा सोपाधिका दृशिश्चाश्रयविषयसापेक्षेति द्रष्टृदृश्यवत्कल्पितैव । तथाच कल्पितानामखिलवस्तूनामाश्रयीभूतं कल्पनाधिष्ठानभूतमत एव सर्वजगन्मूलभूतं ब्रह्म । यतो वा इमानि भूतानि जायन्ते (तै० ३ । १ । १) इति श्रुतौ जन्माद्यस्य यतः (ब्रह्मसू० १ । १ । २) इति सूत्रे च सर्वजगन्मूलकारणं ब्रह्मेति ब्रह्मलक्षणं प्रतिपाद्यते ।

1.10 Among the means of knowledge beginning with perception, verbal testimony is primarily able to reveal Brahman. Then subsequently, in conformity with that [verbal testimony] the other means of knowledge also begin to reveal that [Brahman]. Verbal testimony such as: "My dear, this was existence alone in the beginning, one alone, non-dual" (Ch. 6.2.1.) very clearly states that reality is one alone and is of the nature of the Supreme Self.

That Supreme Self is of the nature of "Seeing". Although a three-fold category of seer, seen and Seeing is undoubtedly experienced by everyone from young to old, still, the seer is the locus of Seeing and the seen is the object of Seeing. So because both of these, the seer and the seen are with regard to Seeing then the ascertainment of their essential nature is dependent upon the ascertainment of Seeing. Seeing alone is, in actual fact, reality. The seer and the seen, however, are certainly superimposed (kalpita). Seeing is Knowledge. That Seeing is of two types: without reference to limiting adjuncts and with reference to limiting adjuncts. The Seeing without reference to limiting adjuncts is Knowledge which is of the nature of pure existence, without locus or object. That Seeing which is without reference to limiting adjuncts does not depend upon anything in regard to the obtaining of its own nature. This [Seeing] is indeed what is expressed by the word Brahman and by the word supreme Self. The seeing which has reference to limiting adjuncts is with regard to a locus and an object and it is in the form of knowledge which is produced by the ordinary means of knowledge etc., which have a locus and an object. So it is certainly superimposed like the seer and seen.

And so, as the locus of all superimposed things is the substratum of the superimposition, Brahman is therefore the root [cause] of the whole world. The definition of Brahman as: Brahman is the root cause

of the whole world, is taught in the sacred text: "from which, indeed, these beings are born" (Tai.3.1.1.) and in the sūtra: "The birth etc. of this [world] is from which" (B.S.1.1.2.).

comment

Śaṅkara's position on the relation between reasoning and verbal testimony is unambiguous. He considers that reason is unable, by itself, to reach finality on issues of metaphysics:

because reasoning which is independent of the Vedas depends merely upon the conjecture of people and lacks conclusiveness, for conjecture has no limit.³²

Reasoning should be in accord with what is ascertained to be the conclusive teaching of the scriptures and in this role it serves as "a subsidiary means"³³ to realization. Although the position of reason is solely supportive, its utility should not be disregarded. The Veda employs "argumentation and demonstration among its own modes of expression and communication."³⁴ Reasoning is used to expose fallacious argument and to ascertain the purport of scriptural passages.³⁵

Importantly, Advaitins rely on methods of reasoning such as separating the variable from the constant (anvayavyatireka; vyabhicāra-avyabhicāra) to ascertain the true nature of the individual self, which is an indispensable condition for the understanding of the mahāvākya.³⁶

Abhyankar attempts to demonstrate the Advaita conclusion regarding the nature of consciousness through a method of reasoning based upon such Upaniṣad texts as: "there is no loss of the seeing of the seer."³⁷ Proceeding upon the basis of common experience that all cognitive activity reveals a seer, the object seen and Seeing or awareness which connects the two, he argues that both the seer and seen can only be denoted with reference to awareness. Since seer and seen are never cognised without relation to awareness they are dependent upon awareness: for the determination of their existence is dependent upon their being ascertained by means of awareness. Reality is equated with awareness because the latter is invariable whereas both the seer and seen are inconstant and are, therefore, adventitious.³⁸

There are two "types" of awareness:³⁹ the first can be expressed by the word Brahman and it forms the essence of the individual. This awareness is not the knowledge of "such and such" (īdrśam tādrśam) but

it is awareness as such: identical with the existence and essence of the sense of self (svarūpacaitanya). It is self-effulgent (svaprakāśa) in the sense that it does not depend upon another thing for its illumination (ananyaparakāśya). In relation to mental states this awareness is known as sāksicaitanya⁴⁰ and it constitutes the real referent of the word "I" (aḥampratya). Without relation to the limiting adjunct of the mind it is mere, unchanging, awareness in which both subject and object are superimposed.

Awareness conditioned by the modes of the mind (sopādhika) constitutes the second type. The Vedāntaparibhāṣā specifies this awareness to be of three kinds: as associated with the object (viśaya-caitanya), with the means of knowledge (pramāṇacaitanya) and with the knower (pramātrcaitanya).⁴¹ The first is awareness limited by the object (ghatādyavacchinnaṁ caitanyam), the second kind is awareness limited by the mode of the mind (antahkaranavṛtṭyavacchinnaṁ caitanyam) and the third is awareness limited by the mind (antahkaranāvachchinnaṁ caitanyam).⁴² This means pure awareness, conditioned by the mental modes, assumes the functions of knower and the means of knowledge, and it also modifies to represent objects in perception. These forms of particularized awareness depend upon the limiting adjunct of the mind and hence have beginning and end.⁴³

Abhyankar has argued that the seen objects and the sopādhika seer and act of seeing have no reality independent of awareness. Awareness constitutes the substratum upon which all else is superimposed. The substratum is equivalent to the root cause, in the same manner as a rope is the root cause for the superimposition of a snake form. The author cites the definition of Brahman (Tai. 3.1.1. B.S.1.1.2.) which Advaitins consider to be an incidental definition (tatasthalakṣana)⁴⁴ and which seems to connect Brahman with causal agency. Abhyankar, however, demonstrates that this definition need not imply causal agency since it can equally refer to Brahman as the mere substratum of superimposition. In this sense it becomes a definition of Brahman as cause only in the manner of an apparent transformation (vivarta).

1.11.

कारणं च कार्यापेक्षया सूक्ष्मं व्यापकं च भवति । यदुक्तमुपदेशसाहस्र्याम्—
सूक्ष्मताव्यापिते ज्ञेये गन्धादेरुत्तरोत्तरम् ।

प्रत्यगात्मावसानेषु पूर्वपूर्वप्रहाणतः ॥ (उ० सा० ९ । १) इति ।

अत्र गन्धशब्देन पृथिव्युच्यते । गुणानां गुण्यपेक्षया पृथगुपलम्भाभावेन गुणगुणिनोरभेदस्यैव सिद्धान्तेऽङ्गीकारात् । प्रत्यगात्मावसानेषु परमात्मपर्यन्तेषु । प्रहाणं कार्याकारत्यागः । पृथिवीजलतेजआदिस्वरूपात्कार्यात्पूर्वस्मात्पूर्वस्मादुत्तरोत्तरं कारणतया स्थितेषु परमात्मपर्यन्तेषु पदार्थेषु यथाक्रमं कार्याकारत्यागेन सूक्ष्मता व्यापिता च विज्ञातव्या । न च कार्यापेक्षया सूक्ष्मं चेत्कारणं तर्हि तस्य न्यूनपरिमाणत्वात्कथं कार्यव्यापकत्वमिति वाच्यम् । यतः कार्येषु विद्यमानमपि कारणस्वरूपं कार्याकारतिरोहिततया न स्वरूपेण

कारणस्य सूक्ष्मत्वं
व्यापित्वं च

सम्यगवभासत इत्येवात्र सूक्ष्ममुच्यते न न्यूनपरिमाणयोगात् । तथा सकलविकारानुगतस्यैवोपादानकारणत्वात्कार्यापेक्षयाऽधिकदेशवृत्तित्वेन कारणस्य कार्यव्यापकत्वम् । तस्मात्पृथि-

वी स्वकार्यापेक्षया सूक्ष्मा व्यापिका च सिद्धा । पृथिव्यपेक्षया जलं सूक्ष्मं व्यापकं च । शरीरे स्वेदस्य पर्वतशिलादिष्वन्तर्भूमौ प्रस्रवणस्य चोपलम्भात् । जलासाधारणगुणस्य रसस्य पृथिव्यां सर्वत्रोपलम्भाच्च । पृथिव्यां तत्र तत्राप्रतिबन्धेन जलप्रवेशानुभवाच्च । जलापेक्षयापि तेजः सूक्ष्मं व्यापकं च । जलमदूरीकृत्यैव रविकिरणानामग्निपरमाणूनां चान्तःप्रवेशदर्शनात् । जलविनाशस्याप्यग्नेरवयवानामुष्णजले प्रविष्टानां जलेनाविनाशदर्शनाच्च । तत्र हि तेषामवयवानामविनाशे जलापेक्षया सूक्ष्मतैव हेतुः । तेजोपेक्षयापि वायुः सूक्ष्मो व्यापकश्च । रविकिरणेषु यथावस्थितेषु सत्स्वेव वायुसंचारदर्शनात् । तदपेक्षयाप्याकाशं सूक्ष्मं व्यापकं च । तथैवोपलम्भात् । यतः पाषाणस्यापि भेदो दृश्यते । अवकाशं विना च भेदस्यासंभव एव । एवं परमात्मपर्यन्तेषु सूक्ष्मत्वं व्यापकत्वं च बोध्यम् ।

1.11. With reference to the effect the cause is subtle and pervasive.

This has been told in the Upadeśasāhasrī (9.1.):

Subtlety and pervasiveness should be understood successively from [the series] beginning with smell, on account of abandoning each preceding one up until the inner Self.

Here [in the verse] earth is expressed by the word smell: because qualities are not perceived separately with regard to the possessor of qualities, therefore only the absence of difference between

qualities and their possessor has been accepted in the final conclusion. "Up until the inner Self", means extending as far as the Supreme Self. "Abandoning" means giving up the form of the effect. Subtlety and pervasiveness should be understood by giving up the form of the effect in due order as [all] things extending as far as the Supreme Self are successively cause with regard to the preceding effects: earth, water, fire, etc.

It should not be said: if the cause is subtle with regard to the effect, then because it is of a lesser size how could it pervade the effect ? Because although the essential nature of the cause exists in the effects it is not clearly evident in its own nature since it is hidden in the form of the effect. For this reason subtlety is said here but not as a consequence of being of a lesser size. So because only what is accompanied by all the modifications is the material cause, the cause pervades the effect through being in a greater position with regard to the effect. Therefore it is established that earth is subtle and pervasive with regard to its effects. Water is subtle and pervasive with regard to earth. Because there is the perception of sweat in the body and of springs within the rocks of mountains and within the earth. And because everywhere on the earth there is the perception of taste which is the special quality of water. And because there is the experience of the penetration of water everywhere on earth without obstruction.

Fire is subtle and pervasive even with regard to water. Because the entry of the sun's rays and of the minute particles of fire is seen without splitting the water. And because although fire is able to be extinguished by water, the portions which enter into warm water are seen to be not extinguished by the water. Indeed there, subtlety alone with regard to the water is the reason for the non extinguishing of those

portions. Air is subtle and pervasive even with regard to fire. Because the passage of air is certainly seen when sunbeams are present. Space is subtle and pervasive even with regard to that. Because the perception is just so. For separation is observed even for a stone and without accommodation there is certainly no possibility of separation. In this manner subtlety and pervasiveness should be understood [in all things] up to the Supreme Being.

comment

The author's explanation of this topic is largely derived, in form and content, from Rāmatīrtha's commentary upon this verse in the Upadeśasāhasrī.⁴⁵

Abhyankar explains that Śaṅkara uses the word "smell" instead of earth because qualities are not perceived separately from their locus and since smell is the special quality (asādhāraṇaguna) of earth it can be used to refer to the latter.

The idea of this passage is that a material cause is more subtle and pervasive than its effect, for example clay is more subtle and pervasive with respect to all the products derived from it. Based upon the description of the origination of matter presented in Tai.2.1.1. ("From that [Brahman], i.e. from the Self, space was produced. From space, air [was produced]. From air, fire. From fire, water. From water, earth.")⁴⁶ each preceding element is said to be more subtle and pervasive than its product. This discussion of subtlety and pervasiveness is intended to show the Self to be the most subtle and pervasive since everything has originated from it. Rāmatīrtha sums up the purport more clearly than Abhyankar:

all this [world] is experienced as certainly pervaded by existence and manifestation, thus pure existence-awareness is the material cause of everything ... since the entire collection of visible [things] is consumed by pure existence-awareness, there is nothing at all existing separate from that.⁴⁷

1.12.

व्यापकत्वादेव च कारणं कार्यपेक्षया सामान्यभूतम् । कार्यगतविशेष-
रहितमित्यर्थः । घटशरावादिकार्यगतानां घटत्वशरावत्त्वादिविशेषाणां कारणा-
वस्थायां मृद्यदर्शनात् । अत एव सर्वकार्याणां मूलकारणं ब्रह्म सर्व-
विशेषरहितम् । यदि तत्र कोऽपि विशेषः स्यात्तर्हि
आत्मनो निर्विशेषत्वम् तादृशविशेषरहितं ब्रह्मणोऽपि मूलकारणमन्यत्कि-
चित्स्यात् । तस्यापि सविशेषत्वे तादृशविशेषर-
हितं तन्मूलभूतं पुनरन्यत्स्यादित्यनवस्थाप्रसङ्गः । तन्निरासाय मूलकारणं
सर्वविशेषरहितमित्यवश्यं वाच्यम् । तदेव च नो ब्रह्म ।

1.12. Indeed because of pervasiveness the cause is universal with regard to the effect. That means it is free from the distinctions belonging to the effect. Because the distinctions such as potness and dishness which belong to the effects such as a pot and a dish are not seen in clay which is the causal state. For this very reason, Brahman, which is the root cause of all effects, is free from all distinction. Suppose there should be some distinction there [in Brahman], then there should be some other root cause even for Brahman which is free from that particular distinction. If that also possesses distinction then once again there should be another root [cause] of that which is free from that particular distinction, so there would be the consequence of an infinite regress. For the removal of that [fallacy] the root cause must necessarily be said to be free from all distinction and that alone is our Brahman.

comment

The relation between the universal (sāmānya) and the distinction (viśeṣa) is an important argument which Abhyankar will later use against the Viśiṣṭādvaitins.

The author attempts to demonstrate that Brahman must be free from all distinctions on account of being the root cause (mūlakāraṇa) of everything. He argues that an effect must inhere in its material cause. The cause, however, is universal⁴⁸ in relation to the effects, which means that it must be free from the distinctions of those effects.

For if a material cause such as clay intrinsically possessed the distinction of a given effect such as potness then it could not also take the form of another effect such as a dish. Thus the cause must inherently be free from the qualities of its effects. Extrapolating from this, Abhyankar argues that the primary cause of the world must be devoid of all distinction. Should the mūlakāraṇa also possess distinction, then such a distinction must inhere in its universal which in turn must be free from that distinction. To avoid infinite regression, the primary cause should be accepted as free from all distinctions. Śāṅkara has also made reference to such an argument.⁴⁹

1.13.

विशेषरहितत्वादेव च न तत्र यस्मात्कस्मादपि सजातीयाद्विजातीयात्स्वग-
ताच्च भेदः संभवति । सविशेषस्यैव भेदाधिक-
ब्रह्मणि भेदत्रयराहि- रणत्वात् । तेन ब्रह्मसजातीयश्चेतनो ब्रह्मवि-
त्यम् जातीयोऽचेतनो ब्रह्मगतो धर्मो वा न कश्चिदन्योऽ-
स्तीति सर्वथा शुद्धमद्वितीयं भेदत्रयशून्यं निर्विशेषं
ब्रह्म सिध्यति ।

1.13. Indeed because of being free from qualification, no difference is possible there [in Brahman] from anything whatsoever of the same class, of another class, or residing in [Brahman] itself. Because only what possesses qualification is subject to difference. Therefore, there is nothing different [from Brahman]: neither a sentient being belonging to the same class as Brahman, nor [something] insentient belonging to a different class from Brahman, nor an attribute belonging to Brahman. In every way Brahman is established as free from qualification, without the three-fold difference, pure and non-dual.

comment

The structure of the argument is as follows: (a) the cause is more subtle and pervasive than the effect and as Brahman is the primary cause, Brahman is the most subtle and pervasive. (b) On account of its pervasiveness of the effects the cause is the universal: which means it is free from the qualifications inhering in the effects. Therefore the primary cause must be free from all qualification. (c) Because the primary cause has no distinguishing characteristic it is free from

(1) the difference which belongs to members of the same class (sajātiya-bheda), (2) the difference which belongs to members of a different class (vi jātiyabheda), (3) internal difference (svagatabheda) and hence it is non-dual.

This verse in the Pañcadaśī vividly portrays the three-fold difference:

For a tree there is difference within itself because of the leaves, flowers and fruits etc., There is difference within the same class on account of another tree. There is difference from another class due to rocks etc.⁵⁰

The negative prefix "a" in the word advitiya indicates the complete absence of duality. This is a more precise term than "monism" because the negative particle eliminates the possibility of svagatabheda.⁵¹

1.14.

तदेव निष्कलं ब्रह्म निर्विकल्पं निरञ्जनम् ।

निर्विकल्पमनन्तं च हेतुदृष्टान्तवर्जितम् ॥ (ब्र० वि० ८।९)

इतिश्रुतौ निर्विकल्पशब्देन ब्रह्मणो निर्विशेषता स्पष्टमेवोच्यते । किंच ब्रह्मणः सविशेषत्वे तद्विशेषपुरस्कारेणेशं तादृशमित्येवं शब्दप्रतिपाद्यता ब्रह्मणः स्यात् । तथा सति "यतो वाचो निवर्तन्ते" (तै० २।९) इति श्रुतिः, 'अगोचरं वचसाम्' (वि० पु० ६।७।५३) इति स्मृतिश्च विरुद्धा स्यात् ।

1.14. That alone is Brahman, undivided, free from distinction, pure - free from distinction and limitless - without a cause or an example. (Br.B. 8.9.)

Thus in the sacred text Brahman is very clearly said to be free from qualification on account of the word "free from distinction" (nirvikalpa). Furthermore, if Brahman possesses qualification [then] in keeping with that qualification Brahman would be able to be taught by a word in the manner of being "such and such". If that was the case, the sacred text: "from which words return" (Tai.2.9.) and the tradition: "not the object of words" (Viṣ.P.6.7.53.) would be contradicted.

- 1.15 'निर्गुणम्' (आत्मोप० १, चू० ७।२) इति च श्रुतिर्ब्रह्मणि शुभान्दे-
यांश्च सर्वानेव गुणान्सामान्येन निषेधति । युक्तं चैतत् । ब्रह्मणः सगुणत्वे तेन
गुणेन ब्रह्मणः सविशेषत्वावश्यभावेन तस्य पूर्वोक्तयुक्त्या जगन्मूलकारणत्वं
न स्यात् । " यः सर्वज्ञः " (मु० १।१।९) " सत्यकामः सत्यसंकल्पः " (छा० ८।७।१)
इत्याद्याः सगुणश्रुतयस्त्वारोपितगुणप्रतिपादिकाः ।
ब्रह्मणि गुणान्वस्तुत एव स्वीकृत्य हेयगुणराहि-
त्येन निर्गुणश्रुतिसमर्थने तु बाह्येन्द्रियग्राह्यरूप-
रसादिगुणराहित्येन जीवस्यापि निर्गुणपदवा-
च्यता स्यात् । पृथिव्यादिभूतानामपि सुखदुःखादिगुणराहित्येन निर्गुणपद-
वाच्यता स्यात् । तथा सति निर्गुणम् (आ० १, चू० ७।२) इति पूर्वोक्त-
श्रुत्या निर्गुणपदेन किमप्यधिकं नोक्तं भवेत् । एवं च परब्रह्मणि कल्याणका-
रका अपि गुणा वस्तुतो नैव सन्ति । किंच परमात्मनिष्ठत्वेनाभिमताः कल्याण-
कारका गुणा जीवानां जीवावस्थायामेवोपयुज्यन्ते । सा चावस्थाऽविद्याकल्पितेति
तत्रोपयुज्जानाः परमात्मगुणा अपि कल्पिता एव । स्वप्नस्थकल्पितगतिक्रिया-
यामुपयुज्जानो रथोऽपि कल्पित एव भवति ।

1.15. Moreover the sacred text: "free from quality" (Ātma. 1. Cū. 7.2.)
negates all qualities universally with regard to Brahman, the
auspicious as well as those that must be given up. This is correct.
For if Brahman possesses quality then due to that quality Brahman
must necessarily possess qualification and therefore that [Brahman]
could not be the root cause of the world according to the reason
which was previously mentioned.

However the sacred texts [denoting] the possession of qualities
such as: "He is omniscient" (Mu. 1.1.9.), "one whose desire is true,
one whose resolve is true" (Ch. 8.7.1.) teach qualities which have
been superimposed. Accepting that there are, in reality,
qualities in Brahman, but in justifying the sacred text [denoting]
freedom from qualities in so far as [Brahman] is free from qualities
that are to be given up, then even the individual soul would be able
to be expressed by the word "free from quality" since it is free
from qualities such as form and taste which can be apprehended by
the external senses. Even the elements such as earth would be able
to be expressed by the word "free from quality" since they are free

from qualities such as pleasure and pain. When that is so, by [using] the term "free from quality" nothing additional would be said by the previously cited sacred text: "free from quality". So in reality there are certainly no qualities in the supreme Brahman, even those that bestow good.

Furthermore, the qualities which bestow good and which are accepted as abiding in the supreme Self are useful for individual souls only in the state of being an individual soul. And that state has been superimposed by Ignorance. So even the qualities of the supreme Self which are useful there are only superimposed. Even the chariot, which is useful in the action of going superimposed by the one who resides in the dream state, is only superimposed.

comment

The mention of "qualities which must be given up" (heyaguna) is in reference to the view of the Viśiṣṭādvaitins who interpret the word nirguna to signify the absence of any inauspicious qualities.⁵²

Advaitins consider saguna statements such as: "He is omniscient" to refer to Brahman possessing the attribute of omniscience due to the limiting adjunct of māyā.⁵³ As previously mentioned, the nirguna statement ultimately sublates its saguna counterpart.

On account of the sentence: "asserting that the "qualities which bestow good ... are useful ... only in the state of being an individual soul" it would be incorrect to assume that Advaitins believe the Lord (īśvara) to be a conscious fiction projected for the purpose of worship and of a lesser order of reality (prātibhāsika) than the worshipper. Rather, the Lord, the world and the soul possess an equivalent ontological status in so far as they partake of the same vyāvahārika reality.⁵⁴ This state is negated in toto as the creation of Ignorance (avidyā) from the pāramārthika standpoint relating to Brahman, where there is neither a Lord, nor a world or a soul. In his example of the dream chariot the author shows that objects existing in a particular state possess the same degree of reality while from another standpoint they are equally false.

- 1.16. ज्ञानमपि परब्रह्मणः स्वरूपं न तु तस्य गुणः । “विज्ञानघनः” (वृ० २। ४। १२) “सत्यं ज्ञानम्” (तै० २। १) “विज्ञानमानन्दं ब्रह्म” (वृ० ३। ९। २८) इत्यादिश्रुत्यनुरोधत् । “विज्ञातारमरे” (वृ० २। ४। १४) इति श्रुतौ विज्ञातृत्वोक्तिस्त्वोपचारिकी । अद्वि-
 ज्ञानस्वरूप आत्मा तीये परब्रह्मणि भेदमूलकस्य धर्मधर्मिभावस्या-
 संभवेन तस्य वस्तुतो ज्ञानाश्रयत्वसंभवात् ।
 एवमेव भेदमूलकस्य विषयविषयिभावस्यापि तत्रासंभवेन न वस्तुतस्तस्य ज्ञेय-
 त्वम् ।

1.16. Moreover, Knowledge is the essential nature of the supreme Self, not its quality. Because this is in accordance with the sacred texts such as: "a mass of consciousness" (Brh. 2.4.12.), "real Knowledge" (Tai.2.1.), "Brahman is consciousness, bliss" (Brh.3.9.28.). But the mention of knowership in the sacred text: "[by what] my dear, [should one know] the knower" (Brh.2.4.14.) is figurative. Because the relation of attribute and its possessor, which is based upon difference, is an impossibility in the supreme Brahman which is without a second, therefore there is no possibility of that [Brahman] being, in reality, the locus of Knowledge. In the very same manner, because the relation of cognition and its object which is based upon difference is also an impossibility there [in Brahman], in reality that [Brahman] is not to be known.

comment

The author presents the established conclusion of the Advaitins that Brahman is identical with pure Knowledge, or awareness as such. Śaṅkara states: "The śruti says Brahman is pure consciousness, devoid of other aspects contrary to this and free from distinction." ⁵⁵

The statement: "in reality, that [Brahman] is not to be known" means that Brahman can not become an object of cognition, like a pot, because Brahman is the awareness which illumines cognition itself: "that which one does not think with the mind, by which, they say, the mind [itself] is thought, know that alone to be Brahman. This is not [Brahman] which people meditate upon as "this"."⁵⁶ Sureśvara argues against the view⁵⁷ that the Self can become its own object:

What is seen in a locus by the seer is a quality of that [locus] alone but not [of the seer]. Because what belongs to the seer, like the consciousness of the seer, never becomes the object of perception.⁵⁸

1.17.

स च परमात्मा नित्य इत्यत्र प्रायः सर्वेषामैकमत्यमेव । चार्वाकादयो नास्तिकाः परं परमात्मानमेव न मन्यन्ते दूरे तस्य नित्यत्वमिति त्वन्यत् । श्रुत्येकशरणानां तु “ स वा एष महानज आत्माऽजरोऽमृतो ब्रह्म ” (वृ०४ । ४ । २५) “ नित्यो नित्यानाम् ” (श्वे० ६ । १३) इत्यादिभिः श्रुतिभिर्नित्यत्वमेवाभिमतम् । अनुमानमप्यत्र लब्धावसरम् । ब्रह्म नित्यं मूलकारणत्वात् । यदनित्यं तन्मूलकारणं न भवति यथा घटादि । मूलकारणस्यानित्यत्व आकस्मिककार्योत्पादप्रसङ्गः । स च न संभवतीत्येवमत्रानुकूलस्तर्कः । सा च नित्यता न सुवर्णस्येव परिणामिनित्यता । यथा सुवर्णं तत्तदलंकाररूपेण परिणममानमप्यलंकारवन्न विनश्यतीत्यलंकारापेक्षया नित्यं भवति न तथा परमात्मा । “ निष्कलं निष्क्रियम् ” (श्वे० ६ । १९) इत्यादिश्रुतिषु तस्य विकारराहित्याभिधानेन परिणामासंभवात् । किं तु ब्रह्मणः कूटस्थनित्यता । एकेनैव रूपेण सदा विद्यमानं कूटस्थनित्यम् ।

1.17. There is certainly unanimity of thought among almost all in that the supreme Self is eternal. However, disbelievers such as the Cārvākas do not think that there is indeed a supreme Self, even less its eternity. Therefore they belong to a different category. Whereas for those who rely solely on the sacred texts its eternity is certainly accepted because of sacred texts such as: "That great, birthless Self is undecaying, undying, immortal Brahman" (Brh.4.4.25.)⁵⁹, "eternal among the lasting" (Śv.6.13.). Inference also finds scope here: Brahman is eternal. Because [Brahman] is the root cause. What is non-eternal is not the root cause, like a pot, etc. If the root cause was non-eternal there would be the occurrence of the production of an effect without a cause and that is impossible. In this way, the reasoning here conforms [to the sacred texts].

That eternity is not the eternity of what is subject to transformation, like gold. Gold, even though transforming into the form of various ornaments, does not perish like the ornaments and thus it is

eternal with reference to the ornaments. The supreme Self is not like that. Because there is the mention of that [Brahman] being free from change in the sacred texts: "without parts, without action" (Śv.6.19.) etc. so there is no possibility of transformation. Rather, Brahman has unchangeable eternity. Unchangeable eternity is always existing in one and the same form.

Comment

Abhyankar's inference is based upon kēvalavyatirekavyāpti.⁶⁰

Parināma is the causal explanation where both cause and effect have the same degree of reality (samasattā)⁶¹ and the cause transforms into the effect (pūrvāvasthāpāyena-avasthāntarāpattiḥ)⁶² like gold transforms into the form of various ornaments.

According to Advaita, only what is free from change is absolutely real: "a thing is real when it does not change the nature that is ascertained to be its own"⁶³ and consequently if Brahman transforms into the world then Brahman could not be eternal. Advaitins accept Brahman as the cause of the world only in the manner that the world is an apparent transformation (vivarta) of Brahman. Vivarta means that the cause and effect have different degrees of reality (visamasattā)⁶⁴ and the cause, without undergoing change, appears in the form of the effect (pūrvāvasthānapāye'vasthāntarāpattiḥ).⁶⁵ The standard Advaita illustration is the case of a rope mistaken for a snake. The snake appearance has no separate existence apart from the rope, its material cause. The rope, however, has undergone no change to appear as the snake and so they both possess a different order of reality. The rope is the vivarta cause and Ignorance (avidyā) is the transformative cause which accounts for the appearance of the snake. Similarly, Brahman is the vivartakāraṇa for the appearance of the world and avidyā is the parināmikāraṇa.

Though the word vivarta belongs to post-Śāṅkara Advaita, Śāṅkara clearly considers the world to be only an apparent transformation of Brahman.⁶⁶

- 1.18. तदेतद्ब्रह्माद्वितीयम् । ब्रह्मणा संबद्धं तदसंबद्धं तच्छरीरभूतं तदंशभूतं तद्धर्मभूतं वाऽन्यत्किंचिदपि नास्ति । " सर्वं खल्विदं ब्रह्म " (छा० ३ । १४ । १) " इदं सर्वं यदयमात्मा " (बृ० २ । ४ । ५) " ऐतदात्म्यमिदं सर्वम् " (छा० ६ । ८ । ७) इत्यादिश्रुत्यनुरोधात् । ब्रह्माद्वैतमिति प्रसिद्धिरप्येतन्मते सापीचीन्येन संगच्छते । ब्रह्मणि वस्तुतः केनापि प्रकारेण द्वैतस्याभावात् । अत एवेदमद्वैतमतमिति गीयते ।

1.18. Brahman which is of this nature is without a second. There is nothing at all which is connected with Brahman, or not connected with it, which is its body, or a part of it, or an attribute of it. Because of the conformity with the sacred texts such as: "indeed all this is Brahman" (Ch.3.14.1.), "all this is this Self" (Brh.2.4.5-6), "all this [world] has This for its self" (Ch.6.8.7.). Even what is well known in this teaching: that Brahman is non-dual, agrees with the correct view. Because in reality there is no duality in Brahman in any manner whatsoever. For this very reason, this is celebrated as the teaching of non-duality.

1.19.

ब्रह्म च सन्मात्ररूपम् । अस्तीत्येव केवलं वक्तुं शक्यते न त्वीदृशं तादृश-
मिति । ईदृशादिविशेषणोपादाने तु विशेषणस्य
सन्मात्रं ब्रह्म व्यावर्तकत्वनियमेन यस्य व्यावृत्तिस्तेन ब्रह्मणः
सद्वितीयत्वापत्तावद्वितीयश्रुतिविरोधः स्यात् ।

1.19. Brahman is of the nature of pure existence. It is only possible to say that "it is" but not that it is "such and such". But upon mentioning a distinguishing characteristic such as "like this", because of the rule that a distinguishing characteristic excludes, then upon the occurrence that Brahman has the one that is excluded as its second, there would be contradiction with the non-dual texts.

comment

On the basis of Upaniṣad texts such as: "My dear, this was existence alone in the beginning, one alone, without a second",⁶⁷ Advaitins consider that existence as such is Brahman and "indeed, everything is based upon existence, because the idea of existence persists everywhere."⁶⁸ Existence is held to be unsublatable⁶⁹ for both affirmative and negative statements occur in reference to "is" which, in itself, is not negated even upon the denial of the substantive to which it refers.

To denote Brahman as "such and such" means that Brahman possesses some qualification and a qualification invariably excludes one thing from something else: red excludes all that is not red. If Brahman has a

qualifying factor, then such a qualification excludes Brahman from being another thing.

- 1.20. यतो ज्ञानस्वरूपं ब्रह्म सन्मात्ररूपमतो ज्ञानमपि तत्सन्मात्ररूपमेव । न तु सन्मात्रस्य तत्र विषयभावः । लौकिकज्ञानवत्साश्रयत्वे सविषयत्वे वा तस्य सत्सामान्यरूपत्वानापत्त्या ज्ञानस्य ब्रह्मस्वरूपत्वानापत्तेः । तथा च “विज्ञानघनः” (बृ० २।४।१२) इत्यादिपूर्वोक्तश्रुतिविरोधस्तदवस्थ एव स्यात् ।

1.20. Because Brahman, whose essential nature is Knowledge, is of the nature of pure existence, therefore Knowledge is also of the nature of the pure existence of that [Brahman]. But pure existence is not an object there [in Knowledge]. If [Knowledge] has either a locus or an object like ordinary knowledge, because that [Brahman] would not have the nature of existence in general, therefore Knowledge would not be the essential nature of Brahman. In that case, there would be contradiction with the texts cited previously such as: "a mass of consciousness" (Brh. 2.4.12.).

comment

Brahman is awareness which is identical to pure existence. Śaṅkara remarks on this identity in the sūtrabhāṣya:

It cannot be said that Brahman only has the characteristic of existence and not the characteristic of awareness. Because the sacred texts such as: "a mass of consciousness only" would be meaningless. How could Brahman which is bereft of consciousness be taught as the Self of the conscious individual soul? Nor even can it be said that Brahman only has the characteristic of awareness and not the characteristic of existence. Because the sacred texts such as: "[the Self] is to be apprehended as existing" would be meaningless. And how could awareness which is bereft of existence be accepted?⁷⁰

- 1.21. ननु ब्रह्माद्वैते

जीव ईशो विशुद्धा चित्तथा जीवेशयोर्भिदा ।

अधिद्या तच्चित्तोर्योगः षडस्माकमनादयः ॥

इत्यभियुक्तोक्तिर्विरुध्यते । अत्र (१) जीव (२) ईश्वरो (३) ब्रह्म (४) जीवेश्वरयोर्भेदोऽ (५) विद्या (६) ब्रह्मणोऽविद्यासंबन्धश्चेत्येतेषां षण्णामनादित्वकथनेन द्वैतस्य स्पष्टमेव प्रतिपन्नत्वादिति चेत्—उच्यते । सत्ता हि त्रिविधा पारमार्थिकी व्यावहारिकी प्रातिभासिकी च । तत्र पारमार्थिकी सत्ता ब्रह्मण एव नान्यस्य कस्यचित् । तस्य कदाप्यवाध्यमानत्वात् । व्यावहारिकी सत्ता

भूतभौतिकस्य सर्वस्य जगतः तस्य मोक्षदशायाम्
 त्रिविधं सत्त्वम् वाधेऽपि व्यवहारदशायामवाध्यमानत्वात् । प्राति-
 भासिकी सत्ता शुक्त्यादौ भासमानस्य रज-
 तादेः । तस्य व्यवहारदशायामपि वाधात् । प्रतिभासकाल एव तस्य सत्त्वम् ।

1.21. [objection] If Brahman is non-dual, the statement of the learned is contradicted:

For us, there are six which are beginningless: the individual soul, the Lord, pure awareness, the distinction between the individual soul and the Lord, Ignorance and the association of that [Ignorance] and awareness.

Because duality has been very clearly demonstrated by mentioning the beginninglessness of these six here: (1) the individual soul, (2) the Lord, (3) Brahman, (4) the distinction between the individual soul and the Lord, (5) Ignorance and (6) the connection of Brahman with Ignorance.

[reply] Existence is threefold: concerning what is absolutely real, what is empirically real and what appears real. In regard to those, the existence concerning what is absolutely real is only for Brahman, not for anything else. For that [Brahman] is not able to be negated at any time. The existence concerning what is empirically real is for the whole world consisting of the elements and their products. For although that [world] is negated in the state of liberation, it cannot be negated in the state of ordinary relations. The existence concerning what appears real is that of silver etc. which appears upon a pearl-oyster etc., because that is negated even in the state of ordinary relations. It exists only at the time of its appearance.

comment

In Advaita, the definition of truth is linked to unsublatability.⁷¹ What is real cannot be subject to negation and what is negated cannot be fully real. In the case of a pearl-oyster mistaken as silver, the sublation of silver results from a closer inspection of the object. The silver exists only at the time of its appearance (prātibhāsika), whereas the pearl-oyster persists in everyday life.

The world, however, is not absolutely real since it too is sublated. In relation to the enlightened standpoint of the liberated person the world ceases to exist as world and is seen to exist as Brahman appearing in the form of the world. The world is said to have empirical (vyāvahārika) reality since its validity persists until liberation.⁷² Advaitins confer the status of absolute reality (pāramārthika) only to Brahman: pure awareness, existence, which is never sublated. This is further explained in the verses:

1.22. तदुक्तम्—

कालत्रये ज्ञातृकाले प्रतीतिसमये तथा !
 बाधाभावात्पदार्थानां सत्त्वत्रैविध्यमिष्यते ॥
 तात्त्विकं ब्रह्मणः सत्त्वं व्योमादेर्व्यावहारिकम् ।
 रूप्यादेरर्थजातस्य प्रातिभासिकमिष्यते ॥
 लौकिकेन प्रमाणेन यद्बाध्यं लौकिकेऽवधौ ।
 तत्प्रातिभासिकं सत्त्वं बाध्यं सत्येव मातारि ॥
 वैदिकेन प्रमाणेन यद्बाध्यं वैदिकेऽवधौ ।
 तद्व्यावहारिकं सत्त्वं बाध्यं मात्रा सहैव तत् ॥ इति ।

ब्रह्माद्वैतमित्युक्तिस्तु पारमार्थिकसत्ताभिप्रायेण बोध्या । जीव ईश इत्युक्त-
 श्लोके विशुद्धा चिदित्यनेन परं ब्रह्मोच्यते तदतिरिक्तानां जीवादीनां
 पञ्चानां न पारमार्थिकं सत्त्वं किं तु व्यावहारिकम् । अनादित्वसाभ्येन
 तु षण्णां तत्र परिगणनम् । पारमार्थिकस्य ब्रह्मणोऽनादित्वमनन्तत्वं च ।
 कालत्रयावाध्यत्वमिति यावत् । अन्येषां जीवादीनां पञ्चानां त्वनादित्वेऽपि
 नानन्तत्वम् । तेषां यावत्संसारं स्थायित्वेऽपि मोक्षावस्थायां विनाशात् । तेष्वपि
 जीवेश्वरभेदोऽविद्या ब्रह्मणोऽविद्यासंबन्धश्चेत्येषां त्रयाणां स्वरूपेणैव नाशः ।
 जीवेश्वरयोस्तु न तथा । किं तु जीवत्वेश्वरत्वप्रापकोपाधरेव विनाशः । एतेन
 जीवस्य व्यावहारिकसत्त्वे व्यवहारातीतायां मोक्षावस्थायां जीवनाशावश्यंभा-
 वेन मोक्षप्राप्तये न कोऽपि प्रयतेतेत्यपास्तम् ।

1.22. That has been told:

Objects are considered to have three types of existence on the basis of the absence of negation [respectively]: in the three periods of time, at the time of the knower and during the period of [mere] appearance. Brahman's existence is considered to be absolute. The existence of space etc. is empirical and the existence of the class of things such as silver [seen upon a pearl-oyster] is considered to relate to what is an appearance.

What can be sublated by a common means of knowledge when the occasion relates to common life, that existence which relates to appearance can be sublated when there is a knower. What can be sublated by a scriptural means of knowledge when the occasion concerns what is scriptural, that empirical existence can be negated together with the knower.

The statement that Brahman is non-dual should be understood to mean the absolute existence. In the verse cited, [beginning with] "the individual soul, the Lord" the supreme Brahman is expressed by this: "pure awareness". Excluding that [Brahman] the existence of the five such as the individual soul does not relate to what is absolutely real but to what is empirically real. The enumeration of the six there is because of beginninglessness being common. The absolutely real Brahman is beginningless as well as endless. That means it cannot be sublated in the three periods of time. Although the other five such as the individual soul are beginningless, they are not endless. Because although they exist as long as there is the cycle of worldly existence, they are destroyed in the state of liberation. Moreover among those, there is the destruction of these three totally: the distinction between the individual soul and the Lord, Ignorance and the connection of Brahman with Ignorance. But it is not in the same manner for the individual soul and the Lord. But there is the destruction only of the limiting adjuncts which bring about the status of an individual soul and a Lord. Because of this [the argument] is set aside that: if the individual soul has [only] an empirical existence, then because of the necessary destruction of the individual soul in the state of liberation which is beyond the empirical state, no one would strive for the attainment of liberation.

comment

Rāmaṇuja advances the same objection:

If that [non persistence of the individual] was the case, then "liberation is only self destruction" would be postulated in another manner.⁷³

Abhyankar counters this objection by stating that liberation is the removal of what is false, not the destruction of a real thing. For the Advaitin, individuality has only an empirical reality brought about by the adventitious connection of the Self with the limiting adjunct of the subtle body (sūksmaśarīra). When the limiting adjunct ceases, the unconditioned self remains.

1.23.

जीवत्वेश्वरत्वप्रापकोपाधिस्तु भावरूपं त्रिगुणात्मकं सदसद्भ्यामनिर्वचनी-
 यमनाद्यज्ञानम् । तच्चाज्ञानं मायाविद्याभेदेन
 जीवत्वमीश्वरत्वं चोपा- द्विविधम् । शुद्धसत्त्वप्रधानं मायापदवाच्यम् ।
 धिकम् मलिनसत्त्वप्रधानमविद्यापदवाच्यम् । मायोपहितं
 चैतन्यमीश्वरः । अधिग्रोपहितं चैतन्यं जीवः ।

1.23. The limiting adjunct which brings about the status of the individual soul and the Lord is beginningless Ignorance which is positive in nature, composed of three qualities and which cannot be designated as existent or non-existent. That Ignorance is twofold due to the distinction of māyā and avidyā. Predominantly pure sattva can be expressed by the word māyā and predominantly impure sattva can be expressed by the word avidyā. The Lord is consciousness conditioned by māyā. The individual soul is consciousness conditioned by avidyā.

comment

This is according to the Vivarana school of thought.⁷⁴

1.24.

अथवाऽज्ञानं स्वरूपत एकरूपमेव । किंतु तस्य शक्तिद्विविधा ज्ञानशक्तिः
 क्रियाशक्तिश्चेति । रजस्तमोभ्यामनाभिभूतं सत्त्वं ज्ञानशक्तिः । “ सत्त्वात्संजायते
 ज्ञानम् ” (भ० गी० १४ । १७) इति स्मृतेः । सा च शब्दादिविषयकज्ञान-
 हेतुः । क्रियाशक्तिद्विविधा—आवरणशक्तिर्विक्षेप-
 अज्ञानस्य शक्तिद्वयम् शक्तिश्चेति । रजःसत्त्वाभ्यामनाभिभूतं तम आव-
 रणशक्तिः । सा च घटो नास्ति न प्रकाशत इत्यादि-
 व्यवहारहेतुः । तमःसत्त्वाभ्यामनाभिभूतं रजो विक्षेपशक्तिः । सा चाकाशादिप्रप-
 ष्चोत्पत्तिहेतुः । विक्षेपशक्तिमदज्ञानोपहितस्वरूपेणैश्वरस्य जगदुपादानत्वात् ।
 “ यथोर्णनाभिः सृजते गृह्णते च ” (सु० १ । ७) इत्यादिश्रुतिरत्र प्रमाणम् ।
 ऊर्णनाभिर्लूताकीटः । ज्ञानशक्तिमदज्ञानोपहितस्वरूपेण त्वीश्वरो जगतः कर्तेत्यु-
 च्यते । अत्र मत आवरणशक्तिप्रधानमज्ञानमविद्येत्युच्यते । विक्षेपशक्तिप्रधानम-
 ज्ञानं मायेत्युच्यते । जीवत्वेश्वरत्वोपाधिस्तु पूर्ववदेव बोध्यः ।

1.24. Alternatively, Ignorance is essentially just one. But it has a twofold power: the power of knowledge and the power of action. The power of knowledge is sattva which is not dominated by rajas and tamas, for there is the traditional text: "knowledge arises from sattva" (G.14.17.). That [power of knowledge] is the cause of the knowledge relating to words etc.

The power of action is twofold: the power of concealing and the power of projecting. The concealing power is tamas which is not dominated by rajas and sattva. That [concealing power] is the cause of the expression such as "there is no pot, it is not visible". The projecting power is rajas which is not dominated by tamas and sattva. That [projecting power] is the cause for the origination of the world beginning with space. Because the Lord is the material cause of the world only through the nature of being conditioned by Ignorance which possesses the power of projection. The sacred text such as "just as a spider emits and withdraws [its thread]" (Mu. 1.7.) is the means of knowledge in this matter. Ūrnanābhi is the insect which is a spider. The Lord is said to be the creator of the world through the nature of being conditioned by Ignorance which possesses the power of knowledge.

According to the view here, Ignorance which predominantly has the power of concealing is said to be avidyā and Ignorance which predominantly has the power of projecting is called māyā. The limiting adjunct [which brings about] the status of the individual soul and the Lord should be understood just as before.

comment

This is according to the view of Vidyāranya in the Pañcadaśī.⁷⁵

1.25. अथवा मायाविद्याशब्दौ शक्तिद्वययुताज्ञानसामान्यवाचकौ पर्यायावेव ।
अविद्योपहितं विम्बचैतन्यमीश्वरः । अविद्याप्रतिविम्बितं प्रतिविम्बभूतं चैतन्यं
जीव इत्येवं जीवेश्वरभेदो बोध्यः ।

1.25. Alternatively, the two words māyā and avidyā are only synonyms commonly expressing Ignorance endowed with the twofold power. The

distinction between the individual soul and the Lord should be understood in this manner: the Lord is the original consciousness conditioned by avidyā. The individual soul is consciousness which is a reflection and which has been reflected in avidyā.

comment

It has been suggested that this view is Abhyankar's own.⁷⁶ The author now proceeds to discuss the principal conceptions of the nature of the individual soul.

1.26. अत्रेदं बोध्यम् । जीवेश्वरस्वरूपविषये चावच्छेदवाद आभासवादः प्रति-
विम्बवादश्चेत्यनेके पक्षाः संभवन्ति । तद्यथा—

वाचस्पतेरवच्छिन्न आभासो वार्तिकस्य च ।
संक्षेपशारीरकतः प्रतिविम्बं तथेष्यते ॥ इति ।

जीवस्वरूपम् अवच्छेदोऽन्तः प्रवेशः । तद्युक्तोऽवच्छिन्नः । यथा
जलेऽन्तःप्रविष्टमाकाशं जलावच्छिन्नमित्युच्यते ।
अन्यसंबन्धेनान्यत्र भासमानोऽर्थ आभासः । यथा जपाकुसुमसांनिध्यात्स्फटिके
भासमानो रक्तिमा । अयमेवोपहित इत्युच्यते । प्रतिविम्बं प्रसिद्धम् ।

1.26. Here, this should be understood. Several views are possible with regard to the nature of the individual soul and the Lord: the teaching of limitation, the teaching of appearance and the teaching of reflection.

That is [stated] like this:

It is considered thus: the "limited" is for Vācaspati,
"appearance" is for [the author of the] Vārtikas and for
the author of the Samkṣepaśārīraka there is "reflection".

Avaccheda means immanence. What has that is limited (avacchinna). For example the space immanent in water is said to be limited by water. A thing appearing elsewhere because of the connection with something else is "appearance". For example redness appears in a crystal because of the proximity with a red rose. This [crystal] is indeed said as "conditioned". The "reflection" is well known.

comment

The theories of "limitation" (avacchedavāda), "appearance" (ābhasavāda) and "reflection" (pratibimbavāda) constitute attempts to provide a systematic explanation of the nature of the soul, the nature of God and their relation.

Each theory is linked to a particular mode of illustration. The avacchedavāda utilizes the example of space limited by a pot in relation to the total space. Vācaspati writes:

just as the space within a pot is not different from the total space, or is as though different as long as the pot persists...in the same manner the individual soul, superimposed through the limiting condition which is a distinction in the imposition of beginningless, indescribable Ignorance, is not in reality different from the supreme Self.⁷⁷

The ābhāsavāda is illustrated through the example of a crystal which appears to be red due to a red rose. On account of its proximity to the crystal, the rose imputes its colour to the crystal and the latter is mistaken as red so long as the crystal is not discriminated from the appearance of redness. Similarly, Ignorance which is the limiting adjunct (like the red rose) of consciousness (represented by the crystal) gains identity with the latter. As a result, consciousness gains the status of the Lord (like the redness of the crystal) owing to the non-discrimination of the appearance from the pure consciousness (like the non-discrimination of the redness from the crystal). In the same way, consciousness conditioned by the intellect and becoming identified with it gains the status of an individual soul owing to the absence of discrimination between the appearance of consciousness in a certain form (like the redness of the crystal) and pure consciousness. According to the ābhāsavāda, the appearance of consciousness (cidābhāsa) is neither identical with pure consciousness nor is it different from it.

Pratibimbavāda is linked to the illustration of the sun reflected in water, or a face reflected in a mirror. It differs from the ābhāsavāda in maintaining that, while the reflection is false, the reflected image is identical to the original and hence real.⁷⁸ Just as the reflection of a face in a mirror is false because it is a reflection, while the reflected image is as real as the original. Thus the soul, as reflected consciousness, is identical to Brahman. The above verse ascribes this view to Sarvajñātman who maintained that consciousness which is reflected in Ignorance becomes the Lord and consciousness reflected in the intellect becomes the soul.⁷⁹ A similar view is advocated by Padmapāda and the later Vivaraṇa school of thought. The difference between the position of Sarvajñātman and the Padmapāda-Vivaraṇa description will be mentioned below.

Śaṅkara did not exclusively propound any of these views.⁸⁰ He refers to the concept of avaccheda principally to show that a distinction between the soul and Brahman is only due to the limiting adjunct.⁸¹ He utilizes

the illustration of a reflection when discussing how Brahman appears as the individual self⁸² and in order to demonstrate that the defects affecting the reflected image do not pertain to the original.⁸³ He also employs the word "ābhāsa", though often in the sense of a reflection.⁸⁴

1.27.

अवच्छेदेवादिनां वाचस्पतिमिश्राणां मतेऽज्ञानविषयीकृतं चैतन्यमीश्वरः ।
अज्ञानाश्रयीभूतं चैतन्यं जीवः । आभासवादिनां वार्तिककाराणां मतेऽज्ञानोपहि-
तमज्ञानतादात्म्यापन्नं चैतन्यमीश्वरः । अविद्याकार्यभूतवुद्ध्युपहितं बुद्धितादात्म्या-
पन्नं चैतन्यं जीवः । केचित्त्वाभासवादमेव स्वीकृत्याज्ञानसमष्ट्युपहितं चैतन्यमी-
श्वरः । अज्ञानव्यष्ट्युपहितं चैतन्यं जीवः । अज्ञानं च स्वरूपत एव नानाभूत-
मित्याहुः ।

1.27. According to the view of Vācaspatiśra who holds the "limitation" theory, the Lord is consciousness objectified by Ignorance. The individual soul is consciousness which is the locus of Ignorance. According to the view of the author of the vārtikas (Sureśvara) who holds the "appearance" theory, the Lord is consciousness which is conditioned by Ignorance and become one with Ignorance. The individual soul is consciousness conditioned by the intellect which is an effect of Ignorance and become one with the intellect. Some, however, accepting only the "appearance" theory, say that the Lord is consciousness conditioned by collective Ignorance and the individual soul is consciousness conditioned by individual Ignorance. They say that Ignorance, in its essence, is manifold.

comment

In the view of Vācaspati, consciousness which is the object of Ignorance is the Lord and consciousness which is the locus of Ignorance is the individual soul. For example, in the situation that "I do not know the pearl-oyster" "I" is the locus of Ignorance and the pearl-oyster is the object of Ignorance. In the same manner, "I" is the locus of Ignorance (ajñānāśraya) and Brahman is the object of Ignorance (ajñānavisaya). When Brahman is not known, then Brahman conditioned by the limiting adjunct of Ignorance is the Lord. According to Vācaspati, the Ignorance of the pearl-oyster residing in the individual and having the pearl-oyster for its object creates the appearance of silver. Similarly, Ignorance located in the individual soul and having Brahman for its object creates the world. Just

as the pearl-oyster appears as silver without undergoing transformation, in the same manner, Brahman appears in the form of the world (vivartopādāna-kāraṇa). Ignorance is the efficient cause (nimittakāraṇa) for the appearance of the world.

Vācaspati holds that Ignorance is manifold and resides in each individual soul. In this respect, as in other fundamental matters, he follows the view of Maṇḍanamiśra.⁸⁵ Vācaspati maintains that each Ignorance is the efficient cause for the creation of its own world. Just as a flame is constantly different though accepted as single, so too on account of their similarity the different worlds experienced by each soul are accepted to be identical. In the view of Vācaspati, the individual soul is consciousness conditioned by the mind and because Ignorance and minds are manifold there is a multiplicity of souls. The Lord is consciousness which has gained omniscience and omnipotence on account of being conditioned by Ignorance.⁸⁶ Because the Ignorance located within the soul creates the world, the Lord is referred to as the creator by way of courtesy in the sense that the Lord is the substratum of the individual Ignorance and all worldly phenomena.⁸⁷

According to Sureśvara, the Lord is the appearance of consciousness which results from pure consciousness becoming conditioned by and identified with Ignorance. Like the redness of the crystal conditioned by the rose flower. The individual soul is the appearance of consciousness arising from pure consciousness becoming conditioned by and identified with the intellect.⁸⁸ The last view referred to: "some, however..." conforms to the Vedāntasāra though Sadānanda does not appear to accept that Ignorance is actually manifold.⁸⁹

1.28.

प्रतिबिम्बवादिनां संक्षेपशारीरकाराणां मतेऽज्ञानप्रतिबिम्बितं चैतन्यमीश्वरः ।
बुद्धिप्रतिबिम्बितं चैतन्यं जीवः । विवरणकारास्त्वीश्वरविषय आभासवादं
जीवविषये च प्रतिबिम्बवादं मन्वाना अज्ञानोपहितं विन्वचैतन्यमीश्वरः ।
अन्तःकरणतत्संस्कारावच्छिन्नाज्ञानप्रतिबिम्बितं चैतन्यं जीव इत्याहुः । एत-
द्विवरणकारमते धर्मिणः प्रतिबिम्बस्य नाध्यासः । किं त्वज्ञानप्रतिबिम्बितेऽ-
नध्यस्त एव धर्मिणि जीवे ब्रह्मभेदरूपस्य धर्मस्याध्यासः । ननु तर्हि प्रतिबि-
म्बभूतजीवस्वरूपस्य धर्मिणोऽनध्यस्तत्वे तस्य सत्यत्वं स्यादिति चेदिष्टापत्तिः ।
परंतु तत्सत्यत्वं विम्बरूपेणैव न तु प्रतिबिम्बरूपेण । प्रतिबिम्बस्य विम्बव्यति-
रिक्तेन रूपेण सत्यत्वादर्शनात् । यथा घटस्य न घटरूपेण सत्यत्वं किंतु मृद्रूपेणैव
तद्वत् । भारतीतीर्थास्त्वज्ञाने धर्मिणः प्रतिबिम्बस्यैवाध्यासः । ब्रह्मभेदादिक-
मपि सर्वं तत्राध्यस्तमेव । एवं च जीवस्वरूपस्य मिथ्यात्वमित्यूचुः ।

1.28. According to the view of the author of the Saṅkṣepaśārīraka who holds the "reflection" theory, the Lord is consciousness reflected in Ignorance. The individual soul is consciousness reflected in the intellect. However, the author of the Vivarana considers that there is the "appearance" theory in regard to the Lord and the "reflection" theory in regard to the individual soul. He says the Lord is the original consciousness conditioned by Ignorance. The individual soul is consciousness reflected in Ignorance which has been limited by the inner organ and its impressions. According to this view of the author of the Vivarana, there is no superimposition of the subject who is a reflection. However on the individual soul who is the subject and who is certainly not superimposed [but] reflected in Ignorance, there is the superimposition of the attribute in the form of being different from Brahman.

(objection) Then if the subject, which is of the nature of the individual soul who is a reflection, is not superimposed, it would be real.

(reply) It is acceptable. But its reality is only in having the form of the original, not in having the form of a reflection. Because the reflection is not seen to have a reality separate from the original. Just as the pot does not have reality in the form of a pot but only in the form of clay. It is like that.

However Bhāratīrtha says that there is indeed superimposition of the subject, who is a reflection, in Ignorance. Moreover everything beginning with the difference from Brahman is indeed superimposed there [in Ignorance]. Thus he says that the nature of the individual soul is false.

comment

Sarvajñātman considers the Lord to be consciousness reflected in Ignorance⁹⁰ and the individual soul to be consciousness reflected in the intellect. Ignorance associated with the Lord is denoted as māyā and in relation to the soul it is called avidyā.⁹¹ Sarvajñātman maintains that the Self, pure awareness, is the locus and the object of Ignorance⁹² while the individual soul is the locus only in the sense that the soul manifests the Ignorance.⁹³

Prakāśātman is of the view that the Lord is the original consciousness conditioned by Ignorance while the individual soul is consciousness reflected in Ignorance which is limited by the mind and its impressions.⁹⁴ Unlike Vācaspati, Prakāśātman maintains that Ignorance is single in nature and has pure consciousness as both its locus and object, just as darkness abides in and conceals the same locus.⁹⁵ He argues that it is not contradictory for Ignorance to have consciousness as its locus because the witness consciousness (sākṣicaitanya) illumines Ignorance.⁹⁶

According to the Vivaraṇa, Ignorance resides in consciousness as conditioned by the object. For example when the pearl-oyster is mistaken for silver, the Ignorance of the pearl-oyster is located in consciousness conditioned by the form of the pearl-oyster (śuktyavacchinnacaitanya). This Ignorance covers the pearl-oyster and transforms itself into the silver. The pearl-oyster appears as silver without itself undergoing change (vivartopādānakāraṇa) and it is also the efficient cause for the appearance (nimittakāraṇa). Ignorance is the material cause for the transformation into the form of silver (parināmyopādānakāraṇa). Similarly, Brahman is both the efficient cause of the world and the vivarta material cause (abhinnanimittopādānakāraṇa) while Ignorance is the material cause which transforms into the form of the world.

For Padmapāda-Vivaraṇa the reflected consciousness which is the essence of the individual soul is real and non-different from the original consciousness. The author of the Vivaraṇa specifies that the soul is consciousness reflected in Ignorance.⁹⁷

1.29.

अत्र येषां मतेऽविद्यया संयुक्तं चैतन्यं जीवः स च तत्रावच्छिन्न उपहितः प्रतिबिम्बितो वा तेषां मते जीवावस्थायामपि जीवैकत्वम् । अविद्यया एकत्वात् । अयमेकजीववादः । सुखदुःखादिवैचित्र्यं चोपाधिभेदात् । येषां तु मते व्यष्ट्यविद्ययाऽविद्याकार्यभूतबुद्ध्या वा संयुक्तं चैतन्यं जीवः स च तत्रावच्छिन्न उपहितः प्रतिबिम्बितो वा तेषां मते जीवनानात्वम् । अयं जीवनानात्ववादः । अत्र वाचस्पतिमिश्राणां मते जीवैकत्वम् । वार्तिककाराणां विवरणकाराणां संक्षेपशारीरककाराणां च मते जीवनानात्वमिति ।

1.29. Here, according to the view of those for whom the individual soul is consciousness united with Ignorance - and that [individual soul] is "limited", "conditioned" or "reflected" there [in Ignorance] - in their view

the individual soul is single even in the state of being an individual soul. Because of Ignorance being single. This is the theory of a single individual soul. The diversity of happiness and sadness etc. is due to the difference of the limiting adjuncts.

However, according to the view of those for whom the individual soul is consciousness united with individual Ignorance or with the intellect which is an effect of Ignorance - and that [individual soul] is "limited", "conditioned" or "reflected" there [in Ignorance] - in their view there are many individual souls. This is the theory of a plurality of individual souls.

In this matter, according to the view of Vācaspatimiśra there is a single individual soul. According to the view of the author of the Vārtikas, the author of the Vivarana and the author of the Saṅkṣepaśārīraka there are a plurality of individual souls.

comment

In the Siddhāntabindu, Madhusūdana portrays the theory of a single individual soul:

..... the individual soul alone is the material and the efficient cause of the world on account of its own Ignorance. All that is seen exists [only] in cognition. There is the delusion of a difference of souls because of the difference of bodies. Liberation is for the one [soul] alone, when there is the direct apprehension of the Self from the firmness of listening, reflecting and contemplation assisted by the teacher and the scripture etc. which are [the souls'] own superimposition. The hearing of the liberation of Suka etc. is only a eulogy.⁹⁸

According to this view, there are only two states of existence: the absolute (paramārtha) and the apparent (prātibhāsika).⁹⁹ Śaṅkara, however, accepts the practical reality of ordinary relations (vyavahāra)¹⁰⁰ and in accord with that perspective, it is more natural to admit the transactional distinction of a plurality of souls. Śaṅkara's use of the plural form in regard to souls would indicate his acceptance of the common sense view.¹⁰¹

In Advaitāmōda, Vācaspati is said to propound the theory of a single individual soul. This does not appear to be correct. Vācaspati, as we have seen, considers Ignorance to be manifold. If the reason for propounding a single individual is "because of Ignorance being single" then Vācaspati cannot uphold the ekajīvavāda. In the Siddhāntabindu, Madhusūdana writes

that Vācaspati upholds the view of a plurality of souls (ajñānanānātāvājīvanānātva).¹⁰² In a later commentarial work upon the Siddhāntabindu, Abhyankar's explanation of this passage shows that he does not dispute Madhusūdana's statement.¹⁰³ Accordingly, the following discussion should be viewed with circumspection.

The theory of a single individual soul is contained in the Iṣṭasiddhi of Vimuktātman.¹⁰⁴ Sarvajñātman also discusses it favourably in the Sāṅkṣepaśārīraka.¹⁰⁵

1.30.

अत्रेदं तत्त्वम् । एकजीववाद एव सिद्धान्तिसंमतः । अनेकजीववादे कस्या-
विद्या प्रपञ्चरूपेण परिणता । देवदत्तस्य चेद्यज्ञदत्तदृष्ट्या प्रपञ्चाभावप्रसङ्गः । न
चानेकतन्त्रारब्धपटवदनेका अविद्याः संभूय प्रपञ्चरूपेण परिणता इति वाच्यम् ।
केपुचित्तन्तुषु पटान्निष्कृष्टेषु पटन्यूनतावत्केपुचिच्छुक्त्वामदेवादिषु मुक्तेषु तत्तदवि-
द्याया निष्कर्षात्प्रपञ्चन्यूनतापत्तेः । किं च जीवो विभुः । अन्यथा देवदत्तीया-
दृष्टेन देशान्तरे देवदत्तभोग्यवस्तुन उत्पत्तिर्न स्यात् । अणोर्जीवस्य देशान्तरे
व्याप्त्यभावेन तदीयादृष्टस्यापि तत्र कार्योत्पत्तिदेशे कार्योत्पत्तिकाले संनिधाना-
भावात् । किंच कायव्यूह एकस्मिन्कायेऽनुभूतस्य सुखस्य दुःखस्य वा काया-
न्तरेऽनुसंधानं न स्यात् । एकैव जीवेन स्वतपोवलेन योगसामर्थ्येन वा
युगपदेव धृतान्यनेकशरीराणि कायव्यूह इत्यु-
च्यते । स च पुराणादौ प्रसिद्ध एव । किं च
तस्याणुत्वे शरीरव्यापिसुखाद्यनुपलब्धिप्रसङ्गः ।
शरीरपरिमाणत्वे च शरीरस्य बाल्ययौवनाद्यवस्थाभेदेन पिपीलिकामनुष्यह-
स्त्यादिभेदेन चानियतपरिमाणत्वाज्जीवस्याप्यनियतपरिमाणत्वापत्त्या विकारादि-
दोषप्रसङ्गेन्नानित्यत्वापत्तिः । अतो जीवस्य विभुत्वं सिद्धम् । तथा चानेकजीववादे
विभूनां जीवानां सर्वव्यापिनां सर्वेषां सर्वैरदृष्टैः सर्वैः कर्मभिः सर्वैः शरीरैश्च
सह संबन्धस्यावर्जनीयत्वेनामुकमदृष्टममुकं कर्मामुकं शरीरममुकस्यैव जीव-
स्येति नियमहेत्वभावेन सुखदुःखादिवैचित्र्यस्यानुपपत्तिस्तदवस्थैव । एवं च
लाघवादेकजीववाद एवास्थेयः । सुखदुःखादिवैचित्र्यं तु शरीराद्युपाधिभेदेनो-
पपद्यते । तथा च जीवनानात्ववादिनो वार्तिककारा विवरणकाराः संक्षेपशारी-
रकाराश्च प्रत्युक्ताः ।

1.30. Here, this is the reality. The theory of a single individual soul is regarded as the definitive view. In reference to the theory of a plurality of souls, whose Ignorance was transformed into the form of the world? If it is [the Ignorance] of Devadatta, there would be the absence of a world from the standpoint of Yajñadatta. It should not be said that numerous Ignorances, having combined, are transformed into the form of the

world like a cloth made from many threads. [reason] Because when some people such as Śuka and Vāmadeva were liberated, on account of the extracting of their respective Ignorances, there would be the diminishing of the world: like the diminishing of a cloth when some threads have been extracted from the cloth.

Furthermore, the individual soul is all pervasive. Otherwise, there would be no origination of an object to be experienced by Devadatta in another place by the merit and demerit of Devadatta. Because a minute individual soul lacks pervasiveness in another place, therefore the merit and demerit belonging to him will not be present there at the place and time of the origination of the effect.

Furthermore, in a multitude of bodies there can be no recollection in another body of the happiness or sadness experienced in one body. Many bodies simultaneously supported by only one individual soul, on account of his strength of asceticism or capacity in Yoga, are called kāyavyūha. That is certainly well known in the Purānas, etc.

Furthermore, in the case of its [the soul's] minuteness, there would be the non-cognition of happiness etc. pervading the body. In the case of [the soul] being of the size of the body, because the body has undetermined dimensions due to such different states as childhood and youth and because of the differences between ants, men and elephants etc., therefore the individual soul would also have an undetermined dimension and there would be non-eternity on account of the defect of undergoing modification. Therefore, the all pervasiveness of the individual soul is established.

Also, in the case of the theory of a plurality of individual souls, there is the logical impossibility in that case of the diversity of happiness and sadness etc. For there is no restricting cause for a certain individual soul to have a certain body, a certain action and a certain merit and demerit because of the unavoidability of the connection of all the all pervasive, all pervading individual souls with all bodies, all actions and all merit and demerit. So because of the economy of explanation only the

theory of a single individual soul should be accepted. Whereas the diversity of happiness and sadness etc. is logically possible due to the difference of the limiting adjuncts such as the physical body. So the proponents of the theory of a plurality of individual souls: the author of the Vārtikas, the author of the Vivāraṇa and the author of the Saṅkṣepaśārīraka, have been refuted.

1.31. किं च वार्तिककारमतानुसारेणाविद्याकार्यभूतबुद्ध्युपहितचैतन्यस्य जीवत्वे तथा संक्षेपशारीरकारमतानुसारेण बुद्धिप्रतिबिम्बितचैतन्यस्य जीवत्वे "जीव ईश" इत्याद्युक्ता जीवस्यानादित्वोक्तिर्धिरुध्यते । बुद्धेरविद्याकार्यत्वेनानादित्वाभावेन तदुपहितस्य तत्प्रतिबिम्बितस्य वाऽनादित्वासंभवात् । एवं विवरणकारमतानुसारेणान्तःकरणतत्संस्कारावच्छिन्नाज्ञानप्रतिबिम्बितस्य चैतन्यस्य जीवत्वेऽप्युक्तम् । युक्तं च जीवस्यानादित्वम् । सुषुप्त्यवस्थायां जीवस्य परमात्मसंपत्तावपि जीवत्वप्रापकोपाधेरविनाशाज्जाग्रतौ पुनः जीवस्यानादित्वम् स एवोत्तिष्ठतीति 'स एव तु' (ब्र० सू० ३ । २ । ९) इति सूत्र उक्तम् । तद्वन्मोक्षावस्थातः पूर्वं प्रलयेऽपि जीवत्वप्रापकोपाधेरविनाश एव वाच्यः । अन्यथा यथा पात्रस्थं जलं पात्ररहितं जलराशौ प्रक्षिप्तं सत्पुनस्तदेवोद्धारयितुमशक्यं तथा पुनः सृष्टौ तस्योत्थानासंभवेन सर्वस्य मुक्तिः सुलभा स्यात् । जीवत्वप्रापकोपाधेरविनाशे तु यथा पिहितपात्रस्थं जलं पात्ररहितं जलराशौ प्रक्षिप्तमपि पुनस्तदेवोद्धारयितुं शक्यते तथा तस्यैव जीवस्य पुनः सृष्टावुत्थानं सुलभम् । एतच्च जीवस्यानादित्व एव संगच्छते । सादित्वे त्वाविद्याकार्यस्य जीवोपाधित्वेन प्रलये चाविद्याकार्यस्य विनाशेन जीवोपाधिस्थितेरसंभवेन तस्यैव पुनरुत्थानमिति नियमो न स्यात् ।

1.31. Furthermore, the statement of the beginningless nature of the individual soul which has been told [in the verse] beginning with "the individual soul, the Lord" is contradicted in conforming to the view of the author of the Vārtikas in regard to the individual soul who is consciousness conditioned by the intellect which is an effect of Ignorance. In the same manner, it is contradicted in conforming to the view of the author of the Saṅkṣepaśārīraka in regard to the individual soul who is consciousness reflected in the intellect. As the intellect is an effect of Ignorance and as it is not beginningless, therefore what is conditioned by that or reflected in that has no possibility of being beginningless. Thus [the contradiction]

can also be inferred in conforming to the view of the author of the Vivarana in the case of the individual soul who is consciousness reflected in Ignorance which has been limited by the inner organ and its impressions.

The beginningless nature of the individual soul is correct. It has been told in the sūtra: "but that very [individual soul]..." (B.S.3.2.9.) that although the individual soul resolves into the supreme Self in the state of deep sleep, because there is no destruction of the limiting condition which brings about the state of being an individual soul, that very [soul] rises up again in the waking state. Similarly, it should certainly be said that even upon the dissolution [of the world], prior to the state of liberation, there is no destruction of the limiting adjunct which brings about the state of an individual soul. Otherwise, just as the water in a vessel which is being thrown, without the vessel, into a mass of water is unable to be extracted again, so too, because there is no possibility of that [same individual soul] rising up again at [the time of] creation the liberation of all could be easily attained.

However, if there is no destruction of the limiting adjunct which brings about the state of an individual soul, like the water in a sealed vessel though thrown along with the vessel into a mass of water is able to be extracted again, so too, the appearance of that same individual once again at [the time of] creation is easily attained. This agrees only with the beginningless nature of the individual soul. However, if [the individual soul] has a beginning, because the limiting adjunct of the individual soul is the effect of Ignorance and because there is the destruction of the effect of Ignorance at the dissolution [of the world], therefore there is no possibility of the continued existence of the limiting adjunct of the individual soul. Thus there could be no rule about the appearance of that very same [individual soul] once again.

comment

Abhyankar's critique of Sureśvara's, Sarvajñātman's and Prakāśātman's views on the nature of the soul can be summarized as follows: the soul

cannot be beginningless if it is consciousness conditioned by or reflected in the intellect which is an effect of Ignorance. Because it is the product of an effect. As a result of this, at the time of cosmic dissolution when all the effects of Ignorance perish, the limiting adjuncts will also perish and the cessation of the soul will occur. Thus there can be no assurance that the same soul will emerge at the commencement of the following cycle.

This argument is based upon the view that the effects of Ignorance are destroyed at the time of cosmic dissolution. However, if the effects merely resolve into their cause - Ignorance - in a latent condition, then the continued existence of the same soul can be explained. According to this view, the subtle body (sūkṣmaśarīra), of which the intellect is a constituent, remains in a subtle form during the period of dissolution. This would appear to be the accepted position in Advaita, for the subtle body is considered to be beginningless and to persist until liberation.¹⁰⁶

Śaṅkara affirms this position, for he states that:

As long as the soul continues to transmigrate, as long as its transmigratory state does not come to an end through correct insight, its connection with the intellect does not cease ... In reality, there is no individual soul apart from the nature which has been superimposed due to the connection with the limiting adjunct of the intellect.¹⁰⁷

In Brahmasūtra 2.3.31. Śaṅkara replies to an objection of a similar import to that put forward by Abhyankar:

This contact with the intellect certainly exists in a state of latency during deep sleep and dissolution and again appears during waking and creation ... Therefore this is established: the contact with the limiting adjunct such as the intellect continues as long as [the individuality] of the Self.¹⁰⁸

Accordingly, we may conclude that the views of the three authors can be upheld.

1.32. वाचस्पतिभिश्चैव यद्यप्येकजीववाद एवाश्रितस्तथापि तैरवच्छेदवादः
स्वीकृतः । तदपेक्षया च जीवविषये प्रतिबिम्बवाद एव ज्यायान् । यतो जीवा-
नामत्यन्तमज्ञानपारतन्त्र्यमुपलभ्यते । तच्च प्रति-
प्रतिबिम्बवादः बिम्बवाद एव सामीचीन्येनोपपद्यते । किं च यथै-
कस्मिन्पादे शृङ्गलावन्धसत्त्वे पादान्तरे तदभावेऽपि
न मनुष्यो मुक्तो भवति तद्वदवच्छेदवादे यस्या आविद्याया नाशस्तदवच्छि-
न्नस्य ब्रह्मणा सहैक्येऽपि तस्यैवाविद्यान्तरावच्छिन्नांशेन बद्धत्वं तदवस्थमेव
स्यात् । प्रतिबिम्बवादे तु नायं दोषः । यतः प्रतिबिम्बगतमालिन्यादीनां
बिम्बे स्पर्शोऽपि नास्ति । किं चान्तर्यामिब्राह्मणे य आत्मनि तिष्ठन्नात्मनोऽन्तरः ०
य आत्मानमन्तरो यमयति (वृ० ३।७।२२) इत्यत्र नियम्यनियामकयोरेकत्रैव
स्थितिरुक्ता सा प्रतिबिम्बवादे संगच्छते । यथैकत्रैव जले जलावच्छिन्न

आकाशो जले प्रतिबिम्बितश्चाकाश इत्याकाशद्वयं तथाऽविद्यारूपोपाधौ चैतन्य-
द्वयम् । तत्र प्रतिबिम्बचैतन्यं जीवभूतं नियम्यम् । अवच्छिन्नं त्वीश्वररूपं
नियामकम् । घटावच्छिन्नाकाशस्य महाकाशानन्यत्ववदवच्छिन्नचैतन्यस्य
बिम्बानन्यत्वं बोध्यम् । एवं चाज्ञानप्रतिबिम्बितं चैतन्यं जीवः, अज्ञानोपहितं
बिम्बचैतन्यमीश्वर इति प्रागुक्तपक्ष एव सिद्धान्तभूतोऽवतिष्ठते । शुद्धं चैतन्यं
त्वज्ञानानुपहितभवेति । सर्वेष्वप्येषूक्तेषु पक्षेषु ब्रह्माद्वैतं स्थिरमेव । अवच्छिन्न-
स्योपहितस्य प्रतिबिम्बितस्य वा चैतन्यस्य शुद्ध-
चैतन्यापेक्षया पृथग्भावायोगात् । जडवस्तुनापि
ब्रह्मणि द्वैतं नापादनीयम् । जडस्याकाशाद्यखिल-
प्रपञ्चस्य भावरूपाज्ञानोपादानकत्वेन मिथ्यात्वात् ।

1.32. Although Vācaspatimiśra has only resorted to the theory of a single individual soul, nevertheless he has accepted the theory of limitation. With regard to that, the reflection theory is certainly superior in the case of the individual soul. Because it is observed that individual souls have total dependence upon Ignorance. That is logically possible only in the case of the theory of reflection.

Furthermore, just as no person is liberated when one foot is bound with an iron chain, even though it is absent on the other foot, similarly, in the case of the limitation theory although there is identity with Brahman because of the destruction of one Ignorance for the person who has been limited by that [Ignorance], there will still be bondage for that very [person] because of the portion limited by another Ignorance. However, this is not a defect in the case of the reflection theory. Because in the original there is not even a touch of the impurities etc. which belong to the reflection.

Furthermore, here in the antaryāmibrāhmaṇa: "He who inhabits the self, who is within the self ... who controls the self from within ..." (Brh.3.7.22.) the location of the controlled and the controller has been mentioned as at the very same place and that [location] agrees in the case of the reflection theory. Just as space is twofold in the very same location in water: space limited by water and space reflected in water, similarly, consciousness is twofold in the limiting adjunct in the form

of Ignorance. There [in the limiting adjunct], the consciousness reflected is the individual soul who is controlled. Whereas [the consciousness] which has been "limited" is the Lord who is the controller. Just as the space limited by a pot is not different from the total space, the consciousness which has been "limited" should be understood as not different from the original. Thus the previously stated view alone remains the definitive doctrine: the individual soul is consciousness reflected in Ignorance and the Lord is the original consciousness which has been conditioned by Ignorance. Pure consciousness, however, is certainly unconditioned by Ignorance.

Moreover, among all these views which have been stated that alone is constant: Brahman is non-dual. Because it is not correct that the consciousness which is "limited", "conditioned" or "reflected" has a separate existence in relation to pure consciousness. Duality cannot be established in Brahman even by an inert object. Because the entire inert world beginning with space is false (i.e. it has no independent existence) since its material cause is Ignorance which is a positive entity.

comment

The view which the author finally favours is that of Prakāśātman in the Pañcapādikāvivarana (cf. 1.28.). Abhyankar concludes the discussion by stating that although there are various opinions concerning the nature of the Lord and the soul, the different authors are not in dispute with regard to the principal teachings of the Advaita tradition. Sureśvara has aptly written:

By whichever [method] people can develop understanding of the inner Self, that method should certainly be known as good and as consistent [with the main teaching].¹⁰⁹

1.33.

अज्ञानं चेदं सदसद्भ्यामनिर्वचनीयं त्रिगुणात्मकं भावरूपं ज्ञाननिवर्त्यम् ।
अत्र प्रमाणमहं ब्रह्म न जानामीत्यनुभवः. देवा-
अविद्या त्मशक्तिं स्वगुणैर्निगूढाम् “ भूयश्चान्ते विश्वमाया-
निवृत्तिः “ परास्य शक्तिर्विविधैव श्रूयते ”

(श्वे० ६ । ८) इत्याद्याः श्रुतयः,

“ तरल्यविद्यां विततां हृदि यस्मिन्निवेशिते ।

योगी मायाममेयात्मा तस्मै विद्यात्मने नमः ” ॥

“ अज्ञानेनावृतं ज्ञानं तेन मुह्यन्ति जन्तवः ” (गी० ९ । १५)

“ ज्ञानेन तु तदज्ञानं येषां नाशितमात्मनः ” (गी० ५ । १६)

इत्यादिस्मृतयश्च । इयमज्ञानपदवाच्याऽविद्या कथं जाता केन च कारणे-
नास्या ब्रह्मणा सह संबन्धो जात इति न चोदनीयम् । अविद्यायास्तत्संबन्धस्य
चानादित्वाङ्गीकारात् ।

स संबन्धः कीदृश इति चेत्—उच्यते । यथाऽग्निः स्वविरोधिनि जले
साक्षात्प्रवेष्टुमशक्तोऽपि सूक्ष्मरूपेण पात्रादिद्वारा जले प्रविश्य तदीयं शैत्यं
चापहनुत्य तत्र स्वकीयोष्णत्वं तदीयत्वेन प्रदर्शयति तथेयमविद्या साक्षात्प्रवेष्टुम-
शक्ता सूक्ष्मतरेण स्वकीयमूलरूपेण तत्र प्रविश्य तदीयं निर्विषयं निराश्रयं
साक्षान्यपराकाष्ठाभूतं स्वरूपमपहनुत्य स्वकीयं साश्रयत्वसविषयत्वरूपविशेषरूपं
तत्र प्रदर्शयति । अज्ञानशक्तिर्हि स्वयं साश्रया सविषया च । तत्र विषय ईश्वरः ।
आश्रयो जीवः । एतद्द्वयमनयोर्मिथो भेदश्चानादिरेव ।

1.33. This Ignorance cannot be stated as existent or as non-existent, it consists of three qualities, it is a positive entity and is removable through knowledge. The means of knowledge in this matter is the experience "I do not know Brahman" and the sacred texts such as: "[they saw] the power of the divine Self concealed by its own qualities" (Śv.1.3.), "and again at the end there is the cessation of the entire illusionary world" (Śv.1.10.), "the supreme power of this [Lord] is heard of as being indeed various" (Śv.6.8.) and also the tradition such as:

When which [Brahman] is placed in the heart, the
Yogī, who possesses a Self which cannot be measured,
crosses māyā which is an extensive Ignorance. Salutation
to that [Brahman] whose nature is Knowledge.

... knowledge is concealed by Ignorance, due to that
people are deluded. (G.13.15.)

But for whom that Ignorance is destroyed by the
knowledge of the Self... (G.5.16.)

It should not be objected: how is this Ignorance, which is denoted by the

word ajñāna, produced and for what reason is its connection with Brahman brought into being ? [reason] Because Ignorance and its connection are accepted as beginningless.

If [it is asked]: "what is the nature of the connection ?" It is said: fire, for example, although directly unable to enter into water which is contrary to itself, enters into water in a subtle form by such means as a [heated] pot and having removed the coldness belonging to that [water] it manifests its own heat there as belonging to it [the water]. Similarly, this Ignorance is unable to directly enter, [but] having entered there [in Brahman] in its own root form which is more subtle and having concealed the essential nature belonging to that [Brahman] i.e., being free from object and location and being the supreme limit of what is universal, it manifests there its own form which is distinguished by the possession of location and object. Because the power of Ignorance itself possesses location and object. The object there [of Ignorance] is the Lord and the individual soul is the locus. This duality and the mutual distinction of both are indeed beginningless.

comment

"Ignorance" (ajñāna, avidyā) is a metaphysical principal to account for the appearance of the world. If the sacred texts reveal Brahman as pure being, pure awareness, actionless and free from all qualities, then Brahman cannot do any action to originate a world. The existence of a world is, in fact, a logical impossibility. Yet the appearance of a world is undeniable. Advaitins attempt to account for such a contradiction by maintaining that the Vedas reveal the existence of a cosmic power which, though not ultimately real in itself and depending upon Brahman, becomes the transforming principal whereby Brahman as though appears in the form of the world.

Advaita authors such as Sureśvara,¹¹⁰ Padmapāda,¹¹¹ Sarvajñātman,¹¹² Maṇḍanamīśra¹¹³ and Vācaspatimīśra¹¹⁴ consider Ignorance to be a positive entity (bhāvarūpa) endowed with a creative capacity which is responsible for the appearance of the world. However, some authors do not accept that Ignorance possesses such a function. Nāgeśabhaṭṭa argues in the

Vaiyākaraṇasiddhāntalaghumañjūṣā that Śaṅkara only uses the term Ignorance in the sense of erroneous knowledge (bhrāntijñāna) and its impressions.¹¹⁵ Thus Ignorance means superimposition (adhyāsa) and its effects. More recently, Sacchidānandendra Sarasvatī and his supporters have brought this interpretation into greater prominence. They are also of the opinion that the Pañcapādikā is a distortion of Śaṅkara's teaching and, among all the early post-Gaudapāda Advaitins, only Sureśvara is faithful to Śaṅkara's intent.¹¹⁶

The central issue is to discover in which sense Śaṅkara uses the term. In the introduction to the first Brahmasūtra, Śaṅkara states that Ignorance is equivalent to superimposition (evam lakṣaṇam adhyāsaṁ paṇḍitā avidyā-iti manyante).¹¹⁷ Throughout the sūtrabhāṣya Śaṅkara frequently uses such expressions as "superimposed through Ignorance" (avidyākalpita)¹¹⁸ and "manifested by Ignorance" (avidyāpratyaupasthāpita).¹¹⁹ These phrases are not in themselves conclusive evidence, for they can be interpreted according to either perspective. In his other commentarial works Śaṅkara often employs the word Ignorance in the sense of a fundamental error which conceals¹²⁰ the truth and thus lies at the basis of worldly life characterised by sorrow and delusion.¹²¹

However, in the commentary upon Brahmasūtra 1.4.3.¹²² Śaṅkara indicates that his conception of Ignorance possesses another dimension. The passage deserves close examination. He commences with the statement that the Lord requires a "primary power" (bījaśakti) for the purpose of creation. Such a power, he says, is of the nature of Ignorance (avidyātmikā hi bījaśaktiḥ) and can be expressed by the word "unmanifest" (avyakta). It depends upon the supreme Lord, it possesses wondrous powers (māyamayī) and it is a type of sleep: "in which the transmigrating souls are sleeping without awakening to their essential nature".¹²³ Śaṅkara then specifies that the avyakta is sometimes designated by the word "space" (ākāśa) or by the word "imperishable" (akṣara) or by the word māyā and he states that: "that māyā is indeed unmanifest, because it cannot be ascertained as real or otherwise."¹²⁴ Thus far Śaṅkara has equated the power, whose nature is Ignorance, with the word avyakta and declared it to be synonymous with indefinable māyā.

Śaṅkara then states that the sentence "the avyakta is higher than the mahat" means the mahat, the cosmic intelligence associated with Hiranyagarbha, originates from the avyakta (avyaktaprabhavatvan mahataḥ). Śaṅkara then gives an alternative explanation whereby if the mahat refers

to the individual soul the sentence "the avyakta is higher than the mahat is still congruent because the state of becoming an individual soul depends upon the avyakta. For the avyakta is Ignorance and it is only through being possessed of Ignorance that all the transactions of the individual soul continue (avidyā hy avyaktam. avidyāvattvena-eva jīvasya sarvaḥ samivyavahārah santato vartate). Finally, Śāṅkara states that the body can also be referred to by the word avyakta since it is the modification of the avyakta (tadvikāre śarīre parikalpyate).

This passage reveals that, for Śāṅkara, the conception of the avyakta possesses a double significance. The first sense, clearly in evidence through the expression of its nature as Ignorance, refers to a fundamental misapprehension of the nature of things which is the basis of the cycle of transmīgration. Secondly, Śāṅkara mentions that the mahat and the physical body are the products of the avyakta. This indicates the positive aspect of the avyakta as the transformative cause for the world. Although later Advaitins do not refer to the word avyakta as much as to its characteristic of Ignorance or to its synonym māyā, nonetheless we can see in this passage a legitimate basis for the later specification that Ignorance possesses both the power of concealing (āvaranaśakti) and the power of projecting (viksepaśakti).¹²⁵

In discussing the locus and the object of Ignorance, Abhyankar follows Vācaspatimiśra. Sureśvara, Sarvajñātman and Prakāśātman maintain that Brahman is the locus and the object. Śāṅkara does not concern himself with the issue.¹²⁶

1.34.

एतदेव साश्रयत्वं
सविषयत्वं ज्ञानरूपे ब्रह्मणि तदीयत्वेन प्रदर्श-
यति । साश्रयत्वेन सविषयत्वेन च भासमानं
सृष्टधारम्भकालिकमज्ञा- यति । साश्रयत्वेन सविषयत्वेन च भासमानं
नकृत्वम् यज्ज्ञानं तदेव महत्तत्त्वम् । एतदारभ्य सर्वं सादि न
त्वनादि । ततश्चैकमपि ज्ञानरूपं ब्रह्म धर्मधर्मि-
भावेन विषयविषयिभावेन च भिन्नवद्भासते । ज्ञातृरूपेण ज्ञेयरूपेण च भासत
इति यावत् । तत्र ज्ञाताऽहंकारः । ज्ञेयं शब्दतन्मात्रादि । भासमानं चैतत्सर्व-
मविद्यापेक्षया परिणामः । ब्रह्मापेक्षया तु विवर्त एव । एकस्यैव वस्तुनः पूर्वा-
वस्थात्यागपुरःसरमवस्थान्तरप्राप्तिः परिणामः । यथा क्षीरस्य क्षीरव्यवहार-
योग्यतां परित्यज्य दधिव्यवहारयोग्यतापत्तिः । पूर्वावस्थामपरित्यज्यैवावस्थान्त-
रभानं विवर्तः । यथा रज्जुस्वरूपेणावस्थितस्यैव द्रव्यस्य सर्पात्मनाऽवभासनम् ।
तन्मात्रपदेन सूक्ष्मभूतान्युच्यन्ते । शब्दतन्मात्रं सूक्ष्माकाशम् । तस्मात्स्पर्शतन्मा-
त्रम् । सूक्ष्मो वायुरित्यर्थः । एवं क्रमेण सूक्ष्माणां पञ्चभूतानामुत्पत्तिः । सूक्ष्माच्च
तत्तद्भूतात्स्थूलस्य तत्तद्भूतस्योत्पत्तिः ।

1.34. This [Ignorance] indeed manifests in Brahman, whose nature is Knowledge, the possession of a locus and object as belonging to that [Brahman]. The Knowledge which appears as possessing locus and object is the mahattattva. Beginning with this [mahattattva] everything has a beginning and is not beginningless. Thereafter, though Brahman is one and of the nature of Knowledge, it appears as though divided due to the relation of attribute and its possessor and subject and object. The meaning is that it appears in the form of the knower and the known. In regard to that, the knower is the "I-notion". The known is the subtle element of sound and so forth.

All this which appears is a transformation with regard to Ignorance. But with regard to Brahman it is only a false appearance. Transformation is the gain of another state, preceded by giving up the prior state, by one and the same object. Just as milk becomes fit for use as curd having given up its fitness for use as milk. False appearance is the appearing in another state only without having given up the prior state. Just as a substance which actually exists as a rope appears in the form of a snake.

The subtle elements are said by the word tanmātra. Subtle space is the tanmātra of sound. From that [tanmātra of sound] comes the tanmātra of touch, i.e., the subtle air. In this manner there is the successive origination of the five subtle elements. There is the origination of the respective gross element from the respective subtle element.

comment

The mahattattva refers to the subtle body of Hiranyagarbha.¹²⁷ Hiranyagarbha is consciousness associated with the sum total of all minds, just as the individual soul is consciousness associated with a particular mind.¹²⁸ It is referred to as the first soul¹²⁹ and as the "effect-Brahman" which is Brahman identified with the entire subtle universe. Cf. Mu.Ś.1.1.9. (kārya laksanaṁ brahma hiranyagarbhākhyam jāyate).

The tanmātras are subtle elements originating from the Lord at the time of creation. Cf. Tai.2.1.1. (tasmād vai-etasmād ātmana ākāśaḥ sambhūtaḥ. ākāśād vāyuh. vāyor agnih. agner āpaḥ. adbhyaḥ pṛthivī.).

The five subtle elements are: space, air, fire, water and earth. Their respective qualities are sound; sound and touch; sound, touch and form; sound, touch, form and taste; sound, touch, form, taste and smell.¹³⁰ Advaita authors, including Śaṅkara,¹³¹ favour the description of the creation by means of five elements rather than the three elements mentioned in the Chāndogya.¹³²

- 1.35. अविद्यायास्त्रिगुणात्मकत्वात्तत्परिणामभूतं सर्वं त्रिगुणात्मकमेवेति पञ्चभू-
तान्यपि त्रिगुणान्येव । तत्राकाशस्य सात्त्विकांशा-
ज्ञानेन्द्रियोत्पत्तिः च्छ्रोत्रमुत्पद्यते । वायोः सात्त्विकांशात्त्वगिन्द्रि-
यम् । तेजसः सात्त्विकांशाच्चक्षुरिन्द्रियम् । जलस्य
सात्त्विकांशाद्रसनेन्द्रियम् । पृथिव्याः सात्त्विकांशाद्घ्राणेन्द्रियम् ।
पञ्चभूतानां सात्त्विकांशेभ्यो मिलितेभ्योऽन्तःकरणमुत्पद्यते । तच्चतुर्विधम् ।
अन्तःकरणोत्पत्तिः तदुक्तं वार्तिके—
मनो बुद्धिरहंकारश्चित्तं चेति चतुर्विधम् ।
संकल्पार्थं मनोरूपं बुद्धिर्निश्चयरूपिणी ॥
अभिमानात्मकस्तद्वदहंकारः प्रकीर्तितः ।
अनुसंधानरूपं च चित्तमित्यभिधीयते ॥ इति ।

1.35. Because Ignorance consists of three qualities, everything which is a transformation of that certainly consists of three qualities. Thus the five elements also have the three qualities. In regard to that, the sense of hearing arises from the portion of space associated with the quality of sattva. The sense of touch is from the portion of air associated with the quality of sattva. The sense of sight is from the portion of fire associated with the quality of sattva. The sense of taste is from the portion of water associated with the quality of sattva. The sense of smell is from the portion of earth associated with the quality of sattva.

The internal-organ arises from the combined portions of the five elements which are associated with the quality sattva. That [internal-organ] is fourfold. It has been told in the Vārtika:

[The internal organ] is fourfold: mind, intellect, the ego-sense and recollection. The mind is called decision [and indecision].¹³³ The intellect has the

nature of ascertainment. Likewise, the ego-sense is declared to consist of wrong presumption and memory is said to have the nature of recollection.

(Pañcīkaranavārttika 33,34.)¹³⁴

- 1.36. तथाऽऽकाशस्य राजसांशाद्वागिन्द्रियमुत्पद्यते । वायो राजसांशाद्दस्तौ ।
 कर्मेन्द्रियोत्पत्तिः तेजसो राजसांशात्पादौ । जलस्य राजसांशा-
 द्दुग्धस्थः । पृथिव्या राजसांशात्पायुः ।
 पञ्चभूतानां राजसांशेभ्यो मिलितेभ्यः प्राण उत्पद्यते । सोऽपि वृत्तिभेदा-
 प्राणोत्पत्तिः त्पञ्चविधः । प्राग्गमनवान्नासाग्रस्थानवर्ती प्राणः ।
 अवाग्गमनवान्पादवादिस्थानवर्त्युपानः । विष्व-
 ग्गमनवान्सर्वशरीरवर्ती व्यानः । ऊर्ध्वगमनवान्कण्ठवर्त्युदानः । अशितपीतादि-
 समीकरणकरोऽखिलशरीरवर्ती समानः ।

1.36. Similarly, the organ of speech arises from the portion of space associated with the quality of rajas. The hands are from the portion of air associated with the quality of rajas. The feet are from the portion of fire associated with the quality of rajas. The organ of generation is from the portion of water associated with the quality of rajas. The organ of excretion is from the portion of earth associated with the quality of rajas.

The life-breath arises from the combined portions of the five elements which are associated with the quality of rajas. Moreover, that is fivefold because of the difference in function. Prāna has a forward motion and resides at the tip of the nose. Apāna has a downward motion and resides in the organ of excretion etc. Vyāna has motion in all directions and resides in the entire body. Udāna has an upward motion and resides in the throat. Samāna brings about the assimilation of such [things] that are eaten and drunk and it resides in the entire body.

comment

The Vedāntaparibhāṣā locates the samāna in the navel. The Vedāntasāra, too, says that it resides in the middle of the body.¹³⁵

1.37.

भूतानि चेमानि पञ्चीकरणेन दृश्यतामापद्यन्ते । आकाशादीनां पञ्चानां ये तामसा अंशास्तेषां पञ्चानां मिथो मिश्रणं भवति । तदुक्तं पञ्चदश्याम्—

द्विधा विधाय चैकैकं चतुर्धा प्रथमं पुनः ।

स्वस्वेतरद्वियीयांशैर्योजनात्पञ्च पञ्च ते ॥ (प. द. १ । २७) इति ।

अस्यार्थः—आकाशं द्विधा समं विभज्य पुनस्तयोरेको भागश्चतुर्धा विभजनीयः । एवं वाय्वादीनां चतुर्णामपि प्रत्येकं भागपञ्चकं परिकल्प्यम् । पञ्चस्वेकोऽर्धांशः । अपरे चत्वारोऽष्टमांशाः । तत्र चतुर्णामाकाशाष्टमांशानामाकाशव्यतिरिक्तेषु चतुर्षु वाय्वाद्यर्धांशेषु मिश्रणं पञ्चीकरणम् भवति । एवं वायवीयानां चतुर्णामष्टमांशानां वायुव्यतिरिक्तेषु चतुर्षु आकाशाद्यर्धांशेषु मिश्रणं भवति । एवमेव तेजोजलपृथिव्यष्टमांशानामपि स्वस्वव्यतिरिक्तेषु चतुर्षु चतुर्षु मिश्रणं भवति । इयमेव पञ्चीकरणप्रक्रिया । पञ्चीकरणेन च दृश्यतामापन्नेषु स्थूलेषु भूतेषु यत्र यस्यार्धांशस्तत्र तेन शब्देन व्यवहार इदमाकाशमयं वायुरित्येवं भवति । तदुक्तं “ वैशेष्यात्तु तद्वादस्तद्वादः ” (ब्र० सू० २ । ४ । २२) इति । अत्र आकाशादीनां सात्त्विकाद्यंशेभ्यो योत्पत्तिरभिहिता सेतरांशद्वयोपसर्जनीभूतादेव तत्तदंशाद्बोद्धव्या न तु केवलात् । स्थूलानि चेमानि सर्वप्राणिशरीराणि पञ्चीकृतभूतविकारभूतान्येव ।

1.37. These elements become visible by their fivefold combination. These are the portions of the five beginning with space which are associated with the quality tamas. There is a mutual combining of those five. That has been told in the Pañcadaśī:

Having divided each one into two and again having divided the first part into four, they each contain five [elements] on account of joining with the second portion other than their own. (1.27.)

This is the meaning: having divided space equally into two, one portion of the two should again be divided into four. In the same way each one of the four such as air should also be imagined as having five portions. Among the five, one portion is one half. The other four are one eighth portions. There [in the one eighth portions], there is the combining of the four one eighth portions of space in the four half portions of air etc. which are distinct from space. Similarly, there is the combining of the four one eighth portions belonging to air in the four half portions of

space etc. which are distinct from air. In the exact same manner, there is also the combining of the one eighth portions of fire, water and earth in the four half portions which are distinct from their own [element]. This is the procedure for the fivefold combination. When the gross elements have become visible by the fivefold combination, where there is the half portion of an element there is the expression by that word [designating that element]: "this is space", "this is air". That has been told: "but because of the preponderance there is the corresponding designation, there is the corresponding designation" (B.S.2.4.22.). In regard to this, the origination which has been mentioned from the portions of space etc. associated with the quality of sattva etc. should be understood to be from all those parts which are subordinate to the other two and not from one single [part]. These gross bodies of all beings certainly consist of the modification of the elements which have been made fivefold.

comment

The result of the process of pañcīkarana can be shown as follows:

| | | | | |
|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| air | space | space | space | space |
| fire | fire | air | air | air |
| water | water | water | fire | fire |
| earth | earth | earth | earth | water |
| space | air | fire | water | earth |

1.38.

अन्नमयः प्राणमयो मनोमयो विज्ञानमय आनन्दमयश्चेत्येवं प्रसिद्धाः
 पञ्च कोशा अत्रैवान्तर्भवन्ति । स्थूलशरीरमन्नमयकोशः । कर्मेन्द्रियैः सहितः
 प्राणः प्राणमयकोशः । ज्ञानेन्द्रियैः सहितं मनो मनोमयकोशः । बुद्धिर्विज्ञानमय-
 कोशः । तदन्तरज्ञानमात्मा वाऽऽनन्दमयकोशः । जीवात्मनि कर्तृत्वं भोक्तृत्वं
 चोपाधिकमेव । निश्चयाकारवृत्तिमदन्तःकरणं बुद्धि-
 शब्दवाच्यं कर्तृत्वोपाधिः । सुखाद्याकारवृत्तिम-
 दन्तःकरणं भोक्तृत्वोपाधिः । ज्ञानेन्द्रियपञ्चकं
 कर्मेन्द्रियपञ्चकं प्राणपञ्चकं मनो बुद्धिश्चेत्येवं सप्तदशपदार्थानां संघातो लिङ्ग-
 शरीरमित्युच्यते । एतदेव सूक्ष्मशरीरम् ।

1.38. The five sheaths which are well known thus: the modification of food, the modification of the life-breath, the modification of the mind, the modification of intelligence and the modification of bliss, are indeed included here [in the topic of the elements]. The sheath which is a modification of food is the physical body. The sheath which is a modification of the life-breath is the life-breath together with the organs of action. The sheath which is a modification of mind is the mind together with the organs of knowledge. The sheath which is a modification of intelligence is the intellect. The sheath which is a modification of bliss is the Ignorance within that [intellect] or it is the Self.

The doership and enjoyership in the individual self only pertains to the limiting adjunct. The limiting adjunct of doership can be expressed by the word intellect and it is the inner organ which has a modification in the form of ascertainment. The limiting adjunct of enjoyership is the inner organ which has a modification in the form of happiness etc.

The subtle body is the combination of seventeen factors: the five organs of knowledge, the five organs of action, the five vital-breaths, the mind and the intellect. This is the very same as the sūksmaśarīra.

comment

The description of the five sheaths occurs in the Tai.2.1.1.-2.5.1.

The physical body (sthūlaśarīra) is equivalent to the annamayakośa. The prāṇamaya, manomaya and vijñānamaya sheaths are included within the

subtle body (sukṣmaśarīra). The ānandamayakośa is the causal body (kāraṇaśarīra), which has the nature of primary Ignorance.¹³⁶ In the Vedāntasāra, Sadānanda explains the viññānamayakośa differently from Abhyankar by linking both it and the manomayakośa with the organs of knowledge.¹³⁷

According to Advaita, the sense of doership and enjoyership only pertain to the limiting adjunct of the inner organ and are falsely imposed upon the actionless Self: "Similarly, [one superimposes on the Self] the attributes of the internal-organ such as desire, resolve, doubt, determination etc. In the same way, having superimposed the "I-thought" on the inner-Self who is the witness of its entire activities, conversely, one superimposes the inner-Self who is the witness of everything on the inner-organ etc."¹³⁸ Doership and enjoyership are said to be extrinsic to the essential nature of the Self because their reality is contradicted through their cessation in the state of deep sleep.¹³⁹

Abhyankar gives two meanings for the ānandamayakośa. Only the first is congruent with the view of Śaṅkara who maintains that the ānandamaya does not refer to the Self but only to the sheath which is a modification of bliss.¹⁴⁰

1.39. ज्ञानेन्द्रियपञ्चकमन्तःकरणचतुष्टयं कर्मेन्द्रियपञ्चकं प्राणादिपञ्चकं भूतसूक्ष्म-
पञ्चकमविद्या कामः कर्म चेत्यष्टकं पुर्यष्टकमित्युच्यते । अत्राविद्या कार्यभूता
द्रष्टव्या । सा चातस्मिस्तद्बुद्धिः । यथाऽनित्ये स्वर्गादौ नित्यत्वबुद्धिः । अशुचौ
शरीरादौ शुचित्वबुद्धिः । दुःखेषु सुखबुद्धिरना-
त्मनि देहादावात्मबुद्धिश्चेति । कामो रागः । कर्म
त्रिविधम्—संचितमागामि प्रारब्धं चेति । फलमद-
त्वाऽदृष्टरूपेण विद्यमानं संचितम् । आगामि करिष्यमाणम् । यस्य फलं संप्रत्यु-
पभुज्यते तत्प्रारब्धम् । तत्र मोक्षकाले संचितस्य तत्त्वज्ञानेन नाशः । आगामि
तु नैवोत्पद्यते । प्रारब्धस्य तु फलभोगेन विनाश इति ।

1.39. The group of eight consisting of the five organs of knowledge, the fourfold inner organ, the five organs of action, the five vital-breaths, the five subtle elements, ignorance, desire and action is called the puryastakam. Here, ignorance should be seen as an effect. That [ignorance] is the perception of that in what is not that. For example, the perception of eternity in heaven etc. which is non eternal, the perception of purity in the body, etc. which is impure, the perception of pleasure in [what is really] pain and the perception of the Self in the body etc. which is not

the Self. Desire (kāma) means passion. Action is of three types: accumulated (sañcita), impending (āgāmi) and what has begun (prārabdha). Sañcita exists in an unseen form, having not yet given a result. Āgāmi is what will happen. Prārabdha is that [action] the result of which is currently being experienced. At the time of liberation there is the destruction of the sañcita due to the knowledge of the truth. As for the āgāmi, it certainly does not originate. The destruction of the prārabdha, however, is through the experience of the result.

comment

The puryastakam is mentioned in the Saṅkṣepaśārīraka 3.16 ff.

- 1.40. शरीरादिसर्वमचेतनपदार्थजातं पाञ्चभौतिकम् । मरणकाले स्थूलं शरीरं
 विनश्यति न तु सूक्ष्मम् । सूक्ष्मस्य तु प्रलयकाले विनाशः । तत्र तु सूक्ष्मशरी-
 रकारणीभूतमज्ञानमवशिष्यते । इदमेव कारणशरीरमित्युच्यते । तस्य तु तत्त्व-
 ज्ञानेन मोक्षावस्थायां नाशः । तुरीयावस्थायां
 त्रिविधशरीरसंबन्ध- यद्यपि त्रिविधदेहसंबन्धाभिमानो नास्ति तथापि
 विनाशौ त्रिविधदेहसंबन्धोऽवर्जनीय एव । सुषुप्तौ कारण-
 देहस्याभिमानः । स्वप्ने तु लिङ्गदेहस्यापि ।
 जागृतौ तु त्रिविधस्यापि । सुषुप्तिजागृतयोः संधिभूतः क्षणस्तुरीयावस्था ।

1.40. All the bodies etc. which are a collection of insentient materials, are composed of the five elements. The gross body perishes at the time of death, but not the subtle body. However, at the time of the cosmic dissolution there is the destruction of the subtle body. But there [in the state of dissolution] the Ignorance which is the cause of the subtle body remains. This is what is called the causal body. In the state of liberation there is the destruction of that also due to the knowledge of the truth. Although in the "fourth state" there is no wrong presumption of a connection to the three types of bodies, nonetheless the connection to the three bodies certainly cannot be avoided. There is the wrong presumption on the part of the causal body in deep sleep. Whereas in dream [the wrong presumption] is for the subtle body as well. But in the waking

state it is for the three types. The "fourth state" is the instant that comprises the union between deep sleep and waking.

comment

It was previously mentioned that other Advaita authors consider the subtle body to persist until liberation, not just until the cosmic dissolution. Cf. comment to 1.31.

The "fourth state" (turiyāvasthā) is often popularly and erroneously believed to be a transcendent state separate from the three states of waking, dream and deep sleep. The correct understanding is that the turiya is the locus of the three states and while it is intrinsically free from the state of waking, dream and deep sleep the three states are in no way separate from it: "Just as the differences of a snake, a streak of water, etc. are superimposed upon a rope etc. [the states of waking, dream and sleep] are unreal because they are mutually discrepant, though they are without any difference from the witnessing consciousness."¹⁴¹ Abhyankar exemplifies this by referring to the turiya as the instant between sleep and waking. At the time of waking the mind and the ego-sense reappear from their absorption in the pure awareness and at the time of sleep the mind and ego-sense resolve and what persists is pure awareness: "The witnessing consciousness is real because it is everywhere without deviation."¹⁴²

1.41. अथ जीवन्मुक्त्यवस्थातस्तुरीयावस्थायां को विशेष इति चेदुच्यते । ज्ञानस्य यन्निर्विशेषं सामान्यमात्रस्वरूपं तदवस्थाद्वयेऽप्यविशिष्टम् । तुरीयावस्थायां पूर्वसंस्काराणामविनष्टत्वात्सद्यः परिणामोन्मुखं तज्ज्ञानसामान्यं गर्भस्थं स्थूलशरीरमिव वर्तते । जीवन्मुक्तदशायां तु पूर्वसंस्काराणां विनष्टप्रायत्वादखिलपरिणामत्यागोन्मुखम् । यथाऽऽसन्नमृत्योः स्थूलशरीरमखिलभोगसाधनीभूतपरिणामत्यागोन्मुखं भवति तद्वत् । जीवन्मुक्त्यवस्थायां यत्सर्ववन्दनवनितादिविषयदर्शनं न तत्कार्यरूपेण किंतु कारणीभूताविद्याशक्तिमद्ब्रह्मरूपेण । अतो न तत्कार्यसंबद्धं संस्कारं जनयितुं प्रभवति । नापि तादृशपूर्वसंस्कारोद्बोधकं भवति । अतः पूर्वसंस्कारास्तदानीं क्षयोन्मुखा विनष्टप्राया भवन्ति । कारणव्यतिरेकेण कार्यस्यासत्त्वान्न विषयान्कार्यरूपेण पश्यति ज्ञानी । बद्धजीवस्तु कार्यरूपेण पश्यति ।

1.41. [question] What is the distinction between the "fourth state" and the state of a person who is liberated while living ?

[reply] The essential nature of Knowledge, the pure universal free from distinction, remains even in both states. Because the prior mental impressions are not destroyed in the "fourth state" that universal nature of Knowledge is daily ready for modification, like the physical body in the womb. Whereas in the state of a liberated person, because the prior mental impressions are mostly destroyed, [the universal nature of Knowledge] is ready to relinquish all modifications. Just as the physical body of a person who is about to die is ready to relinquish the modifications which are the means for all enjoyments. It is like that.

In the state of a liberated person, the seeing of sense objects such as garlands, sandal paste and women is not in the form of the effect but in the form of Brahman possessing the power of Ignorance which is the cause. Therefore it is not able to produce a mental impression connected to that effect. Nor even does it call to mind such a previous mental impression. Hence the prior mental impressions ready to perish at that time are mostly destroyed. Because the effect does not exist without the cause, the person who is endowed with knowledge does not see objects in the form of effects. Whereas the bound soul sees [them] in the form of effects.

1.42. तत्र सर्वत्रानिर्वचनीयख्यातिरेव । कार्यस्य सदूपेणासदूपेण च निर्वक्तुमशक्यत्वात् । यथा शुक्तौ भासमानं रजतम् । तद्धि न सत् । नेदं रजतमिति बाधानुपपत्तेः । नाप्यसत् । इदं रजतमिति प्रतीत्यनुपपत्तेः । अतोऽनिर्वचनीयमुच्यते । यदा शुक्तिरिदंत्वेन ज्ञायते न तु शुक्तित्वेन तदा तादृशं मूलाविद्याकार्यभूतं शुक्त्यज्ञानमिदंतया जायमानज्ञानसहकृतं चाकचकयादिसमुद्बोधितरजतसंस्कारसहकृतं च रजताकारेण परिणमते । तद्वदेवेदं सर्वं जगन्न सत् । ज्ञानिदृष्ट्या बाधानुपपत्तेः । “नेह नानास्ति किंचन” (वृ० अनिर्वचनीयख्यातिः ४ । ४ । १९) इत्यादिश्रुतिविरोधाच्च । नाप्यसत् । प्रतीत्यनुपपत्तेः । अतोऽनिर्वचनीयमेव । तच्च विक्षेपशक्तिमत्या मूलाविद्याया महत्तत्त्वाहंकाराकाशादिद्वारा कार्यभूतम् । आवरणशक्तिमत्या मूलाविद्यायाः कार्यं च लोकप्रसिद्धं शुक्त्यज्ञानादि । तथा चानिर्वचनीयस्य जगतो या प्रतीतिः साऽनिर्वचनीयख्यातिरेव । न तु सत्ख्यातिः । यत्प्रतीयते तन्न सत् । यच्च सद्ब्रह्म न तत्प्रतीयते । तस्य प्रतीतिरूपत्वेन प्रतीतिविषयत्वाभावात् । अतः सतः ख्यातिर्दुर्वचा । इदं शास्त्रमिति प्रतीतिरप्यनिर्वचनीयख्यातिरेव । शास्त्रस्याप्यविद्याकार्यभूतानिर्वचनीयजगदन्तर्गतत्वेनानिर्वचनीयत्वात् । “वेदा अवेदाः” (वृ० ४ । २ । २२) इत्येवं शास्त्रेण स्वयमेव स्वानिर्वचनीयत्वस्य प्रख्यापनात् ।

1.42. Therein [in relation to objects] there is only the apprehension of the indeterminable everywhere. Because an effect is unable to be stated as real or as unreal. Just like the silver appearing upon a pearl-oyster. That is certainly not real, because there would be no logical possibility of the sublation: "this is not silver". Nor even is it unreal, because there would be no logical possibility of the cognition: "this is silver". Therefore it is said to be indeterminable. When the pearl-oyster is known as "this" but not as pearl-oyster then that ignorance of the pearl-oyster which is an effect of the primary Ignorance, being assisted by the knowledge arising as "this" and aided by the impressions of silver recalled by the lustre etc., transforms into the form of silver.

Just like that, this entire world is not real, because there would be no logical possibility of its sublation through the insight of the person endowed with knowledge. And because there would be contradiction with the sacred texts such as: "there is no diversity whatsoever here" (Brh 4.4.19.). Nor even is it unreal, because there would be no logical possibility of its cognition. Therefore it is certainly indeterminable. That [indeterminable world] is the effect of the basic Ignorance which possesses the power of projection by means of the mahattattva, the ahankāra, space etc. The effect of the basic Ignorance which possesses the power of concealing is the ignorance of the pearl-oyster etc. which is well known in the world. So the cognition of the indeterminable world is indeed the anirvacanīyakhyāti. But [the cognition] is not the apprehension of the real (satkhyāti). What is cognised is not real and what is real, Brahman, is not cognised: because that [Brahman] is not an object of cognition as it is of the nature of cognition. Therefore the apprehension of the real is difficult to be stated.

Even the apprehension: "this is a sacred treatise" is only an apprehension of the indeterminable. For even the sacred treatise is indeterminable since it is included in the indeterminable world which is

the effect of Ignorance. Because the scripture itself has proclaimed its own indeterminable nature thus: "... the Vedas are not Vedas" (Brh 4.3.22.).

comment

According to Advaita, the ontological status of the world is strictly indeterminable (anirvacanīya) as either real or unreal. This position is the outcome of applying an uncompromising definition as to what constitutes real and unreal. For the Advaitin, what is real must be free from change.¹⁴³ If an object is perceived to be determined by certain characteristics and if those characteristics change then the former state of the object cannot be fully real since it is sublated by the latter condition. If the latter condition undergoes change then its reality is sublated by the new condition. Thus the absence of change, or more precisely, non-sublation is the determining factor for the definition of reality.¹⁴⁴ The Advaitin adopts an equally uncompromising position with regard to what constitutes unreality. What is unreal is totally devoid of an objective content, such as the son of a woman who has never given birth.¹⁴⁵

The ontological status of the world cannot be subsumed under either of these definitions. For example, if a clay pot is taken as the symbolic representation of any physical object, the Advaitin argues that according to the above definition its ontological position is indeterminable. The pot cannot be called real because it is sublatale through breaking etc. Nor is it unreal since there is the empirical presentation of a pot. It cannot be both real and unreal simultaneously because that is mutually contradictory. Consequently the Advaitin concludes that a pot, or any object, cannot be categorically determined as real or as unreal.

Abhyankar illustrates the anirvacanīyakhyāti with the well known instance of the silver appearing on the pearl-oyster.¹⁴⁶ This example has considerable instructive value for the Advaitin. Firstly, the silver appears upon the locus of the pearl-oyster which does not undergo any change to appear as silver. Also, when the pearl-oyster is cognized as "this is silver", the "this" element refers to the locus which is the pearl-oyster and which is not recognized as such because of the concealing power (āvaranaśakti) of Ignorance. The appearance of the silver is due to the projecting power (viksepaśakti) of Ignorance which transforms into silver due to some ocular defect, assisted by the prior mental impression of silver which was called to mind due to the brightness of the shell. Finally, the silver which appears cannot be determined as real or as unreal. Similarly, the world appears upon Brahman, pure awareness and

existence, which undergoes no change in order to appear as the world. Like the silver, the phenomenon of the world is a product of the twofold power of Ignorance. The āvaranaśakti is evident in the statement "I do not know myself" and its function is to conceal the truth and thus provide the opportunity for error. The viksepaśakti brings about the appearance of the world which is indeterminable as real or as unreal.

The author states why the cognition of an object is not the apprehension of the real (satkhyāti). What is real, Brahman, is not the object of a cognition. The nature of Brahman is awareness which is the very essence of cognition itself and awareness cannot itself be objectified since everything is its object. The Self, according to Advaita, is pure subject free from any objectification.¹⁴⁷

Abhyankar now elaborates on the relation between the scripture as anirvacanīya and its function in revealing truth.

1.43. तादृशमपि तत्तत्त्वज्ञानहेतुभूतं भवत्येव । यथा स्वप्नस्था गजाश्वादयो जीव-
कल्पितत्वेन स्वयमसत्या अपि सत्यां धियमुत्पादयन्ति सत्यं च शुभमशुभं वा
फलं सूचयन्ति तद्वत् । किंचाज्ञाननिवारकत्वमेव शास्त्रस्य तत्त्वज्ञानहेतुत्वम् ।
न हि शास्त्रं गगनकुसुमवदसत्यम् । किं तु केवलं तस्य पारमार्थिकसत्यत्वं नास्ती-
त्येव । तथा चापारमार्थिकमपि शास्त्रमज्ञानं निवारयति । अज्ञानस्याप्यपार-
मार्थिकत्वात् । एतावतैव शास्त्रस्यापारमा-
असत्यात्सत्योत्पत्तिः र्थिकस्यापि प्रामाण्यम् । न केवलं शास्त्रस्येयं
गतिः । किं तु सर्वेषां प्रमाणानाम् । तदुक्तम्—

देहात्मप्रत्ययो यद्व्यप्रमाणत्वेन संमतः ।

लौकिकं तद्वदेवेदं प्रमाणं त्वात्मनिश्चयात् ॥ इति ।

आ आत्मनिश्चयादिति च्छेदः । आत्मनिश्चयपर्यन्तमित्यर्थः ।

1.43. Although it is like that, it [the scripture] is certainly the cause of the knowledge of the truth. For example, the elephants and horses etc. in a dream, though they are themselves unreal due to being superimposed by the individual soul, produce a real knowledge and indicate a real auspicious or inauspicious result. It is like that. Furthermore, the scripture is the cause of the knowledge of the truth only in that it removes Ignorance. The scripture is certainly not unreal like a sky-flower. Rather, it only has no status of being absolutely real. So even though the scripture is not absolutely real, it removes Ignorance because Ignorance too has no absolute

reality. To this extent the scripture possesses validity, even though it has no absolute reality. This is the position not only of the scripture but of all the means of knowledge. That has been stated:

Just as the idea that the body is the Self is approved as correct knowledge, so too, this ordinary means of knowledge, but only until the Self is ascertained.

The division is ā ātmaniścayāt. It means "till the ascertainment of the Self."

comment

Śaṅkara too uses the analogy of dream to illustrate how a false phenomenon can give rise to real knowledge.¹⁴⁸ Although the dream is sublated by the waking state, the knowledge relating to the content of the dream is not sublated upon waking and hence it is a real knowledge. On the basis of the Chāndogya text 5.2.8. Śaṅkara argues, like Abhyankar, that dream can portend a real future event.¹⁴⁹

Since Brahman alone is absolutely real the scripture cannot possess the same ontological status for then there would be a plurality of absolutely real entities, a position unacceptable to the Advaitin. However, the scripture is also not unreal like a flower imagined in the sky. Therefore, though its position is highly exalted, it has only the same empirical reality (vyāvahārikasattā) as the rest of the phenomenal world.

The function of the scripture is to reveal the knowledge of the truth. Śaṅkara argues that there would be no scope for enjoining the knowledge of a particular thing if there was no ignorance of that thing.¹⁵⁰ Therefore the scope of the scripture lies in revealing the truth through eliminating the ignorance relating to it. Once this is accomplished, the efficacy of the scripture is complete and when Śaṅkara's opponent suggests that scriptural instruction is then meaningless, Śaṅkara agrees: "certainly, let it be meaningless, when [the truth] is known."¹⁵¹

The verse quoted above ("just as ...") is cited by Śaṅkara at the conclusion of his commentary on B.S. 1.1.4. It is also quoted in the Vedāntaparibhāṣā.¹⁵² The author has been identified as Sundarapāṇḍya.¹⁵³

1.44. तानि प्रमाणानि षट् । प्रत्यक्षानुमानोपमानशब्दार्थापत्त्यनुपलब्धिभेदात् ।
चक्षुरादिना घटादिविषयप्रत्यक्षं यदा जायते तदा स्वान्तस्थचिदाभाससहित-

मन्तःकरणं हृदयरूपं मूलदेशमजहदेव चक्षुरादिद्वारा वह्निर्निर्गत्य घटादिविषय-
देशं गत्वा तत्तद्विषयाकारेण परिणमते । सोऽयं परिणामो वृत्तिरित्युच्यते । तदा
वृत्त्या तत्स्थचिदाभासेन च घटादिविषयो व्याप्तो भवति । तत्र वृत्त्या व्याप्तिवृ-
त्तिव्याप्यत्वमित्युच्यते । वृत्तिस्थचिदाभासेन व्याप्तिः फलव्याप्यत्वमित्युच्यते ।

वृत्तिस्थचिदाभासः फलशब्देनोच्यते । विषय-
प्रत्यक्षप्रमाणम् चैतन्यं च तस्यां वृत्तौ प्रतिविम्बितं सत्तत्स्थचि-
दाभासेन सहाभिन्नं भवति । उपाध्योरेकदेशस्थत्व

उपधेयभेदस्यासंभवात् । तदा तामसस्य घटादेस्तमोरूपमावरणं तथा वृत्त्या
विनाश्यते । वृत्तिस्थचिदाभासश्चावरणविनाशे सति परिस्फुरन्विषयचैतन्या-
भिन्नतया विषयरूपेण परिस्फुरति । इदमेव प्रत्यक्षज्ञानमित्युच्यते । अहं
सुखीत्याद्यान्तरप्रत्यक्षस्थलेऽप्येवमेव । “ तत्त्वमसि ” (छा० ६ । ८ ।
७) इत्यादिमहावाक्यजन्यात्मसाक्षात्कारस्थले तु जीवब्रह्मणोरेकत्वस्याज्ञानेनावृ-
तत्त्वात्तस्याज्ञानस्य निवृत्तये वाक्यजन्ययाऽहं ब्रह्मास्मीत्येवमाकारयाऽन्तःकर-
णवृत्त्या व्याप्तिरपेक्ष्यते । स्वस्यैव स्फुरणरूपत्वात्तदर्थं चिदाभासव्याप्तिर्ना-
पेक्ष्यते ।

1.44. Those means of knowledge are six, due to the difference of perception, inference, comparison, verbal testimony, postulation and non-cognition.

When the perception of an object such as a pot is produced through the eye etc., at that time the inner-organ, which is in the form of the heart [i.e. the locus of thought and feeling] and which is endowed with the reflection of consciousness existing within it, without indeed giving up its original location it goes out by means of the visual faculty etc. and having gone to the location of the object such as the pot it transforms into the form of the respective object. This transformation is said to be a mental modification (vṛtti). Then, the object such as the pot is pervaded by the mental modification and by the reflection of consciousness existing within it. The pervasion by the mental modification is said to be the capacity of being pervaded by the mental modification. The pervasion by the reflection of consciousness within the mental modification is said to be the capacity of being pervaded by the result. The reflection of consciousness within the mental modification is called by the word "result". The consciousness [limited by the] object which is being

reflected in that mental modification is not different to the reflection of consciousness within that [mental modification]. Because when both limiting adjuncts exist at the one location there is no possibility of a difference in what is to be limited. Then, for the pot etc. which is produced from the tamas [aspect of the five elements] the concealing, which is of the nature of tamas, is destroyed by that mental modification. The reflection of consciousness within the mental modification, manifesting when the concealing is destroyed, manifests in the form of the object since it is non different from the consciousness [limited by the] object. This is indeed said to be perceptual knowledge. It is exactly in the same manner even in the case of internal perception such as "I am happy".

However, in the case of the direct apprehension of the Self which is produced from the "great sayings" such as "you are That", because the oneness of the individual soul and Brahman is concealed by Ignorance the pervasion by the mental modification of the inner-organ having the form "I am Brahman", which is produced by the sentence, is required for the cessation of that Ignorance. Because oneself certainly has the nature of being self evident the pervasion by the reflection of consciousness is not required for that purpose.

comment

Śaṅkara's works provide the foundation for the later elaboration of the Advaita theory of perception. In the Upadeśasāhasrī¹⁵⁴ and in the Taittirīyopaniṣadbhāṣya¹⁵⁵ Śaṅkara enunciates the view that perception occurs because the mind pervades the sense object by means of the respective sense organ and transforms into the shape of the particular object. The immediacy of perceptual experience is due to the modification of the mind into the form of the object and the illumination of that modification by the ever present consciousness.

This view is further developed in the Vedāntaparibhāṣā. The author, Dharmarājādharin, specifies that consciousness, though in reality undivided, is apparently limited in a threefold manner: in the form of the object (viśayacaitanya), in the form of the means of knowledge (pramāṇacaitanya) and in the form of the cognizer (pramātrcāitanya).¹⁵⁶

In response to the question as to what is the defining feature of perception, Dharmarāja firstly discusses the defining feature of a perceptual cognition and then discusses what is the defining characteristic with regard to the perception of an object. The criterion for a perceptual cognition is the non-difference of the consciousness limited by a mental modification in the form of the object from the consciousness limited by the object, given that the object currently exists and is capable of being apprehended.¹⁵⁷ This means that for there to be perceptibility with respect to a cognition it must have identity with the object of perception. For example, in the perception of a pot the internal-organ becomes externalized by means of the eye and assumes the form of the pot. This mental modification is called a vṛtti. When the mental modification has taken on the form of the pot the limiting adjunct of consciousness in the form of the pot and the limiting adjunct of consciousness in the form of the mental modification occupy the one location and are therefore in effect identical. The identity of the two limiting adjuncts is the defining feature in respect of a perceptual cognition.

Dharmarāja considers that the defining characteristic for the perception of an object is the absence of the object having a separate existence to the consciousness limited by the cognizer.¹⁵⁸ This means that when the pot is cognized the mental modification in the form of the pot connects the cognizer with the object. Both the pot and the cognizer are limiting adjuncts of consciousness which is their common substratum. So the existence of the pot is not separate from the existence of the cognizer since they share the same substratum. The author specifies that the object has no separate existence from "consciousness limited by the cognizer" because in the case of inference the internal-organ does not have contact with the object and so cannot assume the form of the object. Thus the object is not connected with the cognizer and although it has no existence apart from consciousness which is its substratum, it cannot be said as having no separate existence to that of consciousness qualified by the cognizer. Hence the latter is the determining factor in respect of the cognition of an object.

Abhyankar incorporates another factor in the explanation of perception, the "reflection of consciousness" (cidābhāsa) in the mental modification. This is discussed in the Pañcadaśī.¹⁵⁹ The reason for the mention of the reflection of consciousness in the mental modification

is because the mind is not by nature conscious but is illumined by the reflection of consciousness from the Self. The mental modification (vṛtti) is a subtle material substance which is pervaded by the reflection of consciousness. The mental modification does not have the capacity to illumine the object, rather its illumining capacity is due to the reflection of consciousness within it. The mental modification assumes the form of the object and removes the concealing ignorance of the object while the reflection of consciousness reveals the object. Because the reflection of consciousness is what reveals, it is called the phala or "result" and its pervasion of the object is called phalavyāpti. Apart from the distinction between the function of the mental modification and the reflection of consciousness, Abhyankar's explanation does not substantially differ from that of the Vedāntaparibhāṣā.

With regard to internal perception, the consciousness limited by the emotion of happiness etc. and the consciousness limited by the mental modification having that form occupy the one location and are not separate from the consciousness limited by the cognizer. So the cognition "I am happy" is perceptual knowledge.¹⁶⁰

The author now takes up the question of liberating knowledge arising from the apprehension of the meaning of certain scriptural statements such as the "great sentence": "you are That". Some Advaita authors, notably Maṇḍanamīśra and Vācaspatimīśra, maintain that verbal testimony can produce only mediate (parokṣa) knowledge which must be incessantly contemplated in order to produce a mental impression which assists the mind in producing immediate knowledge.¹⁶¹ Śaṅkara, however, states in the Upadeśasāhasrī¹⁶² and in the Brahmasūtrabhāṣya¹⁶³ that the immediate (aparokṣa) knowledge of the Self as Brahman can arise at the time of hearing the Upaniṣad texts, provided that the listener is endowed with the necessary qualifications such as discrimination and dispassion etc.¹⁶⁴ In the Brahmasūtrabhāṣya, Śaṅkara states:

repetition would be meaningless for one who can realize the Self as Brahman after hearing "you are That" once only. But for one who is unable, repetition is certainly proper.¹⁶⁵

Like Śaṅkara, his principal disciples who have left substantial writings: Sureśvara,¹⁶⁶ Padmapāda¹⁶⁷ and Toṭaka¹⁶⁸ uphold the view that verbal testimony can produce immediate knowledge. Abhyankar's expression: "the direct apprehension of the Self which is produced from the great sayings" shows that he follows the view of Śaṅkara and his disciples,

a view which became an important characteristic of the later Vivarana school.¹⁶⁹

In the case of perceptual knowledge arising from scriptural statements, there is the requirement of the pervasion by a mental modification in the manner of the apprehension "I am Brahman" in order to remove Ignorance. However, a pervasion by the reflection of consciousness is not necessary to manifest the object because the Self, which is the content of the sentence such as "you are That", is of the nature of pure awareness.

1.45. तच्च प्रत्यक्षं सविकल्पकनिर्विकल्पकभेदेन द्विविधम् । विकल्पो वैशिष्ट्यम् । घटमहं जानामीत्यादि वैशिष्ट्यावगाहि ज्ञानं सविकल्पकम् । घटरूपविशेषण-विशिष्टज्ञानावगाहित्वात् । " तत्त्वमसि " (छा० ६ । ८ । ७) इत्यादि-महावाक्यजन्यमहं ब्रह्मास्मीति ज्ञानं निर्विकल्पकम् । प्रत्यक्षज्ञानसामग्रीसत्त्वे शब्दादपि प्रत्यक्षं जायते । एकस्मिन्नेव ज्ञाने तत्तन्निमित्तभेदेन शाब्दत्वं प्रत्यक्षत्वं च वर्तते एव । न चास्य प्रत्यक्षस्य प्रत्यक्षावान्तरभेदः शाब्दत्वे शाब्दस्य च ज्ञानस्य पदार्थसंसर्गावगाहित्वेन कथं निर्विकल्पकत्वमिति वाच्यम् । नहि सर्वत्र शाब्दं ज्ञानं पदार्थसंसर्गावगाह्येति नियमः । किंतु वक्तृतात्पर्य-विषयविषयकमेवेति नियमः । " तत्त्वमसि " (छा० ६ । ८ । ७) इत्यत्र तु " सदेव सोम्य " (छा० ६ । १ । १) इति पूर्वप्रक्रमानुरोधेन निर्विशेषासङ्गब्रह्मैव श्रुतितात्पर्यविषयीभूतम् । तथा चास्य निर्विकल्पकत्वं सिद्धम् ।

1.45. Perception is twofold, on account of the difference of determinate (savikalpaka) and indeterminate (nirvikalpaka). Vikalpa means relatedness. The knowledge which apprehends relatedness such as "I know the pot" is determinate, for there is the apprehension of a knowledge qualified by the qualifying attribute in the form of the pot. The knowledge "I am Brahman" which is produced by the great sentences such as "you are That" is indeterminate. With regard to the totality of causes for perceptual knowledge, perception is produced even from a word. In this very same knowledge there is certainly the nature of being perceptual and the nature of being produced from words on account of the difference of the respective causes.

It should not be said: if perceptual knowledge is produced from a word, how can it have an indeterminate nature since the knowledge produced

from a word apprehends the relation between the meanings of the words ? [reason] There is certainly no rule that everywhere knowledge produced from a word only apprehends the relation between the meanings of the words. But there is a rule that [verbal knowledge] only relates to the object of the speaker's purport. In the case of "you are That", Brahman, free from distinction and relation, is alone the object of the purport of the sacred text in agreement with that which precedes: "dear boy [in the beginning this was] existence alone" (Ch. 6.2.1.). So it is established that this [knowledge produced from the sacred text] is indeterminate.

comment

Determinate (savikalpaka) perception apprehends the relation between what is qualified (viśeṣya) and the qualifying attribute (viśeṣaṇa).¹⁷⁰ With regard to the statement "I know the pot", "I" is qualified by the attribute of the pot. All perceptions other than those constituting identity judgements come under the category of determinate.¹⁷¹

Indeterminate (nirvikalpaka) perception is free from the qualified-qualifying relation. With regard to statements like "this is that Devadatta" or the Upaniṣad sentence "you are That", indeterminate perception arises from a previous determinate perception and the negation of the qualifying attributes brings about the apprehension of identity characterizing indeterminate perception. For example, in the statement "this is that Devadatta" (so'yaṁ Devadattaḥ) "this" refers to Devadatta qualified by the present time and place and "that" refers to Devadatta qualified by a past time and place. There is the perception of a single Devadatta due to the negation of the two sets of attributes relating to the different times and places since these do not constitute the essential part of the person. Thus the non-relational (akandārtha) knowledge of identity is brought about by setting aside the non essential features of the statement.¹⁷² With regard to the scriptural statement "you are That", non-relational knowledge of identity arises in the same manner. This statement will be explained in detail in the following section dealing with verbal testimony.

In reply to the objection¹⁷³ that verbal testimony cannot be non-relational since it apprehends the relation between the meanings of

the words, Abhyankar states that verbal knowledge does not solely depend upon the word meanings. For if that were the case, when a cricketer says "bring me a bat" someone could conceivably bring a flying quadruped.¹⁷⁴ It is the speaker's intention which determines the meaning. Similarly, Abhyankar argues that the intention of the sacred text indicates that statements such as "you are That" have only a non-relational sense.

1.46. अनुमितिस्तु व्याप्यव्यापकयोर्द्वयोर्मध्ये व्याप्येन व्यापकस्य ज्ञानम् । यथा
 अनुमानम् धूमेनाग्नेः । यथा वास्य दृश्यमानस्य जगतो
 ब्रह्मभिन्नत्वेन मिथ्यात्वं ज्ञायते । तत्करणमनु-
 मानम् ।

1.46. Inferential knowledge is between the two, the pervaded and the pervader. It is the knowledge of the pervader through what is pervaded. For example [the knowledge] of fire through smoke. Or just as this visible world is known to be false because it is different from Brahman. The particular means for that [inferential knowledge] is inference.

comment

Inferential knowledge (anumiti) is acquired through inferring the presence of what is to be proved (vyāpaka, sādhya or major term) by means of the observation of the instrument of proof (vyāpya, hetu or middle term) which is present in the subject (pakṣa or minor term) where the major term is to be proved. The necessary condition for inference is the previous knowledge of the pervasion (vyāpti), or invariable concomitance, between the middle and the major term. The standard illustration of an inference is: there is fire on the hill. Because there is smoke. Wherever there is smoke there is fire, as in a kitchen.¹⁷⁵ Here, fire is to be proved and smoke is the means of proof. The hill is the subject where the smoke is present. Fire is called the pervader (vyāpaka) because what is to be proved must exist in all cases when the instrument of proof exists. Hence the latter is said to be pervaded (vyāpya) by the former. The knowledge of invariable concomitance between the pervaded and the pervader - wherever there is smoke there is fire - coupled with the observation of smoke on the hill constitutes the means for inferring the presence of fire on the hill.

The Vedāntaparibhāṣā defines invariable concomitance as the co-existence of the major term with the middle term in all the locations where the middle

term exists.¹⁷⁶ The knowledge of invariable concomitance can be derived by repeated observation or even by a single observation provided there is no instance of inconstancy.¹⁷⁷

Abhyankar's second example of inference: "the visible world..." is from the Vedāntaparibhāṣā where it is elaborately treated.¹⁷⁸

1.47.

वने गवयं दृष्ट्वा तत्र गोसादृश्यं ज्ञात्वा यद्वि गवयसादृश्यं ज्ञायते सोप-
 भितिः । सादृश्यज्ञानस्यैवोपभितित्वात् । तत्करणं गोसादृश्यज्ञानं तदेवोपमानम् ।
 नेयमुपभितिः प्रत्यक्षान्तर्गता । गोरसंनिकर्षात् ।
 उपमानम् नाप्यनुमितिः । हेतुभूतस्य गोसादृश्यस्य गवय-
 निष्ठत्वेन साध्यस्य च गवयसादृश्यस्य गोनिष्ठ-
 त्वेन हेतुसाध्ययोः सामानाधिकरण्याभावात् । व्याप्तिस्मृत्यादेरत्रानपेक्षणाच्च ।

1.47. Having seen an ox in a forest and having known the similarity to a cow there [in the ox], the similarity to the ox which is known in the cow is knowledge based upon comparison. Because the knowledge of similarity is only based upon comparison. The particular instrument for that [knowledge], which is the knowledge of the similarity to a cow, is comparison (upamāna).

This knowledge based upon comparison is not included in perception because the cow is not in sense contact. Nor even is it knowledge based upon inference. Because the similarity to the cow, which is the reason, exists in the ox and the similarity to the ox, which is the thing to be proved, exists in the cow. Thus there is no co-existence between the reason and what is to be proved. And there is no requirement here of the recollection of pervasion etc.

comment

Comparison (upamāna) is the particular instrument for acquiring valid knowledge of similarity.¹⁷⁹ For example, a person who owns a cow is travelling through a forest where he sees a wild ox. He thinks "this thing is similar to a cow" and then subsequently he thinks "my cow is similar to this". The first statement where he perceives the similarity

of the ox to the cow is a statement of comparison. Because of this statement he acquires the resultant knowledge based upon the comparison, i.e., "my cow is similar to this".

Abhyankar maintains that knowledge acquired from comparison is not perceptual because the cow is not in sense contact.¹⁸⁰ Nor is it a matter for inference because the similarity of the ox to the cow is the reason (hetu) to infer the similarity of the cow to the ox (sādhyā) and the locus of the reason is the ox while the locus of what is to be proved is the cow. Thus the reason and what is to be proved by it are not co-existent which is a criterion necessary to formulate a rule of pervasion (vyāpti).¹⁸¹ He also argues against inference on the grounds that the cognition "my cow is similar to this" does not require the recollection of pervasion in the manner: "what corresponds to the similarity belonging to a thing is similar to that thing".¹⁸² The use of the word "et cetera" could refer to memory, for although the cow is recollected in the judgement "this is similar to a cow", the similarity is not recollected and so it is not a case of memory.

The author of the Vedāntaparibhāṣā appears to accept the possibility that inference could account for this knowledge but he argues that the knowledge "my cow is similar to this" can be acquired without the formation of an inference and consequently comparison is a separate means of knowledge.¹⁸³

1.48. पदसमूहो वाक्यम् । तस्माज्जायमानं ज्ञानं शाब्दम् । तत्करणं शब्दः । तत्र वेदस्येश्वरप्रणीतत्वात्प्रामाण्यम् । सृष्ट्यारम्भे परमेश्वरेण पूर्वसर्गसिद्धवेदानुपूर्वी-
समानानुपूर्वीको वेदो विरच्यते । स्मृतिपुराणा-
शाब्दज्ञानम् दीनां तु वेदमूलकत्वे प्रामाण्यम् । वेदविरुद्धार्थ-
कानां तु न प्रामाण्यम् । अविरुद्धार्थकानां
तन्मूलभूतवेदाज्ञाने तु तदर्थकं वेदमनुमाय प्रामाण्यं कल्पनीयम् । तात्पर्यानुप-
पत्तां लक्षणयाऽन्यार्थप्रतिपादकत्वेऽपि प्रामाण्यमस्त्येव । यथा " तत्त्वमसि " (छा० ६ । ८ । ७) इत्यादेः ।

1.48. A sentence is a collection of words. The knowledge which is produced from that is born of words. The particular instrument for that [knowledge] is the word. In regard to that [verbal testimony], the Veda has validity because it is composed by the Lord. At the beginning of creation the Lord arranged the Veda which has the same sequence as the sequence of the Veda existent in the previous creation.

The traditions, legendary histories etc. have validity in that they are based upon the Veda. But there is no validity for what is opposed to the meaning of the Veda. In respect of those [traditions and legendary histories] which are not of contradictory meaning to it [i.e. the Veda], but when the Veda text serving as their basis is unknown, their validity is construed by inferring such a Vedic text.

When the purport is not logically possible, there is certainly validity even in teaching another meaning by implication. Just as there is [for the scriptural statement] "you are That" etc.

comment

Advaitins believe that the Lord is the revealer of the sacred texts and, on that account, they seek to ensure the validity of the texts as the source of trans-empirical knowledge.¹⁸⁴ However, the Lord is not the author of the content of the Veda. The Lord reveals the eternal Vedic knowledge at the beginning of each cycle of creation.¹⁸⁵ The Veda has an unbroken continuity in the sense that it is always the same Veda which is revealed in each cosmic cycle.¹⁸⁶ For the Advaitin, the origin of the Vedic knowledge, like the origin of the individual soul, the origin of the Lord or the origin of their material cause, māyā, cannot be ascertained through speculation and for this reason they are all said to be beginningless.

Words can reveal their meaning either through their primary expressive power (śakti) or by implication (lakṣaṇā).¹⁸⁷ The "great sentences" (mahāvākya) such as "you are That" (tat tvam asi) are interpreted as revealing their meaning through implication. Advaita treatises delineate three varieties of implication.¹⁸⁸ The first is exclusive implication (jahallakṣaṇā) which occurs through giving up the express meaning and substituting an implied meaning. For example, in the expression "the cowherd village is on the Ganges" the express meaning is unintelligible and the sentence can only be understood by completely abandoning the literal sense in favour of the implied meaning of "on the bank". The second type is known as non-exclusive implication (ajahallakṣaṇā). In this case there is the cognition of an implied meaning without abandoning the primary meaning of the sentence. For instance in the expression

"protect the curd from the crows" the primary sense is retained and the implied meaning of "and anything else" is incorporated. The third type is exclusive non-exclusive implication (jahadajahallakṣanā or bhāgatyāgalakṣanā). Here, a word expressing something qualified gives up one portion and refers to the other portion. For example, in the expression "this is that Devadatta" the express meaning - the Devadatta qualified by a past time and place is identical to the Devadatta qualified by the present time and place - is unintelligible without giving up the contradictory factors relating to time and place and resorting to the implied meaning of Devadatta as the unqualified substantive.

Later Advaita authors interpret the statement "you are That" by means of exclusive non-exclusive implication.¹⁸⁹ Śaṅkara does not use this term though his method of interpreting the sentence is in accord with the latter type of implication. According to Śaṅkara the word "you" in the sentence primarily refers to the ego sense, the self-conscious knower, and it is able to imply the true inner Self after there is the exclusion of the ego portion which has been erroneously identified with the Self.¹⁹⁰ Śaṅkara refers to the method of discriminating the Self from the non-Self by the term of "continuity and discontinuity" (anvayavyatireka).¹⁹¹ In Advaita, the method of continuity and discontinuity is especially used in the manner of distinguishing a constant factor, the Self, from its association with other variable conditions such as physical and mental states. This is done by means of ascertaining the continued presence (anvaya) of the Self in the absence (vyatireka) of the variable conditions. Śaṅkara exemplifies this method with reference to the state of deep sleep.¹⁹² During sleep there is the negation of all objective conditions but there is no negation of "Seeing" or awareness as such. What persists through the variable states of waking, dream and sleep is awareness, the Self, and what is discontinuous, such as knowership, is an extrinsic condition of the Self.

The discrimination between subject and object is also included within the method of continuity and discontinuity.¹⁹³ According to this mode of reasoning, subject and object are mutually exclusive: the subject cannot be objectified nor can the characteristics of the object belong to the subject.¹⁹⁴ Through the application of this principle the body, senses and mental faculties are successively distinguished from the Self because they are objects of the seer, the subject. Even the subject, the "I", is said to have an objective portion (idam aṁśa)

and a portion which is the pure subject (śiṣṭāṁśa).¹⁹⁵ The objective portion is the ego, the self conception of "me", brought about by the identification of awareness with the internal organ. The remaining portion is the pure subject, awareness, which is the implied meaning of the word "you".¹⁹⁶ According to Śaṅkara words cannot directly denote the Self since it cannot be objectified.¹⁹⁷ However, following the indispensable discrimination of the Self by the method of continuity and discontinuity, the Self can be implied through the word "you" because the ego is not spacially separate from the Self.¹⁹⁸

The word "That" denotes existence (sat) associated with māya.¹⁹⁹ Śaṅkara states that the verb "are" (asi) conveys the meaning of identity between the words "you" and "That".²⁰⁰ Thus there is a relation of qualified and qualifier between the two words and their meanings: the express meanings of the words "you" and "That" should be mutually relatable. The express meaning of the word "you" is the individual who is subject to sorrow and who is immediately present (aparokṣa) in experience. The word "That" expresses what is free from sorrow and is remote (parokṣa). On account of their grammatical apposition the express meaning of the two words is brought into opposition. Through the implication of their essential identity in the common substratum of Being, the word "you" gives up the meaning of sorrow which is contrary to the meaning of the word "That" and "That" relinquishes the meaning of remoteness contrary to the meaning of the word "you".²⁰¹ Thus the two words indicate an essential identity on account of their grammatical apposition and qualifying each other they signify that the Self is free from sorrow and what is denoted by the word "That" is not separate from the Self.

Sureśvara's explanation of the sentence in the Naiṣkarmyasiddhi is a detailed elaboration of Śaṅkara's method of instruction. Sureśvara, like Śaṅkara, is emphatic that the comprehension of the import of the sentence is contingent upon understanding the true meaning of the word "you".²⁰² For that purpose he too employs the method of continuity and discontinuity²⁰³ and he argues that the Self can be implied through the word "I" after negating the objective portion of the "I" notion.²⁰⁴ Sureśvara observes that when all the objective relations with the "I" have been excluded it may seem as though the Self too has been given up.²⁰⁵ Sureśvara specifies that the function of discrimination is to exclude what is not essential to the nature of the Self while the scope

of revelation through the sentence "you are That" is to positively reveal the nature of the Self. Thus both discrimination and the mahāvākya are a necessity for the fruition of understanding.²⁰⁶

Sureśvara provides a technical analysis of the sentence meaning:

For the words, their meaning and the inner Self there is [respectively] grammatical apposition, qualifier - qualified relation and the connection of what is to be indicated and the indication.²⁰⁷

Firstly, there is grammatical apposition (sāmānādhikarānya) between the word "you" and the word "That". Because of grammatical apposition the meaning of the word "you" is qualified (viśeṣya) by the meaning of the word "That" (viśeṣaṇa)²⁰⁸ and because of the contradictory attributes the two words cannot denote identity according to their express meanings. The word "you" expresses the individual possessing the characteristics of limitation and sorrow. The word "That" expresses what is non-dual but remote. Because of the grammatical apposition the word "you" is identical to "That" and so the contradictory factors must be adventitious.²⁰⁹ By resorting to implication the contradictory characteristics of the two words are negated while their essential aspect is retained and in this manner the identity of the two is implied in the common substratum of Being - awareness.²¹⁰

1.49. पीनो देवदत्तो दिवा न भुङ्क्ते इत्यत्र पीनत्वोपपत्तये यद्रात्रिभोजनं कल्प्यते सार्थापत्तिः । नेयमनुमानेन गतार्था । दिवाऽभुञ्जाने पीने पुरुषे प्रथमतो दृष्टेऽन्वयव्याप्तिदृष्टान्तासंभवात् । यद्यपि यत्र यत्र रात्रिभोजनाभावस्तत्र तत्र दिवाऽभुञ्जानत्वसमानाधिकरणपीनत्वस्याभावः, अर्थापत्तिः यथा दिवा रात्रौ चाभोजीति व्याप्तिः संभवति तथापि न सा पीनत्वरात्रिभोजनयोर्हेतुसाध्ययोः । किंतु तदभावयोः । किं चात्र व्याप्तिस्मृत्वादेरपेक्षापि न दृश्यत इत्यर्थापत्तिः प्रमाणान्तरमेव सार्थीयः ।

1.49. "Devadatta who is fat does not eat during the day." Here, the eating at night which is postulated for the logical possibility of fatness is postulation. This is not understood through inference. Because when a person who is fat and who does not eat by day is first seen, there is no possibility of pervasion of co-presence and illustration.

Although the pervasion is possible: wherever there is the absence of eating at night, there is the absence of fatness on account of the co-ordinate relation with not eating by day, just as he does not eat by day and at night, still, that [pervasion] is not between fatness and eating at night, i.e. between the reason and what is to be proved, but between their absence. Moreover, the requirement of the recollection of pervasion etc. is also not seen here. Thus postulation must certainly be established as another means of knowledge.

comment

Arthāpatti means the postulation (āpatti=kalpanā) of some fact (artha) in order to make an already ascertained fact logically possible.²¹¹ For example, Devadatta is known to be fat but he is also known not to eat during the day. The fact of his fatness and not eating in the day becomes unintelligible if it is not postulated that he eats during the night. Arthāpatti rescues a known fact from seeming contradiction through postulating the only other fact which can explain it.²¹²

Advaitins consider that only instances of pervasion of co-presence (anvayavyāpti, i.e. "where there is smoke there is fire") constitute a valid inference.²¹³ They argue that if the case of arthāpatti is formulated as an inference there will only be pervasion of co-absence (vyatirekavyāpti) between the absence of the major term and the absence of the middle term.²¹⁴ Abhyankar has given an example of this. Advaitins maintain that pervasion of co-absence is not a cause for inferential knowledge.²¹⁵ Rather, it is a case of postulation which forms a separate means of knowledge. Importantly, Abhyankar mentions that in such instances as "Devadatta is fat..." there is no requirement for the recollection of pervasion and so it is not a matter of inference.

The Vedāntaparibhāṣā delineates a twofold form of postulation, in reference to what is seen (dr̥ṣṭārthāpatti) or hear (śrutārthāpatti).²¹⁶ Advaitins utilize the latter type for the interpretation of the sacred texts. For example, the text "the knower of the Self crosses sorrow" (Ch. 7.1.3.) would be logically untenable if sorrow were not false, since only knowledge is specified as the means for its removal.²¹⁷ Śaṅkara argues by śrutārthāpatti when he says that the sacred texts would not have enjoined the knowledge of the oneness of Brahman if there had been no superimposition of Ignorance upon Brahman.²¹⁸

1.50.

एवमनुपलब्धिरपि प्रमाणान्तरमेव । यद्यत्र भूतले घटोऽभविष्यत्तदा
 भूतलमिवाद्रक्ष्यदित्येवं घटाद्यनुपलब्ध्या घटाद्य-
 अनुपलब्धिः भावो ज्ञायते । अत्र नेन्द्रियं करणम् । तस्याधि-
 करणग्रहेणोपक्षीणत्वात् । अभावेन सह तत्सं-
 निकर्षाभावाच्च । किंचात्र ज्ञानस्य प्रत्यक्षत्वाङ्गीकारेऽपि तत्प्रमाणस्यानुपलब्धि-
 रूपस्येन्द्रियाद्भेदेन प्रमाणसंकराभाव एवेति ।

1.50. So too, non-cognition is also another means of knowledge. If a pot were to be here on the ground, then it would be seen just like the ground. In this manner the non-existence of a pot etc. is known because of the non-cognition of the pot etc.. Here, the sense organ is not the particular cause [for the knowledge of non-existence]. Because that is absorbed in apprehending the location and because it [the sense organ] has no connection with what is non-existent. Moreover, even if the knowledge is accepted here as perceptual there is certainly no confusion of the means of knowledge because there is the difference of the means of knowledge for that [perceptual knowledge] - which is non-cognition - from the sense organ.

comment

Non-cognition (anupalabdhi) is the particular means for apprehending the non-existence of an object. Abhyankar specifies the criterion for non-cognition to be considered as a means of knowledge: "if a pot were to be here on the ground, then it would be seen just like the ground." This means that only competent non-cognition (yogyānupalabdhi) i.e., an object which is not cognized would have been cognized if it were present, 219 is the valid means for the knowledge of non-existence. Competent non-cognition excludes instances where something may or may not be present but is unable to be perceived.

The cognition of the non-existence of a pot on the ground is perceptual because its non-perception and the knowledge of its non-existence are immediately experienced. However, the means for that knowledge is not perception because the latter requires contact between the sense organ and the sense object. In the case of the non-cognition

of a pot the sense of sight only contacts the bare ground. It cannot come into contact with a pot which is not present. Therefore, although the knowledge is perceptual the means of knowledge must be separately classified, hence non-cognition is treated as a distinct means of knowledge.

1.51.

तदेवं प्रमाणैर्जायमानं लौकिकं ज्ञानं साश्रयं सविषयं च । तदभिव्यञ्जक-
मन्तःकरणम् । अन्तःकरणवृत्तिरेव हि लौकिकं ज्ञानम् । अत एव तत्र ज्ञातृत्व-
मन्तःकरणस्य तदुपाधिकस्य जीवस्य वा । न तु शुद्धस्यात्मनः । तस्य
ज्ञानस्वरूपत्वेन ज्ञातृत्वासंभवात् । अहं जानामी-
त्येवं भासमानं ज्ञातृत्वमपि नात्मनः । किं त्वहम-
त्वम् अन्तःकरणस्य ज्ञातृ-
त्वम् र्थस्य । अहमर्थस्तु नात्मा । किं त्वविद्यापरिणामा-
न्तर्गतोऽहंकारः । अहंकारे चात्मत्वमारोपितं भासते
न तु वास्तविकम् । एवं मनसीन्द्रियेषु प्राणे देहादौ चात्मत्वमारोपितमेव भ्रमेण
भासते । एतादृशभ्रमनिवृत्तिमन्तरा मोक्षो दुर्लभः । भ्रमनिवृत्तिश्च ब्रह्मज्ञानेनैव ।

1.51. The worldly knowledge which is produced in this manner by the means of knowledge possesses a location and an object. The internal-organ manifests that [knowledge]. Because worldly knowledge is only a modification of the internal-organ. For this reason the knowership there [in respect of worldly knowledge] is for the internal-organ or for the individual soul having that [internal-organ] as its limiting adjunct, but not for the pure Self. For that [Self] has no possibility of knowership since it has Knowledge as its essential nature. Even the knowership appearing in the manner "I know" is not for the Self but it is for the sense of "I". The sense of "I", however, is not the Self but the I-notion which is included within the transformation of Ignorance. The nature of the Self which appears in the I-notion has been superimposed, it is not real. In the same manner, the nature of the Self which appears in the mind, in the senses, in the vital breath and in the body etc., has certainly been superimposed on account of error. Liberation is not possible without the removal of such error and the removal of the error is only through the knowledge of Brahman.

comment

According to Advaita, consciousness is of two types. The first is consciousness in its essential nature, identical with the Self and Brahman and manifest in relation to the mind as the unchanging witness of the presence and absence of all mental states.²²⁰ This consciousness is not opposed to Ignorance but illumines both knowledge and Ignorance. The second type is consciousness reflected in and qualified by the internal organ (vṛttiviśiṣṭam caitanyam).²²¹ This consciousness manifests in two forms: in the form of the subject (ahamvṛtti) or I-notion (ahaṅkāra) and in the form of the various mental modifications which are objects (idamvṛtti) of the I-notion.²²² It is the reflected consciousness which is operative in all epistemological activities, whether relating to sense objects or to spiritual matters. Because the gain of any knowledge requires a knowing subject as the locus of knowledge and also the object of knowledge which is revealed to the subject by the appropriate mental modification.²²³

Śaṅkara states that the Self, as pure awareness, cannot possess the quality of knowership. Nor does the intellect, insentient by nature, intrinsically possess knowership.²²⁴ Knowership is the property of the reflection of the Self in the intellect. The reflection of the Self, which is the I-notion, acquires the status of a knower on account of its identification with the attributes of the intellect. Śaṅkara attempts to illustrate the subtle relationship of the Self and its reflection in the intellect through the example of a face reflected in a mirror.²²⁵ The Self is compared to the face and the intellect to the mirror. The reflection of the Self in the intellect is like the reflection of the face in the mirror. Just as the reflection conforms to the attributes of the mirror, so that a defect in the mirror appears upon the reflection also, so too the reflection of the Self naturally assumes the attribute of knowership on account of its conformity to the intellect.²²⁶ Just as the reflected properties of the mirror may be falsely ascribed to the face, similarly the Self is erroneously considered to be a knower because it is not distinguished from its reflection in the intellect.²²⁷

From the preceding it is clear that even the sense of being "so and so", i.e., the I-notion, is not the essential Self but is included among the effects of Ignorance²²⁸ because it is the product of the Self

reflected in the intellect which is an effect of Ignorance. The Self, however, is in no sense spacially remote from the I-notion but is its locus and so the Self is the subject while the I-notion is its object. Thus the "I" is a combination of the I-notion and the Self as such. For this reason Śaṅkara, Sureśvara and other Advaita authors²²⁹ specify that the object portion of the "I" should be distinguished through discrimination from the remaining portion which is the real Self:

The learned should abandon the "this" portion in what is called "I" as not the Self. ["I" in the sentence of the sacred text] "I am Brahman" must be the remaining portion in accordance with the above teaching.²³⁰

The origin of the mutual superimposition of the Self and the intellect cannot be traced.²³¹ The consequential effects of this superimposition are the false ascription of the attributes of the body, senses and mind upon the Self and the erroneous imputation of Selfhood to the body etc. Because this superimposition is said to have Ignorance as its fundamental cause, it can only be removed by the liberating knowledge of the true nature of the Self.

The author now proceeds to state the indispensable pre-requisites for such knowledge.

1.52. ब्रह्मज्ञानेऽधिकारी च साधनचतुष्टयसंपन्न एव । साधनचतुष्टयसंपत्त्यभावे
ब्रह्मविचारस्यानपेक्षणात् । तदुत्तरं ब्रह्मविचारस्यावश्यापेक्षणाच्च । साधनचतु-
ष्टयं च (१) नित्यानित्यवस्तुविवेकः (२) इहामुत्रार्थफलभोगविरागः (३)
शमादिषट्कसंपत्तिः (४) मुमुक्षुत्वं चेति । तदुक्तं वराहोपनिषदि—

साधनं प्रभवेत्पुंसां वैराग्यादिचतुष्टयम् ।

नित्यानित्यविवेकश्च इहामुत्र विरागता ॥

शमादिषट्कसंपत्तिर्मुमुक्षा तां समभ्यसेत् ॥ (व० २ । ३) इति ।

शमदमोपरतितितिक्षाश्रद्धासमाधानानि शमादिषट्कम् । लौकिकव्यापारान्मनस
उपरमः शमः । बाह्येन्द्रियनिग्रहो दमः । कर्म-
साधनचतुष्टयम् संन्यास उपरतिः । शीतोष्णादिद्वंद्वसहनं तितिक्षा ।
आस्तिक्यबुद्धिः श्रद्धा । निद्राया आलस्यस्य
प्रमादस्य च त्यागेन मनःस्थितिः समाधानम् । “ तस्माच्छान्तो दान्त उपर-
तस्तितिक्षुः श्रद्धावित्तो भूत्वाऽऽत्मन्येवात्मानं पश्येत् ” (वृ० ४ । ४ । २३)
“ शान्तो दान्त उपरतस्तितिक्षुर्योऽनूचानो ह्यभिजज्ञौ समानः ” (शाब्द्या० ५)
इत्याद्याः श्रुतयोऽपि शमादीनामात्मसाक्षात्कारसाधनत्वं प्रतिपादयन्ति । एता-
न्यन्तरङ्गसाधनानि । कर्म तु चित्तशुद्धिद्वारा ज्ञानसाधनमिति बहिरङ्गम् ।

1.52. The person eligible for the knowledge of Brahman is only such a one who is endowed with the fourfold qualifications. Because there is no hope of inquiry into Brahman in the absence of the accomplishment of the fourfold means and because there is the sure expectation of the inquiry into Brahman following that [gain of the fourfold means]. The fourfold qualifications are: the discrimination between the permanent and the impermanent, dispassion towards the enjoyment of the results [of action] here or hereafter, the acquisition of the group of six beginning with control of the mind and the desire for liberation. That has been told in the Varāhōpaniṣad:

[Through a life of ethical activity] the fourfold means such as dispassion should arise for people. [They are]: the discrimination between the permanent and the impermanent, dispassion [towards objects of enjoyment] here and hereafter, the acquisition of the group of six [values] beginning with control of the mind and the desire for liberation. One should cultivate that. (Va.2.3.)

The group of six beginning with control of the mind are: the control of the mind, control of the sense organs, renunciation, endurance, faith and single pointed concentration of the mind. Control of the mind is the cessation of the mind from worldly occupations. The control of the sense organs is the restraint of the external senses. Renunciation is the relinquishment of action. Endurance is bearing the opposites such as heat and cold. Faith is the intellect having trust [in the teacher and the scripture]. Single pointed concentration of the mind is the abiding of the mind through giving up sleepiness, want of energy and carelessness. The sacred texts, too, teach that control of the mind etc. are the means for the direct apprehension of the Self:

Therefore, having become calm, self-controlled, withdrawn, enduring and possessed of faith a person should see the Self indeed in the self [the body]. (Brh.4.4.23.)²³²

The person who knows is calm, self-controlled, withdrawn, enduring, well-behaved and equal [to all]. (Śā.5)

These are the internal means. Whereas action is a means for knowledge through purification of the mind and so it is an external means.

comment

In the Brahmasūtrabhāṣya Śaṅkara states that possession of the fourfold qualifications is a necessary pre-condition for the knowledge of Brahman.²³³ Later Advaita treatises which elucidate some aspects of the tradition (prakaraṇagrantha) generally commence with a description of these fourfold means.²³⁴

According to the Advaita conception of liberation, action (kārma) has an important though limited function. Śaṅkara is emphatic that action can have no direct role in bringing about liberation.²³⁵ However, actions in the form of duties, charity, the performance of permanent rites such as agnihotra and the practice of austerity,²³⁶ undertaken with the correct attitude, are accepted as a means to liberation in so far as they prepare the mind to receive the teaching.²³⁷ The purpose of action is to facilitate a proper mental disposition by removing the "impurities" (durita) such as desire and aversion (rāga, dveṣa) which stand in the way of knowledge.

1.53.

अन्तरङ्गन्तरसाधनं तु
श्रवणमनननिदिध्यासनरूपं त्रयम् । “ आत्मा वा अरे द्रष्टव्यः श्रोतव्यो मन्त-
व्यो निदिध्यासितव्यः ” (बृ० २।४।५) इति
श्रवणादिसाधनत्रयम् श्रुतेः । द्रष्टव्यः, अहं ब्रह्मेत्येवं साक्षात्करणीयः ।
तदुपायः श्रोतव्य इत्यादिनोक्तः श्रवणादिः ।
श्रवणं नाम वेदान्तवाक्यानामद्वितीये ब्रह्मणि तात्पर्यनिर्णयः । श्रुतार्थस्योपप-
त्तिभिश्चिन्तनं मननम् । विजातीयप्रत्ययतिरस्कारेण सजातीयप्रत्ययप्रवाहीकरणं
निदिध्यासनम् । तदुक्तम्—

शब्दशक्तिविषयं निरूपणं युक्तितः श्रवणमुच्यते बुधैः ।
 वस्तुतत्त्वविषयं निरूपणं युक्तितो मननमित्युदीर्यते ॥
 चेतसस्तु चित्तिमात्रशेषता ध्यानमित्यभिवदन्ति वैदिकाः ।
 अन्तरङ्गमिदमित्युदीरितं तत्कुरुष्व परमात्मबुद्धये ॥ इति ।

1.53. However, the means which is more internal is the triad consisting in hearing, thinking and meditation. For there is the sacred text: "My dear, the Self should indeed be seen; it should be heard about, thought about and meditated upon" (Brh. 2.4.5.). "Should be seen" means it has to be made direct in the manner: "I am Brahman". The means for that is hearing etc. which has been told by "it should be heard about" etc. Hearing is the ascertainment of the purport of the Vedānta sentences in regard to the non-dual Brahman. Thinking is the consideration of what has been heard through reasonings of logical possibility. Meditation is establishing a continuous flow of thoughts of the same type through setting aside dissimilar thoughts. That has been told:

The wise say that hearing is determining the signification of a word by means of reasoning. Thinking is said to be determining the truth of the thing by means of reasoning.

Those who are versed in the Vedas say that meditation is where the mind has only pure awareness remaining. This internal means has thus been told. You should engage in that for the knowledge of the Supreme Self. (S.Ś. 3.344-345.)

1.54. तत्र वेदान्तवाक्यान्यद्वितीये ब्रह्मणि प्रमाणं न वेति संशयः श्रवणेन निवर्तते । मननेन त्वनेके संशया निवर्तन्ते । ते यथा-प्रपञ्चः सत्यो मिथ्या वा, आत्माऽऽनन्दस्वरूपो न वा, आत्मा देहातिरिक्तो न वा, जीवस्य परमात्मना सहैक्यं संभवति न वा, आत्मज्ञानं मोक्षसाधनं न वा, मोक्षसाधनत्वेऽपि कर्म-

समुचितं तन्मोक्षसाधनमथवा केवलम्, आत्मा ज्ञानस्वरूपो वा ज्ञानगुणको
 वेत्यादयः । मननं हि तर्कात्मकम् । यदि प्रपञ्चः सत्यः स्यात्तर्ह्यद्वितीयश्रुति-
 विरोधः स्यादिति तर्केण प्रपञ्चे सत्यत्वधीर्नि-
 श्रवणाद्युपयोगः वर्तते । आत्मानन्दस्वरूपो न स्याच्चेत्तत्प्राप्तये न
 कोऽपि व्याप्रियेतेति तर्क आत्मन आनन्दरूपतायां
 प्रमाणम् । देह एवात्मा चेज्जन्मान्तराभावेन कृतनाशाकृतोभ्यागमप्रसङ्गः । जीव-
 ब्रह्मणोर्भेदे “ तत्त्वमसि ” (छा० ६ । ८ । ७) इत्यादिश्रुतिविरोधः ।
 आत्मज्ञानस्य मोक्षसाधनत्वाभावे कर्मसमुचितस्य वा तस्य मोक्षसाधनत्वे
 “ नान्यः पन्था विद्यतेऽयनाय ” (श्वे० ३ । ८) इति श्रुतेरप्रामाण्यापत्तिः ।
 आत्मा ज्ञानगुणकश्चेत् “ निर्गुणम् ” (चू० ७ । २) इति श्रुतिर्न संगच्छेतेत्याद-
 यस्तर्का यथायथं स्वयमूह्याः । निदिध्यासनेन त्वहमङ्ग इत्यादिभ्रमो निवर्तते ।

1.54. In regard to the above, the doubt whether or not the Vedānta sentences are the means of knowledge for the non-dual Brahman is removed by hearing. Many doubts are removed by thinking. They are, for example: is the world real or unreal? Does the Self consist of bliss or not? Is the Self distinct from the body or not? Is the identity of the individual soul with the supreme Self possible or not? Is Self-knowledge the means of liberation or not? Even if it is the means for liberation, is it the means for liberation through being combined with action or on its own? Does the Self consist of Knowledge or does it have Knowledge as its quality?

For what is known as "thinking" consists of reasoning. The idea of reality in regard to the world is removed by reasoning: if the world were real then there would be contradiction with the non-dual texts. Reasoning is the means of knowledge about the Self being of the nature of bliss: if the Self does not consist of bliss, no one would be engaged to attain it. If the body alone is the Self, then because of the absence of another birth the consequence would be the destruction of what has been done and the arrival of what has not been done. If there is difference between the individual soul and Brahman there would be

contradiction with the sacred texts such as "you are That" (Ch.6.8.7.). If Self-knowledge is not the means for liberation or if it is the means for liberation combined with action, the conclusion would be absence of validity for the sacred text: "there is no other path for going [beyond death]" (Śv. 3.8.). If the Self has Knowledge as its quality, the sacred text "without quality" (Cū. 7.2.) would not agree. Thus such reasonings should be properly investigated for oneself. By meditation the error such as "I am Ignorant" is removed.

comment

In the Brhadāranyakopaniṣad (2.4.5., 4.5.6.) the sage Yājñavalkya teaches that the Self should be seen (draṣṭavya), it should be heard about (śrotavya), thought about (mantavya) and meditated upon (nididhyāsītavya).

Abhyankar explains that "should be seen" means the Self is to be directly apprehended and the principal means for that are hearing, thinking and meditation.²³⁸ According to Śaṅkara the nature of the Self must firstly be heard from the sacred texts and the teacher. Then the Self must be thought about or reflected upon, i.e., what has been heard should be investigated by means of suitable reasoning. Then the Self should be meditated upon with certainty.²³⁹ Śaṅkara states that when these means become as one, i.e. when there is no separation between what has been heard, reflected upon and ascertained to be true to one's experience then the knowledge of Brahman is clear.²⁴⁰

Śaṅkara accepts the utility of the meditative practices (dhyāna, pranidhāna) prescribed in the Yogasūtras.²⁴¹ However, he parts company with the Yoga school by rejecting the view that the practice of yoga, without the Vedāntic revelation, can lead to the ascertainment of the truth. Śaṅkara is emphatic that "the knowledge of reality is only from the Vedānta sentences"²⁴² and he does not accept that yoga, independent of Vedānta, can give liberation.²⁴³ In regard to the practice of meditative absorption (samādhi), which is the aim of yoga discipline, Śaṅkara considers it a means for the clear ascertainment of the Self which is known from the Upaniṣads.²⁴⁴ However, he does not consider that meditative absorption is of itself a sufficient condition for knowledge:

Even in deep sleep and meditative absorption there is the natural gain of non-distinction, however at the time of waking [from sleep and absorption], there is once again distinction just as before because false knowledge has not been removed.²⁴⁵

It is a misreading of Śaṅkara to consider that hearing and reflection are merely the preliminary stages to meditation. For Śaṅkara accepts that the mahāvākyas can, in the case of highly qualified aspirants, bring about immediate knowledge which requires no further fulfilment.²⁴⁶ In the thought of Śaṅkara, hearing the scriptures from a teacher, reflection and meditation are all to be repeated as long as required²⁴⁷ and the scope of the latter two is essentially to help the ascertainment that the meaning of the Vedānta passages is true to experience.

Padmapāda provides a more extensive definition of hearing, reflection and meditation. He says hearing is inquiry into the Vedānta passages for the knowledge of the Self.²⁴⁸ Reflection is the consideration of illustrations, reasonings and descriptive statements contained in the sacred texts and it is also the consideration of inferences not opposed to the meaning of the texts. Meditation is the establishing of the mind in the meaning of the Upaniṣad passages which have been supplemented by reflection. "Seeing" or realization (darśana) means the experience of the unity of consciousness which is free from the appearance of all worldly phenomena, on account of being established in the meaning of the Upaniṣad passages.²⁴⁹ In the view of Padmapāda, the role of the sacred texts is of primary importance for the knowledge of Brahman while reflection and meditation are supportive.

This question, as to the relative importance of hearing, reflection and meditation, is taken up by Padmapāda's main commentator Prakāśātman who seeks to establish that hearing is the principal member (aṅgī) and the other two are auxiliaries (aṅga) of it. Prakāśātman contends that even if verbal testimony produces only mediate (parokṣa) knowledge of Brahman which gains immediacy (aparokṣatā) on account of assistance from reasoning and meditation, still, verbal testimony is primary because the scope of the other two is to assist hearing. If it is suggested that all three are of equal importance, Prakāśātman disagrees by arguing that verbal testimony must be the principal cause for the knowledge of Brahman since it, as the means of knowledge (pramāna), is in contiguity ("the Self should be seen, heard about...") with what is to be known, i.e. the Self (prameya). Again, if it is accepted that

verbal testimony produces immediate knowledge which, however, remains mediate on account of the unprepared nature of the mind, then reflection and meditation are the auxiliaries to verbal testimony because they serve to assist the result of verbal testimony in so far as they bring about establishment in immediate knowledge by removing the obstructions existing in the mind.²⁵⁰

Prakāśātman maintains that immediate knowledge is not possible solely from meditation without verbal testimony because it would lack validity since meditation is not a means of knowledge. If it is argued that the immediate knowledge gained from meditation has the scriptural knowledge of the Self and Brahman as its subject matter and acquires validity on account of the connection with that, Prakāśātman replies that the validity of such meditative knowledge is dependent upon ascertaining the truth of the subject matter which is itself dependent upon another means of knowledge, i.e. verbal testimony. Therefore extrinsic validity (paratah prāmānya) would be accepted in the case of verbal testimony while the other means of knowledge are said to be intrinsically valid (svatah prāmānya). Prakāśātman concludes that reflection and meditation assist in bringing about the result of hearing and hence they are its auxiliaries.²⁵¹

Vācaspatimiśra, however, has a different interpretation regarding the relative importance of hearing, reflection and meditation. He considers that hearing and reflection give rise to meditation which causes immediate knowledge after being practised with attention and without interruption for a long time.²⁵² According to Vācaspati, verbal testimony produces only mediate knowledge²⁵³ which gains immediacy through a mental modification (vyrtti) assisted by the mental impression (saṃskāra) of non-duality acquired by repeated meditation upon the meaning of the Vedānta passages.²⁵⁴

As mentioned previously, Vācaspati adopts certain views of Maṇḍanamīśra.²⁵⁵ In this matter also he appears to follow Maṇḍana who maintains that repeated meditation (prasaṅkhyāna) is a necessary practice for the gain of immediate knowledge.²⁵⁶ Also, Vācaspati links hearing, reflection and meditation with the Yoga term saṃyama which incorporates the three stages of concentration (dhāraṇa), meditation (dhyāna) and meditative absorption (samādhi).²⁵⁷ He equates hearing and reflection with concentration, meditation upon the meaning of the Vedānta

passages (nididhyāsana) with yoga meditation (dhyāna) and direct apprehension of the Self (in the sentence "the Self is to be seen", etc.) with meditative absorption.²⁵⁸ Along with Vācaspati's use of Yoga terminology there would appear to be an acceptance of the soteriological dimension embodied in those terms. This suggests a certain conceptual eclecticism is operative in Vācaspati's interpretation of the Vedānta means to liberation.

The Vivarāna and Bhāmātī are in agreement regarding the fundamental importance of the Upaniṣad sentences. They differ, however, concerning the role of the Upaniṣads in the gaining of liberation. Padmapāda and the Vivarāna maintain that the Upaniṣad passages can generate immediate knowledge while according to Bhāmātī the texts produce only mediate knowledge. The consequence of this difference is a dissimilarity in attitude toward the gain of the knowledge of Brahman. In the view of Padmapāda and Vivarāna, the function of reflection and meditation is negative in so far as their purpose is to remove the obstructions to the clear apprehension of the Self which is revealed in the Upaniṣads. For Bhāmātī, however, immediate apprehension must be produced through the practice of meditation upon the meaning of the texts.

What has been discussed indicates that the Padmapāda-Vivarāna tradition accords more closely with the tenor of Śaṅkara's teaching than the method laid down by Vācaspati.

- 1.55. एवं श्रवणादिभिः संशयभ्रमनिवृत्तावन्यप्रतिबन्धाभावे सत्यहं ब्रह्मास्मी-
त्यपरोक्षममा जायते । अन्यप्रतिबन्धश्च भूतभाविवर्तमानभेदेन त्रिविधः । पूर्वा-
भूतविषयस्यावेशेन पुनःपुनः स्मरणं भूतप्रतिबन्धः । अयं च यस्य विषयस्य
स्मरणं तत्रत्ये नामरूपे पलालवत्परित्यज्य तदन्तःस्थं तत्त्वं धान्यवत्स्वीकृत्य
निवारणीयः । अत्र परित्यागश्चानुसंधानरूपः ।
मोक्षप्रतिबन्धनिरासः स्वीकारश्चानुसंधानरूपः । प्रारब्धकर्मशेषो भावि-
प्रतिबन्धः । कर्मशेषश्च फलभोगोत्तरमेव निवर्तते ।
तत्र प्रबलस्य काम्यकर्मणः शेषश्चेत्स ज्ञानप्रतिबन्धको भवति । दुर्बलस्य काम्य-
कर्मणः शेषश्चेत्स सामान्यतः शरीरस्थितिं कुर्वन्नापि न ज्ञानप्रतिबन्धको भवति ।
एवं नित्यकर्मशेषः फलं जनयन्नजनयन्वा पापकर्माभिरुचिनिवृत्तिद्वारा तत्त्वज्ञा-
नानुकूल एव न प्रतिबन्धकः । ब्रह्मलोकप्रापकसुकृतकर्मविशेषानुसारिणी ब्रह्म-
लोकेच्छापि कस्यचिज्जायमाना भाविप्रतिबन्ध एव । स तु ब्रह्मलोकं गत्वा
ब्रह्मणा सह मुच्यते । तदनिच्छुस्तु न तावन्तं कालं प्रतीक्षते । वर्तमानप्रतिब-
न्धस्तु विषयासक्तिकुतर्कप्रज्ञामान्या दिभेदेनानेकविधः । तत्र विषयासक्तिः शमा-

दिभिः पुनःपुनरभ्यस्तैर्निवारणीया । कुतर्काश्च श्रवणादिभिः पुनः पुनरभ्यस्तै-
 निवारणीयाः । प्रज्ञामान्द्यनिवारणाय राजसतामसान्नं त्याज्यम् । तथापि तन्नि-
 वृत्तिः शनैरेव भवेज्जन्मान्तरे वा । गुरुप्रसादादिना तु तस्मिन्नपि जन्मानि
 भवति ।

1.55. When doubt and error have thus been removed by hearing etc. and when there are no other obstacles then the immediate, true and certain knowledge arises that "I am Brahman". Other obstacles are of three types on account of the distinction of past, future and present [obstacles]. An obstacle from the past is the repeated remembering on account of absorption in previously experienced sense objects. This can be prevented: in remembering the sense objects one must give up, like husk, the name and form belonging there and take, like grain, the reality which exists within that [name and form]. Here, giving up means not pondering. Taking means pondering.

A future obstacle is the remainder of the action which has begun to produce its effect. The remainder of action ceases only after experiencing the result. In regard to that, if there is a remainder of very strong self-interested action then it is an obstacle to knowledge. If there is a remainder of weak self-interested action, even though it brings about the general preservation of the body it is not an obstacle to knowledge. In the same manner, the remainder of obligatory action, whether producing a result or not producing a result, is not an obstacle but indeed is favourable to the knowledge of reality by means of the cessation of the liking for sinful actions. Even the desire for the world of Brahmā which arises for someone and which is attendant upon particular meritorious actions that procure the world of Brahmā is certainly a future obstacle. However, the person who goes to the world of Brahmā is liberated along with Brahmā. Though the person who is not desirous of that does not wait for such a long time.

A present obstacle is of many types on account of the distinction of attachment to sense objects, fallacious reasoning, dullness of the intellect etc. In regard to that, attachment to sense objects can be prevented by control of the mind etc. practised repeatedly. Fallacious reasonings can be prevented by hearing etc. [i.e. hearing, reflection and meditation] practised repeatedly. Food that has the qualities of rajas and tamas must be given up for preventing dullness of the intellect. Nevertheless the cessation of those [obstructions] would be only by degrees or in another birth. However, even in that birth [the cessation] is through the grace of the teacher etc.

comment

Hearing, reflection and meditation have been told as the direct means for the knowledge of Brahman. Of these three, hearing is the principal member since verbal testimony is considered to be a means of knowledge. If there is the correct operation of the means of knowledge supported by reflection and meditation the immediate knowledge of Brahman must occur. If this is not the case, Advaitins postulate the existence of obstacles which hinder the realization. Sureśvara states that such obstructions may either be from the past, the future or the present.²⁵⁹

In the Upadeśasāhasrī, Śaṅkara teaches a form of meditation called parisaṅkhyāna for the purpose of removing obstructions such as the influence of the sense objects upon the self.²⁶⁰ This meditation is based upon the distinction between the subject, the Self, and objects, i.e. everything else. Its method is to contemplate the Self as intrinsically unaffected by sound, touch, form, taste and smell because the Self is unable to be objectified by any of them.

It may be asked in what way parisaṅkhyāna meditation differs from prasaṅkhyāna meditation which Śaṅkara rejects.²⁶¹ The aim of prasaṅkhyāna is to produce Self-knowledge on account of the repeated meditation upon the meaning of the Upaniṣad passages. Parisaṅkhyāna meditation, however, has no such aim. It is practised in order to clearly appreciate the knowledge which has already been gained through hearing but which has not been fully received in understanding and

experience. At the conclusion of the comment upon the previous section it was mentioned that there is a difference between the production of knowledge from meditation and the use of meditation to remove obstructions preventing the clear appreciation of what is already known through hearing. Parisaṅkhyāna meditation exemplifies the latter approach.

Two commentators upon the Upadeśasāhasrī, Ānandagiri and Rāmatīrtha, explain parisaṅkhyāna in terms of removing the obstacles to clear knowledge. Rāmatīrtha says:

.... if the knowledge on the part of some, though they have knowledge, is not steady like a lamp in a windless place on account of the strong mental impression of difference, then for the firmness of their knowledge what is known as parisaṅkhyāna is about to be explained ...²⁶²

1.56.

तदेवं कस्यचित्प्रतिबन्धकस्याभावेऽहं ब्रह्मास्मीत्यप्रतिबन्धसाक्षात्कारेणाज्ञाने निवृत्ते मुमुक्षुरखण्डैकरससच्चिदानन्दब्रह्मात्मनावतिष्ठते । यथा राजकुले जातोऽपि कर्णो जन्मप्रभृति व्याधकुल एव संवर्धितस्तज्जातीयसहवासादिजनितभ्रान्तिलक्षणाविद्यया स्वात्मानं राधेयं मन्यते न तु स्वतः सिद्धं विद्यमानमपि कौन्तेयत्वमनुभवति । ततश्च कौन्तेयत्वप्रयुक्ताच्छ्रेयसः सकाशात्प्रच्युतः सर्वत्र नाना-
विधशापावमानादिलक्षणं बहुविधं दुःखं प्राप्तवान् ।
मोक्षः स च कदाचिद्भगवता सूर्येण “ कर्ण कौन्तेयोऽसि त्वं न राधेयः ” इत्युपदेशं कुर्वता स्मारितनिजरूप-
स्तया स्मृत्या व्याधत्वादेरविद्याकृतस्य निवृत्तौ सत्यां व्याधत्वा-
दिकृतं दुःखं त्यक्त्वा कौन्तेयत्वप्रयुक्तं श्रेयः प्राप्तवान् । तथा ब्रह्माप्यनादिसि-
द्धया स्वाविद्ययाऽऽवृत्तनिजरूपं सज्जीवभावं प्राप्य स्वतः सिद्धान्नित्यनिरतिशयान-
न्दस्वरूपानुभवात्प्रच्युतं सत्संसारति । तच्च संसरद्ब्रह्म कदाचित्स्वाविद्याकल्पि-
तेन गुरुणा शास्त्रेण चोत्पादितया स्वगोचरविद्यया जीवभावादिप्रयोजकाविद्या-
निवृत्तौ नित्यसिद्धनिरतिशयानन्दस्वरूपेणावतिष्ठते ।

1.56. Thus when there is the absence of any obstacle and when Ignorance is removed by the unimpeded direct apprehension in the manner: "I am Brahman" then the person desirous of liberation remains as Brahman, undivided, of a single nature, existence, awareness and bliss.

For example, Karṇa, though born into a royal family, was brought up ever since birth only in a hunter's family. He considered himself to be Rādheya due to ignorance characterised by the error brought about by

belonging to that [hunting community] and dwelling together etc. and he did not experience his nature as the son of Kuntī even though existing as self-established. Then, deprived of the good fortune resulting from being born of Kuntī, everywhere he gained many types of sorrow characterised by various sorts of curses, disrespect, etc. At one time the Lord Sun caused him to recall his own nature by imparting the instruction: "Karna, you are born of Kuntī, you are not Rādheya". On account of that recollection, when there was the cessation of being a hunter, being Rādheya etc., which was manufactured by ignorance, he gave up the sorrow caused by being a hunter etc. and gained the good fortune which resulted from being born of Kuntī.

So too, even Brahman, its own nature being concealed by the ignorance which belongs to it and which is established as beginningless, has gained the state of an individual soul. And being deprived of the self-established experience of the nature of being eternal, unsurpassed bliss, [Brahman] transmigrates. That transmigrating Brahman, when at some time its Ignorance which was the criterion for the state of being an individual soul etc. is removed through the knowledge about itself [a knowledge] produced by a teacher and a scripture superimposed through its own Ignorance, then it remains in its nature of unsurpassed bliss which is eternally established.

comment

Śaṅkara also narrates this story in his commentary on the Brhadāranyakopaniṣad 2.1.20. (p. 738).

1.57.

इयं च मुक्तिर्जीवतोऽपि भवति । बाधकाभावात् । इयमेव जीवन्मुक्तिः ।
जीवन्मुक्तिः तदुक्तं वराहोपनिषदि—

यस्मिन्काले स्वमात्मानं योगी जानाति केवलम् ।

तस्मात्कालात्समारभ्य जीवन्मुक्तो भवेदसौ ॥ (वरा० २।१२) इति ।

तथा—

नोदेति नास्तमायाति सुखे दुःखे मनःप्रभा ।

यथाप्राप्तस्थितिर्यस्य स जीवन्मुक्त उच्यते ॥ (वरा. ३ । २२)

इत्यादिश्रुतौ विस्तरेण जीवन्मुक्तावस्था वर्णिता । आत्मोपनिषदि च—

शिव एव स्वयं साक्षादयं ब्रह्मविदुत्तमः ।

जीवन्नेव सदा मुक्तः कृतार्थो ब्रह्मविदुत्तमः ॥ (आत्मो० २०) इति ।

1.57. This liberation is even for one who is living. Because there is nothing to contradict it. This is indeed liberation while living. It has been mentioned in the Varāhopaniṣad:

At which time the Yogī knows his own Self to be the whole, beginning from that time he would be liberated while living. (Varā. 2.42.)

Similarly, the state of the person who is liberated while living has been described in detail in the sacred texts such as:

The person whose radiance of mind does not rise up in happiness or diminish in sorrow, who remains in the state he happens to be in, he is said to be liberated while living. (Varā. 4.22.)

And in the Ātmopaniṣad:

This person who is the best of the knowers of Brahman is directly Śiva himself. The best among the knowers of Brahman has accomplished his purpose, while living he is always liberated. (Ātma. 20.)²⁶³

1.58.

जीवन्मुक्तावस्थाप्रयोजनानि तु ज्ञानरक्षा तपो विसंवादाभावो दुःखनिवृत्तिः सुखाविर्भावश्चेति पञ्च । उत्पन्नब्रह्मसाक्षात्कारस्य पुरुषस्य पुनः संशयविपर्ययानुत्पत्तिर्ज्ञानरक्षा । सा च “ संशयात्मा विनश्यति ” (गी० ४ । ४०) इत्युक्त्या संशयसत्त्वे तन्मूलकप्राप्तप्रच्युतेर्वारणायावश्यकी जीवन्मुक्त्यवस्थायां सुलभा । तथा तस्यामवस्थायामखिलवृत्तीनामनुदयाच्चित्तैकाग्र्यं भवति । तदेव तपः ।

मनसश्चेन्द्रियाणां च ह्यैकाग्र्यं परमं तपः ।

इत्युक्तेः । तेन च लोकसंग्रहो जायते ।

यद्यदाचरति श्रेष्ठस्तत्तदेवेतरो जनः । (गी० ३ । २१)

जीवन्मुक्तिप्रयोजनानि इत्युक्तेः । तथा जीवन्मुक्तस्य व्युत्थानदशायां केन-
चिन्निन्दायां कृतायामपि तादृशचित्तवृत्त्यनुदया-
द्विसंवादो न भवति । तदुक्तम्—

ज्ञात्वा वयं तत्त्वनिष्ठां ननु मोदामहे वयम् ।

अनुशोचाम एवान्यान् भ्रान्तैर्विवदामहे ॥ इति ।

तथा जीवन्मुक्तस्य भ्रान्तेर्निवृत्ततया चित्तस्यात्मैकाकारतया च प्रारब्धभोगे
सत्यपि समस्तदुःखनिवृत्तिः । तथा च श्रुतिः—

आत्मानं चेद्विजानीयादयमस्मीति पूरुषः ।

किमिच्छन्कस्य कामाय शरीरमनुसंज्वरेत् ॥ (शाट्या० २२) इति ।

तथा जीवन्मुक्त्यवस्थायां ज्ञानयोगाभ्यासेनाविद्याकृतावरणस्य सर्वथा निवृ-
त्त्या परिपूर्णब्रह्मानन्दानुभवसुखाविर्भावो भवति । तथा च श्रुतिः—

समाधिनिर्धूतमलस्य चेतसो निवेशितस्यात्मनि यत्सुखं भवेत् ।

न शक्यते वर्णयितुं गिरा तदा स्वयं तदन्तःकरणेन गृह्यते ॥ इति ।

1.58. There are five aims of the state of liberation while living: the protection of knowledge, austerity, the absence of disagreement, the cessation of sorrow and the manifestation of happiness. Protection of knowledge is the non-origination once again of doubt and contrary views on the part of a person who has gained the immediate apprehension of Brahman. In the existence of a doubt, that [protection of knowledge] is necessary for preventing the loss which is incurred based on that [doubt] because it is said: "the doubting self is ruined" (G.4.40.) and that [protection of knowledge] is very easily gained in the state of liberation while living.

Also, in that state there is the concentration of the mind upon a single object because of the non-arising of all thoughts. That alone is austerity, for there is the statement: "the highest austerity is the concentration of the mind and the senses" (Mbh. Śā. 250.4.). The welfare of the world is produced by that, for there is the statement: "whatever

a great person does, that indeed the other people do" (G.3.21.).

Also, in the state of not being engaged in contemplation, even when a reproach has been made by someone there is no disagreement on the part of a person who is liberated while living because there is no appearance of a mental modification of that type. That has been told:

Having known completion in the truth we are
certainly joyful. We can only grieve for
others, we do not dispute with those who
are deluded.

So too, even while he experiences the result of action which has begun to operate, the person liberated while living has complete cessation of sorrow since error has been removed and because his mind has only the form of the Self. Accordingly, there is the sacred text:

If a person should know the Self as "I am this",
then desiring what and for the desire of whom
would he worry about the body ? (Śā. 22.)²⁶⁴

So too, in the state of liberation while living there is the manifestation of happiness due to the experience of the perfect bliss of Brahman on account of the complete cessation of the concealing caused by Ignorance through the practice of the Yoga of knowledge. Accordingly there is the sacred text:

The happiness that must be for a mind which has
been placed in the Self and whose impurities have
been dispelled by meditative absorption cannot be
described through speech. At that time, that
[happiness] is apprehended for oneself by the
inner-organ. (Maitri. 6.54.)

- 1.59. ततः प्रारब्धकर्मसमाप्त्या देहावसाने तदुत्तरं विदेहमुक्तिः । तदप्युक्तं श्रुतौ—
 प्रारब्धक्षयपर्यन्तं जीवन्मुक्ता भवन्ति ते ।
 ततः कालवशादेव प्रारब्धे तु क्षयं गते ॥
 वैदेहीं मामकीं मुक्तिं यान्ति नास्त्यत्र संशयः ॥ (मुक्ति० ४३)
 जीवन्मुक्तपदं त्यक्त्वा स्वदेहे कालसाकृते ।
 विशत्यदेहमुक्तत्वं पवनोऽस्पन्दतामिव ॥ (मुक्ति० ७६) इति ।

आत्मोपनिषद्यपि—

- घटे नष्टे यथा व्योम व्योमैव भवति स्वयम् ।
 तथैवोपाधिविलये ब्रह्मैव ब्रह्मवित्स्वयम् ॥ (आत्मो० १।२२) इति ।
 मुक्ताविद्यामूलकस्याभासस्य सर्वथाऽभावान्न तत्र लेशतोऽप्यहंभावः । अहंभाव-
 विदेहमुक्तिः स्यादविद्यापरिणामविशेषत्वात् । एवमविद्यामूलको
 जीवब्रह्मभेदोऽपि तत्र सुतरां न भासते । तदुक्तम्—
 विभेदजनकेऽज्ञाने नाशमात्यन्तिकं गते ।
 आत्मनो ब्रह्मणो भेदमसन्तं कः कारिष्यति ॥
 (वि० पु० ६।७।९४) इति ।

1.59. Then, upon the decease of the body on account of the completion of the results of action which had begun to operate, liberation free from the body follows. That also has been told in the sacred text:

They become liberated while living until the destruction of the result of action which had begun to operate. Then, when the result of action which has begun to operate has reached its end in the course of time, they attain my liberation free from the body. As to that there is no doubt. (Mukti.43.)

Having given up the state of being liberated while living when his body has been overcome by time, he enters the state of being liberated free from the body like air enters the state of not moving. (Mukti. 76.)

Also in the Ātmopaniṣad:

Just as when a pot is destroyed the space [within the pot] itself becomes space alone, in the same manner, upon the dissolution of the limiting adjunct the knower of Brahman himself becomes Brahman alone. (Ātma. 1.22.)

Because the reflection [of the Self] which is based upon Ignorance is completely absent in liberation [free from the body] there is not even a trace of I-ness there. Because I-ness is a particular transformation of Ignorance. In the same manner, the difference between the individual soul and Brahman also, which is based upon Ignorance, most certainly does not appear there. That has been told:

When the Ignorance which produces division has passed into final destruction, who will make a distinction of one's Self from Brahman which does not exist [after its destruction]? (Viṣ. 6.7.94.)

1.60.

मुक्तेः स्वरूपावस्थानमात्रत्वेन, तत्र पूर्वोक्तभेदत्रयस्याभावेन सुखदुःखहेतोर्द्वि-
तीयस्याभावात्तदानीं न सुखं न वा दुःखम् । भोक्तृत्वोपाधेरन्तःकरणस्य विना-
शेन भोगासंभवाच्च । तस्मात् “ब्रह्मविद्ब्रह्मैव भवति” (मु० ३।२।९) इति-
श्रुतिप्रतिपादितो ब्रह्मभावलक्षणो भोक्तो भवतीति सिद्धम् ॥

1.60. Because liberation is merely remaining in one's own nature, at that time there is neither happiness nor sadness. For something else, which is the cause of happiness and sadness, does not exist since the previously mentioned threefold difference is absent there [in liberation free from the body].²⁶⁵ And because experience is not possible due to the destruction of the inner-organ which is the limiting adjunct [bringing about] the state of the experiencer.

Therefore, liberation, which is characterised as the state of being Brahman and which is taught by the sacred text: "the knower of Brahman becomes Brahman indeed" (Mu. 3.2.9.)²⁶⁶ is thus established.

1.61.

श्रीमच्छंकराचार्याश्च शालिवाहनशके खेन्दुहयमिते (शके ७१०, इसवी सन ७८८) संवत्सरे प्रादुरभूवन् । तैश्चद्वैतात्म-
 श्रीशंकराचार्यकालः वादे सर्वत्र प्रकाशिते दर्शनान्तराणि प्रायो विर-
 लप्रचाराणि बभूवुः । महाप्रभावभाजां श्रीमदा-
 चार्यपादानां पुरतश्च न कोऽपि दर्शनान्तराभिमानो विवदितुमुत्सहते स्म ।
 अल्पेनैव कालेन प्रायः सर्वत्र शिष्यगणेन सह संचारं कृत्वा चतसृषु दिक्षु
 मठान्संस्थाप्य तत्र तत्राद्वैतात्मवादप्रख्यापनकुशलान् शिष्यान्संयोज्य स्वीयाव-
 तारकृत्ये परिपूर्णतामाकलय्य शालिवाहनशके पक्षवेदधिपरिमिते (शके ७४२,
 इसवी सन ८२०) संवत्सरे स्वस्वरूपं प्रापुराचार्यचरणाः । अन्ये तु ' शश्व-
 ग्निरसयुग्म (२६३१) परिमिते युधिष्ठिरशके वैशाखशुक्लपञ्चम्यां श्रीमच्छं-
 कराचार्याणां जन्माभूत् । तथाऽग्निरसरसयुग्म (२६६३) परिमिते युधि-
 ष्ठिरशके कार्तिकशुक्लपूर्णिमास्यामाचार्या ज्योतीरूपतां ययुः ' इति कथयन्ति ।
 ततो मोहान्धतमसे निमग्नोऽपि तच्छात्रगणो गुरुचरणप्रसादलब्धज्ञानज्योतिः-
 साहाय्येन द्युमणावस्तंगते दीप इव कर्मवशमप्राणिनिकायस्वान्तप्रविष्टाज्ञानतिमिर-
 वृन्दं विनाशयितुमशकत् । अद्वैतात्मवादश्च प्रायः सर्वत्रास्वलितप्रचारः समजनि।
 अयमद्वैतात्मवाद एव मायावाद इति लोके गीयते ।

1.61. The illustrious Śaṅkarācārya appeared in the year 710 [788 of the Christian era] in the era of Śālivāhana. When he unfolded everywhere the teaching of the non-duality of the Self the other views had, for the most part, little currency. No one who laid claim to another view dared to dispute before the feet of the illustrious teacher which possessed great power. In a very short time, having travelled just about everywhere accompanied by a group of pupils and having established centres of religious life in the four directions he appointed students in various places who were proficient in communicating the teaching of the non-duality of the Self. And having reached completion in what was to be accomplished in his own incarnation, the feet of the teacher gained their own nature in the year 742 [820 of the Christian era] in the era of Śālivāhana.

However, others say the birth of the illustrious Śaṅkarācārya was on the fifth day of the bright half of the month in April-May in the era of Yudhiṣṭhira measured as 2631. Accordingly, they say the teacher went to the nature of light on the day of the full moon in the bright half of the month in October-November in the era of Yudhiṣṭhira measured as 2663.²⁶⁷

Thereafter his group of pupils, even immersed in the deep darkness of delusion, through the assistance of the light of knowledge acquired by the grace of the teacher's feet, like a light when the sun has set, was able to destroy the mass of the darkness of Ignorance which had entered the mind of the multitudes of living beings under the influence of action. The teaching of the non-duality of the Self grew to have unshaken prevalence just about everywhere. This very teaching of the non-duality of the Self is celebrated in the world as the teaching of māyā.

NOTES TO CHAPTER ONE: ADVAITAMATAM.

1. B.S.Ś. 2.1.6. p.360, line 7f.
2. V.P. p.113.
3. Śaṅkara is without equivocation with regard to the necessity of Vedic revelation for the knowledge of reality:
B.S.Ś. 1.1.2. p.50, line 3 and p. 51, line 1; 1.1.3. p.58, line 2; 1.1.4. p.65, line 2f; 2.1.3. p.354, line 10; 2.1.6. p.360, line 7f; 2.1.11. p.368, line 7 and p.369, line 6; 2.1.14. p.379, line 6 and p.380, line 2f; 2.1.27. p.400, line 13f; 2.1.31. p.404, line 8; 2.2.1. p.412, line 6f; 2.3.1. p.499, line 5f; 4.4.8. p.897, line 7.
Bṛh.Ś. intro. p.607, line 9f; 4.4.20. p.928, line 7.
Mu.Ś. 1.1.5. p.144, line 25f; 1.1.6. p.145, line 7.
Mā.Ś. 4.99. p.256, line 10.
G.Ś. 18.66. p.294, line 22f.
U. 1.17.8. 1.18.216, 217.
4. vede pūrvottarakāṇḍayoḥ kramena dharmabrahmaṇī viśayah ... tadubhayañānam vedasya sāksāt prayojanam.
5. B.S.Ś. 1.1.7. p.111, line 1f. Also, Bṛh.Ś. 2.1.20. p.743, line 4f.
6. Bṛh.Ś. 2.1.20. p.743, line 4f; 3.5.1. p.811, line 12f.
7. Bṛh. 4.4.19.
8. U. 1.18.7, 8, 183. Bṛh. 3.3.1. p.802, line 22f.
9. vyāvahārikaprāmāṇyamātram...na-advaitāgamena bādhyate, tu tāttvikam prāmāṇyam. Advaitasiddhi, quoted in W. Halbfass, Studies in Kumārila and Śaṅkara. Reinbek. 1983. p.78, note 118.
10. Śaṅkara states that ultimately all differences created by Ignorance are to be negated, cf., B.S.Ś. 1.1.4. p.79, line 1f. He says that the presentation of saguna statements in the śruti are sometimes specifically intended for negation while on other occasions they are for the purpose of meditation, cf., B.S.Ś. 3.2.14. p.643, line 4f; 3.2.15. p.643, line 12f; 3.2.21. p.647, line 12f.
11. B.S.Ś. 1.1.12. p.116, line 8f.
12. G.Ś. 13.13. p.204, line 3. S. Kuppaswami Sastri (ed) Brahmasiddhi by Acharya Maṇḍanamisra. 2^{ed} ed. Delhi. 1984. p.26, line 22. The V.P. also utilizes this method, cf., p.133f.
13. adhyāropaḥ -vastunyavastvāropaḥ. Cited in Gaurīśaṅkara (ed), Sarva-tantrasiddhāntapadārthalakṣaṇasaṁgrahaḥ. Kāśī. Samvat 2016. p.15.
14. B.S.Ś. 1.1.8. p.112, line 10; 1.1.12. p.121, line 6f.
15. Bṛh.Ś. 4.4.25. p.938, line 25f.

16. Aindra is the name of a pre-Pāṇinīyan grammatical treatise and it is also the name of a school of grammar based upon that text. The work is not available. Cf., K.V. Abhyankar and J.M. Shukla, A Dictionary of Sanskrit Grammar. Baroda. 1977. p.102.
17. Prātiśākhya are treatises on Vedic grammar dealing specifically with euphonic changes based upon sandhi. Originally, each Vedic recension possessed such a treatise, ibid., p.267f.
18. Dvādaśādhyāyī. The name of the sūtra work by Jaimini consisting of twelve chapters.
19. S. Tapasyānanda (trans) Śaṅkaradigvijaya of Mādhava-Vidyāranya. Madras. 1978. p.15. N. Veezhinathan (ed) Śrī Śaṅkaravijaya of Anantānandagiri. Madras. 1971. p.7.
20. Halbfass, op-cit., p.70., considers that in relation to Śaṅkara : "it is... impossible to understand his thought in its philosophical as well as its historical dimensions without fully recognizing and respecting its fundamental commitment to the Vedic revelation".
21. B.S.Ś. 3.2.11. p.641, line 2f.
22. B.S.Ś. 3.2.14. p.643, line 6f.
23. B.S.Ś. 3.2.15. p.643, line 13f.
24. Brh.Ś. 3.8.12. p.832, line 13f.
25. B.S.Ś. 3.2.12. p.642, line 9; 3.2.14. p.643, line 12; 3.2.21. p.647, line 13f.
26. B.S.Ś. 3.2.12. p.642, line 6f.
27. Brh. 2.3.6.
28. B.S.Ś. 3.2.12. p.642, line 6f.
29. As an illustration of this point there is the case of the "apacchedanyāya" referred to by Jaimini, cf., J.S. 6.5.54., which states that where there is a relation of earlier and later the earlier is weaker. In Pāṇinīya grammar too there is the rule: "vipratishedhe param karyam" P.S. 1.4.2., which means that in the case of a conflict of rules of equal applicability the subsequent operation is to be performed. These illustrations do not constitute a proof on their own, rather they exemplify the logical priority of the subsequent over the preceding...
30. B.S.Ś. 4.3.14. p.884, line 10.
31. ibid
32. B.S.Ś. 2.1.11. p.366, line 1f.
33. B.S.Ś. 2.1.6. p.361, line 2.
34. Halbfass, op-cit., p.49.

35. In refuting other schools of thought, cf., B.S.Ś. 2.2.1. p.412, line 1f. In determining scriptural purport, the use of reason is demonstrated through the importance of the śadliṅgas: the beginning (upakrama) and the conclusion (upasaṁhāra) being in harmony, the use of repetition (abhyāsa), originality (apūrvatā), the result (phala), the use of eulogy (arthavāda) and logical demonstration (upapatti), cf., Vs. p.12, line 11.
36. Śaṅkara discusses the method of discriminating the invariable Self from its limiting conditions in B.S.Ś. 2.1.6. p.361, line 2f. Advaitins use the method of anvayavyatireka in two ways. The first follows the mode of the Naiyāyika where anvaya and vyatireka establish the invariable concomitance in presence and absence between the reason (hetu) and the thing to be proved (sādhyā). Cf., Y. Athalye (ed), Tarka-Saṅgraha of Annambhaṭṭa. Poona. 1974. p.40, 281f. The author of the Pañcadaśī uses anvayavyatireka in this manner in 4.32. The second mode of usage is to distinguish the invariable from the variable: X is and Y is, X is not and Y is. This usage is found in Pañcadaśī 1.37-42. The Advaitins utilize this latter method to discriminate the Self from adventitious conditions. In N.S. 2.1., Sureśvara states that the meaning of the word "you" (tvam) must be correctly understood in order to comprehend the mahāvākya.
37. Brh. 4.3.23.
38. Pr.Ś. 6.2. p.133, line 15f. Also, N.S. 2.83, 97.
39. Śaṅkara uses the word "dr̥śī" in the sense of awareness. Cf., U. 1.10. Also, 1.12.vs.6, 7, 9, 10, 13, 15. 1.13.vs.8, 9, 1.14.vs.44, 49. 1.15.vs.18. 1.17.vs.29, 35, 39. 1.18.vs.26, 83, 84, 97, 202.
40. "The mental modes which assume different forms are, indeed, pervaded at the beginning and end, and also in the middle, by the one undifferentiated consciousness which experiences none separate from it." R. Balasubramanian (ed. and trans.), The Taittirīyopaniṣad-bhāṣya-vārtika of Sureśvara. Madras. Rev. ed. 1984. 2.123. Also, 2. 94, 411, 666.
41. V.P. p.12. I have followed the rendering by Mādhavānanda here. S. Mādhavānanda (trans), Vedānta-Paribhāṣā. Calcutta. 1942. Rev. 2nd ed. 1972. p.13.
42. ibid.
43. ibid., p.8.
44. ibid., p.115.
45. D.V. Gokhale (ed.), Śrī Śaṅkarācārya's Upadeśasāhasrī with the gloss Padayojanikā by Rāmatīrtha. Bombay. 1917. p.148f.
46. Tai. 2.1.1.
47. Rāmatīrtha's gloss, op-cit., p.150.
48. The concept of "sāmānya" is a category in the system of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika where it is divided into higher and lower with reference to its extensiveness. The highest sāmānya is existence (sattā). Abhyankar utilizes the concept of sāmānya to the advantage of Advaita. Cf.,

- T.S. p.5, 89f.
49. B.S.Ś. 2.3.9. p.514, line 3f. Bṛh.Ś. 2.4.9. p.762, line 11f.
50. P.D. 2.20.
51. B.S.Ś. 1.3.1. p.206, line 4f.
52. R.D. Karmarkar (ed. and trans.), Śrībhāṣya of Rāmānuja. Part One. Poona. 1959. Para.50. p.93.
53. Cf., Anandagiri on Muṇḍaka 1.1.9. S. Subramanyaśāstrī (ed.), Upaniṣadbhāṣyam. Vol 1. Varanasi. 1979. p.134.
54. Bṛh.Ś. 3.8.12. p.832, line 13f. B.S.Ś. 2.1.14. p.382, line 2f; 4.3.9. p.881, line 6f.
55. B.S.Ś. 3.2.16. p.643, line 19. Also, B.S.Ś. 3.2.18. p.644, line 16. Mā.Ś. 3.33. p.222, line 9; 3.35. p.223, line 5f. Bṛh.Ś. 2.1.20. p.739, line 5f. U. 1.18.vs.50, 66.
56. Ke. 1.6. p.22. Śaṅkara clearly states that the Self does not become known as an object, cf., Bṛh.Ś. 4.4.6. p.919, line 19f. U. 1.14.vs. 17; 1.15.vs.39.
57. This view is put forward by the Bhaṭṭa school of the Pūrvamīmāṃsā, cf., the Candrikā of Jñānottama. M. Hiriyanna (ed.), The Naiṣkarmya-siddhi of Suresvara with the Candrikā of Jñānottama. Poona. 4th ed. 1980. p.66, line 20.
58. ibid., 2.25. p.67.
59. It appears that Abhyankar is following the Mādhyandina recension.
60. sādhyābhāvahetvabhāvayor vyāptir vyatirekavyāptih (Nyāyabodhinī), T.S. p.41, line 14.
61. V.P. p.37.
62. Sarvatantra, op-cit., p.153.
63. Tai.Ś. 2.1. p.283, line 8f.
64. V.P. p.37.
65. Sarvatantra, op-cit., p.235.
66. Śaṅkara clearly indicates his acceptance of the apparent transformation of Brahman into the form of the world. Cf., B.S.Ś. 2.1.14. p.380f, line 10f; 2.1.27. p.400, line 6 and p.401, line 5f; 2.1.28. p.401f, line 15f.
67. Ch. 6.2.1. Also, Tai.Ś. 2.1. p.283, line 27f.
68. G.Ś. 13.14. p.205, line 1f.
69. ibid., 2.16. p.14, line 22f.
70. B.S.Ś. 3.2.21. p. 646, line 10f.

71. V.P. p.3, 5, 35. Tai.Ś. 2.1. p.283, line 8f. In B.S.Ś. 3.2.4. p.626, line 15, Śaṅkara mentions sublation as the criterion of falsity: vaitathyaṁ bādhyamānatvād ityabhiprāyaḥ .
72. V.P. p.5. B.S.Ś. 1.1.4. p.99, line 3f; 2.1.14. p.377, line 6.
73. Śrī.B.Para.44.p.78.
74. Communication by R. Thangaswami. Also, cf., R. Thangaswami, Advaita-Vedānta Literature. A Bibliographical Survey. Madras. 1980. p.viii.
75. ibid., p.xii.
76. Communication by R. Thangaswami.
77. B.S. (Bhāmatī) 3.2.9. p.637, line 26f.
78. tattvam iti bimbasthānīyabrahmasvarūpatā pratibimbasthānīyasya jīvasya upadiśyate. "The reality, i.e. the nature of Brahman which represents the original, is taught for the individual soul who represents the reflection." Pañcapādikā. Cf., S. Rāmaśāstrī (ed.), Pañcapādikā with two commentaries and Pañcapādikāvivarana with two commentaries. Madras Govt. Oriental Series CLV. p.127.
79. P.C. Divānji (ed. and trans.) Siddhāntabindu of Madhusūdana with the commentary of Puruṣottama. Baroda. 1933. p.28.
80. In B.S.Ś. 3.2.34. p.663, line 10f., Śaṅkara employs illustrations of both reflection and limitation.
81. B.S.Ś. 1.2.20. p.186, line 9f. Also, B.S.Ś. 2.1.22. p.394, line 17f; 3.2.34. p.663, line 10f; 3.2.35. p.663, line 17f.
82. Ch.Ś. 6.8.1. p.521, line 25f.
83. B.S.Ś. 2.3.46. p.557, line 10f; 3.2.20. p.645, line 13f.
84. B.S.Ś. 2.3.50. p.561, line 2f. U. 1.18.vs.43, 63, 87.
85. Rāmaśāstrī, op-cit., p.130.
86. B.S. (Bhāmatī) 1.1.3. p.57, line 23f., (...anādyavidyopadhānalabdhasarvasaktijñānasyāpi paramātmanah...).
87. S.B. p.29.
88. ibid., p.26f.
89. The commentary Subodhinī states that Ignorance is single. Cf., G.A. Jacob (ed.), Vedāntasāra of Sadānanda with the commentaries of Nṛsiṃhasarasvatī and Rāmatīrtha. Varanasi. 6th ed. 1975. p.8, line 26.
90. However he also accepts that the Lord is the pure consciousness. Cf., N. Veezhinathan (ed. and trans.), The Śaṅkṣepaśārīraka of Sarvajñātman. Madras. 1972. 2.176.
91. ibid., 2.190.

92. ibid., 1.20, 319.
93. ibid., 2.192.
94. S.B. p.28.
95. Vivarana cited in Rāmasāstrī, op-cit., p.129.
96. ibid., p.130.
97. ibid., p.129, (brahmaivāvidyāpratibimbatam iti vadāmaḥ).
98. S.B. p.29.
99. S.Ś. intro. p.109.
100. B.S.Ś. 2.1.14. p.377, line 3f. Devaraja rightly states that: "Śaṅkara, in fact, is a realist in epistemology". Cf., N.K. Devaraja, An Introduction to Śaṅkara's Theory of Knowledge. Delhi. 2nd ed. 1972. p.11.
101. B.S.Ś. 2.3.50. p.561, line 3.
102. S.B. p.29.
103. Vasudev Shastri Abhyankar (ed. with original commentary), Siddhāntabindu by Madhusūdanasarasvatī. A commentary on the Daśasloki of Śaṅkarācārya. Poona. 2nd ed. 1962. p.47.
104. Rāmasāstrī, op-cit., p.131, (...ekajīvavādinām iṣṭasiddhikārāṇām...).
105. S.Ś. 2.128f.
106. The subtle body is said to be the "beginningless limiting adjunct of the Self" (anādir upādhir ātmanah), cf., S. Mādhavānanda (trans.), Vivekacūḍāmaṇi of Śaṅkarācārya. Calcutta. 9th ed. 1974. p.35. The subtle body is also said to "persist until liberation" (mokṣaparyantaṁ sthāyi), cf., V.P. p.123.
107. B.S.Ś. 2.3.30. p.539, line 14f.
108. B.S.Ś. 2.3.31. p.541, line 3f.
109. Bṛh.B.V. 1.4.102. yayā yayā bhavet puṁsām vyutpattiḥ pratyagātmani/ sā saiva prakriyā jñeyā sādhvī sā ca vyavasthita//
110. Sureśvara uses the expression "primary Ignorance" (avidyā...maulī), Bṛh.B.V. 1.2.136. Cited in Rāmasāstrī, op-cit., p.53.
111. Padmapāda interprets Śaṅkara's expression: mithyājñānanimittah (B.S.Ś. p.9, line 2.) as a bahuvrīhi compound containing the karmadhāraya compound: mithyā meaning "indeterminable" and: ajñāna which refers to a positive entity. The compound is understood in the sense that there is an indeterminable power known as ajñāna which is the material cause (nimittah) of worldly dealings (lokavyavahāra): mithyā ca tad ajñānaṁ ca mithyājñānam. mithyā-iti-anirvacaniyatā-ucyate. ajñānam iti ca jaḍātmikā-avidyāsaktiḥ, jñānaparyudāsena-ucyate. tan nimittah tad upādāna iti-arthaḥ. ibid., p.18.

112. S.Ś. 1.320, 322. 2.190, 191. 3.94, 105, 108, 109.
113. Rāmaśāstrī, op-cit., p.130, line 28f.
114. Cf., introductory verse to the Bhāmatī. B.S.Ś. p.1.
115. Rāmaśāstrī, op-cit., p.21, line 19f.
116. Cf., S. Saccidānandendrasarasvatī, Pañcapādikāprasthānam. Holenarsipur. 1966. Also, Viṭṭhalasāstrī, Mūlāvidyā-bhāṣyavārtikaviruddhā. Holenarsipur. 1975.
117. B.S.Ś. p.19, line 2.
118. B.S.Ś. 2.1.31. p.404, line 10; 2.1.33. p.406, line 8.
119. B.S.Ś. 2.1.22. p.395, line 3f; 2.2.2. p.419, line 9; 2.3.40. p.547, line 7; 3.2.6. p.629, line 3; 3.2.11. p.641, line 6; 3.2.15. p.643, line 16.
120. G.Ś. 13.2. p.192, line 1f.
121. Īśa.Ś. Introduction, p.2, line 3f.
122. B.S.Ś. 1.4.3. p.297, line 5f.
123. ibid., line 6f.
124. ibid., p.298, line 1.
125. S.Ś.1.20.
126. D.H.H. Ingall's, "Śaṅkara on the Question: Whose is Avidyā?" Philosophy East and West, vol 3 (1953) no.1. p.69-72.
127. V.P. p.124.
128. Vs. p.5, line 24f.
129. V.P. p.126.
130. ibid., p.120.
131. In Mu.Ś. 2.1.3. p.156, line 1f, Śaṅkara mentions the five elements and their respective qualities. Mayeda is of the opinion that Śaṅkara accepted the pañcīkaraṇa rather than the trivṛtkaraṇa, cf., introduction to U. p.27.
132. V.P. p.122. Vs. p.6, line 8f. However, S. Dasgupta in his A History of Indian Philosophy. Vol 2. Delhi. 1975. p.74 (note), mentions that Vacaspati prefers the trivṛtkaraṇa.
133. Vs. p.5, line 1, specifies that the nature of the mind is a modification of the internal-organ having the form of vacillation.
134. Pañcīkaraṇam of Śaṅkarācārya with Vārttikā. (translator unknown). Calcutta. 2nd ed. 1972. p.31.
135. V.P. p.122. Vs. p.5, line 12.

136. p.3, line 18.
137. ibid., p.5, line 4f.
138. B.S.Ś. (adhyāsabhāṣya) p.25, line 1f. Also, cf., U. 1.12.vs.16, 17.
139. S.Ś. 3.113, 114.
140. Tai.Ś. 2.5.1. p.294, line 15f. B.S.Ś. 1.1.19. p.125, line 12f; 3.3.12. p.692, line 7f.
141. Mā.Ś. 1.7. p.187, line 16f.
142. ibid., line 18.
143. Tai.Ś. 2.1.1. p.283, line 8f. Also, cf., Tai.Ś. 1.11.4. p.276, line 19f. Brh.Ś. 2.4.12. p.766, line 14f. G.Ś. 2.16. p.14, line 23f.
144. V.P. p.3. B.S. (Bhāmatī) 1.1.4. p.65, line 27, (abādhitānadhigata-asandigdabodhajanakatvaṃ hi pramānatvaṃ, pramānanam tacca svata ity upapaditam). Also, cf., P.D. 3.29.
145. Śāṅkara's pūrvapakṣin cites an amusing verse illustrating what is meant by "unreal", cf., Tai.Ś. 2.1.1. p.284, line 6f.
146. V.P. p.36f.
147. Kena.Ś. 1.4. p.20, line 24f. Brh.Ś. 4.4.6. p.919, line 20f. B.S.Ś. 2.3.7. p.508, line 3f. U. 1.14.vs.17; 1.15.vs.39. S.Ś. 1.285. Tai.B.V. 2.666.
148. B.S.Ś. 2.1.14. p.378, line 3f.
149. ibid., p.379, line 1f.
150. Brh.Ś. 1.4.10. p.669, line 25f.
151. ibid., p.670, line 10f.
152. V.P. p.5.
153. ibid., p.176, note 3.
154. U. 1.14.vs.3, 4.
155. Tai.Ś. 2.1.1. p.284, line 25f.
156. V.P. p.6.
157. ibid., p.20.
158. ibid., p.25.
159. P.D. 8.vs.1-16.
160. V.P. p.14.
161. B.S. (Bhāmatī) 1.1.1. p.31, line 26 (na ca-eṣa sākṣātkāro...). Regarding the means to realization, cf., 1.1.4. p.70, line 21f.

162. U. 1.18.vs.188, 189.
163. B.S.Ś. 4.1.2. p.829, line 1f.
164. ibid., 1.1.1. p.36, line 3f.
165. ibid., 4.1.2. p.829, line 1f.
166. N.S. 3.22, 67. Sureśvara also cites Śaṅkara on this matter (U. 1.18. 188-90.) in N.S. 4.31-33.
167. D. Venkataramiah (trans.), The Pañcapādikā of Padmapāda. Baroda. p.290f., 307f.
168. Śrutisārasamuddharaṇam of Śrī Totakācārya with the commentary of Śrī Sacchidānanda Yogī. Srirangam. (no date) Verses 93-106.
169. Rāmaśāstri, op-cit., p.118, line 21f. Also, cf., S.S. Suryanarayana Sastri and S. Sen (trans.), The Vivaraṇaprameyasaṅgraha of Bhāratīrtha. Andhra Univ. Series. 1941. 1.CLXII. Also, V.P. p.28.
170. Abhyankar's explanation follows that of the V.P. and his expression is identical to that of the commentator Śivadatta. Cf., Vedānta-paribhāṣā with the commentary Arthadīpikā by Śivadatta. Varanasi. 1968. p.32, line 20f.
171. D.M. Datta, The Six Ways of Knowing. 2nd ed. Calcutta. 1972. p.101.
172. S.S. Suryanarayana Sastri and C. Kunhan Raja (ed. and trans.), The Bhāmatī of Vācaspati on Śaṅkara's Brahmasūtrabhāṣya (catussūtrī). Madras. 1933. Introduction, p.xxi f.
173. V.P. p.28.
174. Mādhavānanda gives this example, op-cit., p.36, note 2.
175. According to V.P. p.57, three members are sufficient to form an inference instead of the five members required by the Naiyāyikas. Also, a negative instance is unnecessary since only pervasion in co-presence is accepted, cf., V.P. p.55f.
176. V.P. p.55. Also, cf., Datta, op-cit., p.205.
177. V.P. p.55.
178. ibid., p.57f.
179. The Advaita usage of upamāna follows that of the Bhaṭṭa school of the Mīmāṃsā and differs from the Nyāya school. For an explanation of the latter view, cf., T.S. p.49f, 327f.
180. V.P. p.62.
181. Cf., the definition of vyāpti in V.P. p.55.
182. V.P. p.63. Also, cf., Mādhavānanda, op-cit., p.84.
183. V.P. p.63f.

184. B.S.Ś. 1.1.3. p.55, line 9f.
185. B.S. (Ratnaprabhā) 1.1.3. p.55, line 23f. (yad vā yathā...).
ibid., (Bhāmatī) p.57, line 23f. (vaiyāsikam tu...).
186. The Veda has a relative eternity (pravāhanityatā) which means that the same Veda is revealed by the Lord in each cycle of creation. Only Brahman has unchanging eternity (kūṭasthanityatā). Abhyankar, like the author of the V.P. p.87, uses the word "same" (samāna) which could mean either identical or similar. The author of the Ratnaprabhā p.55, line 23f., maintains that the Veda is identical in each cycle. In the Bhāmatī p.57, line 18f, Vācaspati presents the analogy of a dancer who repeats the same dance as the instructor but does not repeat the identical movements. In this manner, the Veda is the same but not identical in each cycle.
187. V.P. p.69.
188. V.P. p.73. Vs. p.10, line 17f. Also, R.D. Karmarkar (ed. and trans.), Vedāntakalpalatika. Poona. 1962. p.78f.
189. Vs. p.10, line 5. P.D. 1.43. 7.74.
190. The Self is able to be implied through the word "I" which directly denotes the ego. Cf., U. 1.18.28, 29, 58. For an explanation of the discrimination between the Self and the objective attributes considered to be the Self, cf., B.S.Ś. (adhyāsabhāṣya) p.4, line 1f. U. 1.18.64, 65.
191. U. 1.18.96, 189.
192. ibid., 1.18.97.
193. Sureśvara refers to the discrimination between subject and object as "another example of continuity and discontinuity" N.S. 4.26., prose portion. Ānandagiri and Rāmatīrtha, commenting upon U. 1.18. 96., illustrate continuity and discontinuity with reference to subject-object relation.
194. B.S.Ś. (adhyāsabhāṣya) p.4, line 1f.
195. U. 1.6.6.
196. ibid., 1.18.94, 101.
197. ibid., 1.18.24.
198. ibid., 1.18.101, 110.
199. The Ch. 6.3.3. : "That [existence] perceived" (tad aikṣata), indicates that the pure Existence (sat) referred to in 6.3.1. has the power of creation. For this reason, later Advaitins specifically interpret the word "That" in the sentence "you are That" as primarily signifying the Lord, cf., V.P. p.74; Vs. p.9, line 9; P.D. 1.44. Such an interpretation makes the use of jahada jahallakṣaṇa more explicit since both the adjuncts i.e. the nature of being an individual soul and the nature of being the Lord, are given up through the implication of their identity in awareness. Śaṅkara and

Sureśvara, however, do not appear to specify the word "That" as expressly signifying the Lord.

200. U 1.18.194.
201. ibid., 1.18.169, 170, 195.
202. ibid., 1.18. 90, 180, 193. N.S. 2.1. 4.21.
203. N.S. 3.28., (prose), 54., (prose), 64., (prose). 4.9., (prose), 26., (prose).
204. ibid., 3.98, 100, 102.
205. ibid., 4.9f. Also, 3.5, 113.
206. ibid., 3.5, 33, 34, 113. 4.18.
207. ibid., 3.3.
208. ibid., 3.26.
209. ibid., 3.78., (prose), 79.
210. ibid., 3.75-80.
211. V.P. p.90. Dharmarāja alternatively interprets arthāpatti as a bahuvrīhi compound referring to the reason for the postulation, i.e. fatness.
212. Datta, op-cit., p.243.
213. V.P. p.55.
214. Datta, op-cit., p.238.
215. V.P. p.56.
216. ibid., p.90.
217. ibid., p.91.
218. Brh.Ś. 1.4.10. p.670, line 1f.
219. V.P. p.97f. Datta, op-cit., p.168.
220. P.D. Ch. 10.
221. V.P. p.8. See comment to 1.10.
222. P.D. 6.70, 71. Also, Śrutisāra, op-cit., verse 14.
223. Cf., comment to 1.44.
224. U 1.18.54. Intellect (buddhi) is used here in the same sense as internal-organ (antahkarana).
225. ibid., 1.18.43.

226. ibid., 1.18.53.
227. ibid., 1.18.63, 64.
228. G. 13.5.
229. S.Ś. 1.27, 159. P.D. 7.8.
230. U. 1.6.6.
231. B.S.Ś. (adhyāsabhāṣya) p.25, line 3.
232. The Kāṇva recension differs from the above. Cf., Brh. 4.4.23. p.936.
233. B.S.Ś. 1.1.1. p.36, line 3f.
234. Vs. p.1, line 21f. Viveka., verses 18-27. S. Vimuktānanda (trans.) Aparokṣānubhūti. Calcutta. 1977. Verses 3-10.
235. B.S.Ś. 1.1.4. p.74, line 2f. Brh.Ś. 3.1.1. p.798, line 20f. Tai.Ś. 1.11. p.276, line 4f. G.Ś. 18.66. p.288, line 25f.
236. B.S.Ś. 4.1.18. p.853, line 20f. U. 1.17.22. G.Ś. 18.5, 6, 7. p.258, line 5f.
237. B.S.Ś. 4.1.18. p.853, line 20f. Tai.Ś. 1.11. p.278, line 1f. G.Ś. 18.5. p.258, line 6f.
238. Cf., Tai.Ś. 1.11. p.279, line 14f.
239. Brh.Ś. 2.4.5. p.760, line 19f; 4.5.6. p.941, line 22f. Ke.Ś. 2.1. p.25, line 14f. Śaṅkara explains the word "nididhyāsana" as "the desire to meditate with certainty", Brh.Ś. 2.4.4. p.759, line 16.
240. Brh.Ś. 2.4.5. p.760, line 20f. When Śaṅkara says: "not otherwise, by mere hearing" (p.760, line 21.), it must mean hearing which is unsupported by inquiry, i.e. the discrimination of the Self from the non-Self through the method of anvayavyatireka etc., as mentioned in U. 1.18.96, 176, 178, 179, 180, 189. Śaṅkara states in B.S.Ś. 4.1.2. p.829, line 1f, p.830, line 5f., and in U. 1.18.188, 189., that direct knowledge can be gained through hearing the Vedānta texts.
241. B.S.Ś. 1.4.1. p.295, line 10; 3.2.24. p.657, line 15. Mu.Ś. 3.1. p.164, line 24f; 3.2. p.166, line 3f.
242. B.S.Ś. 2.1.3. p.354, line 10.
243. B.S.Ś. 2.1.3. p.353, line 7f. Brh.Ś. 1.4.7. p.663, line 7f. Mā.Ś. 3.39. p.224, line 24.
244. B.S.Ś. 2.3.39. p.545, line 10. G.Ś. 2.39. p.27, line 16. In the Gītābhāṣya (ibid., p.27, line 16.), Śaṅkara states that both the performance of action (karmayoga) and the practice of samādhi (samādhiyoga) are yoga. Here, Śaṅkara places the practice of meditation on the same level as karmayoga, i.e. as secondary means to knowledge.

245. B.S.Ś. 2.1.9. p.365, line 5f.
246. B.S.Ś. 4.1.2. p.830, line 5f. U. 1.18.174, 188, 199.
247. B.S.Ś. 4.1.1. p.826, line 7f; 4.1.2. p.829, line 16f.
248. Rāmaśāstrī, op-cit., p.122, line 28f. Venkataramiah, op-cit., p.313f.
249. Rāmaśāstrī, op-cit., p.123, line 4.
250. ibid., p.125, line 1f.
251. ibid., p.125, line 21f.
252. B.S. (Bhāmatī) 3.4.26. p.801, line 26f.
253. ibid., 1.1.1. p.31, line 25 (na ca-eṣa sāksātkāro...).
254. ibid., 1.1.1. p.32, line 6f. 1.1.4. p.70, line 21f.
255. See comment to 1.27.
256. R. Balasubramanian, Advaita Vedānta. Madras. 1976. p.218.
257. Y.S. 3.4.
258. B.S. (Bhāmatī) 2.3.39. p.545, line 28f.
259. T.M.P. Mahadevan (ed. and trans.), The Saṁbandha-Vārtika of Suresvarācārya. Madras. 1972. p.148, verse 294.
260. U. 3.3. p.251f.
261. ibid., 1.18.9-18., is the objection. The reply is from verse 19f.
262. Gokhale, op-cit., p.96, line 14f.
263. This verse could not be located.
264. This verse could not be located under the given reference. However it occurs in the Brh., cf., Brh. 4.4.12.
265. See text 1.13., and comment.
266. The Mu. text is: brahma veda brahmaiva bhavati (Mu. 3.2.9.).
267. A number of mnemonics have been cited in the text with reference to Śaṅkara's dates. The first is kha (space) = 0, indu (moon) = 1, haya (horse) = 7 on account of the seven horses of the sun. The second mnemonic is pakṣa (half) = a symbolical expression for the number 2, veda (the Veda) = 4, ṛṣi (sage) = 7 which is given as a traditional number. The third mnemonic is śaśin (moon) = 1, agni (fire) = 3 because of the three types of sacrificial fire, rasa (taste) = 6 on account of the six types of tastes, yugma (pair) = 2. The fourth mnemonic contains symbols previously mentioned.

2.1.

ततः सप्ताधिकसंवत्सरशतत्रयानन्तरं शके ग्रहवेदाकाशेन्दुपरिमिते (शके १०४९ इसवी सन ११२७) रामानुजाचार्याः श्रीरामानुजाचार्यकालः प्रादुरभूवन् । मायावादमसहमानानामेषां मायावादनिरसनाय प्रवृत्तिरिति तत्र तत्र तत्प्रणीतेषु श्रीभाष्यादिप्रबन्धेषु मायावादिमतमुल्लिख्य तत्रापारितोषमुद्गावयद्भिस्तैरेव प्रकटीकृतम् । किं त्वयं तेषां यत्नः कियतांशेन सफली बभूवेति विभावनीयं सूरिभिः । रामानुजाचार्याश्च त्रिचनापल्लीसंज्ञकप्रदेशे भूतपुरीग्रामे हारीतान्वयसंभवात्केशवभट्टेति सुगृहीतनाम्नो द्राविडब्राह्मणात्सकाशात्कान्तिमत्यां समभूवन् । एते शेषावतारभूता इति तत्संप्रदायः । बौधायनकृतवृत्त्यादिप्रयत्नेन कुर्वद्रूपतां प्रापितो द्रमिडाचार्यप्रणीतभाष्येण दड्डनचार्यविरचितवार्तिकेन चाङ्कुरितो विशिष्टाद्वैतदर्शनमहीरुहो यामुनाचार्यादिनिर्मितसिद्धित्रयादिग्रन्थैः पुष्पितो रामानुजाचार्यप्रणीतवेदार्थसंग्रहादिना फलितोऽभवत् । रामानुजाचार्यैश्च वेदार्थसंग्रहे विशिष्टाद्वैतानुसारेण श्रुत्यर्थोऽवधारितः । तथापि ब्रह्मसूत्रकाराणामसंमतोऽयं विशिष्टाद्वैतवाद इति लोकानां मतिः स्यात्तन्निराकरणाय ब्रह्मसूत्रव्याख्यारूपः श्रीभाष्यप्रबन्धस्तैरेव निरमायि । तत्र च विशिष्टाद्वैतदर्शनानुसारेण ब्रह्मसूत्राणि व्याख्यातानि । वेदान्तसार-वेदान्तदीप-गीताभाष्य-नित्याराधनविधि-श्रीगद्यप्रभृतयोऽन्येऽपि ग्रन्था रामानुजाचार्यैर्विरचिता इति प्रसिद्धिः ।

2.1. Then after three hundred years plus an additional seven, Rāmānujācārya appeared in the era measured as 1049 [1127 of the Christian era]. Not tolerating the teaching of māyā, his activity was towards the refutation of the teaching of māyā. This was made evident, because having delineated in various places the view of the exponents of māyā in works such as the Śrībhāṣya which he composed, he certainly showed his displeasure there. However the learned should clearly determine to what extent his effort was successful.

Rāmānujācārya was born in the village of Bhūtapurī in the region known as Tricanāpallī, of Kāntimatī and the Drāviḍa brāhmaṇa whose respected name was Keśavabhaṭṭa and who was born in the lineage of Hārītā.¹ The tradition about him is that he was an incarnation of Śeṣa.²

The tree of Viśiṣṭādvaita teaching was made into an immediate cause through the initial effort produced by the Vṛtti [i.e. commentary] of Baudhāyana. It sprouted into the commentary written by Dramiḍācārya and the vārtika composed by Ṭaṅkācārya. It blossomed into books such as

Siddhitraya prepared by Yāmunācārya etc. and it bore fruit through the Vedārthasaṅgraha etc. written by Rāmānuja.

In the Vedārthasaṅgraha the meaning of the sacred texts has been ascertained by Rāmānujācārya according to Viśiṣṭādvaita. Even so, thinking that the view of the people would be: "this teaching of Viśiṣṭādvaita is not in agreement with the author of the Brahmasūtra", for the refutation of that [view] he composed the treatise Śrībhāṣya which took the form of an explanation of the Brahmasūtra. In that [treatise] the Brahmasūtras were explained according to the teaching of Viśiṣṭādvaita. It is well known that Rāmānuja composed other works also, beginning with Vedāntasāra, Vedāntadīpa, a commentary upon the Gītā, Nityārādhanavidhi and Śrīgadya.

2.2.

श्रीमद्रामानुजाचार्या विशिष्टाद्वैतवादिनः ।
चकुर्मायामनाश्रित्य प्रस्थानत्रययोजनम् ॥ ३ ॥

2.2.

Śrīmat Rāmānujācārya, the exponent of Viśiṣṭādvaita, brought about a union of the three systems [Upaniṣads, Bhagavadgītā and Brahmasūtra] without having recourse to māyā. 3.

2.3.

अथ सुखबोधाय रामानुजदर्शनं प्रदर्शयते ।
नित्यं हेयगुणावधूननपरा नैर्गुण्यवादाः श्रुतौ
स्पष्टार्थाः सगुणोक्तयः शुभगुणप्ररूपापनाद्ब्रह्मणः ।
अद्वैतश्रुतयो विशिष्टविषया निष्कृष्टरूपाश्रया
भेदोक्तिस्तदिहाखिलश्रुतिहितं रामानुजीयं मतम् ॥ ४ ॥

2.3. Now, the teaching of Rāmānuja is shown for easy understanding.

In the sacred text, the statements pertaining to freedom from qualities are always meant for

discarding qualities that must be given up. The expressions relating to the possession of qualities have a clear meaning, because they communicate that Brahman possesses auspicious qualities. The sacred texts dealing with non-duality refer to what is qualified. An expression of difference has its basis in a determined form. The view here belonging to Rāmānuja has been placed upon the entire sacred texts. 4.

comment

Rāmānuja, like Śaṅkara, considers that the role of the Vedic scripture is to reveal truths which cannot be known either through perception or perceptually based means of knowledge such as inference.³ In his commentary upon Brahmasūtra 1.1.3., Rāmānuja argues against the followers of Nyāya who maintain that the existence of God can be demonstrated through inference based upon consideration of the world as an effect.⁴ In contrast to this, Rāmānuja asserts that both the existence and nature of God are knowable only through scriptural testimony.⁵ Reason cannot, of itself, generate conclusive proof in the domain of metaphysics⁶ and its legitimate function is supportive: to assist in elucidating scriptural purport and to demonstrate that the ascertained purport is alone logically possible.

Rāmānuja recognizes two basic categories of Upaniṣad texts: those which teach a distinction between the individual soul and Brahman and passages which teach their unity.⁷ This contradiction strikes at the root of the validity of the Veda as a means of knowledge and consequently the mutual concord (samanvaya) of all the Upaniṣad texts is a matter of fundamental importance. Rāmānuja states that: "when there is contradiction between two equally valid texts, their scope must be discerned through non-contradiction."⁸ Rāmānuja rejects Śaṅkara's method of interpretation,⁹ for he considers it ridiculous that the sacred texts should firstly teach that all plurality is connected to Brahman and then subsequently negate its own teaching.¹⁰ Rāmānuja attempts to bring about the mutual concord of all the Upaniṣad texts by interpreting them in accordance with passages which denote a qualified relation between the self and Brahman, analogous to the

relation between body and soul.

The body-soul relation (śarīraśarīribhāva) is the primary conceptual model for Rāmānuja's interpretation of the Upaniṣads. He relies particularly upon the section of the Bṛhadāraṇyaka known as the Antaryāmirāhmaṇa:

He who dwelling in the earth is different from the earth...whose body is the earth, who being within controls the earth...He who dwelling in the self is different from the self...whose body is the self, who being within controls the self...¹¹

Rāmānuja maintains that Brahman is the Self of the whole universe comprising all souls and matter and all sentient and insentient things are the modes of Brahman and constitute His body. Rāmānuja defines this body-soul relation as:

...the relation between the substratum and the dependent entity which is incapable of existing separately, the relation of controller and controlled and the relation of principal and subsidiary.¹²

With respect to this position, Rāmānuja explains that there is no contradiction between passages which teach that Brahman is free from qualities (nirguṇa) and passages expressing possession of qualities (saguṇa).¹³ He considers that nirguṇa statements mean only that Brahman is free from qualities which must be given up (heyaguṇa)¹⁴ and, on the basis of the analogy of body and soul, he argues that Brahman is untainted by the defects of the souls and matter just as the soul is untouched by the defects of the body.¹⁵ He holds that saguṇa passages should be accepted just as they are.¹⁶ Texts indicating non-duality are to be interpreted in a qualified sense because the individual souls and matter, which constitute the body of Brahman, possess the relationship of qualifying attributes (viśeṣaṇa) to a substantive (viśeṣya).¹⁷ Just as attributes inhere in their substantive and are incapable of being established independently of it, in the same manner, the souls and matter exist in Brahman as attributes to a substantive and they have no separate existence from Brahman. Passages signifying duality can be explained on the basis of the inherent distinction between body and soul. The souls and matter, as the body of Brahman, are essentially other than Brahman.¹⁸

When Rāmānuja's opponent (pūrvapakṣin) inquires whether Rāmānuja holds the position of a dualist, non-dualist, or accepts both duality and non-duality simultaneously, he replies that all these views are valid

since they can all be found in the Veda.¹⁹ Rāmānuja then proceeds to bring them into mutual concord by showing their correspondence to a particular feature of the body-soul model. Non-difference is established because Brahman alone exists, having everything as His body. Difference is established since the Lord, souls and matter are mutually distinct in essence and in attributes. Difference and non-difference is also established because Brahman, though one, exists as many in so far as He has all things as His attributes.

Thus we can see that Rāmānuja seeks to explain all the Upaniṣad texts on the basis of the analogy of body and soul. This analogy provides the fundamental model for the Viśiṣṭādvaita conception of the relationship between the Lord, souls and matter: Brahman alone exists (advaita), but Brahman is qualified (viśiṣṭasya) by all sentient and insentient things which are dependent upon Brahman and exist in an attributive relation to Brahman.²⁰ According to Rāmānuja:

In explaining identity through the relation of self and body, all the sacred texts are properly demonstrated....²¹

2.4. प्रमाणसिद्धं वस्तु तत्त्वशब्देनोच्यते । तच्च तत्त्वं त्रिविधम् । जडजीवेश्वर-
भेदात् । जडं प्रसिद्धं पाञ्चभौतिकं शरीरादिक-
त्रिविधं तत्त्वम् । तदेव भोगसाधनम् । तदपेक्ष-
या स्वरूपतः स्वभावतश्चात्यन्तविलक्षणस्तदन्त-
र्यामी जीवात्मा । स च बद्धो मुक्तो नित्यश्चेति त्रिविधः । जीवस्याप्यन्तर्यामी-
श्वरः । अयं च निखिलहेयगुणराहित्येन कल्याणैकतानत्वेन च जीवापेक्षयाऽ-
त्यन्तविलक्षणः । ईश्वरश्च सर्वावस्थाञ्जीवाञ्जडान्श्च पदार्थान्व्याप्नोति । जडानां
जीवानां चान्तर्यामी भूत्वा तेषां नियन्ता च भवति । तथा च श्रुतयः—‘यः
पृथिव्यां तिष्ठन्पृथिव्या अन्तरः० यः पृथिवीमन्तरो यमयति’ (बृ० ३ । ७ ।
३) ‘य आत्मनि तिष्ठन्नात्मनोऽन्तरः० य आत्मानमन्तरो यमयति’ (बृ० ३ ।
७ । २२) ‘अन्तर्बहिश्च तत्सर्वं व्याप्य नारायणः स्थितः’ (ना० १३ । १)
‘प्रधानक्षेत्रज्ञपतिर्गुणेशः’ (श्वे० ६ । १६) इति । न चायं जीवेश्वरयोर्भेद औपा-
धिक इति मन्तव्यम् । तदा विद्वान्पुण्यपापे विधूय निरञ्जनः परमं साम्यमुपैति
(मु० ३ । १ । ३) इत्यादिश्रुतिषु, मुक्तोपसृप्यव्यपदेशाच्च (ब्र० सू० १ । ३ । ३)
भोगमात्रसाम्यलिङ्गाच्च (ब्र० सू० ४ । ४ । २१) इत्यादिसूत्रेषु,

इदं ज्ञानमुपाश्रित्य मम साधर्म्यमागताः (गी० १४ । २)

इति गीतायां च सर्वाविद्योपाधिविनिर्मुक्तस्य जीवस्य मोक्षावस्थायामपीश्वरा-
पेक्षया भेदप्रतिपादनात् । न हि स्वस्य स्वेनैव साम्यं भवति । न वा स्वयमेव
स्वस्योपसृप्यो भवति । मुक्तैरुपसृप्यो मुक्तोपसृप्यः । मुक्तप्राप्य इति यावत् ।

2.4. An object which is established by a means of knowledge is called

by the word "real". That reality is threefold, due to the distinction of the inert, the individual souls and the Lord. The inert is well known to be the entire world composed of the five elements and consisting of the physical body etc. That is indeed the means for experience. With regard to that [physical body etc.], the individual self is completely distinct in essence and in attributes and is the inner controller of that [body etc.]. That [individual self] is of three kinds: bound, freed and eternal [i.e. eternally freed]. The Lord is the inner controller of even the individual soul. This [Lord] is completely distinct with regard to the individual soul due to being free from all qualities which must be abandoned and on account of being absolutely auspicious. The Lord pervades the categories i.e. the individual souls and the inert things in all their conditions. Having become the inner controller of the inert objects and the individual souls, He is their ruler. Accordingly, there are the sacred texts: "He who dwelling in the earth is other than the earth...who being within controls the earth" (Brh.3.7.3.), "He who dwelling in the self is other than the self...who being within controls the self" (Brh.3.7.22.), "Nārāyaṇa exists, having pervaded all that is within and without" (M.Nā.13.5.), "The Lord of matter and of the souls, the Lord of the qualities" (Śv.6.16.).

It should not be thought that this distinction between the individual soul and the Lord is brought about by a limiting adjunct. [reason] Because even in the state of liberation, the individual soul, who is free from the limiting adjunct consisting of all ignorance, is taught as being different with regard to the Lord in the sacred texts: "Then the one who knows, having shaken off good and evil and being without taint, attains the highest similarity" (Mu.3.1.3.), in the [Brahma] sūtras: "And on account of the designation that it is to be approached by the released" (B.S.1.3.2.) and in the Gītā : "Having

resorted to this knowledge, they reach an equality of attributes with me" (G.14.2.). [Comment upon words in the preceding quotations]: there is certainly no "similarity" (sāmyam) of oneself with oneself. Nor can oneself "be approached" (upasrpya) by oneself. "Muktopasrpya" means that it is to be approached by the liberated. Which is to say that it is to be gained by the liberated.

2.5.

प्रकारान्तरेण पुनस्तत्त्वं द्विविधम् । द्रव्यं गुणश्चेति । उपादानत्वं गुणाश्रयत्वं
स्वाश्रयादन्यत्र वर्तमानत्वं संकोचविकासावस्था-
द्रव्यनिरूपणम् श्रयत्वं वा द्रव्यत्वम् । तच्च द्रव्यं षड्विधम्—
ईश्वरो जीवो नित्यविभूतिर्ज्ञानं प्रकृतिः कालश्चेति ।


2.5. Again, according to another mode, reality is twofold: substance and quality. The nature of a substance is being a material cause, or being the locus of qualities, or existing in another place with respect to its locus, or being the locus of the states of contraction and expansion. Substance is sixfold: the Lord, the individual soul, the "eternal manifestation", Knowledge, matter and time.

comment

With regard to the definition of substance (dravya), the statement "existing in another place with respect to its locus" means that a substance, unlike a quality, is able to be separated from its locus. For example, a book is a substance since it can exist separately from its locus such as a table. However the colour of the book cannot be separated from the book and hence it is a quality (guna).

The expression "according to another mode" refers to the exposition of Viśiṣṭādvaita as presented in the Yatīndramatadīpikā.²² Abhyankar follows this text closely in his description of the Viśiṣṭādvaita system. The fundamental schema of Viśiṣṭādvaita, as delineated in the Yatīndramatadīpikā, is as follows:

Everything can be divided, firstly, into a twofold category: means of knowledge and object of knowledge.



Abhyankar now proceeds to explain each of the six substances.

- 2.6. ईश्वरः परमात्मा ब्रह्मशब्दवाच्यः सर्वाधारः सर्वकर्ता । जीवो नित्यविभूतिः प्रकृतिः कालश्चेति द्रव्यचतुष्टयमीश्वरस्य शरीरभूतम् । ईश्वरस्य स्वरूपं ज्ञानं शरीरं चेति त्रयमपि व्यापकमेव । स चेश्वरः पञ्चविधः—परव्यूहविभवान्तर्याम्यर्चावतारभेदात् । तत्र परो वैकुण्ठे श्रिया सहितोऽनन्तगरुडादिभिर्नित्यजीवैः सह क्रीडन्नास्ते । अयमेव मुक्तप्राप्यः । पर एवोपासनार्थं वासुदेवसंकर्षणप्रद्युम्नानिरुद्धभेदेन चतुर्धाऽवस्थितो व्यूह इत्युच्यते । जगत्सर्जनमुपासकानुग्रहः संसारिरक्षणं चास्यैव कृत्यम् । तत्र वासुदेवः पद्मगुणपूर्णः । ज्ञानशक्तिवलैश्वर्यवीर्यतेजांसि पद्मगुणाः । ज्ञानं नाम सर्वदा सर्वविषयप्रकाशकः स्वप्रकाशो गुणविशेषः । शक्तिर्जगत्प्रकृतिभावः, अघटितघटनासामर्थ्यं वा । बलं जगत्कारणत्वप्रयुक्तश्रमाभावः, सकलवस्तुधारणसामर्थ्यं वा । ऐश्वर्यं स्वातन्त्र्येण कर्तृत्वं, सकलजीवजडनियमनसामर्थ्यं वा । वीर्यं जगदुपादानकारणत्वेऽपि स्वरूपविकाराभावः । तेजः सहकारिनैरपेक्ष्यं पराभिभवनसामर्थ्यं वा । संकर्षणप्रद्युम्नानिरुद्धेषु संकर्षणे ज्ञानवलयोराधिक्यम् । प्रद्युम्ने चैश्वर्यवीर्ययोराधिक्यम् । अनिरुद्धे तु शक्तितेजसोः । विभवस्तु मत्स्यकूर्मादिः । अन्तर्यामी तु तत्तत्प्राणिनां हृदयप्रदेशेष्ववस्थितो योगिभिः स्वहृदये ध्येयः । अयं

च जीवेन सह विद्यमानोऽपि जीवगतदोषैर्न लिप्यते । अर्चावतारस्तु भक्त-
कल्पितप्रतिमादिपदार्थं शरीरतया स्वीकृत्योपासकाधीनस्नानादिमान्सर्वसहि-
ष्णुर्देवाल्यादिषु विद्यमानो मूर्तिविशेषः । व्यूहादिषु चतुर्षु पर एव कचिच्छक्त्या-
वेशेन कचित्स्वरूपावेशेन चावतिष्ठते । आवेशश्चायं कचित्पूर्णत्वेन कचिदंशेन च
भवति ।

2.6. The Lord is the supreme Self, who can be denoted by the word Brahman. He is the supporter of all and the agent of all. The group of four substances: the individual soul, the "eternal manifestation", matter and time are the Lord's body. Moreover the group of three: the [Lord's] essential nature, Knowledge and body are certainly invariably concomitant with the Lord.

The Lord exists in a fivefold way, due to the distinction of Para, Vyūha, Vibhava, Antaryāmin and Arcāvatāra. In regard to that [fivefold distinction], the Para dwells in Vaikuṅṭha enjoying along with Śrī and accompanied by the eternally [liberated] souls such as Ananta and Garuḍa. This [Para] is indeed what is to be gained by the liberated. The Para himself, abiding for the purpose of worship in a fourfold manner due to the distinction of Vāsudeva, Saikarṣaṇa, Pradyumna and Aniruddha, is called the Vyūha. The activity of that [Vyūha] is indeed creating the world, assistance to the worshipper and protecting the transmigrating soul.

In regard to that [Vyūha], Vāsudeva is replete with the six qualities. The six qualities are: Knowledge, potency, strength, lordship, valour and splendour. What is called Knowledge is a particular quality which is self-effulgent and which illuminates all objects at all times. Potency is the state of being the material cause of the world, or the capacity for accomplishing the unaccomplished. Strength is the absence of fatigue arising out of being the cause of the world, or it is the capacity to support all things. Lordship is independent agentship, or the capacity to control all souls and inert things. Valour is the

absence of a change in essential nature, even though being the material cause of the world. Splendour is the absence of dependence upon an assistant, or it is the capacity to subdue another. Among Saṅkarṣaṇa, Pradyumna and Aniruddha, there is an abundance of Knowledge and strength in Saṅkarṣaṇa. There is an abundance of lordship and valour in Pradyumna and there is [abundance] of potency and splendour in Aniruddha.

The Vibhava are the [ten incarnations] such as the fish and the tortoise. The Antaryāmin abides in the region of the heart of every living being and can be contemplated in their own hearts by Yogis. This [Antaryāmin], though existing with the individual soul, is not tainted by the defects belonging to the soul. The Arcāvatāra accepts for its body an object such as an image fashioned by a devotee, it is a particular image existing in temples etc., enduring all and depending upon the worshipper for baths etc. Among the four commencing with the Vyūha, only the Para exists with the possession of his potency at one place and the possession of his essential nature elsewhere. This "possession" is the existing in completeness at one place and as a part elsewhere.

comment

Viśiṣṭādvaita teaching incorporates aspects of the Pañcarātra tradition.²³ In the body of texts known by that name, the Lord is described as manifesting in a fivefold way: (1) as the Supreme (Para) possessing a divine form and dwelling with Śrī, his śakti; (2) as his four emanations (Vyūha) i.e. Vāsudeva, Saṅkarṣaṇa, Pradyumna and Aniruddha; (3) in the form of incarnations (Vibhava); (4) as the soul's inner controller (Antaryāmin) and (5) as incarnate in images used for worship (Arcāvatāra).²⁴

A distinctive feature of the Pañcarātra system is its conception of a progressive emanation of the Para in the form of the Vyūha. The Vyūha is none other than the Para and possesses the same six qualities, though Saṅkarṣaṇa, Pradyumna and Aniruddha each highlight two of those six qualities.²⁵ The Para is called Vāsudeva at the time he is about to commence the creation of a new cosmic cycle. Saṅkarṣaṇa originates from Vāsudeva and has the twofold function of revealing the scriptures

and the destruction of the world. Pradyumna is an emanation from Saṅkarṣaṇa and possesses the dual function of revealing spiritual practice and also creation. Aniruddha proceeds from Pradyumna and has the two functions of bringing about the result of spiritual practice and the sustaining of the universe.²⁶

The orthodoxy of the Pañcarātra system has been vigorously upheld by Viśiṣṭādvaita authors.²⁷ Rāmānuja, however, makes only one reference to the Pañcarātra, in his commentary on Brahmasūtra 2.2.39-42 where he seeks to prove that its doctrines are not in conflict with the Veda.²⁸

Abhyankar's explanation of each of the six qualities accords with the traditional interpretations given in the Lakṣmī Tantra and the Viśiṣṭādvaita text Tattvatraya.²⁹

2.7.

परमात्मनः स्वरूपनिरूपका धर्माश्च सत्यत्वज्ञानत्वानन्दत्वामलत्वादयः ।
एते सर्वासु विद्यास्वनुवर्तन्ते । सर्वविद्यास्वेते धर्मा
उपास्या इति यावत् । उक्तैर्धर्मैः स्वरूपे निरूपिते
तद्विशेषका ज्ञानबलादयो धर्माः । सौशील्यादयो
धर्मास्तु ज्ञानादिधर्मविततिरूपाः । सर्वज्ञत्वसर्वशक्तित्वादयो धर्मा जगदुत्पादन
उपयुज्यन्ते । वात्सल्यसौशील्यसौलभ्यादय आश्रयण उपयुज्यन्ते । वात्सल्या-
दीन्द्रैवोपासकाः परमात्मानमाश्रयन्ति । कारुण्यादयो धर्मा भक्तरक्षण
उपयुज्यन्ते ।

2.7. The attributes which determine the essential nature of the supreme Self are existence, Knowledge, bliss, purity etc. These persist in all meditations. That means these attributes form the object of devotional meditation in all the meditations. When the essential nature is determined by the attributes mentioned, attributes such as Knowledge, strength etc. are the distinguishing features of that [essential nature]. Attributes such as excellence of disposition etc. are extensions of the attributes such as Knowledge etc. Attributes such as omniscience, omnipotence etc. are useful for the creation of the world. Affection, excellence of disposition, easiness of attainment etc. are useful for providing refuge [to devotees]. Worshippers resort to the supreme Self only having perceived [the qualities of] affection etc. Attributes such as compassion are useful for protecting the devotee.³⁰

comment

Viśiṣṭādvaitins make a twofold distinction with regard to the Lord's attributes. Firstly, the attributes which constitute the essential nature (svarūpa) of the Lord and secondly, all other attributes characterizing the nature (svabhāva) of the Lord.³¹

In Śrībhāṣya 3.3.13., Rāmānuja delineates two categories of attributes. The essential nature of Brahman is derived from the Upaniṣad texts: "Brahman is real, Knowledge and limitless" (Tai.2.1.) and "Brahman is bliss" (Tai.3.6.). Rāmānuja considers that these statements reveal the essence of Brahman's nature. In addition to these, Rāmānuja specifies the additional attribute of purity (amalatva) and thus five attributes constitute the essential nature.

According to Rāmānuja, the distinction between the two categories is made on the basis that the attributes which make up the essential nature are inherently connected with the very idea of Brahman. Whereas the other attributes are not necessarily inherent to the conception of Brahman.³² For this reason, the essential attributes are included in all meditations. The other attributes, though in no sense separate from Brahman, are only emphasized through certain functions and relations such as omniscience with regard to the creation of the world and compassion etc. in relation to the devotee.

2.8. जीवः प्रतिशरीरं भिन्नोऽणुपरिमाणः स्वयंप्रकाशो नित्यश्च । अस्य कर्तृत्वमी-
श्वराधीनम् । स च त्रिविधः बद्धमुक्तानित्यभेदात् ।
जीवभेदाः ब्रह्मदेवप्रभृतयः स्तम्बपर्यन्ताः संसारिणो जीवा
बद्धाः । परमात्मोपासनया त्यक्तसूक्ष्मशरीरा
वैकुण्ठनिवासिनो मुक्ताः । तेषां ब्रह्मानुभवोऽनन्त एव । न तस्य चरमावधिः ।
बद्धदशायां तिरोभूतं गुणाष्टकं मुक्तदशायामाविर्भवति । गुणाष्टकं त्वप्राकृतशब्द-
स्पर्शरूपरसगन्धशक्तिज्ञानानन्दरूपम् । अनन्तगरुडविष्वक्सेनादयो जीवा नित्याः ।

2.8. The individual soul is different in each body, the size of an atom, self-effulgent and eternal. Its agentship is dependent upon the Lord. That [soul] is of three types, due to the distinction of the bound, liberated and eternally [freed]. The transmigratory souls, beginning from the god Brahmā down to a clump of grass, are bound. The souls which have relinquished their subtle bodies and dwell in Vaikuṇṭha due to their worship of the supreme Self are liberated. Their experience of Brahman is indeed endless, it has no final limit.

The group of eight qualities which have disappeared in the bound state become manifest in the liberated state. The group of eight qualities are the non-material sound, touch, form, taste, smell, potency, Knowledge and bliss. The eternally [liberated] souls are Ananta, Garuḍa, Viṣvaksena etc.

comment

In the following verse, Yāmunācārya presents six defining characteristics of the individual soul:

The self is different from the body, sense organs, mind, vital breath and intellect. It does not require another means [for its manifestation]. It is eternal, all pervasive, different in each body and blissful by nature.³³

(1) The author of the Yatīndramatadīpikā seeks to demonstrate the essential distinction of the self from the body etc through the discrimination of subject and object, similar to the method employed by the Advaitin. He considers that the body cannot be the self because the statement such as "my body" reveals a relationship of possessor and possessed. In a similar manner, the statement "I see with the eye" indicates difference between the subject and object since there is a knower, known relation between the self and the attribute of seeing. Similarly, the cognition "I know by the mind" denotes a distinction between the self and its instrument of knowledge. So too, the expression "my vital breath" reveals a relation of subject and object through the inherent difference of possessor and possessed. Even the statement "I know" distinguishes the self from its attribute, awareness.

(2) Not requiring another means for its manifestation means that the soul is by nature self-effulgent, for consciousness is its intrinsic attribute.³⁴ The soul is inherently a knowing subject possessing agentship.³⁵ However, as Abhyankar points out, the soul's agentship is dependent upon the Lord. This means that the soul exercises free will over all actions only because the Lord, who is the inner-controller, permits freedom of action to the soul.³⁶

(3) The soul is eternal, for the scriptures reveal that it is without birth (aja) and constant (nitya).³⁷

(4) The soul is all pervasive by means of its attributive consciousness (dharmabhūtajñāna). However, in essence the soul is the size of an atom (aṇu)³⁸ and it enters into the body of a god, human being or animal on account of its connection with beginningless karma.³⁹

(5) Though all souls share the same nature,⁴⁰ they are different in each body.⁴¹ Their uniqueness, however, is so subtle that it cannot be expressed and can only be known by the soul itself.⁴²

(6) The soul is by nature blissful⁴³ and pure.⁴⁴ The sorrows of transmigratory existence are brought about due to the soul's connection with karma.⁴⁵

In addition, Rāmānuja specifies another important characteristic of the soul i.e. its utter dependence upon the Lord who is the Self of the soul, its inner controller and sustainer.⁴⁶

2.9. नित्यविभूतिर्नाम शुद्धसत्त्वात्मकः स्वयंप्रकाशो देशविशेषः । इदं च
 नित्यविभूतिः शुद्धसत्त्वं द्रव्यात्मकं गुणसत्त्वाद्विलक्षणं गुणस-
 च्चस्याश्रयभूतं च । देशविशेषश्चायमधः परि-
 च्छिन्नः । ऊर्ध्वं त्वस्य परिच्छेदो न विद्यते ।
 परमात्मनो मुक्तानां नित्यजीवानां च भोगस्थानमेतत् ।

2.9. What is known as the "eternal manifestation" (nityavibhūti) is a particular location which is self-effulgent and composed of pure sattva. This pure sattva is of the nature of a substance, it is distinct from the quality sattva and is the locus of the quality sattva. This particular location means it is limited in the lower regions but it is without limitation in the higher regions. This is the place of enjoyment for the supreme Self, the liberated and the eternally [liberated] souls.

comment

The "eternal manifestation" (nityavibhūti) is considered to be a special substance (see comment to 2.5.) which is by nature self-effulgent (svayamprakāśa). Its effulgence, like that of consciousness, is only for the sake of someone else i.e. the Lord and the souls.⁴⁷ Nityavibhūti is composed of pure sattva (śuddhasattva) which means sattva free from any contact with rajas or tamas and hence it is bereft of any imperfection.⁴⁸

The Lord utilizes this substance nityavibhūti in order to provide a location, objects and means of enjoyment for Himself, the liberated and the eternally liberated souls.⁴⁹ His divine form, the bodies of the two classes of liberated souls and the celestial abodes such as Vaikuṇṭha are all made from nityavibhūti.⁵⁰

2.10. ज्ञानं बुद्धिः । अर्थप्रकाश इति यावत् । तच्च सदा सविषयं स्वप्रकाशं विभ्रु
 च । इदं च द्रव्यं सदेव गुणात्मकमपि भवति ।
 ज्ञानम् नियमेन जीवेश्वरान्यतरवृत्तित्वात् । यथा दीपस्य
 प्रभा द्रव्यरूपापि दीपगुणभूता भवति तद्वत् ।
 जीवेश्वरस्वरूपभूतं ज्ञानं त्वेतस्मादन्यत् । तच्च केवलं द्रव्यमेव । न तु गुणः ।
 जीवेश्वरयोः केवलद्रव्यत्वात् । तत्र यथा

स्वस्यैव भासको दीपः स्वस्य चान्यस्य च प्रभा ।

तद्वज्जीवेश्वरस्वरूपभूतं ज्ञानं स्वस्यैव प्रकाशकम् । गुणभूतं ज्ञानं तु स्वस्य चा-
 न्यस्य च प्रकाशकं भवति । तच्च गुणभूतं ज्ञानमीश्वरस्य नित्यानां च जीवानां
 सदाविर्भूतमेव न तु कदापि तिरोहितं भवति । बद्धानां जीवानां त्वंशेनाविर्भूतं
 भवति । मोक्षप्राप्त्यनन्तरं तु कात्स्न्येनाविर्भूतं भवति तारुण्यावस्थायां पुंस्त्ववत् ।
 तच्च ज्ञानं नित्यमेव । ज्ञानमुत्पन्नं ज्ञानं नष्टमित्यादिव्यवहारस्तु ज्ञानस्य संकोच-
 विकासावस्थामादायोपपादनीयः । घटादिविषयप्रत्यक्षकाले जीवात्मनिष्ठमेत-
 ज्ञानमिन्द्रियद्वारा बहिर्निःसृत्य घटादिविषयेण संनिकृष्यते । आत्मगुणभूतस्या-
 प्यस्य ज्ञानस्य द्रव्यरूपत्वाङ्गीकारेण स्वाश्रयादन्यत्र गमनं बहिर्निःसरणादिक्रि-
 यावत्त्वं च न विरुध्यते । तदुक्तं यामुनाचार्यैः—

आश्रयादन्यतो वृत्तेराश्रयेण समन्वयात् ।

द्रव्यत्वं च गुणत्वं च ज्ञानस्यैवोपपद्यते ॥ इति ।

2.10. Knowledge means awareness. That means it illumines the object. That [Knowledge] always possesses an object, it is self-effulgent and all pervasive. This [Knowledge], while remaining a substance, also has the nature of a quality. Because its operation is necessarily as one or the other for the individual soul and the Lord. For example the effulgence of a light, though it is a substance, is a quality of the light. It is like that.

However the Knowledge which is the essential nature of the individual soul and the Lord is different from this. That is solely a substance, not a quality. Because the individual soul and the Lord are solely substances. In that regard, just as: "a light shines only for itself, the effulgence is for itself and for another", so too, the Knowledge which is the essential nature of the individual soul and the Lord shines only for itself.

However the Knowledge which is a quality shines for itself and for another. The Knowledge which is a quality is always fully manifest

for the Lord and the eternally [liberated] souls and is never concealed. Whereas for the bound souls it is partially manifest. But following the gain of liberation it becomes entirely manifest, like manhood in the state of youth. That [attributive Knowledge] is certainly eternal. But an expression such as: "Knowledge has been produced, Knowledge has vanished" can be justified by accepting that there is a state of contraction and expansion for Knowledge. At the time of perception of an object such as a pot, this Knowledge which is located in the individual self does out by means of the sense organ and comes into immediate contact with the object such as pot. Because this Knowledge, even though a quality of the self, is accepted as a substance, the motion elsewhere from its own locus and the possession of the activity of going out etc. is not contradicted. That has been told by Yāmunācārya :

Knowledge can be both a substance and a quality.

Because a mental modification exists elsewhere
than its locus and has conjunction with the locus.⁵¹

comment

According to Viśiṣṭādvaita, the meaning of the word "I" (ahamartha) directly denotes the self which is revealed by the first person in statements such as "I know" etc.⁵² The self has awareness as its nature (cidrūpa)⁵³ which means that it possesses self-effulgence (svayamprakāśatā).⁵⁴ Rāmānuja, following Yāmuna, defines self-effulgence as: "illuminating solely through its own existence for its own locus".⁵⁵ This means that the self is manifest to itself through its own being independent of any factor.⁵⁶ Though the self intrinsically possesses consciousness it is not mere consciousness as the Advaitins maintain. For Viśiṣṭādvaitins, the self is an eternal, self-effulgent, knowing subject.

While the self is always manifest to itself as "I", it is only revealed in relation to objects through the presence of its attributive consciousness (dharmabhūtajñāna). This is an intrinsic attribute of the self who is its witness.⁵⁷ Rāmānuja and Yāmuna define consciousness as "the manifesting of an object through its own existence for its own locus".⁵⁸ This statement differs from the above definition regarding

the self-effulgent nature of the self because in the latter the self only illumines itself for itself. Attributive consciousness, however, manifests the object to the self.

The attributive consciousness is by nature all pervasive when it is unobstructed by the effects of karma.⁵⁹ In the case of the Lord, the liberated and the eternally liberated souls, it is all pervasive, whereas for the bound souls it is in a contracted state. All mental states: happiness, sadness, memory etc. are particular modes of attributive consciousness.⁶⁰ According to Viśiṣṭādvaita, attributive consciousness is both a quality and a substance.⁶¹ It is a quality because it depends upon the self which is independently existent.⁶² Yet it is also a substance because it can go beyond its substrate.⁶³ Rāmānuja seeks to illustrate this through the example of a light and its quality of effulgence.⁶⁴ The light's effulgence is dependent upon the substance light, yet the effulgence is a substance in its own right because it can leave its locus in illumining objects and since it possesses the quality of colour.⁶⁵ Analogous to this, Rāmānuja considers that the self, like the light, is self-effulgent and, just as the light manifests objects through its effulgence, so too, the attributive consciousness manifests objects to the self.

It may be useful to briefly contrast the fundamental distinction between the Advaita and the Viśiṣṭādvaita concept of self. In the view of Advaita,⁶⁶ the empirical self, denoted by the word "I", is composed of two aspects: an objective portion (yuṣmadartha) containing any predicative conception of "I" as "such and such". The remaining portion is the pure subject (anidamaṁśa), awareness, which is the essential Self. In Viśiṣṭādvaita, the conception of the self is just the reverse. The inner self is the knower who is directly expressed by the word "I". Awareness is external (parāk) to the "I" and exists in an attributive relation, qualifying the self. Viśiṣṭādvaita does not admit the Advaitins pure consciousness. The self is the empirical "I" who possesses attributive consciousness as an intrinsic quality.

The Viśiṣṭādvaita conception of the self will be critically examined in the following chapter.

- 2.11. प्रकृतिस्तु सच्चरजस्तमोरूपगुणत्रयवती नित्या चतुर्विंशतितत्त्वात्मिका ।
 इयमेव विचित्रसृष्टिकरत्वान्मायाशब्देन व्यपदिश्यते । तथा ज्ञानविरोधिस्वाद-
 विद्याशब्देन नित्यत्वाच्चाक्षरशब्देन व्यपदिश्यते ।
 प्रकृतिः इयमेव सच्चरगतो मूलप्रकृतिः । चतुर्विंशतित-
 त्त्वानि तु प्रकृतिमहदहंकारमनःपञ्चज्ञानेन्द्रियपञ्च-

कर्मेन्द्रियपञ्चतन्मात्रपञ्चभूतानि । त्रिगुणात्मिकायां प्रकृतौ भगवत्संकल्पाधीन-
गुणवैपन्यात्कार्योन्मुखावस्थाऽव्यक्तशब्देनोच्यते । तस्मादव्यक्तान्महतत्त्वमुत्प-
द्यते । बुद्धिसामान्यस्य महत्त्वमिति पारिभाषिकी संज्ञा । तच्च सात्त्विकं राजसं-
तामसं चेति त्रिविधम् । महत्त्वादहंकार उत्पद्यते । अयमेव देहात्माभिमानादिज-
नकः । अयमपि सात्त्विकराजसतामसभेदेन त्रिविधः । राजसाहंकारसहकृतात्सा-
त्त्विकाहंकाराज्ज्ञानेन्द्रियषट् कर्मेन्द्रियपञ्चकं चेत्येकादशेन्द्रियाणि जायन्ते । मनः-
श्रोत्रचक्षुर्घ्राणरसनात्वग्भेदेन ज्ञानेन्द्रियं षड्विधम् । एषु षट्स्वन्तरीन्द्रियं मनः ।
श्रोत्रादीनि पञ्च बाह्येन्द्रियाणि । तत्र मनः संकल्पस्मृत्यादौ कारणं भवति ।
बाह्येन्द्रियाणां विषयप्रवृत्तौ सहकारि च भवति । एतदेव मनः शब्दादिविषया-
सक्त्यवस्थायां बन्धकारणम् । यदा तु बाह्यविषयाञ्छब्दादीन्विमुच्यात्मरूपविष-
यासक्तं भवति तदा तदेवापवर्गकारणं भवति । श्रोत्रचक्षुर्घ्राणरसनात्वगाख्यानि
पञ्चेन्द्रियाणि क्रमेण शब्दरूपगन्धरसस्पर्शग्राहकाणि । त्वगिन्द्रियं चक्षुरिन्द्रियं
च द्रव्यग्राहकमपि यथायोग्यं भवति । आकाशादीनि पञ्चमहाभूतानि क्रमेण
श्रोत्रत्वक्चक्षुर्जिह्वाघ्राणाख्यानां पञ्चानामिन्द्रियाणां पोषकाणि भवन्ति । इन्द्रि-
याणि चाभरणे रत्नानीक शरीरमाश्रित्य तिष्ठन्ति । वाक्पाणिपादपायूपस्थात्म-
कानि कर्मेन्द्रियाणि पञ्च । एतानि वचनादानविहरणोत्सर्गानन्दात्मकानि का-
र्याणि क्रमेण जनयन्ति । आकाशवायुतेजोजलपृथिव्याख्यानि पञ्चमहाभूतानि ।
एतान्येव भूतानि सूक्ष्माणि प्रागवस्थास्थितानि तन्मात्रशब्देनोच्यन्ते शब्द-
तन्मात्रं स्पर्शतन्मात्रं रूपतन्मात्रं रसतन्मात्रं गन्धतन्मात्रं चेति । दध्यवस्थातः
माकललरूपेण क्षीरपरिणामवत् ।

2.11. The primary material possesses a group of three qualities in the form of sattva, rajas and tamas. It is eternal and consists of twenty-four principles. This [primary material] is designated by the word "māyā" because it brings about the manifold creation. So too, it is designated by the word "avidyā" since it obstructs knowledge and by the word "akṣara" because it is eternal. This is indeed the primary material for the whole world.

The twenty-four principles are: prakṛti, mahat, ahaṅkāra, manas, the five organs of knowledge, the five organs of action, the five subtle elements and the five gross elements. In respect of the primary material composed of the three qualities, the state of being on the verge of becoming the effect because of the inequilibrium of the qualities, which is dependent upon the will of the Lord, is expressed by the word "avyakta". The principle known as mahat is produced from

that avyakta. The principle mahat is a technical name for the genus intellect. That [mahat] is threefold: possessed of sattva, rajas and tamas. The ahañkāra is produced from the principle mahat. This [ahañkāra] produces the false presumption that the body is the self etc. This is also threefold, due to the distinction of possessing sattva, rajas and tamas. The eleven organs: the group of six organs of knowledge and the group of five organs of action are produced from the ahañkāra possessed of sattva assisted by the ahañkāra possesses of rajas.

The organs of knowledge are sixfold, due to the distinction of mind, the sense of hearing, sight, smell, taste and touch. Among these six, the mind is the internal organ. The five beginning with the sense of hearing are external organs. In respect of that [i.e. the organs of knowledge], the mind is the cause of volition, memory etc. and it is the instrumental cause for the activity of the external senses among the sense objects. This mind is indeed the cause of bondage when in the state of attachment to sense objects like sound etc. But when it becomes attached to the object in the form of the self, having relinquished the [attachment to] external objects such as sound etc., then that very [mind] is the cause for liberation. The five organs known as the sense of hearing, sight, smell, taste and touch apprehend respectively sound, form, smell, taste and touch. The organ of touch and the organ of sight are suitable even in apprehending substances. The five great elements beginning with space are, respectively, the supporters of the five sense organs known as the ear, skin, eye, tongue and nose. The sense organs, having dependence on the body, are like jewels upon an ornament.

The five organs of action are; the organ of speech, hands, feet, anus and organ of generation. These respectively produce the effects consisting of speaking, taking, walking, evacuation and pleasure.

The five great elements are known as; space, air, fire, water

and earth. These same elements, existing in a subtle state prior [to the effect], are called by the word "tanmātra": sound-tanmātra, touch-tanmātra, form-tanmātra, taste-tanmātra and smell-tanmātra. Like the transformation of milk through an embryonic stage prior to the state of being curd.⁶⁷

comment

The Viśiṣṭādvaita description of prakṛti follows the model given in the Sāṅkhyakārikā.⁶⁸ They differ, however, in some respects: according to Viśiṣṭādvaita, prakṛti is the locus of sattva, rajas and tamas whereas in Sāṅkhya they constitute the very substance itself.⁶⁹ In Viśiṣṭādvaita, prakṛti does not extend into the divine regions which are composed of nityavibhūti, pure sattva. Also, for Viśiṣṭādvaitins, the evolution of prakṛti depends upon the will of the Lord whereas in Sāṅkhya it is an independent principle.

2.12.

भूतानां तन्मात्राणां चोत्पत्तावनेकं दर्शनम् । तत्र तामसाहंकारात्पञ्चापि
तन्मात्राण्युत्पद्यन्ते, तेभ्यश्च क्रमेण पञ्चभूतान्युत्प-
भूतोत्पत्तिक्रमः द्यन्ते इत्येकम् । तामसाहंकाराच्छब्दतन्मात्रमुत्प-
द्यते । शब्दतन्मात्रादाकाशः । आकाशात्स्पर्श-
तन्मात्रम् । स्पर्शतन्मात्राद्वायुः । वायो रूपतन्मात्रम् । रूपतन्मात्रात्तेजः । तेजसो
रसतन्मात्रम् । रसतन्मात्राज्जलम् । जलाद्गन्धतन्मात्रम् । गन्धतन्मात्रात्पृथिवीति
द्वितीयम् । तामसाहंकाराच्छब्दतन्मात्रमुत्पद्यते । शब्दतन्मात्रादाकाशः स्पर्श-
तन्मात्रं चेति द्वयमुत्पद्यते । तथा स्पर्शतन्मात्राद्वायु रूपतन्मात्रं चोत्पद्यते । रूप-
तन्मात्रात्तेजो रसतन्मात्रं चोत्पद्यते । रसतन्मात्राज्जलं गन्धतन्मात्रं चोत्पद्यते ।
गन्धतन्मात्रात्पृथिव्युत्पद्यत इति तृतीयम् । आकाशादिषु पञ्चसु भूतेषु शब्दादीनां
पञ्चानां गुणानामुत्तरोत्तरमेकैकाधिक्यमस्ति । तथा चाकाशे शब्दो वायौ शब्द-
स्पर्शो तेजसि शब्दस्पर्शरूपाणि जले शब्दस्पर्शरूपरसाः पृथिव्यां शब्दस्पर्शरूप-
रसगन्धा इति । इह गुणभूतानां शब्दादीनां पञ्चानां शब्दतन्मात्रस्पर्शतन्मात्रादि-
पञ्चतन्मात्रस्वरूपभूतेभ्यः शब्दादिभ्यो भेद एव न तु नामैक्यादभेद इति
भ्रमितव्यम् । महदादिकार्याणामुत्पात्तिर्नाम कारणस्यावस्थान्तरापत्तिरेव । न तु
नैयायिकानामिवापूर्वकार्यारम्भः । पञ्चमहाभूतानां पञ्चीकरणप्रक्रिया पूर्ववदेव
(पृ० १४) बोध्या ।

2.12. There is more than one teaching about the origination of the elements and the tanmātras. In regard to that, one [view] is that the five tanmātras are produced from the aḥānkāra possessed of tamas and the five elements are produced from them [the tanmātras i.e. the subtle

elements] in due order. A second [view] is that the sound-tanmātra is produced from the ahaikāra possessed of tamas. Space originates from the sound-tanmātra. Touch-tanmātra is produced from space. Air originates from touch-tanmātra. Form-tanmātra is produced from air. Fire originates from form-tanmātra. Taste tanmātra is produced from fire. Water originates from taste-tanmātra. Smell-tanmātra is produced from water. Earth originates from smell-tanmātra. A third [view] is that sound-tanmātra is produced from the ahaikāra possessed of tamas. Both space and touch-tanmātra are produced from sound-tanmātra. Similarly, air and form-tanmātra are produced from touch-tanmātra. Fire and taste-tanmātra are produced from form-tanmātra. Water and smell-tanmātra are produced from taste-tanmātra. Earth is produced from smell-tanmātra.

Among the five elements beginning with space, there is a preponderance for each one successively of the five qualities beginning with sound. So [the quality] sound is in space. Sound and touch are in air. Sound, touch and form are in fire. Sound, touch, form and taste are in water. Sound, touch, form, taste and smell are in earth. Here, there is certainly a distinction of the five qualities beginning with sound from the sound etc which are the essential nature of the five tanmātras: sound-tanmātra, touch-tanmātra etc. It should not be mistaken that there is no distinction because of identity in name.

What is known as the origination of the effects beginning with mahat is only the cause changing into another state, not the commencement of a new effect like it is for the Naiyāyikas. The procedure for the fivefold division and combination of the five great elements should be understood as before (see 1.37. and comment).

2.13. कालस्तु जडो विमुद्रव्यविशेषः । स च द्विविधः स्वण्डोऽस्वण्डश्च । स्वण्डो
निमेषकाष्ठाकलामुहूर्तादिरनित्यः । अयमेव युग-
कालः पत्क्षिप्रादिव्यवहारहेतुरतीतादिव्यवहारहेतुश्च ।

अखण्डकालस्तु नित्यः । ईश्वरश्च वैकुण्ठलोकाति-
रिक्तस्थले कालाधीन एव सृष्ट्यादिकं करोति । वसन्त एव पुष्पोद्गम इत्येवं
कालविशेषनियमेनैव तत्तद्विकारजातोत्पत्तेः । ईश्वरः स्वसंकल्पितकालनियमा-
नुरोधेनैवाखिलकार्याण्युत्पादयति । एतदेवात्र कालस्य स्वातन्त्र्यम् । वैकुण्ठे तु
विभुत्वाद्विद्यमानस्यापि कालस्येश्वराधीनत्वमेव न कथमपि स्वातन्त्र्यम् । न
कालस्तत्र वै प्रभुरिति वचनात् । अत एव तत्रेश्वरः सर्वदा सर्वं यदृच्छयो-
त्पादयति ।

2.13. Time is a particular substance which is inert and all pervasive.
It is of two types: divided and undivided. The divided time consists
of nimeṣa, kāṣṭhā, kalā, muhūrta etc. and it is non-eternal.⁷⁰ This
[divided time] is the cause of the designation "simultaneous",
"quickly" etc. and it is the cause of the designation "past" etc. The
undivided time, however, is eternal. The Lord, in the supreme location,
the world of Vaikuṅṭha, brings about the creation etc. while being
dependent upon time. Because the origination of the class of each
modification is certainly restricted to a particular time in the manner
that: "the appearance of flowers is only in the spring." The Lord
produces all effects only in accordance with the limitation of time
which He has willed. This alone is the independence of time here [in
respect of the creation]. Whereas in Vaikuṅṭha, though time exists
there on account of being all pervasive, it is certainly dependent
upon the Lord's will and in no way has independence. For there is the
declaration: "time is certainly not the Lord there." For this reason,
the Lord at all times creates everything there [in Vaikuṅṭha]
spontaneously.

2.14. ईश्वरो जीवो नित्यविभूतिर्ज्ञानं प्रकृतिः कालश्चेत्येतेषूक्तेषु षट्सु द्रव्येष्वी-
श्वरादिचतुष्टयमजडम् । प्रकृतिः कालश्चेति द्वयं
द्रव्याणां मिथः साधर्म्यम् जडम् । ईश्वरो जीवश्चेति द्वयं प्रत्यगित्युच्यते ।
नित्यविभूतिर्ज्ञानं चेति द्वयं परागित्युच्यते ।
स्वस्मै भासमानत्वं प्रत्यकृत्वम् । परस्मा एव भासमानत्वं पराकृत्वम् ।

2.14. Among these six substances that have been mentioned: the Lord, the individual soul, the "eternal manifestation", Knowledge, primary matter and time; the group of four beginning with the Lord are not inert. The pair: primary matter and time, are inert. The pair: the Lord and the individual soul, are said to be "internal". The pair: the "eternal manifestation" and Knowledge, are said to be "external". The nature of being internal means illumining for oneself. The nature of being external means illumining only for another.

comment

This statement summarizes the preceding discussion of substance (dravya). The nature of "illumining for oneself" and "illumining only for another" has been mentioned in the comment to 2.10., in respect of the nature of the self and its attributive consciousness.

The author now explains the Viśiṣṭādvaita category of non-substance (adravya).

2.15. गुणास्तु दशविधाः सत्त्वरजस्तमःशब्दस्पर्शरूपरसगन्धसंयोगशक्तिभेदात् ।
 सत्त्वरजस्तमोरूपं गुणत्रयमतीन्द्रियं तत्तत्कार्येणानुमेयम् । सत्त्वगुणः स्वाश्रये
 प्रकाशसुखलाघवादि जनयति । तच्च सत्त्वं द्विविधं शुद्धं मिश्रं चेति । रजसा
 तमसा चास्पृष्टं शुद्धम् । तच्च वैकुण्ठलोकवर्ति वैकुण्ठलोकसंबन्धात्परमेश्वरे चेति
 द्रव्यद्वयनिष्ठम् । रजसा तमसा च स्पृष्टं मिश्रम् ।
 गुणाः तत्त्रिगुणात्मकप्रकृतिनिष्ठं प्रकृतिसंबन्धाज्जीवे
 चेत्येतदपि द्रव्यद्वयनिष्ठम् । प्रकृतिस्वरूपभूतेभ्यः
 सत्त्वादिभ्य उक्तं सत्त्वादिगुणत्रयं भिन्नमेव । रजोगुणस्तु स्वाश्रये रागलोभप्रवृ-
 त्त्यादिकं जनयति । तमोगुणस्तु स्वाश्रये मोहप्रमादाप्रवृत्त्यादिकं जनयति ।
 रजस्तमोरूपं गुणद्वयं तु प्रकृतौ तत्संबन्धाज्जीवे च वर्तते । सत्त्वगुणः सम्यग्ज्ञा-
 नरूपेण सुखादिहेतुर्मोक्षप्रदश्च । रजोगुणो रागादिरूपेण कर्मसङ्गद्दुःखादिहेतुः
 स्वर्गादिप्रदश्च । तमोगुणस्त्वज्ञानरूपेणालस्यादिहेतुर्नरकप्रदश्च भवति ।

2.15. The qualities are tenfold, due to the distinction of sattva, rajas, tamas, sound, touch, colour, taste, smell, conjunction and potentiality. The group of three qualities: sattva, rajas and tamas, are not perceptible to the senses and are to be inferred through their respective effects. The quality sattva produces the illumination [of objects], happiness, lightness etc. in its locus. That sattva is of two types: pure and mixed. Pure [sattva] is untouched by rajas and

tamas. It is located in two types of substance; it exists in the world of Vaikuṅṭha and in the supreme Lord on account of His connection with the world of Vaikuṅṭha. Mixed [sattva] is in contact with rajas and tamas. This is also located in two types of substance; it is located in the primary material which is composed of the three qualities and in the individual soul on account of its connection with the primary matter. The group of three qualities beginning with sattva which have just been mentioned are certainly distinct from sattva etc. which constitute the essence of the primary matter. The quality rajas produces desire, greed and activity etc. in its locus. The quality tamas produces delusion, carelessness and inactivity etc. in its locus. The two types of qualities: rajas and tamas, exist in the primary matter and in the individual soul on account of its connection with that [primary matter].

The quality sattva is in the form of correct knowledge, it is the cause of happiness etc. and it bestows liberation. The quality rajas is in the form of desire etc., it is the cause of attachment to action, sorrow etc. and it bestows heaven etc. The quality tamas is in the form of ignorance, it is the cause of laziness etc. and it bestows hell.⁷¹

2.16. श्रोत्रेन्द्रियग्राह्यः शब्दः । स च पञ्चभूतवर्ती । त्वगिन्द्रियमात्रग्राह्यः स्पर्शः । स च पृथिव्यप्तेजोवायुवृत्तिः । चक्षुरिन्द्रियमात्रग्राह्यं रूपम् । तच्च पृथिव्यप्तेजो-वृत्तिः । रसनेन्द्रियग्राह्यो रसः । स च पृथिवीजलवृत्तिः । घ्राणेन्द्रियग्राह्यो गन्धः । स च पृथिव्यामेव । सत्त्वरजस्तमांसि शब्दस्पर्शरूपरसगन्धाश्चेत्येतदष्टकं प्रत्येकं द्विविधम्—पञ्चमहाभूतोपादानभूतं तदनुपादानभूतं च । आद्यं द्रव्यशब्दवाच्यं द्रव्येष्वेवान्तर्भवति । तत्र सत्त्वरजस्तमांसि प्रकृत्यवयवा एव । शब्दादिपञ्चकं तु प्रकृतिविकारभूतं चतुर्विंशतितत्त्वान्तर्गतं तन्मात्रशब्दवाच्यम् । अन्त्यं तु पञ्चमहाभूतनिष्ठं गुणशब्दवाच्यमत्रोक्तम् ।

2.16. Sound is able to be apprehended by the faculty of hearing and it exists in the five elements. Touch can only be apprehended by the sense of touch and it exists in earth, water, fire and air. Colour can only be apprehended by the faculty of sight and it exists in earth,

water and fire. Taste can be apprehended by the sense of taste and it exists in earth and water. Smell can be apprehended by the sense of smell and it exists only in earth.⁷²

This group of eight: sattva, rajas and tamas and sound, touch form, taste and smell is each twofold; as the material cause of the five great elements and not as being their material cause. The first can be expressed by the word "substance" and is included only among the substances. In that regard, sattva, rajas and tamas are indeed the parts of the primary material. Whereas the group of five commencing with sound is a modification of the primary matter, it is included within the twenty-four principles and can be expressed by the word "tanmātra". However the last is located in the five great elements and has been told here as expressible by the word "quality".

comment

Abhyankar makes the additional specification that the eight qualities beginning with sattva are not only the qualities of prakṛti but are also constitutive of the substance itself.

2.17.

संयुक्तप्रत्ययहेतुः संयोगः । अयं पद्द्रव्यवृत्तिः सामान्यगुणोऽव्याप्यवृत्तिर-
नित्यश्च । विभूनामपि संयोगोऽस्त्येव । वाचकाभावात् ।

2.17. Conjunction is the cause of knowledge as conjoined [i.e. knowledge that this or that are conjoined]. It is a universal quality existing in the six substances. Its condition does not pervade [the whole substance] and it is non-eternal. There is certainly conjunction even for all pervasive [substances], because there is nothing which invalidates it.⁷³

comment

Conjunction (saṁyoga) is a temporary connection between two things which can exist separately. It does not pervade the whole substance (avyāpyavṛtti) which means that the conjunction is only between the parts which are in contact. For example a book can be in conjunction with the table, but it is only in contact with a part

of the table. Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika does not accept conjunction between all pervasive substances, whereas the Viśiṣṭādvaitins accept it.⁷⁴

Conjunction is different from the other Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika category of relation called "inherence" (samavāya).⁷⁵ In the former, the relation is between two substances and is temporary (anitya) whereas samavāya is an eternal relation (nityasambandha)⁷⁶ which pervades the whole entity. Samavāya exists in these five relations: the product and its parts, a quality and its possessor, motion and the possessor of the movement, the individual and its class character and particularity and an eternal substance.⁷⁷ Samavāya is eternal in the sense that it cannot be produced or destroyed without the production or the destruction of the whole entity.⁷⁸

2.18. सर्वकारणानां कारणत्वनिर्वाहिका शक्तिः । शक्तिरपि पद्द्रव्यवृत्तिः
सामान्यगुणः । इयं चानित्या कार्यानुमेया च ।

2.18. Potentiality brings about the causality on the part of all causes. Potentiality is also a universal quality existing in the six substances. This [potentiality] is non-eternal and can be inferred through its effect.⁷⁹

comment

Potentiality (śakti) is a principle which brings about causal efficacy. The Mīmāṃsakas seek to prove its existence through postulation: even though there is no defective nature in the cause, in the presence of an obstructing factor it does not produce its effect and this can only be explained by assuming that a potentiality exists in all causes.⁸⁰

2.19. ननु कथं दशैव गुणा इति । तदतिरिक्तस्य ज्ञानाख्यस्य गुणस्य जीवेश्वररूप-
पद्रव्यनिष्ठस्य सत्त्वादिति चेन्न । एतज्ज्ञानं हि
ज्ञानस्य द्रव्यत्वमपि द्रव्यगणनायामुक्तमेव । तस्य संकोचविकासरू-
पावस्थाश्रयत्वेन द्रव्यत्वस्य स्पष्टमेव प्रतिपन्नत्वात् ।
तस्य च द्रव्यस्यापि सतो जीवेश्वरनिष्ठत्वेन नित्यं परावलम्बित्वस्वभावत्वाद्गुण-
त्वबुद्धिर्भवति । एवं तेजोद्रव्यान्तर्गतायाः प्रभाया द्रव्यभूताया अपि नित्यं
स्वातिरिक्ततेजोन्तरावलम्बित्वस्वभावत्वाद्गुणत्वबुद्धिर्वोभ्या ।

2.19. [objection] How are there only ten qualities? Because there exists the quality known as Knowledge, which is located in the

substances in the form of the individual soul and the Lord, and which is other than those [ten].

[reply] No, because this Knowledge has already been mentioned in the enumeration of substances. Since that [Knowledge] is the locus of the states of contraction and expansion, therefore its nature as a substance has been very clearly demonstrated. There is the apprehension as a quality because that [Knowledge], though existing as a substance, is located in the individual soul and the Lord and because its nature is always dependent upon another. In the same manner, the apprehension as a quality should be understood [for light] since light, though it is a substance being included within the substance fire, has a nature which is always dependent upon another fire other than itself.

2.20. जीवो नित्यविभूतिः प्रकृतिः कालश्चेति चतुष्टयमीश्वरस्य शरीरम् । यस्यात्मा शरीरम् (वृ० ३ । ७ । २२) यस्य पृथिवी शरीरम् (वृ० ३ । ७ । ३) इत्यादिश्रुतेः । यस्य च यच्छरीरं स तस्य शरीरस्यात्मा भवति । आत्मशरीर-शब्दौ हि स्वामिभृत्यशब्दवत्सत्त्वन्धिकार्यकौ शरीरशरीरिभावः आत्मनः शरीरं शरीरस्यात्मेति । अतति व्याप्नोतीत्यात्मा । यच्च येन व्याप्यते तत्तस्य शरीरम् । ईश्वरेण हि सजीवं सर्वं जगदन्तर्यामिरूपेण व्याप्यते । न तु तमन्यः कश्चनान्तर्यामी भूत्वा व्याप्नोति । अत ईश्वरः परमात्मशब्देनोच्यते । जीवात्मानि नैतादृशं परमत्वम् । ईश्वरस्य जीवान्तर्यामित्वात् । ईश्वरः केवलमात्मैव न तु कस्यापि शरीरभूतः । जीवस्त्वीश्वरस्य शरीरं भवति जडस्य चात्मा भवति । जडं तु शरीरमेव न तु कस्याप्यात्मभूतम् ।

2.20. The group of four: the individual soul, the "eternal manifestation", primary matter and time are the body of the Lord. For there is the sacred text, such as: "whose body is the self" (Brh. 3.7.22.), "whose body is the earth" (Brh. 3.7.3.). The one who has a body is the self of that body. Indeed the two words "self" and "body" signify the possession of a relation like the words master and servant : the self's body, the body's self. [The etymology of the word] self (ātmā) is "it goes" (atati) in the sense that "it pervades" (vyāpnoti). What

is pervaded by a thing is the body of that. Indeed the entire world, together with the individual soul, is pervaded by the Lord in the form of the inner controller. But there is no other thing which, having become the inner controller, pervades that [Lord]. Therefore the Lord is called by the word "supreme Self". There is no such supremacy in regard to the individual soul, for the Lord is the inner controller of the individual soul. The Lord is solely the self and does not exist as the body of anyone. Whereas the individual soul is the body of the Lord and is the self of the inert matter. The inert matter, however, is only a body and does not exist as the self of anyone.

comment

As mentioned, the body-soul analogy between the souls, matter and the Lord forms the dominant model in Rāmānuja's teaching. See comment to 2.3. Also, cf. Rāmānuja's defence of this model in Śrībhāṣya 2.1.9.

- 2.21. शरीरशरीरिणोश्च तादात्म्येन व्यवहारो यद्यपि लोके दृश्यते यथा मनुष्योऽहं गौरोऽहं स्थूलोऽहमित्यादौ तथापि स व्यवहारो गौण एव । शरीरप्रतिसंबन्धिन आत्मनो वस्तुतः शरीरापेक्षया भिन्नत्वात् । परमात्मशरीरं च चेतनत्वेन सजातीयं जीवरूपमचेतनत्वेन विजातीयं च जड-
शरीरशरीरिणोर्भेदः रूपम् । तथा च परमात्मनि सजातीयाद्विजातीयाच्च भेदः सिध्यति । तथा च श्रुतिः क्षरात्मना-
वीशते देव एकः (श्वे० १ । १०) इति । अत्र क्षरात्मपदवाच्ययोर्जडजीव-
योर्नियम्यत्वेन देवपदवाच्यस्य परमात्मनश्च तन्नियन्तृत्वेन प्रतिपादनात्ताभ्यां परमात्मनो भेदः स्पष्ट एव । सूत्रकारैरप्यधिकं तु भेदनिर्देशात् (ब्र० सू० २ । १ । २२) इत्यादौ जीवेश्वरयोर्भेद उक्तः । तथा ज्ञानशक्तिवैश्वर्यवीर्यतेजो-
रूपं गुणषट्कं न परमात्मस्वरूपान्तर्गतं किं तु परमात्मनिष्ठमिति तस्मादपि परमात्मा भिन्न एवेति परमात्मनि स्वगताद्भेदः सिध्यति । तथा च परमात्मनि सजातीयभेदविजातीयभेदस्वगतभेदरूपं भेदत्रयं सिद्धम् ।

- 2.21. Even though there is a common designation observed in the world on account of the identity of the body and the embodied, in the manner that: "I am a man", "I am white", "I am fat" etc., nonetheless, that designation is only figurative. Because the self, which has a close connection to the body, is in reality different with regard to the body.

The body of the supreme Self, in the form of the individual

soul, belongs to the same class [as the Lord] on account of being sentient and in the form of the inert material it belongs to a different class on account of being insentient. So a difference is established in the supreme Self because of what belongs to the same class and because of what belongs to a different class. Accordingly, there is the sacred text: "the one God rules over the perishable and the self" (Śv.1.10.). Here, because the inert matter and the individual soul, which can be expressed by the words "perishable" and "self", are taught as being controlled and because the supreme Self, who can be expressed by the word "God", is taught as their controller, the difference of the supreme Self from these two is very clear. The author of the sūtras has also told the difference between the individual soul and the Lord: "But [Brahman] is additional, on account of the declaration of difference" (B.S.2.1.22.) etc.

So too, the group of six qualities: Knowledge, potency, strength, lordship, valour and splendour are not included within the essential nature of the supreme Self but are located in the supreme Self, thus the supreme Self is certainly different from that [group of six qualities] also. So a difference is established in the supreme Self from what belongs to itself. Accordingly, a threefold difference in the form of difference belonging to one's own class, difference belonging to another class and difference belonging to oneself is established in the supreme Self.

2.22. नन्वेवं सोऽकामयत बहु स्यां प्रजायेय (तै० २ । ६ । १) इति श्रुतिर्वि-
 रुध्यते । तत्र ह्यहं बहु स्यामिति परमात्मसंकल्पो दृश्यते न तु स्वैतरद्यत्किंचिन्नि-
 दिश्य तद्बहु स्यादिति । तथा च कार्यकारणानन्य-
 त्वन्यायेन परमात्मनः सकाशाज्जगतो भिन्नत्वा-
 शरीरद्वारकम् परमात्मनो बहुभवनं त्वन्यायेन परमात्मनः सकाशाज्जगतो भिन्नत्वा-
 भावः सिध्यति । उक्तभेदाङ्गीकारे त्वैतच्छ्रुति-
 विरोधः स्पष्ट इति चेत्सत्यम् । बहु स्यामिति बहु-
 भवनसंकल्पो हि न साक्षात् किंतु शरीरद्वारा । तथा च स संकल्पो नामरूपवि-
 भागानर्हसूक्ष्मचिद्वस्तुशरीरकतयैकरूपेणावस्थितस्य विभक्तनामरूपचिदचि-
 द्वस्तुशरीरकतया बहुप्रकारताविषय इत्येवं श्रुतितात्पर्याङ्गीकारान्न विरोधः ।

2.22. [objection] According to this manner [of explanation] the sacred text: "He desired, 'let me be many, let me be born' " (Tai.2.6.1.) is contradicted. Because there, the resolve of the supreme Self is seen: I will become many. But it is not that having indicated something other than Himself, that [other thing] would become many. Also, the absence of difference of the world from the supreme Self is established by the rule concerning the non-difference of cause and effect. But upon the acceptance of the difference which has been mentioned, the contradiction with this sacred text is clear.

[reply] True. The resolve for becoming many: "let me become many" is certainly not directly, but by means of the body. Thus that resolve refers to the manner of becoming many: for what abides in a single form, having as its body the subtle sentient and insentient things which are incapable of division into name and form, and [then] having as its body the sentient and insentient things which have become divided into name and form. Through accepting the purport of the sacred text, thus there is no contradiction.

comment

According to Viśiṣṭādvaita, Brahman is eternally qualified by individual souls (jīva) and primary matter (prakṛti) which have a dependent existence upon Brahman as attributes to a substantive or as a body to a self.

At the time of periodic cosmic dissolution (pralaya) the souls and primary matter remain in a subtle, almost undifferentiated condition in Brahman. Brahman exists in the state of being the cause (kāranāvasthā) when He is qualified in this manner. At the time of creation, Brahman does not transform Himself into the world nor does He undergo any essential change. Brahman causes the ever existent primary matter to evolve from its subtle condition into the physical world and He causes the bound souls to assume appropriate bodies in accordance with their karma. Brahman exists in the state of being the effect (kāryāvasthā) when qualified by souls and matter in their manifest condition.⁸¹

This view avoids the difficulty inherent in Brahman directly becoming the material cause of the world. For if that were the case,

Brahman would be subject to change and the unwelcome consequence of non-eternity. However the Upaniṣad text such as: "let me become many" (Tai.2.6.1.) reveals that Brahman is both the efficient and the material cause and the task for Rāmānuja is to reconcile the immutability of Brahman with the teaching that the efficient and the material cause are not distinct. He seeks to do this through the explanation that Brahman is the efficient cause when qualified by souls and matter in their subtle condition and Brahman is also the material cause when qualified by souls and matter in a manifest condition. Thus one unchanging Brahman exists in two states, both as cause and as the effect or material cause, depending upon whether He is qualified by His attributes, souls and matter, in their subtle or gross state. This teaching is summarized in the Yatīndramatadīpikā :

The traditional teaching of the Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedāntins is that Brahman is the cause [of the world] being qualified by the sentient and insentient in their subtle state and Brahman is the effect being qualified by the sentient and insentient in their gross state. Thus the effect is non-different from the cause.⁸²

2.23. ननु यदा ह्येवैष एतस्मिन्नुदरमन्तरं कुरुते । अथ तस्य भयं भवति (तै० २ ।
७ । १) इति श्रुतौ भेदो निषिध्यते । य एतस्मिन्ब्रह्मणि स्वल्पमपि भेदं मन्यते
तस्य भयं भवतीति तदर्थादिति चेन्न । श्रुत्यर्था-
यदा ह्येवेतिश्रुत्यर्थः ज्ञानात् । तत्र ह्यन्तरशब्दोऽवकाशवाची । ब्रह्मो-
पासनाया अवकाशे विच्छेदे सति भयं भवती-
त्यर्थः ।

यन्मुहूर्तं क्षणं वापि वासुदेवो न चिन्तयते ।

सा हानिस्तन्महच्छिद्रं सा भ्रान्तिः सा च विक्रिया ।

इति महर्षिवचनेनोपबृंहणादयमर्थो निश्चीयते ।

2.23. [objection] Difference is negated in the sacred text: "When he makes just the smallest difference in this, then there is fear for him" (Tai.2.7.1.). Because the meaning of that is: he who thinks there is even a slight difference in this Brahman, there is fear for him.

[reply] No. For there is ignorance of the meaning of the sacred text. Because there, the word "antara" expresses an interval. The meaning is: there is fear when there is an interval, a break, in the worship of Brahman. This meaning has been ascertained due to the

augmenting by the saying of the great sage:

When Vāsudeva is not contemplated upon for a short time, or even for an instant, that is a loss, that is a great defect, that is error and that is an altered condition.

comment

Rāmānuja interprets this Taittirīya text in this manner in Śrībhāṣya 1.1.1. Para.51.p.99.

2.24.

एकमेवाद्वितीयम् (छा० ६ । २ । १) इति श्रुत्याप्यद्वैतं नापादनीयम् ।
तत्र ह्येकशब्देन ब्रह्मव्यतिरिक्तं जगतो निमित्त-
कारणं निषिध्यते । कार्यगतबहुत्वावस्था कार्या-
नुसारेण कारणे ब्रह्मणि कल्पिता स्यात्तन्निवृत्तये
एवकारः । अद्वितीयमित्यनेन च ब्रह्मव्यतिरिक्तं जगत उपादानकारणं निषि-
ध्यते ।

2.24. Non-duality cannot be established even by the sacred text:

"one alone, without a second" (Ch.6.2.1.). Because there, an efficient cause of the world other than Brahman is negated by the word "one". The state of multiplicity which belongs to the effect could be imagined in Brahman, the cause, in accordance with the effect. The word "alone" is for the removal of that [wrong supposition]. A material cause of the world other than Brahman is negated by this: "without a second".

comment

In Śrībhāṣya 1.1.1. Para.49.p.91., 1.1.2. Para.86.p.197., and in Vedārthasaṅgraha Para.16.p.80., Para.33.p.90., Rāmānuja interprets "one alone" as referring to the material cause and "without a second" as denoting the absence of another efficient cause.

2.25. नेह नानास्ति किञ्चन (वृ० ४ । ४ । १६) इति श्रुतेस्त्वयमाशयः ।
यस्य ब्रह्म कारणं न भवति नाप्यन्तर्यामि भवति
नेह नानेतिश्रुत्यर्थः तादृशं ब्रह्मभिन्नं वस्तु किञ्चिदपि नास्तीति । न
तु ब्रह्मकार्यभूतस्य जगतो निषेधः प्रतिपाद्यते ।
जगत्कारणत्वस्य श्रुतावेव प्रतिपादनात् । यत्र हि द्वैतमिदं भवति (वृ० २ । ४

१४) य इह नानेव पश्यति (बृ० ४।४।१९) इत्याद्याः श्रुतयोऽप्येवमेव योज्याः ।

2.25. This is the meaning of the sacred text: "there is no diversity whatsoever here" (Brh.4.4.19.). There is no such thing whatsoever which is different from Brahman, for which Brahman is not the cause and also the inner controller. But the negation of the world, which is the effect of Brahman, is not taught because causality in respect of the world has been taught in the sacred text itself. Also, the sacred texts: "where there is duality, as it were..." (Brh.2.4.14.), "He who sees diversity, as it were, here..." (Brh.4.4.19.) etc. are to be construed in just the same manner.

comment

Rāmānuja maintains that throughout all the sacred texts: "no word is seen anywhere expressing a negation of the fact that Brahman possesses distinction".⁸³ Accordingly, he interprets Brh.4.4.19. as denying any diversity which does not have Brahman as its Self.⁸⁴

2.26. यतश्चायं परमात्मा जगत्कारणत्वस्य, कारणत्वोपयोगिनां सर्वज्ञत्वादि-धर्माणां चाश्रयोऽतः स सविशेष एव । सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तं ब्रह्म (तै० २।१।१) इति श्रुतावपि सत्यत्वादयो विशेषाः प्रतिपादिताः । तथा हि । छत्री कुण्डली वा-सस्वी देवदत्त इत्यत्रेव सत्यं ज्ञानमिति वाक्ये सत्यादिपदानां सामानाधिकरण्यं दृश्यते । सामानाधिकरण्यं च भिन्नप्रवृत्तिनिमित्तकानां शब्दानामेकस्मिन्नर्थे प्रवृत्तिः । तथा च सत्यादिपदप्रवृत्तिनिमित्तीभूतानां सत्य-परमात्मनः सविशेषत्वम् त्वादीनां ब्रह्मगतानां धर्माणामनपलपनीयत्वेन ब्रह्मणः सविशेषत्वं सिध्यति । युक्तं चैतत् । ब्रह्मणो जगत्कारणत्वं यतो वा इमानि भूतानि जायन्ते (तै० ३।१।१) इत्यादिश्रुतिसिद्धं निर्विवादमेव । तथा च जगद्रूपकार्योत्पादनोपयोगी सामर्थ्यविशेषस्तत्रावश्यमा-स्थेयः । लोके घटपटादिकार्याण्युत्पादयतां कुलालकुबिन्दादीनां तत्तत्कार्योत्पत्त्यु-पयोगिसामर्थ्यविशेषस्य दर्शनात् । तथा च ब्रह्मणोऽपि सामर्थ्यविशेषोऽनुमीयते येन स सूक्ष्मचिदचिद्रूपशरीरद्वारेण सृष्टेरुपादानकारणं भवति, येन च जीवानां स्वप्नावस्थायां तत्तत्पुरुषमात्रानुभाव्यांस्तत्तत्कालावसानांश्च हस्त्यादीन्पदार्थान्क्षण-मात्रेण सृजति । एवं च परमात्मनः सविशेषत्वं सिद्धम् ।

2.26. Because this supreme Self is the locus of the causality in

respect of the world and of the attributes such as omniscience which are applicable for causality, therefore, He certainly possesses distinction. Distinctions such as "reality" have been taught even in the sacred text: "Brahman is real, Knowledge, limitless" (Tai.2.1.1.). To explain. In the sentence "real, Knowledge...", the words beginning with "real" are seen to have grammatical apposition, just as here: "Devadatta has an umbrella, ear-rings and clothes". Grammatical apposition is the use of words, which have different reasons for their employment, in respect of one and the same object. So Brahman is established as possessing distinction because attributes such as reality, which are the reason for the use of the words "real" etc., are not able to be denied as belonging to Brahman. This is correct.

Brahman being the cause of the world is established without any contention in sacred texts such as: "from which these beings are born" (Tai.3.1.1.). Accordingly, a special capacity applicable for producing the effect in the form of the world must necessarily be acknowledged there [in the cause, Brahman]. Because in the world, a potter and a weaver etc. who produce the effects such as pots and cloth are seen to possess the special capacity applicable for the production of the respective effects. So Brahman too is inferred to have a special capacity through which He is the material cause of the creation by means of a body in the form of the subtle sentient and insentient things. And through which [special capacity] He creates for people in the state of dream, for a mere instant, objects such as elephants which can be experienced only by the respective person and which last for a particular time. Thus the supreme Self has been established as possessing distinction.

comment

Rāmānuja cites the following definition of grammatical apposition (sāmānādhikarāṇya), it is: "the application of words, having different reasons for their use, to one and the same object".⁸⁵ For example in

the sentence: "Devadatta (Devadattaḥ) has an umbrella (chatrī), earrings (kundalī) and clothes (vāsasvī)", Devadatta is the one substantive qualified by three words employed adjectivally, each denoting a particular distinguishing attribute which is the reason for its usage (pravṛttinimitta). According to Rāmānuja, the function of words placed in grammatical apposition is to show that an independent substantive exists in a qualified manner, possessing the distinguishing features expressed by the other words which share the same case relation as the substantive and hence qualify it adjectivally.⁸⁶

Rāmānuja interprets the sentence: "Brahman is real, Knowledge, limitless" (Tai.2.1.1.) in the same manner as the sentence referring to Devadatta is to be understood i.e. Brahman is the independent substantive who possesses the attributes of reality, Knowledge and limitlessness. According to Viśiṣṭādvaita, Brahman must possess the above attributes since they are the reason for the usage of the words "real" etc.

Rāmānuja considers that the sentence: "Brahman is real, Knowledge, limitless" constitutes a definition of Brahman and so serves to distinguish Brahman from all other things.⁸⁷ The word "real" signifies that Brahman possesses unconditioned existence and this distinguishes Brahman from change, inert matter and the souls which are connected with matter. The word "Knowledge" denotes that Brahman has the nature of uncontracted awareness. This distinguishes Brahman from the liberated souls whose attributive consciousness (dharmabhūtajñāna) is sometimes in a contracted state. The word "limitless" communicates that Brahman is free from any limitation: relating to space, time, or objects.⁸⁸

The Advaita interpretation of this passage, together with a more detailed discussion of grammatical apposition, will be presented in the following chapter.

As Abhyankar mentions, according to Viśiṣṭādvaita the Lord is the creator of dream events:

in dream, the Lord creates, in accord with the merit or demerit of living beings, objects of a special nature which can be experienced only by the respective person and which last for a certain time.⁸⁹

2.27. स च परमात्मा सगुण एव न तु निर्गुणः । निर्गुणे जगत्कारणत्वस्य सुतरामसंभवात् । गुणाश्च केचित्स्वरूपप्रतीत्यनुबन्धिनः । यथाऽऽनन्दो ब्रह्म (तै०

३।६), सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तं ब्रह्म (तै० २।१) इत्यादिश्रुतिप्रतिपादिता आनन्दसत्यत्वादयः । एते हि ब्रह्मस्वरूपप्रतिपत्तावेवोपयुज्यन्ते । आनन्दादि-
 गुणविशिष्टस्यैव ब्रह्मत्वेन तेषां ब्रह्मस्वरूपान्तर्ग-
 परमात्मनः सगुणत्वं गुणे- तत्वात् । अत एवैते वस्तुस्वरूपप्रतीतिकाल एव
 ध्ववान्तरभेदश्च प्रतीयन्ते । यथा लोके कस्मिंश्चित्पुरुषे दृष्टे तदैव
 तद्रता ह्रस्वत्वोन्नतत्वादयः प्रतीयन्ते । एते च
 स्वरूपान्तर्गतत्वात्सर्वासूपासनास्वनुवर्तन्ते । कारुण्यादयो गुणास्तु यद्यपि पर-
 मात्मानं न कदापि व्यभिचरन्ति तथापि ते स्वरूपान्तर्गतत्वान्न सर्वासूपासना-
 स्वनुवर्तन्ते । किं तु ये यत्रोक्तास्त एव तत्र भावनीयाः । ज्ञानशक्तिबलैश्वर्यवीर्य-
 तेजोरूपं गुणषट्कमपि कारुण्यादिवदेव न ब्रह्मस्वरूपान्तर्गतम् । किं तु ब्रह्मणा
 नित्यसंबद्धम् । यत्संबन्धं विना न कदापि ब्रह्मणोऽवस्थितिर्ब्रह्मसंबन्धं विना च न
 क्षणमपि तेषामवस्थितिः । प्रियशिरस्त्वादयो ब्रह्मगता गुणास्तु न ब्रह्मणा सह
 नित्यसंबद्धाः । किंतूपासनाविशेषे कल्पिताः । तेऽपि यत्रोक्तास्तत्रैवोपासनायां
 भावनीयाः । यस्यामुपासनायां न केऽपि गुणा निर्दिष्टास्तस्यामपि ब्रह्मस्वरूपा-
 न्तर्गता गुणा भावनीया एवेति सर्वासूपासनासु प्राप्यं ब्रह्म सगुणमेव ।

2.27. That supreme Self certainly possesses qualities, He is not free from qualities. Because causality in respect of the world is all the more impossible in that which is free from qualities. Some qualities are connected with the cognition of the essential nature. For instance bliss, existence, etc. which are taught in sacred texts such as: "Brahman is bliss" (Tai.3.6.), "Brahman is existence, Knowledge, limitless" (Tai.2.1.). Because these [qualities] are applicable in the very ascertainment of the essential nature of Brahman. For what is indeed being distinguished by qualities such as bliss etc. is Brahman, and therefore those [qualities] are included in the essential nature of Brahman. For this reason, these are recognised at the very time of the cognition of the essential nature of the object [i.e. Brahman]. Just as in the world when some person is seen, at that very time the qualities of being small, being tall etc. are recognised as belonging to that person. Because these are included in the essential nature, they persist in all meditations.

Whereas qualities such as compassion, even though they never deviate from the supreme Self, still because they are not included in

the essential nature they do not persist in all meditations. However they are certainly to be conceived where they are mentioned. Even the group of six qualities: Knowledge, potency, strength, lordship, valour and splendour are, just like compassion etc., not included in the essential nature of Brahman. However they are eternally connected to Brahman. At no time does Brahman remain without connection to those [qualities] and they do not remain even an instant without connection to Brahman.

Whereas qualities belonging to Brahman such as joy being the head⁹⁰ are not eternally connected to Brahman but are imagined in a particular meditation. Those too are to be conceived in that very meditation where they are mentioned. Where no particular qualities are specified in a meditation, the qualities included in the essential nature of Brahman are certainly to be conceived in that [meditation] as well. Thus in all meditations Brahman is to be found only as possessing qualities.

2.28.

निर्गु-

णम् (चू० ७ । २) इति श्रुतिस्तु हेयगुणरहितमित्यर्थेन योजनीया । हेया गुणास्तु पातकजरामरणशोकभुधातृषादयः । अत एव छान्दोग्ये “अपहतपाप्मा विजरः” (छा० ८ । १ । ५) इत्येवं त एव विशेषतः प्रतिषिद्धाः । तदग्रे च सत्यकामः सत्यसंकल्पः (छा० ८ । १ । ५) इत्येवं शुभा गुणा उक्ताः । सर्वगुणनिषेधे हि सत्यकाम इतीयं श्रुतिविरुध्यते । अतस्तदानुगुण्येन निर्गुण-मिति श्रुतेर्हेयगुणरहितमित्येवार्थः स्वीकार्यः ।

2.28. The sacred text: "free from qualities" (Cū.7.2.) is to be thought of in connection with the meaning: free from qualities which are to be given up. The qualities which are to be given up are sin, old age, death, sorrow, hunger, thirst etc. For this reason, those [qualities] have been specifically negated in the Chāndogya: "free from sin, free from old age" (Ch.8.1.5.). And subsequent to that, auspicious qualities are told: "whose desire is true, whose resolve is

true" (Ch.8.1.5.). Indeed this sacred text: "whose desire is true" is contradicted if there is the negation of all qualities. Therefore in accordance with that [sacred text], the only meaning which can be accepted for the sacred text: "free from qualities" is: free from the qualities which are to be given up.

comment

See comment to 2.3.

2.29. ज्ञानमप्यात्मनो गुण एव । न च ज्ञानस्यात्मगुणत्वे विज्ञानघनः (वृ० २ । ४ । १२) इतिश्रुतिविरोध इति वाच्यम् । तत्र परमात्मस्वरूपभूतस्य ज्ञानस्य निर्देशात् । आत्मगुणभूतज्ञानादात्मस्वरूपभूतं ज्ञानं पार्थक्येनास्माभिरङ्गीक्रियते । विज्ञानघनः (वृ० २ । ४ । १२) विज्ञानमानन्दं ब्रह्म (वृ० ३ । ९ । २८) इत्यादिश्रुतिषु विज्ञानस्य ब्रह्मतादात्म्यं प्रतीयते । विज्ञातारमरे केन विजानीयात् (वृ० २ । ४ । १४) जानात्येवायं पुरुषः इत्यादि-श्रुतिषु विज्ञानस्य ब्रह्मणः सकाशाद्भेदः प्रतीयते ।
ज्ञानद्वैविध्यम् द्विविधश्रुतिनिर्वाहाय द्विविधज्ञानाङ्गीकार एव साधीयान् । एतेनानन्दो ब्रह्म (तै० ३ । ६ । १) ब्रह्मण आनन्दः (तै० २ । ८ । १) इत्येवमानन्दविषयेऽपि द्विविधा श्रुतिर्व्याख्याता । आनन्दस्य ज्ञानादनतिरेकात् । ज्ञानमेव ह्यनुकूलमानन्दशब्दे-नोच्यते । ये चात्मस्वरूपभूतज्ञानात्पार्थक्येन गुणभूतज्ञानं नाङ्गीकुर्वन्ति तेषां मत आत्मनो ज्ञातृत्वं न सिध्यति । यतो ज्ञातृत्वं ज्ञानगुणाश्रयत्वमेव । विज्ञातारमरे केन विजानीयात् (वृ० २ । ४ । १४) न विज्ञातुर्विज्ञातेर्विपरि-लोपो विद्यते (वृ० ४ । ३ । ३०) एष हि द्रष्टा (प्र० ४ । ९) इत्यादि-श्रुतिसिद्धमेव ज्ञातृत्वम् । सूत्रकारैरपि ज्ञोऽत एव (ब्र० सू० २ । ३ । १९) इत्युक्तम् । जानातीति ज्ञः । ज्ञानाश्रय इति यावत् ।

2.29. Knowledge is also only a quality of the self. It should not be said: if Knowledge is a quality of the self, then there is contradiction with the sacred text: "a mass of consciousness" (Brh.2.4.12.).

[reason] Because there, the Knowledge which is the essential nature of the supreme Self is being specified. The Knowledge which is the essential nature of the self is accepted by us as being different from the Knowledge which is a quality of the self. Consciousness is recognized as identical with Brahman in the sacred texts such as: "a mass of consciousness" (Brh.2.4.12.), "Brahman is consciousness

and bliss" (Brh.3.9.28.). The difference of consciousness from Brahman is recognized in the sacred texts such as: "by what, my dear, can one know the knower?" (Brh.2.4.14.), "this Being indeed knows". The acceptance of two types of Knowledge is certainly more correct for the establishment of the two types of sacred texts. The sacred text is explained in a twofold manner even in regard to bliss, on account of this: "bliss is Brahman" (Tai.3.6.1.) and "the bliss of Brahman" (Tai.2.8.4.). This is because bliss is not different from Knowledge. For a pleasing state of consciousness is said by the word "bliss".

The self is not established as a knower according to the view of those who do not accept Knowledge which is a quality as being different from Knowledge which is the essential nature of the self. For knowership means just being the locus of the quality of Knowledge. Knowership has certainly been established in the sacred texts, such as: "by what, my dear, can one know the knower?" (Brh.2.4.14.), "for the knower's function of knowing is not lost" (Brh.4.3.30.), "this is indeed the seer" (Pr.4.9.). It has been told by the author of the sūtras also: "For this very reason, [the soul] is a knower" (B.S.2.3.19.). A knower (jñāḥ) means that "one knows" (jānāti), which means being the locus of Knowledge.

comment

When Brahman is defined as "consciousness and bliss" (Brh.3.9.28.), these are not two different attributes. Brahman has consciousness as His essence and that consciousness is of the nature of bliss.⁹¹ Since consciousness is both the essential nature of Brahman and His attribute, bliss is also the essence and the attribute of Brahman. See Śrībhāṣya 1.1.1. Para.51.p.97.

The statement that the knower is "the locus of the quality of Knowledge" indicates that the self, though a knower by nature, is free from change. All modifications are through the knower's attributive consciousness. See Śrībhāṣya 1.1.1. Para.40.p.69f.

2.30. परमात्मा च ज्ञानविषयो भवत्येव । बाधकाभावात् । न हि परमात्मनो ज्ञानस्वरूपत्वं ज्ञातृत्वं वा ज्ञेयत्वेन साकं विरुध्यते । ज्ञानस्वरूपस्य ज्ञातृश्च जीवात्मनोऽहमिति मानसप्रत्यक्षविषयत्वस्यानुभवारूढत्वात् । शरीरे चेष्टादिलिङ्गदर्शनेन तदन्तर्यामिणं जीवात्मानमनुमिन्वन्ति परमात्मनो ज्ञेयत्वम् लोकाः । तथा चानुमानविषयत्वमवर्जनीयम् । एवं परमात्मनः स्वप्रत्यक्षविषयत्वे नित्यसिद्धमुक्तजीवनिष्ठप्रत्यक्षानुमानविषयत्वे च न किञ्चिदपि बाधकं दृश्यते । किं च परमात्मनो ज्ञेयत्वाभाव आगमगम्यत्वस्य सुतरामसंभवेन किमिति श्रुतिरूपनिषत्सु परमात्मानं प्रतिपादयितुं प्रवृत्ता स्यात् ।

2.30. The supreme Self is certainly an object of knowledge. Because there is nothing to invalidate it. The supreme Self being of the nature of Knowledge or being a knower is not at variance with being knowable. Because the individual self, the "I", who is of the nature of Knowledge and a knower, has the experience of being an object of mental perception. By observing the signs of motion etc. in a body, people infer an individual soul who is its inner controller. So the nature of being an object of inference cannot be avoided. Thus nothing invalidating is seen in regard to the supreme Self being an object of His own perception and in being the object of perception and inference belonging to the liberated souls and those whose liberation is eternally accomplished. Moreover, if the supreme Self is not an object of knowledge, why would the sacred text have commenced to teach about the supreme Self in the Upaniṣads? Because there is an even greater impossibility of being understood through the scripture.

2.31. न च परमात्मनो ज्ञेयत्वे मनोगम्यत्वस्यावश्यकत्वेन यन्मनसा न मनुते (के० ५) इतिश्रुतिविरोध इति वाच्यम् । श्रुतौ साकल्येनेत्यध्याहृत्य यद्ब्रह्म मनसा साकल्येन न मनुत इति श्रुतितात्पर्याङ्गीकारेणाविरोधात् । अत एव तदेव ब्रह्म त्वं विद्धि (के० ४) इति ब्रह्मविषयकवेदनविधिः संगच्छते । अव्यक्तोऽयमचिन्त्योऽयम् (गी० २ । २५) यत्तदव्यक्तमजरमचिन्त्यमजमव्ययम् (वि० पु० ६ । ५ । ६६) इत्यादौ ब्रह्मणोऽचिन्त्यत्वोक्तिरपि कात्स्न्येनाचिन्तनीयत्वाभिप्रायिका बोध्या । न च परमात्मनो ज्ञेयत्वाङ्गीकारे परमात्मा जडो ज्ञेयत्वाद्घटवदित्यनुमानेन परमात्मनो जडत्वापत्तिरिति वाच्यम् । ज्ञेयत्वहेतोरप्रयोजकत्वात् । न हि यत्र-

जज्ञेयं तत्तज्जडमिति व्याप्तिग्रहे कार्यकारणभावसामान्यविशेषभावादिमूलकः कश्च-
नानुकूलस्तर्को दृश्यते ।

2.31. It should not be said that if the supreme Self is an object of knowledge, there is contradiction with the sacred text: "That which one does not think with the mind" (Ke.1.6.) because there would be the necessity of being understood by the mind. [reason] Because there is no contradiction on account of the acceptance of the purport of the sacred text by supplying [the word] "entirely" in the sacred text: "That which i.e. Brahman, one does not think in its entirety with the mind". For this reason, the injunction about the knowledge which has Brahman as its object: "know that alone to be Brahman" (Ke.1.6.) is correct.

Also, the statement that Brahman is inconceivable: "This one is unmanifest, unthinkable..." (G.2.25.), "This one is unmanifest, ageless, unthinkable, unborn, changeless" (Viṣ.P.6.5.66.) etc. should be understood as intending inconceivability in its entirety.

It should not be said that upon the acceptance that the supreme Self is an object of knowledge, there would be the result that the supreme Self is inert, on account of the inference: the supreme Self is inert. Because of being an object of knowledge, like a pot. [reason] Because the reason i.e. being an object of knowledge, is not the determining factor. For some favourable logic based upon the relation of cause and effect or upon the relation of universal and particular etc. is not observed in the formation of the invariable concomitance: whatever is an object of knowledge is inert.

comment

Passages such as Ke.1.6. are to be interpreted in the manner that Brahman is unable to be comprehended in His entirety by the mind. The word "entirely" (sākalyena) is used by Raṅgarāmānuja in his commentary upon this verse in the Kenopaniṣad.⁹²

The formation of a rule of invariable concomitance requires a

necessary relationship between the factors concerned. For example in the case of fire and smoke there is the relation of cause and effect. But there is no cause-effect relation between being an object of knowledge and being inert. Nor can the reason in the syllogism be established on the basis of universal (sāmānya) and particular (viśeṣa) as for example between the universal "humanity" and the particular of being an individual member of the human race, so that one could formulate the rule: without the universal there is no particular.

2.32. स च परमात्मा कूटस्थनित्यः । एकेनैव रूपेण सदा वर्तमानः कूटस्थ इत्युच्यते । ननु परमात्मा जगत् उपादानकारणं निमित्तकारणं च स एवेति सिद्धान्तः । उपादानकारणत्वं च विकारयोग्यस्यैव वस्तुनः संभवति मृदादेरिव । तथा च परमात्मनो विकारित्वे कथं तस्य कूटस्थत्वमिति चेन्न । परमात्मनो जगदुपादानकारणत्वं न साक्षात् । किंतु शरीर-
 परमात्मनः कूटस्थ-
 नित्यत्वम् द्वारा । सूक्ष्मं परमात्मशरीरं प्रधानशब्दवाच्यं स्थूलजगद्रूपेण परिणमते । तथा च परमात्मशरीरस्य सूक्ष्मस्य स्थूलरूपेण परिणामेऽपि शरीरान्तर्यामिणः परमात्मस्वरूपस्य कूटस्थत्वानपायात् । शरीरविशिष्टस्य तु परमात्मन उक्तरीत्या विकारित्वेऽपि न क्षतिः ।

2.32. That supreme Self is eternally unchangeable. Unchangeable is said to be: always existing in the very same form.

[objection] The established position is that the supreme Self is indeed the material cause and the efficient cause of the world. The nature of being a material cause is possible only for a substance capable of modification like clay etc. Hence if the supreme Self possesses modification, how is it unchangeable?

[reply] No. The supreme Self is not directly the material cause of the world, but by means of a body. The subtle body of the supreme Self, which can be expressed by the word "primary material" (pradhāna), transforms into the form of the physical world. So therefore the essential nature of the supreme Self, who is the inner controller of the body, has no loss of its unchangeable nature even though the subtle body of the supreme Self undergoes transformation into a physical form. But there is no fault even though the supreme

Self who is qualified by a body possesses modification in the manner described.

2.33.

तच्चमसि (छा० ६। ८। ७) इदं सर्वं यदयमात्मा (बृ० २। ४। ५) इत्यादिश्रुतिभिर्जीवानां जडानां च यद्ब्रह्मणा सहैक्यप्रतिपादनं तच्छरीरशरीरिभावमूलकं गौणमेव न तु वस्तुतः । अद्वैतवादश्च शरीरविशिष्टः परमात्मैक एवेत्यभिप्रायेण योजनीयः । यद्ब्रह्मणः शरीरभूतं न भवति तादृशं ब्रह्मव्यतिरिक्तं किञ्चिदपि नास्तीति तात्पर्यम् । एतदेव विशिष्टाद्वैतं प्रकार्यद्वैतमिति चोच्यते । ब्रह्मणः प्रकारीभूता येऽनन्ता जीवा जडाश्च पदार्थास्तेषां नानात्वेऽपि ब्रह्मणः सकाशात्तेषां भेदेऽपि च तद्विशिष्टस्य प्रकारिणो ब्रह्मण एकत्वात् ।
 विशिष्टाद्वैतम् प्रकार्य- जीवैक्यमिति व्यवहारस्य त्वयमभिप्रायः । जीवाः
 द्वैतम् प्रकाराद्वैतम् परस्परं वस्तुतो भिन्ना एव । किं तु भिन्नानामपि
 तेषां ज्ञानस्वरूपेणैकजातीयत्वाज्जीवैक्यमिति व्यवहारो भवति । ऐक्यं तुल्यत्वम् । स चायं च ब्रीहिरैक एव तच्चेदं चौषध-
 मेकमेवेत्यत्रेवात्राप्येकशब्दस्तुल्यार्थकः । जीवाद्वैतमिति व्यवहारस्याप्येतदेव तात्पर्यम् । जीवानां मियो भेदेऽपि तद्वत्प्रकारस्यैक्यात् । एतदेव प्रकाराद्वैत-
 मित्युच्यते । जीवभेदानिषेधकवचनानि तु न जीवगतस्य वास्तविकभेदस्य निषेधकानि । किं तु शरीरभेदमूलको यो जीवेष्वारोपितो भेदोऽयं मनुष्याऽयं पशुरित्याकारकस्तन्निषेधकानि बोध्यानि ।

2.33. The teaching of identity of the individual souls and the inert objects with Brahman through sacred texts such as: "you are That" (Ch.6.8.7.) and "all this which is, is this Self" (Brh.2.4.6.) is only figurative, being based upon the relation of a body and its possessor, but it is not a fact. A statement of non-duality is to be thought of as having the intended meaning: the supreme Self who is qualified by a body is one alone. The purport is that there is no such thing different from Brahman which is not the body of Brahman. This very non-duality of what is qualified (Viśiṣṭādvaita) is called the non-duality of the possessor of modes. Because the boundless individual souls and inert objects are the modes of Brahman and even though they are manifold and even though they are different from Brahman, Brahman who is the possessor of the modes and qualified by them is one.

This is the intended meaning of the expression: "the identity

of individual souls". The individual souls are, in reality, mutually different. However the expression "the identity of individual souls" is because even though they are different they belong to the same class in having Knowledge as their essential nature. Identity means similarity. Just as here: "that and this grain of rice are indeed identical", "that herb and this herb are indeed identical" here also [in regard to individual souls] the word "identical" has the meaning of "similar". This is certainly the purport of even the expression: "the non-duality of souls". Because even though the souls are mutually different, the mode to which they belong is identical. This is said to be the non-duality of the modes.

The statements which reject the difference among individual souls do not reject the real difference belonging to the soul. However the difference based upon the difference of bodies has been imposed upon the souls and has the form: "this is a man", "this is an animal", [the statements rejecting difference] should be understood as rejecting that [imposed difference].

2.34. जीवस्य प्रतिशरीरं भिन्नत्वादेव सुखदुःखादिवैचित्र्यमुपपद्यते । किं च जीवस्यैक्ये देवदत्तेनानुभूते विषये यद्भदत्तस्यापि स्मरणप्रसङ्गः । संस्कारनाशात्स्मरणं न भवतीति चेद्देवदत्तस्यापि स्मरणं न स्यात् । देवदत्तीयसंस्कारो न विनष्ट इति चेज्जीवैक्यपक्षेऽमुकस्य संस्कारो नष्टोऽ-
जीवनानात्वोपपत्तिः मुकस्य न नष्ट इति वक्तुमशक्यम् । किं च जीवैक्ये कश्चिद्बद्धः कश्चिन्मुक्तः कश्चिच्छिष्यः कश्चिदाचार्य इति व्यवस्था न सिध्यति । देवमनुष्यतिर्यगादिभेदेन सृष्टिवैषम्यं च नोपपद्यते । कर्मभेदेन विषमा सृष्टिरिति तु न । जीवैक्यपक्षेऽमुकस्येदं कर्म नामुकस्येतिनियमासंभवात् । एवमिदमन्तःकरणममुकस्यैव नान्यस्येत्यस्यापि नियमस्य जीवैक्यपक्षेऽसंभवेनान्तःकरणभेदोऽपि न सुखदुःखादिवैषम्यस्य नियामको भवति । किं च जीवस्याणुत्वं वक्ष्यते । तथा चैकस्याणोर्जीवस्यानन्तशरीरसंबन्धः सुतरां न संभवति । देवदत्तात्मा यद्भदत्तात्मनः सकाशाद्भिन्नो यद्भदत्तानुभूतसुखाद्यनुसंधानशून्यत्वादित्यनुमानादापि जीवभेदसिद्धिः ।

2.34. The diversity of happiness and sadness etc. is logically possible only because the individual soul is different in each body.

Moreover, if there is one individual soul, an object experienced by Devadatta would be recollected by Yajñadatta also. If there is no recollection [by Yajñadatta] because of the loss of the mental impression, then there should be no recollection for Devadatta also. If [it is objected] the mental impression belonging to Devadatta is not lost, [it is replied] in the view that there is one individual soul it is not possible to say: "the mental impression of one person is lost and for another it is not lost".

Furthermore, if there is one individual soul, the distinction that someone is bound, someone is freed, someone is a student and someone is a teacher is not established. And the inequality of creation with the difference of gods, men, animals etc. is not logically possible. But it is not that the creation is unequal because of the difference of karma, because in the view that there is one individual soul the rule is not possible that: "this is the karma of one person and not of another person". In the same manner, even the difference of internal organs [i.e. minds] is not the determining factor for the inequality of happiness and sadness etc., because in the view that there is one individual soul even this rule is not possible: "this internal organ is only for one person and not for another". Moreover, the minuteness of the individual soul will be told. So the connection with endless bodies is all the more impossible for one minute individual soul. The difference of individual souls is proved by inference also: the self of Devadatta is different from the self of Yajñadatta. Because of the absence of recognition of the happiness etc. experienced by Yajñadatta.

- 2.35. परमात्मा ज्ञानगुणक इत्युक्तम् । तच्च ज्ञानं न सन्मात्रस्वरूपम् । सन्मात्रं ह्यस्तित्वमात्रम् । ज्ञाने च घटोऽस्तीत्यादौ घटादिरिव तदस्तित्वं विषयो भवति । विषयविषयिणोश्च भेदो लोकप्रसिद्ध एव । न हि घटादिविषयो
- सदनुभूत्योर्भेदः

ज्ञानस्वरूप इत्येवं कोऽपि प्रत्येति । तथा चास्तित्वरूपाद्विषयाद्विषयिणो ज्ञानस्य भेदोऽवश्यं स्वीकार्यः ।

2.35. It was said that the supreme Self has Knowledge as His quality. That Knowledge is not of the nature of mere existence. For mere existence is mere "is-ness". And in the knowledge: "the pot is" etc., the "is-ness" of that [pot] is an object just like the pot etc. The distinction between subject and object is certainly well known in the world. For nobody believes that an object such as a pot is of the nature of Knowledge. Accordingly, the difference of Knowledge, the subject, from the object in the form of "is-ness" must necessarily be accepted.

comment

The Advaitin maintains that pure awareness is identical to pure existence and constitutes the nature of Brahman. The Viśiṣṭādvaitin, however, considers that there is neither pure awareness nor pure existence.⁹³ Awareness is always in relation to a knowing subject and refers to some object. Since "is-ness" too is an object of awareness it cannot be identical to awareness.

2.36. स्थूलं जगत्तत्कारणीभूतं सूक्ष्मं च जगत्परमात्मनः सदा शरीरभूतमेव । परमात्मनो जगदुपादानकारणत्वं तु सूक्ष्मशरीरद्वारैव न तु साक्षादित्युक्तम् ।
जगतः साक्षादुपादानकारणं तु परमात्मशरीरभूतं
जगतः सत्यत्वम् प्रधानादिकं सूक्ष्मं जगदेव । प्रधानादिकं चान्त-
र्यामिरूपेण चित्संबन्धादेव परिणमते न तु स्वा-
तन्त्र्येण । प्रधानं च त्रिगुणात्मकमविद्यामायाशब्दवाच्यमपि नानिर्वचनीयम् ।
अविद्यामायाशब्दयोः प्रधानरूपेऽर्थेऽनिर्वचनीयत्वरूपेणाप्रवृत्तेः । तयोः प्रवृत्ति-
निमित्तं तु प्रागुक्तमेव (पृ० २७।२५) । अतश्च प्रधानपरिणामभूतं जगदपीदं सत्य-
मेव न तु प्रातिभासिकत्वेन मिथ्यात्वं जगतः कल्पनीयम् । किं चास्य प्रधान-
परिणामभूतस्य जगतो ज्ञानिदृष्ट्याप्यबाध्यमानत्वेन न कथमपि मिथ्यात्वस्यो-
पपत्तिर्भवति ।

2.36. The physical world and the subtle world which is the cause of that [physical world] always constitute the body of the supreme Self. It has been mentioned that the supreme Self is the material

cause of the world, though only by means of a subtle body, not directly. Directly, however, the material cause of the world is only the subtle world which is the body of the supreme Self and which consists of primary matter etc. The primary matter etc. changes only because of the connection with what is sentient, in the form of the inner controller, not independently. The primary matter is composed of the three qualities and even though it can be expressed by the words "avidyā" and "māyā" it is not indeterminable. Because the two words "avidyā" and "māyā" are not employed in the manner of being indeterminable in regard to an object in the form of the primary matter. But the reason for their usage was certainly mentioned previously (2.11.). Therefore, though the world is a modification of the primary matter, this is certainly real and the falsity of the world, as being an appearance, should not be imagined. Furthermore, because this world which is a modification of primary matter cannot be sublated even by the opinion of a person who has knowledge, its falsity is no way logically possible.

2.37.

अयं च परिणामवादो ब्रह्मसूत्रकाराणामभिमत इति परिणामात् (ब्र० सू०
१।४।२७) इति सूत्राद्भव्यते । ' स्वभावतो निरस्तनिखिलदोषस्य
निरतिशयज्ञानानन्दैकतानस्य परस्य ब्रह्मणोऽनन्तापुरुषार्थास्पदप्रपञ्च-
रूपेण बहुभवनं नोपपद्यत इति बहुभवन-
परिणामवादः संकल्पबोधिका सोऽकामयत बहु स्यां प्रजायेय
(तै० २।६) इति श्रुतिर्विरुध्यते ' इत्याशङ्कना-
पनोदाय हि तत्सूत्रं प्रणीतम् । प्रलयावस्थायामतिसूक्ष्मशरीरकं ब्रह्म पूर्वव-
त्स्थूलचिदाचिन्मिश्रप्रपञ्चशरीरकं स्यामिति संकल्प्यात्मानं शरीरद्वारा स्थूलरू-
पेण परिणमयतीति न परमात्मनः कश्चिदपुरुषार्थगन्ध इति तत्सूत्रतात्पर्यम् ।

2.37. This teaching of modification is understood from the sūtra:

"On account of modification" (B.S.1.4.27.) to be the accepted view of the author of the Brahmasūtra. Because that sūtra was composed for the removal of the doubt; it is not logically possible that the supreme Brahman, who is by nature free from all defects and who consists

solely of unsurpassed knowledge and bliss, becomes manifold in the form of the manifest world which is the location of endless wrong human endeavours and hence the sacred text which makes known the resolve to become many: "He desired, 'let me become many, let me be born' " (Tai.2.6.) is contradicted. The purport of the sūtra is that Brahman, who has an extremely subtle body in the state of cosmic dissolution, resolves: "I shall have as a body the manifest world consisting of the material sentient and insentient entities, just as before" and He transforms Himself into a material form by means of a body. Thus the supreme Self does not have even a whiff of wrong human endeavour.

2.38. नन्वेवं प्रपञ्चस्य सत्यत्वे तत्प्रतीतिर्न भ्रान्तिरूपेति तत्त्वज्ञानेन तस्या नाशो न स्यादिति चेदिष्टापत्तिः । तत्त्वज्ञानं तु न व्यर्थम् ।
 तत्त्वज्ञानोपयोगः देहात्मभ्रमस्वातन्त्र्यभ्रमादीनां सत्त्वेन तन्निरा-
 करणार्थमात्मस्वरूपप्रतिपत्त्यर्थं च तस्यावश्यक-
 त्वात् । तथा हि । देहस्यात्मसंबन्धित्वेऽप्यात्मत्वाभावेन तत्रात्मत्वबुद्धिर्मनुष्योऽ-
 हं देवोऽहमित्याकारिका भ्रान्तिरेव । अयमेव देहात्मभ्रम इत्युच्यते । अनात्मनि
 देह आत्मत्वबुद्धिर्हि देहात्मभ्रमः । न त्वदेह आत्मनि देहत्वबुद्धिर्देहात्मभ्रमः ।
 जीवात्मनि परमात्मदेहत्वस्य वस्तुत एव सत्त्वात् । प्रत्युत तस्य तत्त्वज्ञानान्त-
 र्गतत्वेनावश्यकत्वमेव । तेन हि जीवे स्वातन्त्र्यभ्रमो निवार्यते । जीवस्य तत्-
 त्कर्मकर्तृत्वं तदन्तःप्रविष्टपरमात्माधीनमेव । अन्तः प्रविष्टः शास्ता (तै० आ०
 ३ । ११ । २) य आत्मनि तिष्ठन् (वृ० मा० ३ । ७ । २२) सर्वस्य चाहं
 हृदि संनिविष्टः (गी० १५ । १५) ईश्वरः सर्वभूतानां हृद्देशेऽर्जुन तिष्ठति
 (गी० १८ । ६१) इत्यादिश्रुतिस्मृतिभिः परमात्मनो जीवान्तःप्रवेशपूर्वकं
 तन्नियमनस्य स्पष्टमेव प्रतिपादनात् । परात्तु तच्छ्रुतेः (ब्र० सू० २ । ३ । ४०)
 इति सूत्रयतां सूत्रकाराणामप्येतत्संमतमेव ।

2.38. [objection] If the manifest world is real, the cognition of that [world as real] is not an error and there would be no destruction of that [cognition] by the knowledge of reality.

[reply] That is the desirable conclusion. However the knowledge of reality is not without use. Since an error that the body is the self and the error of independence etc. exists, therefore that

[knowledge of reality] is necessary for the purpose of removing that [error] and for the purpose of the ascertainment of the essential nature of the self. To explain. Although the body has connection with the self, since it is not the self the cognition of selfhood there in the form: "I am a man", "I am a god" is certainly an error. This is said to be the error that the body is the self. For the error that the body is the self is the cognition of selfhood in the body which is not the self. However the cognition of being a body in regard to the self which is not the body is not the error that the body is the self. Because in regard to the individual self, the nature of being the body of the supreme Self certainly exists as a reality. Rather, that [i.e. seeing oneself as the body of the supreme Self] is certainly necessary since it is included in the knowledge of reality. For due to that, the error of independence is removed in respect of the individual soul. The agentship of various actions on the part of the individual soul is certainly dependent upon the supreme Self who has entered within that [soul].

For the sacred texts and the tradition teach very clearly that the supreme Self, after entering within the individual soul, does the controlling of that [soul]: "the ruler who has entered within" (Tai.Ā.3.11.2.), "He who dwells in the self" (Bṛh.3.7.22.), "I am seated in the heart of all" (G.15.15.), "Arjuna, the Lord dwells in the heart of all beings" (G.18.61.). This is certainly the accepted view of the author of the sūtras as well, who composed the sūtra: "But that [agentship] is from the Highest, on account of the sacred text" (B.S.2.3.40.).

2.39. दुग्धादीनां जडवस्तूनामहर्निशं
जायमानः परिणामोऽप्यन्तर्यामीश्वराधीन एव । शरीरस्य च परिणामो द्विविधः ।
जीवदेहस्य बाल्याद्यवस्थाभेदेन जायमान एकः ।
जीवानां पारतन्त्र्यम् मरणोत्तरं च तस्यैव देहस्य जायमानोऽपरः ।
द्विविधोऽप्ययमीश्वराधीन एव । आद्यो जीवसंब-

न्धेन जायमानोऽपि न जीवाधीनः । जीवसंबन्धेनैव तादृशपरिणामस्येश्वरेच्छा-
विषयीभूतत्वात् । सर्वथा परमात्मव्यतिरिक्तस्य जीवस्य जडस्य वा न स्वात-
न्त्र्यम् । तत्त्वज्ञानेन देहात्मभ्रमे स्वातन्त्र्यभ्रमे च दूरीकृते स्वतन्त्रस्येश्वरस्या-
राधनादौ पुरुषः प्रवर्तते नान्यथा । तथा च तत्त्वज्ञानेन देहात्मभ्रमादय एव
निरसनीया न तु प्रपञ्चसत्यत्वं निरसनीयम् । प्रधानपरिणामभूतस्याखिलप्र-
पञ्चस्य सत्यत्वात् ।

2.39. Even the modification which continually occurs for inert objects such as milk is certainly dependent upon the Lord who is the inner-controller. The modification of the body is twofold. One occurs for the living body due to the difference of stages such as childhood etc. The other occurs for that same body after death. This [modification], though of two types, is certainly dependent upon the Lord. Even though the first occurs due to the connection with the individual soul, it is not dependent upon the individual soul. Because such modification is an object of the Lord's will only due to the connection with the individual soul. An individual soul or an inert object has no independence at all distinct from the supreme Self.

When the error that the body is the self and the error of independence has been removed by the knowledge of reality a person engages in the adoration etc. of the Lord who is independent, not otherwise. So only the error that the body is the self etc. is able to be removed by the knowledge of reality. But the reality of the manifest world is not able to be removed. Because the entire manifest world, which is a modification of the primary matter, is real.

2.40. शुक्तिकायां प्रतीयमानं रजतमपि सदेव प्रतीयते । असतः प्रतीतेरसंभवात् ।
इतरथा किमिति शुक्तिकायां रजतमेव प्रतीयते न घटपटादयः । सादृश्याद्रजतं
प्रतीयत इति तु न संभवति । यतः शुक्तिकायां
सख्यातिः रजतसादृश्यं रजतसंस्कारोद्बोधनद्वारा रजत-
स्मृतिं जनयेन्न तु रजतप्रत्यक्षम् । शुक्तिकायां
रजतस्य सत्त्वं त्वित्थम् । पञ्चानां पृथिव्यादीनां भूतानां पञ्चीकरणेन सर्वत्र
सर्वेषां सत्त्वेन शुक्तिकारूपपृथिव्यां तेजसो रजतस्यांशतः सत्त्वात् । किं च—

तदेव सदृशं तस्य यत्तद्द्रव्यैकदेशमाक् ।

इत्युक्त्वा स्वसदृशे वस्तुनि स्वस्यांशतः सत्त्वमवर्जनीयमेव । एवमेव रज्ज्वादौ प्रतीयमानानां सर्पादीनामपि सत्यत्वं वेदितव्यम् । 'शुक्तिकादौ रज्ज्वादिप्रतीतिभ्रान्तिः' इति व्यवहारस्तु शुक्त्यंशापेक्षया रज्ज्वांशस्याल्पत्वान्न तु रज्ज्वांशतोऽप्यभावात् ।

2.40. Even the silver which is perceived in a pearl-oyster is recognized as certainly real. Because cognition of what is not real is impossible. Otherwise, why is it that silver alone is recognized in the pearl-oyster and not a pot or a cloth etc.? It is not possible that: "silver is recognized on account of similarity". Because the similarity of the pearl-oyster to silver would produce the recollection of silver by means of recalling to memory the mental impression of silver. But it would not produce the perception of silver.

However the existence of silver in the pearl-oyster is in this manner: because all the five elements such as earth exist everywhere [i.e. in each other] due to their fivefold combination, therefore silver, which is fire, exists partially in earth which is in the form of the pearl-oyster. Moreover according to the method which has been told: "whatever possesses a part of a substance is similar to it"⁹⁴ the existence of itself partially in a thing similar to it is unavoidable. The existence even of a snake etc. perceived upon a rope etc. is to be understood in just the same manner. However the expression: "the cognition of silver etc. in a pearl-oyster etc. is error" is because the portion of silver is minute with regard to the portion of pearl-oyster. But it is not because the silver, even partially, does not exist.

2.41.

जपाकुसुमसमीपवर्तिस्फटिकमणौ प्रतीयमानो रक्तिमापि सत्य एव । यथा जलान्तर्गततेजोद्रव्यगतः सत्य एवोष्णस्पर्शः संयुक्तसमवायेन जले भासते उष्णं जलमिति तथा स्फटिकसंयुक्तायां जपाकुसुमप्रभायां विद्यमानः सत्य एव रक्तिमा स्फटिके भासते रक्तः स्फटिक इति ।

नैतावता विषयस्यासत्यत्वम् । जपाकुसुमप्रभा सर्वतः प्रसृतापि स्फटिकस्य स्वच्छद्रव्यत्वेन तत्रैव स्फुटमुपलभ्यते नान्यत्र । पीतः शङ्ख इति प्रतीतौ प्रतीयमानः पीतिमापि सत्य एव । स च पित्तद्रव्यगतः । द्रष्टृपुरुषनयनगत-पित्तद्रव्यसंयुक्तानां नेत्ररश्मीनां शङ्खेन सह संयोगात् । स्वप्ने दृश्यमाना गजाश्वादयः पदार्था अपीश्वरेणोत्पादिताः सत्या एव । यद्यपि ते पदार्था-स्तत्तद्द्रष्टृपुरुषेणैवानुभूयन्ते नेत्रैस्तथा सद्य एव ते विनश्यन्ति तथाप्यचिन्त्यश-क्तेरीश्वरस्य तादृशपदार्थोत्पादने सामर्थ्यसत्त्वान्न दोषः । दर्पणे प्रतीयमानं मुखमपि सत्यमेव । दर्पणप्रतिहतगतीनां नेत्ररश्मीनां ततः परावृत्तानां स्वमुखेन सह संबन्धसत्त्वात् । एवं सर्वत्र सत एव विषयस्य ख्यातिः प्रतीतिर्भवति न तु काप्यसतः प्रतीतिः । इयमेव सत्ख्यातिरिति व्यवहियते ।

2.41. Even the redness perceived in a crystal situated close to a red flower is certainly real. Just as the real sensation of heat belonging to the substance fire which has entered into water appears in the water, due to the inherence in what is conjoined, so that: "the water is hot", in just the same manner, the real redness existing in the lustre of a red flower which is in contact with a crystal appears in the crystal so that: "the crystal is red". This does not result in the unreality of the object. Though the lustre of the red flower is diffused in all directions, because the crystal is a transparent substance it is clearly perceived there alone and not elsewhere.

Even the yellow colour perceived in the cognition: "the conch shell is yellow" is certainly real. That [yellow colour] belongs to the substance bile. [The perception of the yellow conch shell is] because the rays of the eyes, which are connected to the substance bile located within the eyes of the person seeing, have conjunction with the conch shell.

Even the objects such as elephants and horses etc. seen in dream are certainly real, as they are produced by the Lord. Although those objects are experienced only by the person who sees them and not by others and in that same way are destroyed in an instant, still there

is no defect because the Lord, who has inconceivable power, possesses the capacity to produce such objects.

Even the face perceived in a mirror is certainly real. Because the rays of the eyes which have struck the mirror are reversed from it and are connected with one's own face. Thus there is the apprehension, i.e. the cognition, everywhere of an object which is certainly real. There is nowhere cognition of the unreal. This is indeed designated as: "the apprehension of the real."

comment

The Viśiṣṭādvaita tradition upholds the view that: "all cognition is true to its object."⁹⁵ This means all knowledge is intrinsically valid since it always has, as its object, something which really exists. Such a position is called: "the apprehension of the real" (satkhyāti) or "the apprehension of the object as it is" (yathārthakhyāti).⁹⁶

If all cognition is true to its object, the possibility of error would seem to be precluded. Rāmānuja, however, does not deny the fact of perceptual error for he considers that: "the existence [of one thing] in another manner must be accepted."⁹⁷ His use of the expression "in another manner" (anyathā) suggests that Rāmānuja's position is in accord with the Naiyāyika explanation of error as: "the apprehension in another manner" (anyathākhyāti). However the similarity is only in so far as Rāmānuja agrees with the Naiyāyikas' that one thing, such as a pearl-oyster, can appear in another manner in the form of a piece of silver. He accepts anyathākhyāti to this extent, but he does not consider that the object of error, such as the silver, is something illusory. In accordance with satkhyāti, Rāmānuja maintains that all, even erroneous, cognition has a real entity for its object.

On account of the threefold combination of the elements described in Chāndogya 6.3.3. or the fivefold combination enumerated in Taittirīya 2.1. (see text 1.37), each element contains lesser portions of the other elements. When a pearl-oyster is seen as silver, the perception is true because real silver is perceived. This is because minute portions of silver, which are of the nature of the element fire or light (tejas), actually exist in the pearl-oyster which is of the nature of the element earth. Due to an ocular defect the predominant shell portion is not recognised and only the minute silver is seen.

Thus there is error in so far as the pearl-oyster is apprehended as silver, however the cognition of silver is not illusory since it is real silver that is perceived. In the case of the erroneous perception of two moons, Rāmānuja explains that the visual apparatus of the eye becomes divided through such causes as cataract or by pressure of the finger upon the eye. One apparatus apprehends the moon in its own location. The other moves at a tangent and apprehends a place near the moon and also the moon disassociated from its actual location. Because there is a real division of the visual apparatus, there is a real twofold apprehension and on account of the reality of the two apprehensions the double aspect of the object, the moon, is also real.⁹⁸ While there is error because the moon appears double, the second moon is not illusory because it is the real moon which is being cognized.

Although Rāmānuja accepts that objects appear in a different manner, he does not make an ontological distinction between a valid and an erroneous cognition.⁹⁹ The object perceived in each case is real. Viśiṣṭādvaitins, however, explain that knowledge is valid when it is: "in accord with practical life as it really is."¹⁰⁰ Thus while all knowledge is true since it has a real object, valid knowledge must accord with the ordinary relations of life.

2.42.

प्रपञ्चस्य

सत्यत्वादेव तदन्तर्गतस्य शास्त्रस्यापि सत्य-
शास्त्रस्य सत्यत्वम् त्वात्तज्जनितं ज्ञानं सम्यग्ज्ञानमित्युच्यते । अन्यथा
ह्यसत्याच्छास्त्राज्जायमानं ज्ञानमप्यसत्यमिति तस्य
मोक्षसाधनत्वं दुरूपपादं स्यात् । न ह्यशापोदकैस्तृप्तिर्भवति । न वा मृगतृष्णो-
दकेन स्नानादिकार्यं निष्पद्यते ।

2.42. Because the manifest world is certainly real, therefore the scripture too, which is included within that [world] is real. The knowledge produced by that [scripture] is called "true knowledge". Because otherwise even the knowledge which is produced from an unreal scripture is unreal and thus that it [the scripture] is a means for liberation would be difficult to demonstrate. For there is no satisfaction through sweets which are [merely] hoped for, nor is an action such as bathing accomplished with mirage water.

2.43.

तदेवं सर्वत्र विद्यमानस्य विषयस्य या प्रतीतिर्जायते सा प्रमाणत्रयजन्या ।
 प्रमाणत्रयं च प्रत्यक्षानुमानशब्दरूपम् । तत्र साक्षात्कारिप्रमाकरणं प्रत्यक्षम् ।
 यथावस्थितव्यवहारानुगुणज्ञानं प्रमा । साक्षा-
 प्रत्यक्षम् । त्कारीति प्रमाया विशेषणेनानुमानादिव्यावृत्तिः ।
 अनुमानादौ प्रमायाः साक्षात्कारित्वाभावात् ।
 इन्द्रियसंनिक्लृष्टघटादिप्रत्यक्षज्ञाने प्रमायाः करणमिन्द्रियं भवति । तदेव प्रत्यक्ष-
 प्रमाणम् । तज्जन्यं ज्ञानं च प्रत्यक्षमित्युच्यते । नित्यस्य ज्ञानस्येन्द्रियजन्यत्व-
 मौपचारिकम् । यथा नित्यस्य जीवस्य शरीरसंबन्धादुत्पत्तिरुपचर्यते तथा
 विषयसंबन्धेन ज्ञानस्य विकासे जायमाने सत्युत्पत्तिरुपचर्यते ।

2.43. Thus everywhere, the cognition which arises about an existing object is produced by the group of three means of knowledge. The group of three means of knowledge are: perception, inference and verbal testimony. In regard to these, perception is the instrument of valid knowledge which causes direct apprehension. Valid knowledge is the knowledge which is in accord with practical life as it really is. There is the exclusion of inference etc. by distinguishing valid [perceptual] knowledge as: "causing direct apprehension". Because in the case of inference etc., valid knowledge does not cause direct apprehension. The sense organ is the instrument of valid knowledge in regard to the perceptual knowledge of a pot etc. which is in contact with the sense organ. That is indeed the means of knowledge through perception. The knowledge produced by that is called "perception".

It is figurative that Knowledge, which is eternal, can be produced by a sense organ. Just as the birth of an eternal soul is figurative on account of its connection with a body, so too, the production of Knowledge is figurative when its expansion occurs due to the connection with a sense object.

comment

The definition of valid knowledge (pramā) as: "knowledge which is in accord with practical life as it really is" can be found in the Yatīndramatadīpikā, Para.7.p.5. This is the definition given by Vedānta Deśika in his work: Nyāyapariśuddhi.¹⁰¹

- 2.44. प्रत्यक्षं द्विविधम् । निर्विकल्पकसविकल्पकभेदात् । प्रथमतो जायमानं गुण-
संस्थानादिविशिष्टपिण्डज्ञानं निर्विकल्पकम् । संस्थानमवयवरचनाविशेषः ।
यथा प्रथमत एव गवि दृष्टेऽयं गौरिति ज्ञानम् ।
प्रत्यक्षभेदाः अत्र ह्यवयवरचनाविशेषरूपगोत्वविशिष्टगोपिण्डस्य
ज्ञानेऽप्येतद्गोत्वमितरगोव्यक्तिसाधारणमित्येवं गो-
त्वस्यानुवृत्ताकारता न प्रतीयते । अतोऽनुवृत्ताकारतारूपस्य विकल्पस्यात्राप्रती-
तत्वादेतन्निरविकल्पकमुच्यते । द्वितीयादिज्ञानं तु सविकल्पकम् । गोव्यक्त्यन्तर-
साधारणग्रीदृशं गोत्वमिति तत्र गोत्वस्यानुवृत्ताकारताया ज्ञायमानत्वात् । नाम-
जात्यादियोजनाहीनं विशेषणविशेष्यसंबन्धानवगाहि ज्ञानं निर्विकल्पकमिति
नैयायिकोक्तं निर्विकल्पकलक्षणं तु न समीचीनम् । तथाविधज्ञानस्य क्वाप्यभा-
वात् । संस्थानरूपजातेर्व्यक्तेश्च समानसामग्रीवेद्यत्वेन केवलजातेः केवलव्यक्तेर्वा
प्रत्यक्षं न संभवति । आत्मा मनसा संयुज्यते । मन इन्द्रियेण संयुज्यते । इन्द्रिय-
मर्थेन संयुज्यते । ततः प्रत्यक्षज्ञानं भवति । इन्द्रियार्थयोः संनिकर्षं विना न
कदापि प्रत्यक्षं भवति । इन्द्रियाणां प्राप्यवस्तुप्रकाशकारित्वनियमात् । इन्द्रिया-
र्थसंनिकर्षश्च संयोगः संयुक्ताश्रयणं चेति द्विविधः । तत्र द्रव्यप्रत्यक्ष इन्द्रियार्थ-
योः संयोगः संनिकर्षः । द्रव्यगतगुणादिप्रत्यक्षे तु संयुक्ताश्रयणरूपः । इन्द्रिय-
संयुक्ते द्रव्ये गुणादीनामाश्रितत्वात् ।

2.44. Perception is twofold, due to the distinction between being indeterminate and being determinate. The knowledge of an object distinguished by its qualities, configuration etc., which occurs firstly, is indeterminate. The configuration is the particular arrangement of the component parts. For example, when a cow is first seen there is the knowledge: "this is a cow". Because here, even though there is knowledge of the object cow, distinguished by cowness which has the form of a particular arrangement of the component parts, the persisting form of cowness is not recognized in the manner that: "this cowness is common to another individual cow". Therefore, because a determination in the manner of a persisting form is not perceived here, it is called "indeterminate". Whereas the knowledge of a second [cow] etc. is "determinate". Because there [in determinate perception], cowness is known as having a persisting form so that [one knows]: "the cowness which is in this manner is common to another individual cow".

However the definition of indeterminate told by the Naiyāyikas

is not correct: "indeterminate knowledge does not apprehend an attribute, substantive, or a relation [between attribute and substantive], it is bereft of the connection with name, class etc.". Because such a type of knowledge does not exist anywhere. The perception of a mere class or a mere individual is not possible, because a class, in the form of the configuration, and an individual, are to be known through the same causal apparatus.

The self is united with the mind. The mind is united with the sense organ. The sense organ is united with the object. From that, there is perceptual knowledge. Perception never takes place without the connection between the sense organ and the object. Because, as a rule, the sense organs bring about the illumination of attainable objects. The connection between the sense organ and the object is twofold: conjunction and dependence upon what is conjoined [with the sense organ]. In regard to those, the connection between the sense organ and an object in regard to the perception of a substance is "conjunction". Whereas in regard to the perception of qualities etc. located in the substance, [the connection] has the form of "dependence upon what is conjoined". Because qualities etc. depend upon a substance which is conjoined with the sense organ.

comment

Rāmānuja's explanation of indeterminate (nirvikalpaka) and determinate (savikalpaka) perception follows that of the Mīmāṃsā school of Prabhākara.¹⁰² The first instant when an object is perceived is said to be "indeterminate". At that time, the specific features of the object and its generic character are perceived, however the generic character is not recognized as common to all other individuals of the same class. The perception of another cow at a later time is called "determinate" because there is the recognition that the generic character i.e. the "cowness" of the cow perceived firstly, is common to all cows.

Indeterminate perception does not apprehend the mere generic character, or as the Naiyāyikas and Bhaṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas maintain, the mere individual (vyakti) possessing specific features and a generic

character which has not yet been discriminated.¹⁰³ Prabhākara and Rāmānuja maintain that all cognition apprehends the individual qualified by the relation with the specific features and the generic character.

According to Rāmānuja, the generic character (jāti) is nothing but the configuration (saṁsthāna) of the object.¹⁰⁴ The configuration is "the particular arrangement of the component parts". For example the generic character of cowness is the configuration common to all cows such as having a certain type of dewlap and other common features.

2.45.

पुनः प्रकारान्तरेण प्रत्यक्षं द्विविधमनर्वाचीनमर्वाचीनं चेति । नित्यानां मुक्तानां च जीवानामीश्वरस्य च जायमानमाद्यम् । अर्वाचीनं त्वस्मदादीनामिन्द्रियापेक्षया जायते । इन्द्रियानपेक्षमर्वाचीनं तु स्वयंसिद्धं दिव्यं चेति द्विविधम् । स्वयंसिद्धं योगिनाम् । दिव्यं तु भगवत्प्रसादजन्यं भगवद्भक्तानाम् । दशमस्त्वमसि, तत्त्वमसि (छा० ६ । ८ । ७) इत्यादिवाक्यजन्यं ज्ञानं तु शाब्दज्ञानमेव न प्रत्यक्षम् । तस्य तत्तच्छब्दाज्जायमानत्वेन निरुक्तकारणाजन्यत्वात् ।

2.45. Again, according to another mode, perception is twofold: ancient and recent. The first occurs for the eternal souls [i.e. the eternally liberated souls], the liberated souls and the Lord. Whereas the "recent" occurs for people such as us who are in dependence upon the sense organs. However the "recent" which is not dependent upon the sense organs is twofold: self-accomplished and divine. "Self-accomplished" is for Yogis, whereas the "divine" is for the Lord's devotees and is produced through the grace of the Lord.

The knowledge produced by a sentence such as: "you are the tenth", "you are That" (Ch.6.8.7.) etc. is only verbal knowledge, not perception. Because that [knowledge] cannot be produced from the cause which has been told, as it is being produced from the respective words.

comment

Śaṅkara considers that verbal testimony can produce the immediate (aparokṣa) knowledge of Brahman free from distinction (see comment to 1.48. and 1.53.). Rāmānuja disagrees and argues that a sentence cannot

denote anything free from distinction since it consists of a number of words, each of which conveys a particular meaning. See Śrībhāṣya 1.1.1. Para.28.p.46.

2.46.

व्याप्यस्य व्याप्यत्वेन ज्ञानाद्व्यापकस्य यज्ज्ञानं सानुमितिः । तत्करणमनुमानम् । पर्वतो वह्निमान्धूमादित्यत्र पर्वतवर्तिनो धूमस्य 'धूमो वह्निव्याप्य' इत्येवं वह्निव्याप्यत्वानुसंधानात्तद्व्यापकस्य वह्नेर्ज्ञानं जायते । सैवानुमितिः । तत्करणं धूमे वह्निव्याप्तिज्ञानं पक्षवृत्तित्वज्ञानं अनुमानम् च । तदेवानुमानम् । व्याप्तिपक्षधर्मताज्ञानानन्तरमनुमितौ जायमानायां मध्ये व्याप्तिविशिष्टपक्षधर्मताज्ञानरूपस्य नैयायिकाभिमतस्य लिङ्गपरामर्शस्य न काचिदपेक्षा दृश्यते । प्रथमतः पर्वते धूमप्रत्यक्षम् । ततो धूमे वह्निव्याप्यत्वज्ञानम् । पश्चादनुमितिरित्येवं क्रमस्यानुभविकत्वेन परामर्शस्याप्रयोजकत्वात् । यत्र धूमस्तत्र वह्निरित्येवं नियतसंबन्धो व्याप्तिः । सा चान्वयव्यतिरेकभेदेन द्विविधा । साधनविधौ साध्यविधिरूपेण प्रवृत्ता व्याप्तिरन्वयव्याप्तिः । यथा यो यो धूमवान्स सोऽग्निमानिति । साध्यनिषेधे साधननिषेधरूपेण प्रवृत्ता व्याप्तिर्व्यतिरेकव्याप्तिः । यथा योऽग्निः स निर्धूम इति । तथा च द्विविधव्याप्तिसत्त्वाद्भूमो हेतुरन्वयव्यतिरेकी । कश्चिद्धेतुः केवलान्वयी । यथा ब्रह्म शब्दवाच्यं वस्तुत्वाद्घटवादिति । अत्र यच्छब्दवाच्यं न भवति तद्वत्त्वपि न भवतीति व्यतिरेकव्याप्तेर्न किमप्युदाहरणं संभवति । केवलव्यतिरेकी तु हेतुर्न कापि दृश्यते । पृथिवी गन्धवती पृथिवीत्वादित्यादौ तु गन्धवत्त्वरूपसाध्यस्यान्यत्र क्वाप्यप्रसिद्ध्या तदभावव्याप्तेर्दुर्ग्रहत्वेन व्यतिरेकव्याप्तेरसंभवात् ।

2.46. Inferential knowledge is the knowledge of the pervader from the knowledge of the pervaded as being pervaded. Inference is the means for that [inferential knowledge]. Here [in the inference]: "the hill is possessed of fire, because of smoke", because the smoke existing on the hill is remembered as being pervaded by fire in the manner: "smoke is pervaded by fire", the knowledge of fire which is the pervader of that [smoke] arises. That is indeed inferential knowledge. The means for that is the knowledge of the invariable concomitance of smoke with fire and the knowledge of [smoke] existing in the subject [i.e. on the hill]. That is indeed inference.

When, after the knowledge of the invariable concomitance and the attribute [i.e. the existence of smoke] on the subject [the hill], the

inferential knowledge arises, no requirement whatsoever is seen for the subsumptive reflection of the sign in the form of the knowledge of the attribute existing in the subject qualified by invariable concomitance, which is accepted by the Naiyāyikas in between [(a) the knowledge of concomitance and the knowledge of the attribute in the subject and (b) inferential knowledge]. Because subsumptive reflection is not the determining factor since the sequence relates to the apprehension: firstly there is the perception of smoke on the hill, then there is the knowledge that smoke is pervaded by fire and subsequently there is inferential knowledge.

Invariable concomitance is the invariable relation in the manner: where there is smoke there is fire. That [concomitance] is twofold due to the distinction between co-presence and co-absence. Pervasion of co-presence is the invariable concomitance which occurs by the affirmation of what is to be proved upon the affirmation of the ground [i.e. the reason]. For instance: whatever has smoke has fire. Pervasion of co-absence is the invariable concomitance which occurs by the negation of the ground upon the negation of what is to be proved. For instance: what has no fire has no smoke. So because two types of invariable concomitance exist, smoke is a reason which possesses co-presence and co-absence.

Some types of reason have only co-presence. For instance: Brahman can be expressed by a word, because it is a thing, like a pot. Here, any illustration of the pervasion of co-absence : what cannot be expressed by a word is also not an object, is impossible.

A reason which has only co-absence is not seen anywhere. Because in a case such as: the earth possesses smell on account of being earth, there is no possibility of pervasion in co-absence since what is to be proved i.e. the possession of smell, is not known anywhere else and so the invariable concomitance of its absence is difficult to be apprehended.

comment

The technicalities of inference are explained in Athalye's Ed. of Tarkasaṅgraha. Also, cf. Kuppaswami Sastri, A Primer of Indian Logic.

2.47.

अनुमानं च स्वार्थपरार्थभेदेन द्विविधम् । तत्र परार्थानुमानेऽनुमानबोधक-
वाक्यं प्रतिज्ञाहेतूदाहरणोपनयनिगमनरूपपञ्चावयवसंयुक्तमिति नैयायिकाः । ते
चावयवास्तार्किकग्रन्थेभ्योऽवसेयाः । प्रतिज्ञाहे-
तूदाहरणरूपत्रयवयववादिनो मीमांसकाः । उदा-
हरणोपनयरूपावयवद्वयवादिनः सौमताः । वस्तु-
तस्त्ववयवसंख्याया अनियम एव । यतो मन्दबुद्धीनां पञ्चावयवापेक्षा । तीक्ष्ण-
बुद्धीनामवयवत्रयेणैव सिद्धिः । तीक्ष्णतरबुद्धीनां त्ववयवद्वयेनैवेति ।

अनुमानभेदाः

2.47. Inference is of two types due to the distinction of being for oneself and being for another person. With regard to those two, the Naiyāyikas [consider] that a sentence communicating an inference, in respect of inference for another person, is endowed with five members: the proposition, reason, illustration, application and conclusion. Those members can be understood from the books of the logicians. The Mīmāṃsakas teach three members: the proposition, reason and illustration. The Buddhists teach two members: the illustration and the application. In reality, however, there is no rule about the number of members. Because people of slow intellect require five members. For people of sharp intellect, [the inference] is accomplished by only three members. Whereas for people of sharper intellect, by only two members.

2.48.

अनाप्तोक्तभिन्नाद्वाक्याज्जायमानं तदर्थज्ञानं शाब्दज्ञानम् । तत्करणं तादृश-
वाक्यरूपः शब्दः । वेदोऽपौरुषेयत्वादीश्वरप्रणीतत्वाभावेनाप्तोक्तो न भवति ।
अत आप्तोक्तादित्यनुक्त्वाऽनाप्तोक्तभिन्नादित्युक्तम् । स च वेदोऽनाप्तोक्तो न
भवतीत्यतः प्रमाणमेव । मनुस्मृतिभारतादयस्तु
मन्वादिभिरापौरुषेयत्वेनानाप्तोक्तभिन्नत्वात्प्रमाणम् ।
तत्र वेदः सर्व एव प्रमाणम् । अप्रामाण्यं हि कर्तृ-
दोषाद्वाधकप्रत्ययप्रामाण्याद्वा ज्ञायते । वेदस्य नित्यत्वेनाकर्तृकत्वान्न कर्तृदोष-
संभवः । न वा वेदप्रतिपादितार्थस्य प्रमाणभूतः क्वचिदपि वाधकः प्रत्ययः ।
स्मृत्यादीनां तु वेदविरुद्धार्थप्रतिपादकानां तदंशेनाप्रामाण्यम् । इतरांशेन तु
प्रामाण्यमेव । श्रीपञ्चरात्रागमस्य क्वचिदपि वेदविरोधाभावात्कात्स्न्येन प्रामा-
ण्यम् ।

शाब्दज्ञानम्

पञ्चरात्रस्य कृत्स्नस्य वक्ता नारायणः स्वयम् ।

इत्युक्तेस्तत्र कर्तृदोषसंभावनापि न भवति । अत एव वराहपुराणे

अलाभे वेदमघ्राणां पञ्चरात्रोदितेन हि ।

आचारेण प्रवर्तन्ते ते मां प्राप्स्यन्ति मानवाः ॥

इत्युक्तम् ।

2.48. Verbal knowledge is knowledge whose meaning is produced from a sentence different from what is uttered by an untrustworthy person.¹⁰⁵ The means for that [knowledge] is a word having the form of that type of sentence. The Veda is not uttered by a trustworthy person since it is not composed by the Lord, because it has no personal origin. Therefore having not said: uttered by a trustworthy person, it was said: different from what is uttered by an untrustworthy person. The Veda is not uttered by an untrustworthy person, therefore it is certainly a means of knowledge.

Manusmṛti, Bhārata etc. are a means of knowledge on account of being different from what is uttered by an untrustworthy person, for they are uttered by trustworthy persons such as Manu etc. In regard to those texts, the whole Veda is the means of knowledge. Because invalidity is known from the defect of the agent or from the validity of a sublating knowledge. There is no possibility of a defect on the part of the agent because the Veda has no agent as it is eternal. Nor is there a sublating knowledge anywhere which is a means of knowledge for a meaning which has been taught by the Veda. The traditions etc. which teach a meaning contrary to the Veda have no validity in that portion. However there is certainly validity in the other portion.

The scripture known as the Śrī Pañcarātra has validity in its entirety because there is no contradiction to the Veda anywhere. There is not even the possibility of a defect of the agent in it, on account of the expression: "Nārāyaṇa himself is the teacher of the entire Pañcarātra". Hence it has been told in the Varāhapurāṇa:

In the want of the Veda mantras, those people will gain Me who act according to the practice communicated by the Pañcarātra.

- 2.49. वेदस्य पूर्वो भागः कर्मप्रतिपादकः । उत्तरभागो ब्रह्मप्रतिपादकः । आराध-
नकर्मप्रतिपादकं पूर्वकाण्डम् । आराध्यप्रतिपादक-
वेदस्य भागद्वयम् मुत्तरकाण्डम् । पूर्वभागे कर्ममीमांसा । तत्र जैमिनेः
सूत्रं द्वादशाध्यायात्मकम् । उत्तरभागे ब्रह्ममी-
मांसा । तत्र व्याससूत्रं चतुरध्यायात्मकम् । उभयोर्मीमांसयोः संभूयैकशास्त्रत्वम् ।
उभयत्रापि धर्मस्यैव प्रतिपाद्यमानत्वात् । अलौकिकं श्रेयःसाधनं हि धर्मः । स
च साध्यरूपः क्रियादिः पूर्वभागेण प्रतिपाद्यते । सिद्धस्तु ब्रह्मरूपो धर्म उत्तर-
भागेण प्रतिपाद्यते ।

2.49. The prior part of the Veda teaches about ritual action. The latter part teaches about Brahman. The prior section teaches the action of worshipping. The latter section teaches about the object of worship. In the prior part there is an investigation of action. In regard to that, there is a sūtra work of Jaimini consisting of twelve chapters. In the latter part there is the investigation about Brahman. In regard to that, there is a sūtra work of Vyāsa consisting of four chapters. Both investigations being united, there is a single scripture. Because even in both places, only dharma is being taught. For dharma is the supra-mundane means of liberation. That [dharma] taught by the prior part is action etc. which has the nature of something to be accomplished. Whereas the dharma taught by the latter part is of the nature of Brahman which is already an existing fact [not to be accomplished].

- 2.50. वाक्यं द्विविधम्—वैदिकं लौकिकं च । द्विविधमपीदं मुख्यया वृत्त्या गोण्या
वार्थं प्रतिपादयति । मुख्यया वृत्त्या प्रतिपादितेऽर्थे तात्पर्यानुपपत्तिश्चेद्गोणी वृत्तिः
स्वीकार्या । यथा गङ्गायां घोष इत्यत्र गङ्गाश-
वृत्तिभेदाः वृत्तिस्य तीरे लक्षणा । तथा तत्त्वमसि (छा० ६ ।
८ । ७) इत्यत्र ब्रह्मवाचकस्य तच्छब्दस्य
ब्रह्मशरीररूपेऽर्थे लक्षणा । लक्षणा च सर्वत्र जहलक्षणैव । कुन्ताः प्रविशन्ति
काकेभ्यो दधि रक्ष्यतामित्यत्र कुन्तशब्दस्य कुन्तवदर्थे काकशब्दस्य दध्युपघात-

क्रेऽर्थे लक्षणायां लक्ष्यार्थे शक्यार्थस्य कुन्तस्य काकस्य च प्रवेशेऽपि शक्यता-
वच्छेदकरूपेणाप्रवेशात्स्वार्थत्याग एव ।

2.50. A sentence is of two types: scriptural and secular. This [sentence], of both types, communicates its meaning through a primary or secondary denotation. If the purport is not logically possible when the meaning is communicated through the primary denotation, then the secondary denotation must be accepted.¹⁰⁶ For example, the implied meaning of the word "Ganges" here: "the cowherd village is on the Ganges" is "on the bank". Similarly, the implied meaning of the word "That" which denotes Brahman here: "you are That" (Ch.6.8.7.) is in the sense of "the body of Brahman".¹⁰⁷ Implication is everywhere only "exclusive implication". In the case of the sentence: "the insects are entering, the curd must be protected from the crows", when there is the implied meaning of the word insect in the sense of "like an insect" and the implied meaning of the word crow in the sense of "spoiling of the curd" there is certainly the relinquishment of its own meaning in an implied sense. Because even if there is the entry of an insect or a crow, which is the literal meaning, there is no entry in a manner which is restricted to the literal meaning.

comment

Rāmānuja employs two principles in interpreting the sentence: "you are That" (tat tvam asi). The first is according to his conception of the meaning of words. The other relates to the rule of grammatical apposition (sāmānādhikarānya) (see comment to 2.26.). Rāmānuja maintains that all words finally denote the supreme Self because He has all souls and matter as His body. Just as the word "man" really denotes the indwelling soul, so too even the word "I" ultimately expresses the supreme Self who is the indweller of the soul.¹⁰⁸ In the sentence: "you are That", the word "That" denotes Brahman who is the cause of the world and the possessor of all auspicious qualities. The word "you" also expresses Brahman, who has as His body the individual soul possessed of a body.¹⁰⁹ Because both the words "you" and "That" refer to Brahman, Rāmānuja considers that his interpretation

agrees with the principle whereby grammatical apposition is meant to express a single object existing in a twofold manner.¹¹⁰

2.51.

उपमानार्थापत्त्यनुपलब्धिरूपप्रमाणत्रयस्योक्तेषु त्रिष्वेवान्तर्भावः । तथाहि ।
 गवयमजानानः कश्चन पुरुषो यथा गौस्तथा गवय इति कुतश्चिदारण्यकाद्वाक्यं
 श्रुत्वा वनं गतो वाक्यार्थं स्मरन्त्यदा गोसादृश्य-
 उपमानं न प्रमाणा- विशिष्टं पिण्डं पश्यति तदा तद्वाक्यार्थस्मरणस-
 न्तरम् हकृतगोसादृश्यविशिष्टपिण्डज्ञानं जायते तदुपमा-
 नमित्युच्यते । अस्य च स्मरणरूपत्वात्प्रत्यक्षेऽन्त-
 र्भावः । व्याप्तिग्रहणापेक्षत्वादानुमानेऽन्तर्भावः । वाक्यजन्यत्वाच्छब्दे चान्तर्भावः ।
 स्मरणात्मकं ज्ञानं च प्रत्यक्षविशेष एव ।

2.51. There is the inclusion of the group of three means of knowledge: comparison, postulation and non-cognition, in the three which have been told. To explain. Some person who does not know about an ox hears a statement from a forester that a cow is just like an ox and having gone to the forest he remembers the meaning of the statement. When he sees an object distinguished by the similarity to a cow, there arises the knowledge of the object distinguished by the similarity to a cow, assisted by the recollection of the meaning of that statement. That [knowledge] is called comparison. It is included within perception, because it is of the nature of recollection. It is included in inference, because it depends upon the apprehension of invariable concomitance. It is included within verbal testimony, since it is produced by a statement. Knowledge which consists of recollection is only a variety of perception.

2.52.

अर्थापत्तिश्चानुपपद्यमानेनार्थेन स्वोपपादकस्यार्थस्य कल्पनम् । यथा दिवाऽ-
 भुञ्जाने देवदत्ते पीनत्वं दृष्टं चेत्तेनानुपपद्यमानेन पीनत्वेन स्वोपपादकस्य रात्रि-
 भोजनरूपस्यार्थस्य कल्पनम् । अस्य चानुमानेऽ-
 अर्थापत्तिर्न प्रमाणा- न्तर्भावः । उपपादकं हि रात्रिभोजनादिकमुपपद्य-
 न्तरम् मानस्य पीनत्वादेर्व्यापकमेव दृश्यते । यत्र यत्र
 दिवाऽभुञ्जानत्वसमानाधिकरणं पीनत्वं तत्र तत्र
 रात्रिभोजनमिति । तदुक्तम्—

अनियम्यस्य नायुक्तिर्नानियन्तोपपादकः ।

इति। अनियम्यस्याव्याप्यस्य । युक्तिरुपपत्तिः । अयुक्तिरनुपपत्तिः । कल्पनी-
यस्य वस्तुनोऽभावे कल्पकस्यानुपपत्तिश्चेत्तस्य वस्तुनः कल्पकं भवति । कल्प-
कस्याव्याप्यत्वे तु कल्पनीयाभावेऽपि तस्यानुपपत्तिरेव नास्ति । तथाऽनि-
यन्ताऽव्यापको नोपपादक इति तदर्थः । तथा चोपपाद्योपपादकयोर्व्याप्यव्या-
पकभावावर्यंभावादनुमानेनैव सिद्धिरित्यर्थापत्तिर्न पृथक्स्वीकार्या ।

2.52. Postulation is the supposition of a fact which logically establishes itself due to a fact being [otherwise] not logically possible. For example, if fatness is observed in Davadatta who does not eat by day, since thereby fatness is not logically possible, there is the supposition of the fact of eating at night which logically establishes itself. This [postulation] is included within inference. Because that which makes [something else] logically possible i.e. eating at night etc., is seen to be indeed the pervader of the fatness etc. which is to be made logically possible: "wherever there is fatness co-ordinate with not eating during the day, there is eating during the night". Hence it is said:

There is no unintelligibility for what is not controlled [i.e. pervaded]. Nor does a non-controller [i.e. non-pervader] make [something] logically possible (Nyā.Ku.3.19.).

"What is not controlled" (anīyamya) means what is not pervaded. Intelligibility means logical possibility. "Unintelligibility" (ayukti) means there is no logical possibility. If there is no logical possibility of the postulating factor [e.g. fatness] in the absence of the thing to be postulated [i.e. eating at night], then that [postulating factor] becomes the postulator for that thing [which is to be postulated i.e. eating at night]. But if the postulating factor is not pervaded [i.e. fatness is not pervaded by eating at night], then that [postulating factor] certainly has no logical impossibility even in the absence of a thing to be postulated. Similarly, a "non-controller" (anīyantr) i.e. a non-pervader, does not make [the postulating factor] logically possible. That is the sense. Thus the establishment is only through inference, because the thing to be made

logically possible and what makes [it] logically possible necessarily have a pervaded-pervader relation. So postulation should not be admitted as separate.

2.53. एवमनुपलब्धिः प्रत्यक्षेऽन्तर्भवति । अनुपलब्धिप्रमाणेन हि सर्वत्राभावस्यैव ग्रहणं न भावस्य । यथा गृहे मनुष्योपलम्भाभावेन गृहे मनुष्याभावो ज्ञायते । परं त्वभावो न भावातिरिक्तः कश्चन पदार्थः । अनूपलब्धिर्न प्रमाणा- न्तरम् किं तु भावान्तरस्वरूप एव । तथा हि । गृहे मनुष्याभावः केवलगृहस्वरूपः । केवलगृहं शून्यगृहम् । तच्च भावरूपं प्रत्यक्षेणैवोपलभ्यते । एवं घटप्रागभावो मृदेव । घटध्वंसश्च कपालमेव । घटभेदश्च पटादेरवयवरचनाविशेष एवेति ।

2.53. So too, non-cognition is included within perception. Because through the means of knowledge known as non-cognition there is everywhere the apprehension of only non-existence, not of existence. For example, the non-existence of a man in the house is known through the absence of cognition of a man in the house. Non-existence, however, is not some category different from existence. Rather, it is only the nature of another existence. For instance, the non-existence of a man in the house is the nature of only the house. "Only the house" means the empty house and that is an existent entity cognized only through perception. Similarly, the prior non-existence of a pot is only clay and the destruction of the pot is only the pieces. The difference of a pot from cloth etc. is only the particular arrangement of the component parts.

2.54. उक्तैस्त्रिभिः प्रमाणैर्जायमानं दृष्टादृष्टविषयाणां ज्ञानं वस्तुत एव जीवनिष्ठं जीवगुणभूतम् । न त्वस्य प्रमाणजन्यज्ञानस्य गुणभूतज्ञानोत्पत्तिः जीवस्वरूपभूतज्ञानेन गतार्थता वक्तुं शक्या । अहं जानामि ज्ञानं मे जातमित्येवं मानसप्रत्यक्षेण जीवात्पार्थक्येन तज्ज्ञानस्यानुभवात् । तथा मुखप्रसादमुखमालिन्याभ्यां तथाविधचेष्टया वा यदानुकूलप्रतिकूलविषयकं देवदत्तादिषु ज्ञानमनुमीयते तदापि पक्षभूताद्देवदत्तादेः सकाशात्साध्यभूतं ज्ञानं तन्निष्ठतया पार्थक्येनैवानुमीयते । तथाऽऽत्मा वा अरे द्रष्टव्यः (वृ० २ । ४ । ५) इत्यादिश्रुतिषूपदिश्यमानं ज्ञानविशेषरूपं परमात्मदर्शनादिकं द्रष्टुर्जीवात्पार्थक्येनैवोपदिश्यते । न हि कापि कर्तव्य क्रिया भवति । न च जीवो ज्ञानस्वरूप एव सन्ध्रमेण ज्ञानाश्रय इति भासत इति वाच्यम् । नाहं ज्ञानाश्रयः किंतु ज्ञानस्वरूप एवेत्येवं

बाधकप्रत्ययस्य कदाप्यदर्शनात् । किञ्च जीवस्य ज्ञातृत्वं श्रुत्यादिसिद्धं जीवात्पृ-
थग्भूतेनैव तन्निष्ठेन ज्ञानेनोपपाद्यते । तथा हि श्रुतयः—अथ यो वेद (छा०
४ । १२ । ४), यो वेद निहितं मुहायाम् (तै० २ । १ । १), जानात्येवायं
पुरुषः, न पश्यो मृत्युं पश्यति (छा० ७ । २६ । २), एवमेवास्य परिद्रष्टुः
(प्र० ६ । ५) इति । स्मृतिरपि

यो मामेवमसंभूदो जानाति पुरुषोत्तमम् (गी० १५ । १९)

इति । ज्ञोऽत एव (ब्र० सू० २ । ३ । १९) इति सूत्रस्वरसतश्च जीवस्य
ज्ञातृत्वं सिध्यति ।

2.54. The knowledge of seen and unseen objects arising through the three means of knowledge which have been mentioned is, in reality, located in the individual soul as a quality of the soul. It is not possible to say that this knowledge produced by a means of knowledge is [already] referred to by the Knowledge which is the essential nature of the soul. Because there is the experience of that knowledge [arising from a means of knowledge] as separate from the individual soul in the mental perception: "I know", "knowledge has arisen in me". Similarly, when the knowledge relating to what is favourable or unfavourable is inferred in Devadatta etc. due to the brightness of countenance or by a troubled countenance, or by movement in such a manner, then too, the knowledge which is to be proved is inferred as indeed separate from the subject, Devadatta etc., as it is located in that [subject i.e. Devadatta]. Similarly, the vision of the supreme Self etc., which is a particular knowledge taught in the sacred texts such as: "my dear, the Self should indeed be seen" (Brh.2.4.5.), is taught as certainly separate from the individual soul who is the seer. Because the agent certainly does not become the action anywhere.

It should not be said that the individual soul, being only of the nature of Knowledge, appears as a locus of Knowledge due to error. [reason] Because a sublating knowledge in the manner that: "I am not the locus of Knowledge, but only of the nature of Knowledge" is not seen at any time. Furthermore, the knowership of the individual soul, which

is established by the sacred texts etc., is logically demonstrated because Knowledge is certainly separate from the individual soul as it is located in that [soul]. For instance there are the sacred texts: "then he knows" (Ch.8.12.4.), "the one who knows [Brahman] situated in the intellect" (Tai.2.1.1.), "this person indeed knows", "the one who sees, does not see death" (Ch.7.26.2.), "Thus indeed...for the all seeing person" (Pr.6.5.). There is also the tradition: "He who is undeluded knows me thus, the Highest Person" (G.15.19.). The knowership of the individual soul is established [by the words]: "for this very reason [the soul] is a knower" (B.S.2.3.19.) and this is in agreement with the essence of the sūtras.

comment

See 2.10. and following comment.

2.55.

अहं जानामीति प्रत्यये ज्ञानमहंकारनिष्ठं भासते नत्वात्मनिष्ठमिति तु न वक्तव्यम् । आत्मन एव तत्राहंशब्दार्थत्वात् । तथा हि । अहंकारोऽहंभावश्च द्वाव-
अहंभावोऽहंकारश्च भिन्नः अहंशब्देनोच्यमानौ मिथो भिन्नौ । तत्राहंकारो
गर्वापरनामा मनोवृत्तिविशेषः । अयं च विद्या-
विरोधित्वान्मुमुक्षुणा त्याज्य एव । अयमेवाहंकारः क्षेणान्तर्भूतत्वेन गीतायां महा-
भूतान्यहंकारः (गी० १३ । ५) इत्यत्रोक्तः । अहंभावस्तु न विद्याविरोधी ।
एतद्वाचकोऽहंशब्द आत्मस्वरूपं परामृशति । अयमहंभावो जागृतौ स्वप्ने सुषुप्तौ
मोक्षे च सर्वत्रैव वर्तते । अयं च न केवलं जीवस्यैव । किं तु परमात्मनोऽपि ।
हन्ताहमिमास्तिस्त्रो देवताः (छा० ६ । ३ । २) इत्यत्र श्रुतौ जगदुत्पत्तेः
प्राग्जगदुत्पत्तिविषयके परमात्मसंकल्पे स्वात्मस्वरूपप्रदर्शकाहंशब्दप्रयोगदर्शनात् ।
एवंभूताहंशब्दप्रयोगो गीतायामपि दृश्यते न त्वेवाहम् (गी० २ । १२), अहं
कृत्स्नस्य (गी० ७ । ६) इत्यादौ । एवं चाहं जानामीति प्रत्ययेऽहंशब्द
आत्मस्वरूपनिर्दर्शक इति ज्ञानमात्मनिष्ठमेव न त्वहंकारनिष्ठमिति सिद्धम् ।

2.55. It should not be said that the Knowledge in the cognition: "I know" appears as located in the I-notion, but it is not located in the self. [reason] Because the self alone is the meaning of the word "I" there [in the sentence: "I know"]. To explain. Though the two, the I-notion and I-ness, are referred to by the word "I", they are mutually distinct. In regard to those two, the I-notion is another name for pride and it is a particular modification of the mind. This is

certainly to be given up by a person who desires liberation because it is contrary to knowledge. This very I-notion has been told here in the Gītā: "The great elements, the I-notion..." (G.13.5.) as being included within the field [i.e. the non-self].

However "I-ness" is not contrary to knowledge. The word "I", which directly denotes this [I-ness], refers to the essential nature of the self. This I-ness exists indeed everywhere: in waking, in dream, in deep sleep and in liberation. This exists not only just for the individual soul, but also for the supreme Self. Because the use of the word "I" which shows the essential nature of His own self can be seen in the sacred text here: "I, [having entered] these three deities..." (Ch.6.3.2.), in regard to the resolve of the supreme Self, prior to the origination of the world, relating to the origination of the world. The use of the word "I" in that manner is seen in the Gītā also: "Never did I [not exist]" (G.2.12.), "I am [the source and dissolution] of the entire [world]" (G.7.6.). So the word "I" in the cognition: "I know" points out the essential nature of the self. Thus it is established that Knowledge is indeed located in the self but it is not located in the I-notion.

- 2.56. तच्च जीवात्मगुणभूतं ज्ञानं न रूपादिवदाश्रयमात्रव्यापि । यथा दीपस्य रूपस्पर्शसंख्यापरिमाणादयो गुणा दीपस्वरूपमात्रवर्तिनस्तथा ज्ञानं न जीवस्वरूपमात्रवर्ति । किं तु यथा दीपस्य प्रभा दीपाश्रयेण विद्यमानापि दीपाधिकरणीभूतं सकलं गेहं व्याप्नोति तथा जीवाश्रयेण जीवोऽप्युः । ज्ञानं शरीर- विद्यमानमपि ज्ञानं जीवाधिकरणीभूतं कृत्स्नं व्यापि । शरीरं व्याप्नोति । जीव एव कृत्स्नशरीरव्यापक इति तु न मन्तव्यम् । तस्याणुपरिमाणत्वात् ! तथा च श्रुतिः—आराग्रमात्रो ह्यवरोऽपि दृष्टः ।

बालाग्रशतभागस्य शतधा कल्पितस्य च ।

भागो जीवः स विज्ञेयः स चानन्त्याय कल्पते (श्वे० ५।८।९) इति ।

आत्मा निष्क्रामति चक्षुषो वा मूर्ध्नो वा (बृ० ४ । ४ । १६) इत्युत्क्रान्ति-श्रुतिरप्यत एव संगच्छते । सूत्रकारैरप्युत्क्रान्तिगत्यागतीनाम् (ब्र० सू० २ ।

३।२०) इत्यादिसूत्रैर्जीवस्याणुत्वमेवोपपादितम् । जीवस्याणुत्वे शरीरव्यापि-
सुखाद्यनुभवो न संभवतीति तु न शङ्कनीयम् । धर्मभूतज्ञानव्याप्त्यापि तस्यो-
पपत्तेः ।

2.56. The Knowledge which is a quality of the individual self does not pervade only its locus, like colour etc. Just as the qualities of a light [i.e. a lamp flame] such as colour, sensation, number, dimension etc. occur only as the essential nature of the light, Knowledge does not exist in that manner i.e. only as the essential nature of the soul. But just as the lustre of a light, though existing with dependence upon the light, pervades the entire house which is the location of the light, so too, even though Knowledge exists with dependence upon the individual soul it pervades the whole body which is the location of the soul.

It should not be thought that the individual soul itself pervades the whole body. [reason] Because that [soul] is of a minute size. Accordingly, there is the sacred text: "...for [the soul] is seen to be even less, merely the point of an awl" (Śv.5.8.).

The individual soul is to be known as a part of
the hundredth part of the point of a hair
divided a hundredfold. And that [soul] is
capable of limitlessness. (Śv.5.8.9.)

Also, the sacred text concerning the departure [of the soul]: "the self departs from the eye or the head" (Brh.4.4.2.) agrees for this very reason. The author of the sūtras has also demonstrated that the individual soul is certainly of a minute nature, through sūtras such as: "On account of [its] departure, moving and returning" (B.S.2.3.20). It need not be doubted that if the individual soul is minute, the experience of happiness etc. pervading the body is impossible. [reason] Because that [experience] is logically possible even through the pervasion by the attributive consciousness.

2:57.

तदिदं जीवगुणभूतं ज्ञानं वद्धावस्थायां कर्मणा संकुचितस्वरूपं भवति । परं ज्योतिरुपसंपद्य कर्मरूपबन्धक्षये सति मोक्षावस्थायां विकसितं भवति । अतस्तदर्थमवश्यं यत्न आस्थेयः । इत्थं हि तत्र क्रमः परिलक्ष्यते । उपनयनोत्तरं स्वाध्यायोऽध्येतव्य इति विध्यनुसारेणादौ साङ्गवेदाध्ययने प्रवृत्तिः । तत आपाततो वेदार्थमवगम्य तन्निर्णयाय कर्मज्ञानानन्तरं ब्रह्मविचारः पूर्वमीमांसाश्रवणे प्रवर्तते । तत ईदृशं कर्मस्वरूपमीदृशं च तस्य फलमिति निश्चिनोति । तत्र च यथेह कर्मचितो लोकः क्षीयत एवमेवामुत्र पुण्यचितो लोकः क्षीयते (छा० ८ । १ । ६) इत्यादिश्रुतिषु कर्मणां फलमल्पमस्थिरं च दृष्ट्वा तथा ब्रह्मविदाप्नोति परम् (तै० २ । १ । १), न पश्यो मृत्युं पश्यति (छा० ७ । १६ । २), स स्वराड्भवति (छा० ७ । २५ । २) इत्यादिश्रुतिषु ब्रह्मज्ञानस्य फलमनल्पं स्थिरं च दृष्ट्वा तन्निर्णयायोत्तरमीमांसाश्रवणे प्रवर्तते । स्वर्गादिफलाभिसंधिपूर्वकं कृतात्कर्मणो न केवलं मोक्षरूपेष्टानवाप्तिः प्रत्युत ज्ञानसंकोचरूपानिष्टावाप्तिः । अतस्तादृशं कर्म परित्यज्य भक्तियुक्तान्तःकरणेन परमपुरुष आराधनीयः । तेन च स्वीयत्वेनाङ्गीकृतस्तेन सहानन्तान्भोगानश्नुते ।

2.57. This Knowledge which is a quality of the individual soul has a contracted nature in the state of bondage because of karma. It becomes expanded in the state of liberation when there is dissolution of the bondage characterized by karma by reaching the supreme light. Therefore, effort must necessarily be applied for that end [liberation].

In regard to that, the sequence has been indicated in this manner; at first, subsequent to investiture with the sacred thread, there is the undertaking of studying the Veda along with its auxiliaries in accordance with the injunction: "one should study one's own portion". Then, having understood the meaning of the Veda in a general way, he undertakes listening to the Pūrvamīmāṃsā for the ascertainment of that [meaning]. Then he ascertains: "the nature of action is like this and its result is of this type". Having observed there in the sacred texts that the result of actions is insignificant and transient: "just as here, the world which is acquired by work perishes, in just the same way there in the other world, the world which is acquired by merit perishes" (Ch.8.1.6.) etc. So too, having

observed in the sacred texts that the result of the knowledge of Brahman is not insignificant and is permanent: "the knower of Brahman attains the highest" (Tai.2.1.1.), "the one who sees, does not see death" (Ch.7.26.2.), "he becomes self-sovereign" (Ch.7.25.2.) etc., he undertakes listening to the Uttaramīmāṃsā for the ascertainment of that [Brahman].

Not only is there no attainment of what is desired i.e. liberation, from work which is performed with the intention of a result such as heaven, on the contrary, there is the attainment of what is not desired i.e. the contraction of Knowledge. Therefore, giving up such work, the supreme Person should be worshipped with a mind endowed with devotion. [The soul] who is accepted by Him as His own enjoys limitless enjoyments along with Him.

2.58. इयं च स्थितिर्न जीवतः । कर्मसंपादितैतच्छरीरसत्त्वे तदुपभोग्यसुखदुःखा-
 नामवर्जनीयत्वात् । प्राकृतेन च तेन शरीरेण दि-
 जीवन्मुक्तिर्नास्ति व्यभोगासंभवाच्च । किं च तस्य तावदेव चिरं या-
 वन्न विमोक्ष्येऽथ संपत्स्ये (छा० ६ । १४ । २)
 इति श्रुतिज्ञानिनः सद्विद्यानिष्ठस्य शरीरपातमात्रमपेक्षते मोक्ष इति वदन्ती जीव-
 न्मुक्तिं वारयति ।

2.58. This state is not for one who is living. Because as long as this body which is acquired by karma exists, the happiness and sadness which are to be experienced by it are not to be avoided. And because divine enjoyment is not possible through that ordinary body. Moreover the sacred text: "there is a delay for him only so long as he is not liberated [from the body], then he will attain" (Ch.6.14.2.) excludes liberation while living by saying that the liberation of a person who possesses knowledge, who remains in the knowledge of the real, depends only upon the fall of the body.

2.59. एतद्देहपातोत्तरं तु मुक्तो दिव्यदेहधारी भूत्वा दोषलेशेनापि शून्यं निःसीमानन्देन युक्तं सविभूतिकं समस्तकल्याणगुणात्मकं परमात्मकैक्यं मोक्षः परमात्मानं याथात्म्येनानुभवन्परमात्मसंकल्पितानेकान्दिव्यभोगानुपभुञ्जानः परमात्मकिकरोऽहमिति भावयन्नास्ते । ननु मुक्तस्य परमात्मकिकरत्वे सेवायां दुःखस्यावर्जनीयत्वेन मोक्षसुखस्य पुरुषार्थत्वानापत्तिः ।

सेवा श्वृत्तिराख्याता तस्मात्तां परिवर्जयेत् (मनु० ४।६)

इतिस्मृत्युक्तप्रकारेण मोक्षे लोकानां प्रवृत्त्यनुपपत्तिश्चेति चेन्मैवम् । सेव्यसेवकयोरुभयोः प्रीतिकारितायां सेवायां दुःखलेशस्याप्यभावात् । तदुक्तं परमसंहितायाम्—

किकरा मम ते नित्यं भवन्ति निरुपद्रवाः । इति ।

मुक्तौ जीवात्मपरमात्मनोरैक्यमिति तु न । भिन्नयोरभेदासंभवात् । वद्धावस्थायां जीवात्मपरमात्मनोर्भेदस्तु प्रागुपपादित एव । विष्णुपुराणेऽप्यभेदो न संभवतीत्युक्तम्—‘अन्यद्रव्यं हि नैति तद्रव्यतां यतः (वि० पु० २ । १४ । २७) इति ।

पृथगात्मानं प्रेरितारं च मत्वा जुष्टतस्तेनामृतत्वमेति । (श्वे० १ । ६)

इतिश्रुतेर्मोक्षावस्थायामपि भेदस्य सिद्धत्वाच्च । मोक्षावस्था च कालतश्चरमावधिरहिता । न स पुनरावर्तते (छा० ८ । १५ । १) इति श्रुत्या मुक्तस्य संसारे पुनरावृत्त्यभावबोधनात् । अनावृत्तिः शब्दात् (ब्र० सू० ४ । ४ । २२) इति ब्रह्मसूत्रेण चैतदेव प्रतिपादितमिति ।

2.59. After the fall of this body, the liberated soul assumes a divine body and he remains experiencing the supreme Self as He is: bereft of even a speck of blemish, endowed with boundless happiness, consisting of all auspicious qualities together with possessing great power and he experiences countless divine enjoyments which are willed by the supreme Self and he thinks that: "I am the servant of the supreme Self".

[objection] If the liberated soul is a servant of the supreme Self, the happiness of liberation would not be a human goal because sorrow cannot be avoided in service. And there is no logical possibility of activity on the part of the people for liberation, on account of what has been said by the tradition: "service has been called the condition of a dog, therefore one should avoid it" (Manu. 4.6.).

[reply] That is not so. Because there is not even a trace of sorrow when service has been brought about by the love between both the one to be served and the servant. Hence it has been told in the Paramasāhita : "my servants are always free from affliction".

There is no identity of the individual self and the supreme Self in liberation. Because there is no possibility of non-difference for two [things] which are distinct. The difference between the individual self and the supreme Self, while in the state of bondage, has certainly been demonstrated before. In the Viṣṇupurāṇa too, it is said that non-difference is impossible: "because one substance does not become [another] substance" (Viṣ.P.2.14.27.). And because difference has been established in the state of liberation as well, on account of the sacred text: "knowing the self and the Mover to be separate, then being blessed by Him, he [the self] attains immortality" (Śv.1.6.). And the state of liberation is free from a final limit with regard to time. Because by the sacred text: "he does not return again" (Ch.8.15.1.) it is made known that the liberated soul has no further return to worldly existence. This very thing has certainly been taught by the Brahmasūtra : "non-return according to scripture" (B.S.4.4.22.).

2.60. एवं रामानुजमतानुसारेण ये पदार्थाः प्रतिपादितास्तदपेक्षयाऽतिरिक्तत्वेन भासमानास्तार्किकादिभिः पदार्थान्तरत्वेन स्वीकृता अपि पदार्था वस्तुतो नातिरिच्यन्ते । किंतुक्तेष्वेवान्तर्भवन्ति । तथा हि । पृथिव्यग्नेजोवाय्वाकाशम-
नसां प्रकृतिमूलकत्वात्मकृतावन्तर्भावः । तमस्तु
इतरपदार्थानामन्तर्भावः पृथिव्येव नातिरिक्तम् । पूर्वदक्षिणादिदिशाप्राका-
शेऽन्तर्भावः । पूर्वादीनां सूर्यसंयोगविशिष्टतत्तदा-
काशभागस्वरूपत्वात् । विभागः संयोगाभाव एव । एवं पृथक्त्वमपि । संख्यापरि-
माणद्रवत्वस्नेहानां तत्तदाश्रयस्वरूपत्वम् । देशकृतपरत्वापरत्वयोर्देशरूपत्वम् ।
कालकृतपरत्वापरत्वयोः कालरूपत्वम् । धर्मेश्वरप्रीतिरूपः । अधर्मश्च तादृश-
प्रीत्यभावरूपः । प्रीतिश्च ज्ञानविशेष एव । बुद्धिसुखदुःखेच्छाद्वेषप्रयत्नभावना-
ज्ञानविशेषरूपा एव । वेगः कर्मविशेषः । स्थितिस्थापकः संयोगविशेषः ।
उत्क्षेपणापक्षेपणाकुञ्चनप्रसारणानां गमनेऽन्तर्भावः । गमनं च संयोगविशेष
एव । गुरुत्वं शक्तिविशेषः । घटत्वादिजातिस्तु तत्तदाकारविशेषरूपा ।

प्रमेयत्वाकाशत्वेश्वरत्वदेवदत्तत्वादयो धर्मा आश्रयरूपाः । अभावस्य च नातिरिक्तत्वं किंतु भावान्तररूपत्वमेवेति प्रागुपपादितम् (पृ० ४२ । २५) । तथोपमानादिप्रमाणानामप्यन्तर्भावः प्रागुक्तः (पृ० ४२ । ५) । कामक्रोधादयो जीवात्मगुणास्तु जीवात्मगुणभूतज्ञानस्यैवावस्थाविशेषाः । कामः संकल्पो विचिकित्सा श्रद्धाऽश्रद्धा धृतिरधृतिर्होर्होर्भीरित्येतत्सर्वं मन एव (बृ० १ । ५ । ३) इति श्रुतिस्तु कामादेर्मनःसहकारित्वनियमेनौपचारिकी बोध्येति ।

2.60. Thus the categories have been taught according to the view of Rāmānuja. With regard to those, there are categories which appear to be different and which are also accepted as different categories by the logicians. In reality, they are not different but are included in what has already been told. To explain. There is the inclusion of earth, water, fire, air, space and mind in the primary matter since they have their basis in the primary matter. Darkness, however, is not different as it is only earth. There is the inclusion of the directions such as east, south etc. in space, because east etc. have the nature of being different parts of space distinguished according to the connection with the sun. Disjunction is only the absence of conjunction. Separateness is also the same. Number, size, fluidity and viscosity are the nature of their respective locations. Remoteness and proximity, which are brought about by location, are the characteristics of location. Remoteness and proximity, which are brought about by time, are the characteristics of time.

Merit is the love of the Lord. Demerit is the absence of such love. Love is only a particular type of Knowledge. Intelligence, happiness, sadness, desire, aversion, effort and reminiscent impression are only particular types of Knowledge. Speed is a particular type of action. Elasticity is a particular type of conjunction. There is the inclusion of upward motion, downward motion, contraction and expansion within motion. And motion is only a particular type of conjunction. Weight is a particular type of potency.

The generic attribute of potness etc. are the particulars of

the respective forms. Attributes such as being knowable, spaciousness, Lordship, being Devadatta etc. are the characteristics of the locus. It was demonstrated previously that non-existence is not [something] different, but is only another form of existence (2.53.). So too, the inclusion of the means of knowledge as well, such as comparison etc., has been mentioned previously (2.51, 52, 53.).

The qualities of the individual self such as desire, anger etc. are only particular states of the attributive consciousness of the individual self. But the sacred text: "desire, resolve, doubt, faith, lack of faith, steadiness, unsteadiness, shyness, intelligence and fear; all these are just the mind" (Bṛh.1.5.3.) must be understood as figurative because desire etc. necessarily accompany the mind.

comment

In this manner, the Viśiṣṭādvaitins subsume the nine substances and twenty-four qualities enumerated by Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika (cf. Athalye's edition of Tarka-Saṁgraha, p.73f.) into their own schema. See comment to 2.5. Also, cf. Yatīndramatadīpikā, Para.17 and 18. p.151f. The mention of darkness (tamas) is with reference to the Bhāṭṭa school of Mīmāṃsā which holds that darkness is a substance.

प्रदर्शितमेतच्छ्रीमच्छंकराचार्याणां रामानुजाचार्याणां च दर्शनम् । अधुना-
त्रत्यमुख्यसिद्धान्तावबोधसौलभ्यायैतद्वर्णनद्वयं सक्षेपेणोच्यते—

| | |
|---|---|
| <p>अद्वैतवादिनां शांकरमतानुयायिनां दर्शनम्— १ आत्मरूपमेकमेव तत्त्वं नान्यत्कि- चित् ।</p> | <p>विशिष्टाद्वैतवादिनां रामानुजीयानां दर्शनम्— चिदचिद्रूपशरीरविशिष्ट आत्मैक एव न तु तस्मात्तच्छरीराच्चान्यत्किंचित् ।</p> |
|---|---|

The teaching of Śrī Śaṅkarācārya and Rāmānujācārya has been explained. Now, these two types of teachings are concisely told for the ease of understanding the principal conclusions set out here.

The teaching of the exponents of non-duality, who follow the views derived from Śaṅkara:

(1) Reality is one alone, it is the Self. There is nothing other.

The teaching of the exponents of the non-duality of what has been qualified, which belongs to Rāmānuja:

(1) The Self is one alone, qualified by a body consisting of the sentient and the insentient. But there is nothing other than that [Self] and His body.

| | |
|--|--|
| <p>२ आत्मनोऽन्यत्किंचिदपि न सत्य- मात्मसजातीयमात्मविजातीयमात्म- निष्ठं वा । स्वगतसजातीयविजा- तीयभेदत्रयशून्य एवात्मा ।</p> | <p>आत्मा चेतनत्वेन स्वसजातीयेभ्यो जीवेभ्योऽचेतनत्वेन विजातीयेभ्यो जडे- भ्यः प्रधानादिभ्यः स्वगतेभ्यः कल्याण- कारकगुणेभ्यश्च भिन्नः ।</p> |
|--|--|

(2) Anything at all other than the Self is not real; whether it belongs to the same class as the Self, to a different class from the Self or is located in the Self. The Self is indeed bereft of the threefold difference: internal

(2) The Self is different from the individual souls, who belong to the same class as Himself on account of being sentient. The Self is different from the inert primary matter etc. which belongs to a different class on account of being insentient and the Self is different from the qualities which

division, having something belonging to the same class or something belonging to a different class.

produce what is good and which belong to Himself.

३ स चात्मा निर्विशेषः । ईदृशस्ता-
दृश इत्येवं केनापि प्रकारेण वक्तुं
न शक्यते ।

स चात्मा सविशेषः । सर्वज्ञत्वनित्य-
त्वव्यापित्वादिविशेषयुक्तः सर्वज्ञो नित्यो
व्यापीत्यादिशब्दैर्वक्तुं शक्यते ।

(3) The Self is free from distinction. It cannot be said in any way that it is "such and such".

(3) The Self possesses distinction. Endowed with such distinctions as omniscience, eternity, pervasiveness etc., it is able to be expressed by words such as: "all knowing", "eternal", "pervasive" etc.

४ अत एव च स निर्गुणः । न तत्र
कल्याणकारका अपि गुणा वस्तुतः
सन्ति ।

आत्मा स्वभावत एवापहतपाप्मत्वा-
द्यनेककल्याणकारकगुणगणाश्रयः । न
तत्र हेयगुणाः सन्ति ।

(4) For this very reason, that [Self] is free from qualities. Even the qualities which produce what is good do not exist there [in the Self] in reality.

(4) The Self is by nature the locus of many groups of qualities which produce what is good, such as being free from sin etc. Qualities which are to be given up do not exist there [in the Self].

५ ज्ञानरूपोऽपि गुणो न तत्र वर्तते ।
स्वयमेव स ज्ञानस्वरूपः ।

ज्ञानस्वरूपोऽपि स ज्ञानगुणाश्रयः ।
गुणभूतज्ञानं च स्वरूपभूतज्ञानाद्भिन्न-
मेव ।

(5) A quality, even in the form of Knowledge, does not exist there [in the Self]. That [Self]

(5) Though that [Self] is Knowledge by its very nature, it is the locus of the quality of Knowledge. The

is itself of the very nature of Knowledge.

Knowledge which is a quality is indeed different from the Knowledge which characterizes the essential nature.

६ अत एव न तत्र वस्तुतो ज्ञातृत्वम् | अतस्तस्य वस्तुत एव ज्ञातृत्वम् ।
विज्ञातृत्वोक्तिस्त्वौपचारिकी । अत एव च स विज्ञातेति व्यवहियते ।

(6) For this very reason, knowership does not exist there [in the Self] in reality. However an expression relating to knowership is figurative.

(6) Therefore, in reality there is certainly knowership for that [Self]. For this very reason, He is designated to be a "knower".

७ ज्ञेयत्वमपि तस्य नास्ति । स्वस्मिन्- | ज्ञेयत्वमपि तस्यास्त्येव । गुणभूत-
न्वाश्रयत्वस्य स्वविषयत्वस्य चासं- | ज्ञानस्यात्मनः सकाशाद्भिन्नत्वेन तदा-
भवात् । श्रयत्वस्य तद्विषयत्वस्य चात्मनि संभ-
वात् ।

(7) That [Self] is also not an object of knowledge. Because having one's own locus and one's own object in oneself is impossible.

(7) That [Self] is certainly also an object of knowledge. Since the Knowledge which is a quality is different from the Self, therefore it is possible to have the locus of that [Knowledge which is a quality] and its object in the Self.

८ परमात्मा स्वेन रूपेण कूटस्थ- | परमात्मा स्वेन रूपेण कूटस्थनित्यः ।
नित्यः । तेनैव रूपेणाद्वितीयश्च । चिदचिद्रूपशरीरविशिष्टरूपेण तु परि-
णामिनित्यः । विशिष्टरूपेणैवाद्वितीयः ।

(8) The supreme Self is unchangeably eternal in its own nature. And in that very nature it

(8) The supreme Self is unchangeably eternal in His own nature. But He is eternal while

is without a second.

undergoing transformation: as qualified by a body consisting of the sentient and insentient. [The supreme Self] is without a second only in a manner which is qualified.

९ अत एव ब्रह्माद्वैतमित्युच्यते ।

ब्रह्माद्वैतं तु न प्रकाराद्वैतम् । किं
तु प्रकार्याद्वैतम् । ब्रह्मप्रकारीभूतानां
जीवानां जडानां चानेकत्वेऽपि प्रका-
रिणो ब्रह्मण एकत्वात् ।

(9) For this very reason, it is said that Brahman is "non-dual".

(9) Brahman is non-dual, but it is not non-duality of the modes but rather non-duality of the possessor of the modes. Because even though the individual souls and inert objects, which are the modes of Brahman, are many, Brahman who possesses the modes is one.

१० परमात्मनः सन्मात्ररूपत्वात्तदभिन्नं
ज्ञानमपि सद्रूपमेव नतु सद्विषय-
कम् ।

तच्च गुणभूतं ज्ञानं न सन्मात्ररूपं
किं तु सद्विषयकम् ।

(10) Because the supreme Self is of the nature of pure existence, Knowledge which is non-different from that [supreme Self] is also only of the nature of existence. It does not have existence as its object.

(10) That Knowledge which is a quality is not of the nature of pure existence, but has existence as its object.

११ परमात्मन एव मायोपाधिकमीश्व-
रत्वमविद्योपाधिकं च जीवत्वम् ।
जडं तु प्रातिभासिकं मिथ्यैवेत्ये-
कमेव तत्त्वम् ।

परमात्मैश्वरः । तच्छरीरभूतो
जीववर्गो जडवर्गश्च ततो भिन्न एवेति
चिदचिदीश्वररूपं तत्त्वत्रयम् ।

(11) The supreme Self alone is
the Lord, having māyā as its
limiting adjunct and [the supreme
Self] is the individual soul,
having avidyā as its limiting
adjunct. What is inert exists
only in appearance and is
certainly false. Thus reality is
one alone.

(11) The supreme Self is indeed
the Lord. The class of individual
souls and the class of inert
objects, which are His body, are
certainly different from that
[Lord]. Thus reality is threefold:
the sentient, the insentient and
the Lord.

१२ परमात्मनः सकाशादभिन्नापिभिन्ने-
व त्रिगुणा परमात्मशक्तिरज्ञाना-
दिपदवाच्या । तदुपहितः परमात्मा
जगतो मूलप्रकृतिः ।

परमात्मनः सकाशाद्वस्तुतो भिन्नं त्रिगु-
णात्मकं प्रधानं जगतो मूलप्रकृतिः ।

(12) The power of the supreme
Self, which has three qualities
and can be expressed by the words
ajñāna etc., though it is non-
different from the supreme Self
it is as though different. The
supreme Self, conditioned by that
[power], is the primary material
of the world.

(12) The primary matter (pradhāna),
which consists of three qualities
and which is different in reality
from the supreme Self, is the
primary material of the world.

१३ अज्ञानेन परमात्मन्येवेदं जगद्भा-
सते । अयं विवर्तवादः ।

प्रधानमेवान्तर्यामीश्वरसांनिध्याज्ज-
गदाकारेण परिणमते । अयं परिणाम-
वादः ।

(13) This world appears just in the supreme Self on account of Ignorance. This is the teaching of apparent transformation.

(13) Only the primary matter transforms itself into the form of the world, on account of the presence of the Lord who is the inner-controller. This is the teaching of real transformation.

१४ परमात्मविवर्तभूतं प्रातिभासिकं चेदं प्रधानपरिणामभूतं चेदं जगत्सत्य-
जगन्मिथ्यैव न तु सत्यम् । मेव न तु मिथ्या ।

(14) This world which is an apparent transformation of the supreme Self and exists only in appearance is certainly false. It is not real.

(14) This world which is a transformation of primary matter is certainly real. It is not false.

१५ अनिर्वचनीयं चेदं जगदज्ञानदोषे- वस्तुतः सत्यमेव जगत्प्रतीयत इति
ण भासत इत्यनिर्वचनीयरव्याप्तिः । सर्वत्र सत्ख्यातिः ।

(15) This world which appears due to the defect of Ignorance is inexplicable. Thus there is the apprehension of the inexplicable.

(15) In reality, the world is recognised as certainly real. Thus everywhere there is the apprehension of the real

१६ शुक्तिरजतस्थले स्वप्नादौ चानिर्व- शुक्तिरजतस्थले स्वप्नादौ च सत्या
चनीया एवार्थाः प्रतिभासन्ते । एवार्थाः प्रतीयन्ते ।

(16) The objects which appear in the case of silver upon a pearl-oyster and in dream etc. are certainly inexplicable.

(16) In the case of silver upon a pearl-oyster and in dream etc. the objects are recognised as certainly real.

१७ शास्त्रमपि जगदन्तर्गतत्वादसत्य-
मेव । तथापि तत्तत्त्वज्ञानसाधनं
भवत्येव स्वप्नपदार्थवत् ।

शास्त्रस्य सत्यत्वादेव तस्य तत्त्व-
ज्ञानसाधनत्वम् । असत्यात्सत्योत्पत्ते-
रसंभवात् ।

(17) Even the scripture is indeed
unreal, because it is included
within the world. Still, it is
certainly the means for the
knowledge of reality, like an
object belonging to a dream.

(17) Because the scripture is indeed
real, it is the means for the
knowledge of reality. Because the
production of what is real from
what is unreal is impossible.

१८ अर्थज्ञानसाधनीभूतानि प्रमाणानि
प्रत्यक्षानुमानोपमानशब्दार्थापत्त्य-
नुपलब्धिरूपाणि षट् ।

अर्थज्ञानसाधनीभूतानि प्रमाणानि
प्रत्यक्षानुमानशब्दरूपाणि त्रीणि ।

(18) The means of knowledge,
which are the instruments for
the knowledge of a thing, are
six: perception, inference,
comparison, verbal testimony,
postulation and non-cognition.

(18) The means of knowledge,
which are the instruments for
the knowledge of a thing, are
three: perception, inference and
verbal testimony.

१९ प्रमाणैश्च यज्ज्ञानं जायते तत्रान्तः-
करणं ज्ञानाभिव्यञ्जकं भवति ।

प्रमाणैर्जायमानं ज्ञानं च वस्तुत एव
जीवनिष्ठम् ।

(19) Where knowledge arises by
the means of knowledge, the
internal-organ manifests the
knowledge.

(19) The knowledge which arises
by the means of knowledge is in
reality located in the individual
soul.

२० परमात्मनः सकाशादभिन्नानां जी-
वानामपि परमात्मवदेव ज्ञानस्वरू-
पत्वं न तु वस्तुतो ज्ञानाश्रयत्वम् ।
किंत्वन्तःकरणोपाधिकं ज्ञातृत्वम् ।

परमात्मनः सकाशाद्भिन्नाः परमात्म-
शरीरभूता जीवा अपि ज्ञानस्वरूपा
ज्ञानगुणकाश्चेति तेषां वस्तुत एव ज्ञातृ-
त्वम् ।

(20) Even the individual souls, who are non-different from the supreme Self, are of the nature of Knowledge just like the supreme Self but they are not, in reality, the locus of Knowledge. Knowership, however, has the internal-organ as its adjunct.

(20) Even the individual souls, who are the body of the supreme Self and who are different from the supreme Self, have Knowledge as their essential nature and Knowledge as a quality. Thus they have knowership in reality.

२१ ज्ञानाश्रयत्वेन भासमानोऽहमर्थो न जीवात्मा । किं त्वन्तःकरणविशेषोऽहंकारः ।

ज्ञानाश्रयश्चाहमर्थो जीव एव न तु तदतिरिक्तोऽहंकारो ज्ञानाश्रयः ।

(21) The sense of "I" which appears as the locus of Knowledge is not the individual self but the I-notion which is a mode of the internal-organ.

(21) The sense of "I" which is the locus of Knowledge is most certainly the individual soul. However the I-notion, which is different from that [sense of "I"], is not the locus of Knowledge.

२२ जीवो विभुः ।

जीवोऽणुः ।

(22) The individual soul is pervasive.

(22) The individual soul is minute.

२३ स्वरूपत एव तस्य सर्वशरीरावयवेषु व्याप्तिः ।

ज्ञानद्वारा च तस्य सर्वशरीरावयवेषु व्याप्तिः ।

(23) That [individual soul] pervades in all the limbs of the body by its very nature.

(23) That [individual soul] pervades in all the limbs of the body by means of Knowledge.

२४ जीवश्च ब्रह्मस्वरूप एवेत्येक एव ।
जीवानेकत्वं त्वौपाधिकम् ।

(24) The individual soul, who has Brahman as its very nature, is thus only one. Whereas the multiplicity of souls pertains to a limiting adjunct.

जीवा वस्तुत एव नानाविधाः ।
जीवाद्वैतं तु प्रकाराद्वैतम् ।

(24) The individual souls are in reality manifold. But the non-duality of souls is the non-duality of the mode.

२५ साधनचतुष्टयसंपत्त्यनन्तरं ब्रह्म-
विचारारम्भः ।

(25) There is the commencement of the inquiry into Brahman following the accomplishment of the fourfold means.

कर्मस्वरूपज्ञानानन्तरं ब्रह्मविचारा-
रम्भः ।

(25) There is the commencement of the inquiry into Brahman following the knowledge of the nature of works.

२६ प्रत्यक्षसामग्रीसंनिधाने शब्दोऽपि
प्रत्यक्षज्ञानं जनयति ।

(26) Verbal testimony also produces perceptual knowledge in the presence of the totality of causes for perception.

शब्दाज्जायमानं ज्ञानं परोक्षमेव न
तु कदाचिदपि प्रत्यक्षम् ।

(26) The knowledge arising from verbal testimony is only mediate, never perceptual.

२७ महावाक्यादिभिरात्मस्वरूपसाक्षा-
त्कारे सद्य एवाविद्यानिवृत्तिः ।

(27) The cessation of ignorance is indeed immediate upon the direct apprehension of the essential nature of the Self through the "great statements" etc.

महावाक्यादिजन्योपासनादाढर्येन
परमात्मा प्रसन्नो भवति ।

(27) The supreme Self is pleased by the strength of meditation which is produced by the "great statements" etc.

२८ सुखदुःखातीतात्मसाक्षात्कारे लौ- तथापि लौकिकशरीरसत्त्वे सुखदुः-
किकशरीरसत्त्वेऽपि जीवते एव खानुभवावश्यकत्वान्न कदापि जीवतो
मुक्तिः । मुक्तिः ।

(28) Upon the immediate apprehension of the Self which is beyond pleasure and pain there is liberation for one who is living, even though the earthly body exists.

(28) There is never liberation for one who is living. Because the experience of pleasure and pain is inevitable as long as the earthly body exists.

२९ प्रारब्धकर्मक्षये शरीरत्यागे सति प्रारब्धकर्मक्षये लौकिकशरीरत्यागे
स्वस्वरूपेणावस्थितिर्भवति । दिव्यदेहप्राप्त्या परमात्मना सह परमं
साम्यं भवति ।

(29) When there is relinquishment of the body upon the destruction of the actions which have produced their results, there is abiding in one's own nature.

(29) When there is relinquishment of the earthly body upon the destruction of the actions which have produced their results, there is the utmost similarity with the supreme Self due to the acquisition of a divine body.

३० इयं विदेहमुक्तिः

इयमेव मुक्तिः

(30) This is liberation free from the body.

(30) This alone is liberation.

३१ मुक्तावहंभावो नास्ति ।

मुक्तावप्यहंभावोऽस्त्येव ।

(31) In liberation [which is free from the body] there is no "I-ness".

(31) "I-ness" certainly exists even in liberation.

३२ मुक्तौ जीवब्रह्मणोर्भेदो नास्ति ।

(32) In liberation there is no difference between the individual soul and Brahman.

मुक्तावपि जीवब्रह्मणोर्भेदोऽस्त्येव ।

(32) The difference between the individual soul and Brahman certainly exists even in liberation.

३३ अस्यामवस्थायां न लेशतोऽपि दुःखं नापि सुखं भवति ।

(33) In this state there is no pain, not even slightly, nor is there pleasure.

अस्यामवस्थायां दुःखलेशेनाप्यसं-
भिन्नं सुखाधिक्यमनुभूयते ।

(33) An abundance of pleasure is experienced in this state, unconnected with even a trace of pain.

NOTES TO CHAPTER TWO: VIŚIṢṬĀDVĀITAMATAM.

1. The name of the author of a code of law. Cf., Apte, p.1755.
2. Śeṣa, or Ananta, is the name of the serpent upon which Viṣṇu reclines. Cf., Yāmunācārya's Stotraratna, vs. 38-40.
3. Śrī.B. 1.1.3. Para.87. p.200; 2.1.12. Para.258. p.577.
4. ibid., 1.1.3. Para.93. p.209ff.
5. ibid., 1.1.3. Para.87. p.200, Para.94, 95. p.213.
6. ibid., 2.1.12. Para.258. p.577.
7. ibid., 2.3.42. Para.353. p.745; 2.3.45. Para.355. p.748.
8. Ved.S. Para.87. p.123.
9. See comment to 1.9.
10. Śrī.B. 1.1.1. Para.51. p.98; 3.2.21. Para.407. p.821. Ved.S. p.93.
11. Bṛh. 3.7.3, 22. Cf., Śrī.B. 1.1.13. Para.134. p.285f.
12. Ved.S. Para.76. p.114.
13. Śrī.B. 1.1.1. Para.50. p.93f.
14. ibid.
15. ibid., 1.4.27. Para.243. p.551; 2.1.14. Para.261. p.580. Ved.S. p.93.
16. Ved.S. Para.84. p.121f (sarvaprakāra...)
17. Śrī.B. 2.3.45. Para.355. p.748.
18. ibid., 1.1.1. Para.57. p.116. Ved.S. Para.85. p.122.
19. Ved.S. Para.85. p.122.
20. Śrī.B. 2.3.45. Para.355. p.748. The term "Viśiṣṭādvaita" can be resolved in two ways. (1) viśiṣṭasya advaitam i.e. the non-duality (advaita) of Brahman who is qualified (viśiṣṭa) by all sentient and insentient things. (2) viśiṣṭayor advaitam i.e. there is non-duality between two qualified Brahman's : Brahman in the causal state qualified by all sentient and insentient things in their subtle condition, and Brahman in the state of effect qualified by all sentient and insentient things in their gross condition. This means that there is non-duality of Brahman qualified by both states. Cf., V. Varadachari, "Antiquity of the term Viśiṣṭādvaita" The Adyar Library Bulletin, vol. xxvi, parts 3-4, 1962. p.177ff. Also Śrīdharaśāstrī Pāṭhak, Kenopaniṣat with the commentaries of Śaṅkarācārya, Raṅgarāmanuja and the commentary Bālabodhinī. Poona. 1919. Introduction, p.15.
21. Śrī.B. 1.4.22. Para.235. p.533.
22. Yatī. p.2ff.

23. Cf. J. van Buitenen, Yāmuna's Āgama Prāmāṇyam or Treatise on the validity of Pañcarātra. Madras. 1971. Also, W. Neevel, Yāmuna's Vedānta and Pañcarātra : integrating the classical and the popular. Harvard. 1977.
24. Yatī. p.2ff.
25. ibid., p.135.
26. F. Otto Schrader, Introduction to the Pañcarātra and the Ahirbudhnya Saṁhitā. Madras. 1916, Second Ed. 1973. p.42ff. Also, S. Gupta, "The Caturvyūha and the Viśākha-Yūpa in the Pañcarātra" in The Adyar Library Bulletin, vol. xxxv. Parts 3-4. Dec. 1971. p.192f.
27. Cf., van Buitenen, op-cit. Vedānta Deśika has also written a work on the Pañcarātra called Pañcarātrarakṣā.
28. Rāmānuja states that the Pañcarātra literature was composed by the Lord Himself. Śrī.B. 2.2.42. Para.326. p.700.
29. Schrader, op-cit., p.38.
30. Cf., Yatī. Para.15. p.132.
31. ibid. Also, J.B. Carman, The Theology of Rāmānuja. An essay in Interreligious Understanding. New Haven. 1974. p.88ff.
32. Śrī.B. 3.3.13. Para.426. p.857.
33. S.T. vs. 3, p.10.
34. S.T. p.42, line 9ff. Śrī.B. 2.3.29. Para.346. p.731.
35. S.T. p.38, line 1. Śrī.B. 2.3.31. Para.347. p.733; 2.3.33. Para. 349. p.736.
36. Ved.S. Para.90. p.125.
37. Cf., Kaṭha. 1.2.18.
38. Śrī.B. 2.3.20. Para.342. p.727.
39. ibid., 1.1.1. Para.58. p.122. Ved.S. Para.5. p.74.
40. Śrī.B. 2.3.43. Para.354. p.747; 2.3.47. Para.356. p.750. Ved.S. Para.5. p.74.
41. Śrī.B. 2.3.47. Para.356. p.750; 2.3.48. Para.356. p.750.
42. Ved.S. Para.5. p.74.
43. ibid.
44. Ved.S. Para.79. p.116, Rāmānuja cites Viṣ.P.
45. Śrī.B. 1.1.1. Para.58. p.122. Ved.S. Para.78. p.116.
46. Śrī.B. 1.1.13. Para.135. p.290. Ved.S. Para.7. p.114; Para.143.

- p.171f.
47. Yatī. Para.1. p.79.
 48. ibid., Para.2. p.79f.
 49. ibid., Para.3. p.80.
 50. ibid., Para.3f. p.80f.
 51. This verse has not been located in the Siddhitrayam.
 52. Śrī.B. 1.1.1. Para.37. p.62 (verses)f. S.T. p.39, line 1 and 6.
 53. Śrī.B. 1.1.1. Para.38. p.65. S.T. p.62, final line.
 54. Śrī.B. 1.1.1. Para.38. p.65.
 55. ibid., 1.1.1. Para.36. p.60. S.T. p.31, line 16.
 56. S.T. p.62, line 8f.
 57. Śrī.B. 1.1.1. Para.36. p.61.
 58. ibid., 1.1.1. Para.36. p.60. Also, p.61. S.T. p.31, line 15.
 59. Ved.S. Para.43. p.98.
 60. Yatī. Para.13. p.91. S.T. p.56, line 5f.
 61. Śrī.B. 1.1.1. Para.38. p.64. Yatī. Para.9. p.89.
 62. S.T. p.32, line 16f; p.39, line 7; p.62, line 8ff.
 63. Śrī.B. 2.3.26. Para.344. p.730.
 64. ibid., 1.1.1. Para.38. p.64.
 65. ibid.
 66. See comment to 1.51. Also, cf. Rāmānuja's accurate presentation of the Advaita view in Śrī.B. 1.1.1. Para.37. p.62 (pūrvapakṣa). Also, S.T. p.39, final line.
 67. This section largely follows the more lengthy exposition in the Yatī. p.53ff.
 68. S.S. Suryanarayana Sastri (Ed. & trans.), The Sāṅkhyakārikā of Īśvara Kṛṣṇa. Madras. 1973. p.xxxii.
 69. ibid., p.37. However it must be said that according to Abhyankar's later explanation, the three qualities are both the constituents and the attributes of prakṛti.
 70. For an elaboration of this topic, cf. Yatī. p.75ff. For an explanation of these divisions of time, cf. ibid., notes to p.187.
 71. This explanation is largely based upon the Yatī. p.141ff.

72. ibid., p.144ff.
73. In the T.S. (Athalye's Ed.) section 27, p.18, conjunction is defined as the "cause of the common designation of two things being joined" (saṁyuktavyavahārahetu) which is, in effect, the same as the Viśiṣṭādvaita definition: saṁyuktapratyayanimittam saṁyogaḥ. Cf. Yatī. Para.14. p.148.
74. T.S. p.164. Yatī. Para.15. p.150.
75. Viśiṣṭādvaita does not accept the category of samavāya. Instead, they maintain that the perception of a quality in its locus is "dependence in what is conjoined with the sense organ". Yatī. Para.15. p.10.
76. T.S. Para.79. p.61.
77. ibid., p.96.
78. ibid., p.97.
79. Yatī. Para.16. p.150.
80. S. Kuppaswami Sastri, A Primer of Indian Logic. According to Annambhaṭṭa's Tarkasaṁgraha. Madras. Third Ed. 1961. p.7f (part 111).
81. Ved.S. Para.78. p.113. Śrī.B. 1.1.1. Para.77. p.178; 2.1.15. Para. 283. p.615.
82. Yatī. Para.11. p.130.
83. Ved.S. Para.39. p.94.
84. ibid.
85. Śrī.B. 1.1.1. Para.48. p.90. Also, cf. the Kāśikāvṛtti on the Aṣṭādhyāyī 2.1.49.
86. Śrī.B. 1.1.1. Para.48. p.90. Ved.S. Para.37. p.93.
87. Śrī.B. 1.1.2. Para.86. p.198.
88. ibid.
89. ibid., 1.1.1. Para.66. p.145. Also, 3.2.3. Para.395. p.801; 3.2.5. Para.396. p.803.
90. Cf., Tai.2.5.1.
91. Śrī.B. 1.1.1. Para.51. p.97.
92. Cf., the commentary of Raṅgarāmānuja in Pāṭhak, op-cit., p.16. See fn. 20.
93. Śrī.B. 1.1.1. Para.28. p.45; Para.30. p.51.
94. ibid., 1.1.1. Para.66. (verse) p.144.
95. ibid., Para.66. p.143. Sudarśana Sūri, in commenting upon this

- section, states that Nāthamuni, Yāmuna etc. held this view.
96. The Yatī, Para.24. p.14, refers to this view as satkhyāti. Sudaršana calls it yathārthakhyāti.
97. Śrī.B. 1.1.1. Para.65. p.141.
98. ibid., Para.67. p.148f. Also, Yatī. Para.33. p.17.
99. N.S. Anantharangachar, The Philosophy of Sādhana in Viśiṣṭādvaita. Mysore. 1967. p.250.
100. Yatī. Para.7. p.5.
101. Anantharangachar, op-cit., p.248.
102. Kuppuswami Sastri, op-cit., p.168. For an explanation of Prabhākara's view, cf., G. Jha, The Prābhākara School of Pūrva Mīmāṃsā. Delhi. (reprint) 1978. p.37ff.
103. G.P. Bhatt, Epistemology of the Bhāṭṭa School of Pūrva Mīmāṃsā. Varanasi. 1962. p.194. Also, Yatī. Para.38. p.19. T.S. p.215.
104. Śrī.B. 1.1.1. Para.30. p.51.
105. Cf., Yatī. Para.1. p.38. The same definition has been given by Vedānta Deśika in his Nyāyaparīśuddhi, cf., Anantharangachar, op-cit., p.278.
106. The Yatī. Para.47. p.48, makes a subdivision within secondary denotation; implication (lakṣaṇā) and figurative expression (gaunī).
107. Abhyankar states that Viśiṣṭādvaitins interpret the sentence: "you are That" (tat tvam asi) by resorting to "exclusive implication" (jahallakṣaṇā). He says the word "That", which directly expresses Brahman, has the implied meaning through "exclusive implication" in the sense of the "body of Brahman". According to Abhyankar, the sentence means: "you" (tvam) i.e. the individual soul "are" (asi) "That" (tat) i.e. body of Brahman. This explanation does not seem to be correct. In the view of Viśiṣṭādvaita there is no use of implication in the sentence: "you are That". They interpret the sentence in the following manner; the word "That" denotes the omniscient Brahman who is the cause of the world. The word "you" makes known -just through its express meaning- the supreme Self qualified by the individual soul because the word "you" directly expresses the supreme Self qualified by a body in the form of the individual soul. The word "are" (asi) has the meaning of "is" (asti).
108. Ved.S. Para.108. p.138; Para.75. p.113. Śrī.B. 1.1.13. Para.134. p.287.
109. Śrī.B. 1.1.1. Para.72 p.163; 1.1.13. Para.134. p.288. Ved.S. Para.20. p.82.
110. Śrī.B. 1.1.1. Para.72. p.163. Ved.S. Para.20. p.83.

3.1.

प्रदर्शितमेतन्मायावादिनां विशिष्टाद्वैतवादिनां च दर्शनम् । अयं च मायावादः
 श्रीमच्छंकराचार्यैरपूर्वं एव स्वकपोलकल्पनयोद्भाषित इति न भ्रमितव्यम् ।
 यतो मायावादमसहमानैरपि रामानुजाचार्यैः सूत्र-
 कारात्प्रागप्ययं मायावाद आसीदित्यङ्गीकृतम् ।
 मायावादारम्भः कारात्प्रागप्ययं मायावाद आसीदित्यङ्गीकृतम् ।
 तथा च श्रीभाष्ये (पृ० २३६।२०) 'सर्वत्र प्रासिद्धो-
 पदेशात्' (ब्र०सू० १।२।१) इति सिद्धान्तसूत्रं प्रणयद्भिः सूत्रकारैर्मनस्यनुसंहितः
 पूर्वपक्षः प्रदर्शितः—' अयं जीवात्मा स्वतोऽपरिच्छिन्नरूपत्वेन ब्रह्मभूतः सन्न-
 नाद्यविद्यया देवतिर्यङ्मनुष्यस्थावरात्मनावतिष्ठते ' इति । तथा तत्रैव ' (श्रीभा०
 पृ० ३३६ । ३) सुपुप्त्युत्क्रान्त्योर्भेदेन ' (ब्र० सू० १ । ३ । ४३) इत्ये-
 तत्सूत्रनिरसनीयत्वेन सूत्रकृदभिमतोऽऽशङ्कन प्रदर्शिता—' प्रत्यगात्मनोऽर्थान्त-
 रभूतमात्मान्तरमेव नास्ति । ऐक्योपदेशात् । द्वैतप्रतिषेधाच्च । शुद्धावस्थ एव हि
 प्रत्यगात्मा परमात्मा परं ब्रह्म परमेश्वर इति व्यपदिश्यते ' इति । तथा च सूत्र-
 कारात्प्रागप्ययं मायावाद आसीदिति सिद्धम् ।

3.1. The teaching of the exponents of māyā and of the exponents of Viśiṣṭādvaita has been explained. It should not be mistaken that this teaching of māyā was produced by Śrī Śaṅkarācārya through his own imagination as [something] that was indeed quite new. [reason] Because Rāmānujācārya, though not tolerating the teaching of māyā, has accepted that this teaching of māyā existed even prior to the author of the sūtras. Accordingly, in the Śrībhāṣya (Para.159. p.335.), a prima facie view was shown to have been aimed at in the mind by the author of the sūtras who composed the sūtra presenting the established conclusion: "Everywhere, because there is taught what is known" (B.S.1.2.1.) [by the statement]:

this individual self, which is itself Brahman as its nature is unlimited, exists as a god, animal, human being or a plant due to beginningless Ignorance.

Similarly, in that same place (Śrī.B.Para.205.p.473.) a doubt was shown to have been admitted by the author of the sūtras since it is to be removed by this sūtra: "On account of difference in deep sleep and departing" (B.S.1.3.43.) [the doubt is expressed by the words]:

there is certainly no other Self which is a different entity from the Self within; because of the teaching

of identity and because of the negation of duality.

Because the inner-Self, in its pure state, is designated as the "supreme Self", the "supreme Brahman" and the "supreme Lord".

Thus it is established that this teaching of māyā existed even prior to the author of the sūtras.

3.2. अयं च मायावादो ब्रह्मसूत्रकाराणामनभिमत इति तु न कल्पनीयम् ।

मायां तु प्रकृतिं विद्यान्मायिनं तु महेश्वरम् (श्वे० ४ । १०)

इति श्रुतावेव मायावादस्योपन्यासात् । सूत्रकारैश्च सिद्धान्तदर्शने ' मायामा-
यिनौ' (ब्र०सू०सि०१।१।२) इति सूत्रे मायावादः

मायावादः सूत्रकारा- स्पष्टमेवाभिहितः । न च सत्यायाः प्रकृतेरेव विचि-
मिमतः त्रार्थसर्गकरत्वान्मायाशब्दवाच्यत्वमिति वाच्यम् ।
मायाशब्दस्यानिर्वचनीयार्थकत्वेन असिद्धत्वात् ।

'तस्मिन्मरुशुक्तिकास्थाणुस्फटिकादौ जलरूप्यपुरुपरेखादिवह्योहितशुक्लकृष्णा गुण-
मयी गुणसान्याऽनिर्वाच्या मूलप्रकृतिरासीत्' इति निरञ्जनभाष्यगृहीतश्रुति-
विरोधाच्च । तथा च मायाया अनिर्वचनीयत्वाद्विवर्तरूपं जगदुपादानत्वं ब्रह्मणः
सिध्यति । सूत्रकारैश्चायं विवर्तवादः स्पष्टमेवोक्तः । तथा च सूत्रम्—' परिणा-
मिविवर्तिनौ' (ब्र० सू० सि० १ । १ । ७) इति । अस्यार्थः—द्विविधं
ह्युपादानं परिणामि विवर्ति च । तत्र घटाद्युत्पत्तौ मृदादिः परिणामी । शुक्ति-
रजतादौ तु शुक्तिकादिर्विवर्ती । परिणामश्च पूर्वावस्थायामेनावस्थान्तरप्राप्तिः ।
विवर्तश्च तदपरित्यागेन सा । तथा च प्रपञ्चोत्पत्तौ प्रकृतिः परिणामिनी पुरुषस्तु
विवर्तीति ।

3.2. However it should not be supposed that this teaching of māyā was not accepted by the author of the Brahmasūtras. Because there is mention of the teaching of māyā in the sacred text itself: "one should know that the primary matter is māyā and that the great Lord is the possessor of māyā" (Śv.4.10.). And the teaching of māyā has been very clearly mentioned by the author of the sūtras in the sūtra: "māyā and the possessor of māyā" (B.S.Si.1.1.2.) in the Siddhāntadarśanam.¹ It should not be said that the real primary matter alone can be expressed by the word māyā, since it brings about the creation of diverse objects. [reason] Because the word māyā is well

known as having the meaning of "indeterminable". And because of the contradiction with the sacred text referred to by the Nirañjanabhāṣya²: "in it [Brahman] the primary matter was indeterminable, possessing the qualities red, white and black and having the qualities in equilibrium, just like water, silver, a man or a streak etc. upon a desert, a pearl-oyster, a post or a crystal etc.". So because māyā is indeterminable [as real or unreal], Brahman is established as the material cause of the world which [i.e. the material cause] is in the form of a false appearance. This teaching of a false appearance has been very clearly told by the author of the sūtras. Accordingly, there is the sūtra: "Possessing real transformation and false appearance" (B.S.Si.1.1.7.). This is the meaning: a material cause is of two types: possessing real transformation and possessing a false appearance. In regard to those two, clay etc. possesses real transformation in the production of a pot etc. Whereas a pearl-oyster etc. possesses a false appearance in the case of silver upon a pearl-oyster etc. Real transformation is the attainment of another state by abandoning the previous state. False appearance is that [attainment of another state] without abandoning that [previous state].³ So in the production of the manifest world, primary matter (prakṛti) possesses real transformation whereas the supreme Being (puruṣa) possesses false appearance.

- 3.3. विवर्तोपादानभूतः पुरुष एव ब्रह्मशब्देन व्यपदिश्यते । बृंहणाद्ब्रह्म । बृंहणं
 व्यापनम् । उपादानकारणं हि कृत्स्नं कार्यजातं
 ब्रह्मशब्दव्युत्पत्तिः व्याप्तोत्येव । यत्तु सर्वत्र बृहत्त्वगुणयोगेन ब्रह्म-
 शब्दः । बृहत्त्वं च स्वरूपेण गुणैश्च यत्रानवधिका-
 तिशयं सोऽस्य मुख्योऽर्थः (श्रीभा० पृ० २ प० ९) इत्युक्तं तन्न । निर्गु-
 णस्य ब्रह्मणो गुणकृतबृहत्त्वासंभवात् । अथ सगुणमेव ब्रह्मास्माभिरङ्गी क्रियत
 इति चेत् उच्यते । बृहत्त्वं हि परिणामविशेषः । अनवधिकातिशयबृहत्त्वं च
 परममहत्त्वमेव । तच्च स्वरूपत एव संभवति न तु गुणतः । गुणेषु महत्त्वासंभ-
 वात् । वैशेषिका अपि गुणेषु गुणान्नैवाङ्गी कुर्वन्ति । गुणेष्वप्याश्रयद्वारा गुणाः
 संभवन्तीति चेत्तस्य स्वरूपगतमहत्त्व एव पर्यवसानमिति गुणैश्चेत्युक्तिर्न विशे-

षार्थसाधिका । न च रामानुजीयैर्ब्रह्मनिष्ठस्य गुणभूतस्यापि ज्ञानस्य द्रव्यत्वा-
ङ्गीकारात्तत्र महत्त्वस्य संभव इति वाच्यम् । तावतापि गुणैरिति बहुवचनासंगते-
स्तादवस्थ्यात् । ननु पूजितत्वमेव बृहत्त्वमिति चेन्न । ईदृशस्य बृहत्त्वस्य लोकाप्र-
सिद्धत्वात् ।

3.3. The very supreme Being who is the material cause through false appearance is designated by the word Brahman. Brahman has the sense of "expanding". Expanding means pervading. Because the material cause certainly pervades the entire class of effects. But what has been stated (Śrī. B. Para.2.p.3.):

Everywhere, the word Brahman [is understood] as being connected to the quality of greatness. Where greatness has unlimited pre-eminence in essential nature and through qualities, that is the primary meaning of this [word Brahman].

That is not so. Because Brahman who is free from qualities has no possibility of the greatness which is brought about by qualities.

[objection] But we accept that Brahman is indeed the possessor of qualities.

[reply] Greatness is a particular type of transformation. The greatness which has unlimited pre-eminence is certainly the supreme greatness. That is possible only in the essential nature, but not in respect of qualities. Because there is no possibility of greatness in qualities. Even the Vaiśeṣikas certainly do not accept qualities within qualities. If [you object] that qualities are possible by means of dependence upon qualities also, then [our reply is] that there is the termination [of such a regress] only in the greatness belonging to the essential nature of that [Brahman]. Thus the statement: "and through qualities" does not establish a special meaning.

It should not be said: because the followers of Rāmānuja accept Knowledge, though a quality located in Brahman, as a substance, there

is the possibility of greatness there [in Knowledge]. [reason] Because even so, there is the same situation on account of the incongruity of the plural number: "through qualities". [objection] Suppose the greatness [in respect of qualities] is only the nature of what is worshipped. [reply] No, because such greatness is unknown in the world.

comment

Abhyankar argues that the explanation of the word "greatness" (brhattva) refers only to the essential nature and not to qualities, because there is no possibility of greatness in qualities. For example, the colour blue is a quality but it has no "greatness" of its own. Also, the mention of qualities does not establish anything new because qualities refer to their locus and when the locus i.e. Brahman is established as possessing greatness in its essential nature there is no need to mention qualities separately.

3.4.

लोकावगतसार्थः शब्दो वेदेऽपि बोधकः ।

इति न्यायेन लोकप्रसिद्धार्थकवृहद्धात्वनुसारेणैव ब्रह्मशब्दव्युत्पत्तेर्वक्तव्यत्वात् । काचित्कप्रयोगस्तु नेप्सितार्थसाधकः । 'वृहत्त्वं च यत्रानवधिकातिशयं सोऽस्य मुख्योऽर्थः' इत्यप्ययुक्तम् । अनवधिकातिशयांशस्य शक्यतावच्छेदकानन्तर्गतत्वात् । गुणवाचकानां हि शब्दानां तत्तद्गुणः सामान्यत एव प्रवृत्तिनिमित्तम् । नतु तत्र निरतिशयत्वाद्यन्तर्भवति । गजप्रासादादिषु महत्त्वस्याकाश इव निरतिशयत्वाभावेऽपि महान्गजो महान्प्रासाद इत्यादयो व्यवहारा मुख्या एव सर्वैरङ्गी क्रियन्ते न तु गौणाः । तथाच बृहणाद्ब्रह्मेति सिद्धम् । उक्तं जगद्विर्वर्तोपादानभूतं ब्रह्मैवात्मशब्देन व्यपदिश्यते । एतदेवैकं तत्त्वं न तु तदतिरिक्तं किञ्चित् । अस्यैवात्मनो ज्ञाने मुक्तिर्भवति ।

3.4. For the etymology of the word Brahman must be stated only in accordance with the root brh the meaning of which is well known in the world, because there is the maxim: "a word which can possess a meaning that is understood in the world communicates [such a meaning] in the Veda also". But a usage that is [only] met with occasionally does not establish the intended meaning.

"Where greatness has unlimited pre-eminence, that is the primary meaning of this [word Brahman]" is also incorrect. Because the portion

"unlimited pre-eminence" is not included in determining the capacity [of the word "greatness"]. Because the reason for the usage of words which express qualities is only the respective quality in general. But "pre-eminence" etc. are not included there [in the reason for the usage of the word]. Even though the greatness in elephants and palaces etc. does not have pre-eminence like [it has] in space, expressions such as: "the great elephant", "the great palace" are accepted by all as only primary, not as figurative. Thus it is established that Brahman has the sense of "expanding".

The said Brahman, as the material cause of the false appearance of the world, is indeed designated by the word "Self". This [Brahman] alone is the one reality. There is nothing other than that [Brahman]. There is liberation upon the knowledge of this very Self.

comment

Expressions such as: "unlimited pre-eminence" are not included in the reason for the usage of the word "greatness", because the word "greatness" alone has been told and there is no need to add these adjectives to it. The etymological meaning is sufficient of itself.

3.5.

ननु कीदृशी मुक्तिः । उच्यते ।
 आत्मज्ञानाद्भवेन्मुक्तिः शरीररहितस्थितिः ।
 अमृतादिगिरा सैव श्रुतौ समभिधीयते ॥ ५ ॥

3.5. What kind of liberation? That is told:

Liberation, which is continuance free from a body, must take place from the knowledge of the Self.

That very [liberation] has been called in the sacred text by the word "immortal" etc. 5.

3.6.

सशरीरावस्थायां जायमानं सर्वमपि सुखं दुःखसंभिन्नमेव । केचिद्राजपुत्रा-
दयो यद्यपि सुखातिशयभाजो दृश्यन्ते तथापि न क्वचिदपि तादृक्
सुखं यत्र दुःखलेशेनाप्यसंभिन्नम् । क्वचित्सद्यो दुःखाभावेऽपि भाव्यवस्था-
लोचनजं दुःखं सर्वत्राव्यभिचार्येव । स्वर्गेऽप्येवमेव । अहर्निशं विशरणस्व-
भावं शरीरमनुपश्यतामवश्यंभाविशरीरपातजन्यदुःखचिन्तनस्य सर्वत्र सत्त्वात् ।
अशरीरावस्थायां च लेशतोऽपि न दुःखसंभवः ।
मोक्षावस्था दुःखानुभवस्य शरीरतन्त्रत्वात् । अशरीरं वाव
सन्तं न प्रियाप्रिये स्पृशतः (छा० ८ । १२ ।
१) इति श्रुतेश्च । यद्यपि तस्यामवस्थायां प्रियस्पर्शोऽपि नास्ति तथापि न
क्षतिः । दुःखसंभिन्नसुखापेक्षया यत्र लेशतोऽपि न दुःखं तादृशसुखाभावस्या-
त्येष्टव्यत्वात् । विषविन्दुस्पृष्टामृतापेक्षया हि वरममृताभावोऽपि । अशरीरावस्था
चोक्तश्रुतिप्रामाण्यादेव सिध्यतीति न तत्र मीमांसकानुयायिनाऽन्येन वा
केनापि विवदितव्यम् । इयमेवावस्था मोक्षशब्देनाभिधीयते । मोक्षावस्थां प्राप्त
एव मुक्तः । नतु स्वर्गसुखभागपि मुक्त इत्युच्यते । मुक्त एव च तमेवं विद्वान-
मृत इह भवति (नृ० पू० ६) इति श्रुतावमृतशब्देनोच्यते । मुक्तो ह्यशरीरः ।
अशरीर एव चामृतः । शरीरसत्त्वे मरणस्य नियतत्वात् ।

3.6. All happiness arising in the state of possessing a body is certainly connected with unhappiness. Even though some, such as the sons of kings etc., are seen to enjoy pre-eminent happiness, still, there is no such happiness anywhere which is not unconnected with even a trace of unhappiness. Even if there is no unhappiness anywhere today, the unhappiness brought about by seeing the future state is certainly inevitable everywhere. Even in heaven it is just the same. Because thinking about the unhappiness produced by the inevitable death of the body exists everywhere for those who keep in mind that the body has a nature which is decaying day and night. There is no possibility of unhappiness, even slightly, in a state where there is no body. Because the experience of unhappiness is dependent upon a body. And on account of the sacred text: "pleasure and pain do not touch the one who is indeed bodiless" (Ch.8.12.1.).

Even though the sensation of pleasure does not exist in that state, still, there is no fault. Because with regard to the happiness which is connected to unhappiness, where there is no

unhappiness, even slightly, the absence of that type of happiness is also to be desired. Because even the absence of nectar is preferable with regard to nectar which has been defiled by a drop of poison. The bodiless state is established only from the validity of the sacred text which has been cited (Ch.8.12.1.) and so it cannot be disputed there [in the text] by a follower of the Mīmāṃsakas or by anyone else. This very state is called by the word liberation. Only one who has gained the state of liberation is liberated. Whereas even one who enjoys the happiness of heaven is not said to be "liberated". And only the one who is liberated is referred to by the word immortal in the sacred text: "the one who knows That in this manner becomes immortal here" (Nr.Pū.6). Because the one who is liberated is bodiless and only the one who is bodiless is immortal. Because death is certain if the body exists.

3.7. भयसीमा मृत्युरिति हि लोकादः । मोक्षस्य तु ' अभयं वै ब्रह्म भवति ' (वृ० ४ । ४ । २५) इति श्रुत्या भयात्यन्ताभावरूपत्वं बोध्यते । द्वितीयवस्तुसंबन्धप्रतीभाससत्त्वे कयाऽपि विधया भयसंभावनास्तीति तत्र द्वितीयवस्तुसंबन्धप्रतीत्यभावोऽवश्यं वर्णनीयः । सा च प्रतीतिमुक्तस्य स्वदृष्ट्या, परदृष्ट्या चेति द्विविधा । मुक्तिश्च विदेहमुक्तिर्जीवन्मुक्तिश्चेति द्विविधा । द्वितीयवस्तुसंबन्धप्रतीत्यभावश्च क्वचिद्द्वितीयस्य वस्तुन एवाभावेन, क्वचिद्वस्तुसत्त्वेऽपि तत्संबन्धाभावेन, क्वचित्तत्संबन्धसत्त्वेऽपि तत्प्रतीत्यभावेनेति त्रिविधः । तदेवं स्वदृष्ट्या परदृष्ट्या चेति द्विविधप्रतीतिः प्रत्येकं जीवन्मुक्तिविदेहमुक्त्यवस्थाभेदेन द्वैविध्याच्चातुर्विधये तत्रापि प्रत्येकं वस्तुसंबन्धप्रतीत्यभावत्रैविधयेन त्रैविधये संकलनया द्वादश प्रकारा भवन्ति । तेषु वस्तुतः के संभवन्ति के वा नेति विचार्यते । तत्र विदेहमुक्तौ मुक्तदृष्ट्या द्वितीयं वस्तुत्वेव नास्तीति कुतस्तत्संबन्धः कुतस्तरां तत्संबन्धप्रतीतिः । इतरदृष्ट्या तु द्वितीयवस्तुनोऽभावः सर्वथाऽसंभव्येव । यतः संसारस्यानादित्वमिवानन्तत्वमपि सर्वसंमतमेव नतु सर्वमुक्तिपक्षः कस्यापि संमत इति शुक्रवामदेवादीनां केषांचिद्विदेहमुक्तावपि बद्धजीवानामनन्तानां सत्त्वेन तद्दृष्ट्या द्वितीयवस्तुनः सत्त्वावश्यंभावात् । तथापि तेन द्वितीयवस्तुना सह विदेहमुक्तस्य संबन्धो न संभवतीति कुत इतरबद्धजीवदृष्ट्यापि मुक्तजीवस्य द्वितीयवस्तुना सह संबन्धः प्रतीयेत । यथाऽऽदर्शाभावे मुखस्य प्रतिबिम्बरूपेण न भानं तथा विदेहमुक्तौ दर्पणस्थानीयवुध्याद्युपाध्यभावेन न वस्तुसत्प्रतिबिम्बभूतजीवरूपेण स्वस्य परस्य च भानम् । अतः कथं द्वितीयवस्तुसंबन्धप्रतीतिः स्यात् ।

3.7. There is a popular statement: "the limit of fear is death". But liberation is made known by the sacred text to be the total absence of fear: "he certainly becomes the fearless Brahman" (Brh.4.4.25.). There is the possibility of fear in some manner if the appearance of a connection to a second object exists. Thus the absence of the cognition of a connection to a second object there [in liberation] must necessarily be stated. That cognition is twofold: according to his own view on the part of one who is liberated and according to the view of others. And liberation is twofold: liberation free from the body and liberation while living. The absence of the cognition of a connection to a second object is threefold: (1) on account of the absence of a second object anywhere, (2) even if an object exists somewhere, on account of the absence of a connection to it, (3) even if the connection to it exists somewhere, on account of the absence of the cognition of that [connection]. Thus there are twelve modes due to joining each of the two types of cognition: according to his own view and according to the view of others, in a fourfold division on account of their having a twofold nature due to the distinction between the state of liberation while living and liberation free from the body, and then each one [among those four] in a threefold manner on account of the threefold absence of the object, the connection [to the object] and the cognition [of the connection to the object]. With regard to those, it is being investigated: are they actually possible or are they not?

Among those, a second object certainly does not exist according to the view of the one liberated in the state of liberation free from the body. So how can there be a connection to that and how can there be the cognition of a connection to it? However according to the view of another [one who is not liberated] the absence of a second object is utterly impossible. Because it is certainly accepted by all that just as transmigratory existence is beginningless so also it is endless.

Whereas the view that there is liberation of all is not accepted by anyone. So even though some such as Śuka, Vāmadeva, etc. are in the state of liberation free from the body, because innumerable bound souls still exist, a second object necessarily exists according to the view of those [bound souls]. Nevertheless, the connection with that second object is impossible for one who is liberated free from the body, so how can the liberated soul be recognized as having a connection with a second object, even according to the view of another bound soul? Just as a face does not appear in the form of a reflection when there is no mirror, so too, in liberation free from the body there is no appearance of oneself or of another in the form of an individual soul which is a really existing reflection, because of the absence of a limiting adjunct such as the intellect which represents the mirror. Therefore how could there be the cognition of a connection to a second object?

comment

The "twelve modes" can be represented as follows:

- | | |
|---|--|
| 1. absence of a second object. | liberation free from the body -ref. to liberated soul and to another. liberation while living -ref. to liberated soul and to another. |
| 2. absence of a connection to a second object. | liberation free from the body -ref. to liberated soul and to another. liberation while living -ref. to liberated soul and to another. |
| 3. absence of a cognition of a connection to a second object. | liberation free from the body -ref. to liberated soul and to another. liberation while living -ref. to liberated soul and to another. |

3.8.

जीवन्मुक्तौ तु दर्पणस्थानीयबुद्ध्याद्युपाधिसत्त्वेन मुक्तस्यापि
जीवस्य प्रतिबिम्बभूतजीवरूपेण भानमवर्जनीय-
जीवन्मुक्तिः मेव । द्वितीयं वस्तु चास्त्येवेति तत्संबन्धोऽप्य-
वर्जनीय एव । जीवन्मुक्तस्य च स्वस्यापि
जीवरूपेण भानसत्त्वाद्द्वितीयवस्तुसंबन्धस्य च सत्त्वात्तत्प्रतीतिरपि जीवन्मु-

क्तदृष्ट्या इतरदृष्ट्या च यद्यप्यवर्जनीयैव तथापि सा प्रतीतिः कीदृशीति विचारः कर्तव्यः । तत्र यथा बद्धजीवानां वस्तुतः प्रतिबिम्बभूतस्यापि सतो जीवस्य न प्रतिबिम्बरूपेण भानं किंतु केवलजीवरूपेणैव न तथा जीवन्मुक्तस्य । यथा चटकादिः पक्षी आदर्शे स्वप्रतिबिम्बं पश्यन्नपि ' इदं प्रतिबिम्बम् ' इत्येवमजानानश्चटकान्तरबुद्ध्या तदभिमुखं गच्छति तथा बद्धो जीवः स्वयं प्रतिबिम्बभूतोऽपि ' प्रतिबिम्बभूतोऽहमित्येवमजानानः स्वस्मिन्नात्मान्तरबुद्ध्या लोके व्यवहरति । विम्बभूते चात्मनि इदं विम्बमित्येवमजानानस्तत्रात्मान्तरबुद्ध्या तमुपास्त उपेक्षते वा । यथा च चटकाद्यपेक्षया ज्ञानेनाधिको मनुष्यादिरादर्शे स्वप्रतिबिम्बं पश्यन् ' इदं प्रतिबिम्बम् ' इत्येवं जानन् प्रतिबिम्बे कृष्णगौरादिरूपं दैर्घ्याद्याकारविशेषांश्च पश्यन् इदं प्रतिबिम्बमिति ज्ञानसत्त्वात्तत्र प्रतीयमाना धर्माः किं विम्बगता उतादर्शगता इति विचारं कर्तुं प्रवर्तते तथा बद्धजीवापेक्षया ज्ञानेनाधिको जीवन्मुक्तो बुद्ध्याद्युपाधौ परमात्मप्रतिबिम्बभूतं स्वं पश्यन् ' जीवोऽयं प्रतिबिम्बभूतः ' इत्येवं जानन् प्रतिबिम्बभूते जीवे चैतन्यम्, अहंभावं, कर्म, सुखदुःखादिभोगांश्च पश्यन् ' जीवोऽयं प्रतिबिम्बभूतः ' इति ज्ञानसत्त्वात्तत्र प्रतीयमानेषु चैतन्याहंभावकर्मसुखदुःखादिषु मध्ये किं विम्बभूतपरमात्मगतं किंवा बुद्ध्याद्युपाधिगतमिति विचारं कर्तुं प्रवर्तते ।

3.8. Whereas in the state of liberation while living, the appearance of even a liberated soul in the form of an individual soul who is a reflection cannot be avoided, because of the existence of a limiting adjunct such as the intellect which represents the mirror. A second object certainly exists, so the connection to that also cannot indeed be avoided. Because one who is liberated while living appears as an individual soul even to himself and because the connection to a second object exists, even though the cognition of that [connection to a second object] also cannot indeed be avoided according to the view of the one who is liberated and according to the view of another, still, an investigation has to be made as to: "what is the nature of that cognition?".

In regard to that, just as for bound souls an individual soul does not appear in the form of a reflection, though existing as a reflection in reality, but only in the form of a mere individual soul, for one who is liberated while living it is not like that. Just as a bird such as a sparrow, though seeing its own reflection in a mirror

does not know that "this is a reflection" and goes toward it with the idea that there is another sparrow, similarly, a bound soul, though himself the nature of a reflection, does not know that "I am a reflection" and transacts in the world with the idea that there is another self with regard to himself. And in respect of the Self, which is the original [i.e. not a reflection], not knowing that "this is the original" he worships it or disregards it with the idea that there is another Self there [with regard to himself].

Just as a man etc., who is superior in knowledge with regard to a sparrow etc., sees his own reflection in a mirror and knows "this is a reflection" and seeing in the reflection the colour black, white etc., and the particular characteristics of the form such as length, because the knowledge exists that "this is a reflection" he begins to do the investigation: "do the attributes perceived there [in the reflection] belong to the original [i.e. the face] or do they belong to the mirror?" Similarly, one who is liberated while living, who is superior in knowledge with regard to a bound soul, sees himself to be a reflection of the supreme Self in the limiting adjunct of the intellect etc. and knows "this individual soul is a reflection" and seeing in the individual soul who is a reflection: consciousness, I-ness, action and experiences of happiness and unhappiness etc., because the knowledge exists that "this individual soul is a reflection" he begins to do the investigation: "among consciousness, I-ness, action, happiness and unhappiness etc. which are perceived there [in the individual soul], what belongs to the supreme Self who is the original and what belongs to the limiting adjunct such as the intellect?"

3.9.

तत्र

अहंकारादहंभावं कर्म सत्त्वादितस्तथा ।

मनस्तः सुखदुःखे च चैतन्यं परमात्मतः ॥

इत्येवमनुवृत्तिर्वोभ्या । यथा मनुष्य आदर्शे स्वप्रतिविम्बे क्वचित्कालिमान-

मसारल्यं च पश्यन्नापि ' न कालिमासारल्ये विम्बगते तत्राभावात् किंत्वादश-
गते ' इति बुद्ध्या न व्यथते तथा जीवन्मुक्तो विम्बस्य निर्विशेषचिन्मात्रस्वरूप-
त्वेन चैतन्यातिरिक्तस्य सर्वस्याप्यन्यत एव प्रतिविम्बभूते जीवेऽनुवृत्तिं मन्वानो
न व्यथते । यथा प्रतिविम्बे दृश्यमानं कालिमानमादर्शतोऽनुवृत्तमप्यज्ञानेन वि-
म्बतोऽनुवृत्तं मत्वा बालाः कदाचिद्भ्रान्त्येयुस्तन्निवृत्तये प्रौढो मनुष्यः स्वयम-
भ्रान्तोऽप्यादर्शं परिमार्जयति तत्र हेतुर्बाला अप्येवमादर्शपरिमार्जनं कृत्वा भ्रमं
दूरी कुर्युरिति, तथा जनकादिर्जीवन्मुक्तः समीचीनं कर्म फलाननुसंधानेन करोति ।
तत्रायं हेतुरन्ये वद्धा जीवा अप्येवं समीचीनं कर्म फलमनभिसंधाय कृत्वा
चित्तशुद्धिद्वारा स्वभ्रान्तिं दूरी कुर्युरिति । तच्चज्ञानमपि यावत्परोक्षं न तावज्जी-
वन्मुक्तः । प्रत्यक्षज्ञाने सत्येव सः । स्वस्वरूपसाक्षात्कारोत्तरमपि प्रारब्धकर्मणः
सत्त्वान्मरणपर्यन्तं पूर्वसंस्कारानुरोधेन बुद्ध्याद्युपाधिसत्त्वात्प्रतिविम्बस्यावर्ज-
नीयत्वमेव । प्रतिविम्बे चादर्शगतकालिमेवाहंकारगतोऽहंभावोऽपि भासत एवेति
जीवन्मुक्तस्यापि क्वचिदहमर्थपूर्वको व्यवहारो दृश्यते । एतेन जीवन्मुक्तिर्नास्त्ये-
वेति रामानुजोक्तमपास्तम् । तमेवंविद्वानमृत इह भवति (वृ० पू० १।६) इति
श्रुताविहशब्देन जीवन्मुक्त्यवस्थायाः स्पष्टमेव प्रतिपादनाच्च ।

3.9. In regard to that [investigation], their conformity is to be understood in this manner:

I-ness is from the I-notion, action is due to sattva etc., so too, happiness and unhappiness are on account of the mind and consciousness is from the supreme Self.

Just as a person, though seeing blackness and crookedness somewhere in his own reflection in a mirror, is not troubled, knowing: "the blackness and crookedness do not belong to the original [the face] because they are absent there, but they belong to the mirror", in the same way, the one who is liberated while living is not troubled, perceiving that indeed everything else which is different from consciousness persists in the individual soul who is a reflection, because the original has the nature of pure consciousness free from distinction.

Just as boys at some time due to ignorance might be mistaken thinking that the blackness seen in a reflection, although it persisted [only] in the mirror, persisted in the original [the face], and for the

removal of that [mistake] an adult person, though not mistaken himself, cleans the mirror and the reason for that is: "the boys too, having cleaned the mirror in this way, can remove their mistake". In the same manner, a liberated person such as Janaka performs the correct action without attributing the result [to himself]. This is the reason for it: "the other bound souls too, having performed the correct action in this way without attributing the result [to themselves] can remove their own error through purification of the mind".

Also, as long as the knowledge of reality is mediate, a person is not liberated while living. That [person is liberated while living] only when the knowledge is perceptual. Even after the direct apprehension of one's own essential nature the reflection cannot indeed be avoided, because the limiting adjuncts such as the intellect exist in accordance with prior mental impressions up until the time of death due to the existence of the karma which has begun to produce its result (prārabdha-karma). Like the blackness in the mirror is in the reflection, the I-ness belonging to the I-notion also certainly appears. Thus an expression preceded by the sense of "I" is seen somewhere even for a person who is liberated while living. On account of this, what Rāmānuja has said: "there is certainly no liberation while living" is rejected. Also because the state of liberation while living is taught very clearly by the word "here" in the sacred text: "the one who knows That in this manner becomes immortal here" (Nṛ.Pū.1.6.).

comment

For Rāmānuja's view see Śrībhāṣya 1.1.4. Para.105. p.228f.

- 3.10. अथ मुक्तः कर्म करोति न वा । यदि किञ्चित्पश्यति तर्हि करोति यदि न पश्यति तर्हि न करोति । अथ पश्यति न वा पश्यति । विदेहमुक्तो न किञ्चिदपि पश्यति । तदिदमुक्तं ' यत्र त्वस्य सर्वमात्मैवाभू-
मुक्तस्य कीदृशं कर्म चत्केन कं पश्येत् ' (बृ० २ । ४ । १४) इति ।

जीवन्मुक्तस्तु समाधौ नैव किञ्चित्पश्यति ।
 अन्यदा तु पश्यन्निव लक्ष्यते । तदानीं कर्म करोति । कर्म च द्विविधं—बुद्धिपुरः-
 सरम्बुद्धिपुरःसरं च । बुद्धिपुरःसरं द्विविधं—स्वार्थं परार्थं च । स्वार्थमापि द्विविधं
 शरीरयात्रार्थमधिकोत्कर्षप्राप्त्यर्थं च । आद्यं क्षुत्पीडया भिक्षाटनादि । तच्च
 जीवन्मुक्तस्य संभवति । द्वितीयं तु स्वर्गाद्युद्देशेन क्रियमाणं यागादिकम् । तच्च
 जीवन्मुक्तस्य न संभवति । वितृष्णत्वात् । परार्थं च द्विविधं परपरिचर्यादिक-
 माद्यम् । द्वितीयं च स्वकृतं कर्म दृष्ट्वा लोका अप्येवं करिष्यन्ति इति बुद्ध्या क्रिय-
 माणम् । इदमेव लोकसंग्रहार्थमित्युच्यते । द्विविधमपीदं जीवन्मुक्तस्य संभवति ।
 कर्म कुर्वन्नायं कैश्चिदज्ञैः स्वार्थं कुर्वन्निव लक्ष्यत इत्यन्यत् । अबुद्धिपुरःसरं
 च द्विविधम् । किञ्चित्कर्म कर्मकाले ज्ञातुं न शक्यते । यथा निद्रायां हस्तपाद-
 चालनादि । किञ्चित्तु कर्मकाले ज्ञातुं शक्यते परंतु ज्ञायत एवेति न नियमः ।
 यथा जीवमात्रस्य श्वासोच्छ्वासादिकम् । इदमपि द्विविधं जीवन्मुक्तस्य संभवति ।
 यद्यत्कर्म संभवति तत्सर्वं व्युत्थानदशायामेव । तदपि चाहं करोमीत्यभिमाना-
 भावेन संसारबन्धाय न भवति । तथा च जीवन्मुक्त इतरवद्जीवनैव कर्म
 करोति किं तु कर्म जायत इत्येव । यतो जीवन्मुक्तेन कृतमप्यकृतमेव तत् । दृष्ट-
 मप्यदृष्टमेव ।

3.10. Now, does one who is liberated perform action or not? If he sees something then he acts, if he does not see then he does not act. Then does he see or does he not see? The one who is liberated free from the body does not see anything at all. That has been told: "but when everything has become the Self for this one [the knower of Brahman], then what would one see and through what?" (Brh.2.4.14.). Whereas the one who is liberated while living certainly does not see anything while in meditative absorption but at another time it looks like he is seeing. He performs action at that time.

Action is twofold: with the intellect and without the intellect. With the intellect is twofold: for the sake of oneself and for the sake of another. For the sake of oneself is also twofold: for the sake of the maintenance of the body and for the sake of the attainment of what is much more exalted. The first is going about for food etc. because of the affliction of hunger. That is possible for one who is liberated while living. The second, however, consists of sacrifices etc. performed with the aim of heaven etc. That is impossible for one

who is liberated while living, due to the fact of being free from desire. For the sake of another is twofold: the first consists of the service of others etc. The second is performing action with the idea: "the people too, seeing the action done by me, will act in the same way". This is indeed said to be for the sake of the welfare of the world. Though twofold, this is possible for one who is liberated while living. Performing action, this [liberated person] looks like he is doing it for his own sake, according to some ignorant people. But this is a different thing.

Without the intellect is twofold. Some action is not able to be known at the time of the action. For instance the moving etc. of the hands and feet during sleep. Some [action], however, is able to be known at the time of the action but there is no rule that it is indeed known. For instance inhalation and exhalation etc. for just keeping alive. This twofold group is also possible for one who is liberated while living. Whatever action is possible, all that is only in the state of coming out of meditative absorption. That [whatever actions he does] also does not become [a means] for bondage in transmigratory existence because there is no false presumption that: "I am doing". So the one who is liberated while living certainly does not perform action like another bound soul, but it is just that "action takes place". Because though it has been done by the one liberated while living it is certainly not done, though seen it is certainly not seen.

comment

The state of "actionlessness" is mentioned in the Gītā, cf. 4.18., 5. 8, 9, 13., 13.29. An interesting exposition upon liberation while living (jīvanmukti) can be found in Pañcadaśī ch.7.

- 3.11. तस्य चैवंविधस्य मोक्षस्य साधनमात्मतत्त्वज्ञानं नान्यत् । तमेव विदि-
त्वाऽति मृत्युमेति (श्वे० ३ । ८) इति श्रुतेः । तत्रैव नान्यः पन्था विद्यतेऽयनाय
(श्वे० ३ । ८) इत्यनेनान्यस्य मोक्षसाधनस्य स्पष्टमेव निषेधाच्च ।

3.11. The knowledge of the true nature of the Self is the means for such liberation, not anything else. Because there is the sacred text: "having known That one alone, he goes beyond death" (Śv.3.8.). Also, because in the same passage there is the very clear negation of another means of liberation, by this: "there is no other path for going [beyond death]" (Śv.3.8.).

3.12. ननु तत्त्वज्ञानादेव मोक्ष इत्येवं सिद्धान्तोऽस्तु नाम । परंतु यस्य तत्त्वस्य ज्ञानान्मोक्षस्तत्त्वत्त्वं ज्ञेयं भवति न वा । आद्ये तत्त्वज्ञानशब्दार्थः ज्ञेयत्वसत्त्वे विषयविषयिभावसत्त्वान्मोक्षावस्थायामपि द्वैतं तदवस्थमेव । अन्त्ये तत्त्वस्य ज्ञानं दुरुपपादमिति चेत् । अत्र केचिदित्थं समर्थयन्ते । तत्त्वज्ञानमिति नायं षष्ठीतत्पुरुषः । किंतु कर्मधारयः । निषादस्थपतिन्यायेन लाघवानुरोधात् । तथा च तत्त्वभूतं यज्ज्ञानं तस्मान्मोक्ष इत्यर्थः । तत्त्वभूतं सर्वबीजभूतं यज्ज्ञानं निर्विशेषानुभूतिरूपं तदेव सर्वेषां जीवानां मूलस्वरूपमिति तत्प्राप्त्या मोक्ष इति यावत् । नन्वेवमपि मोक्षे प्राप्तिप्राप्तव्यभावोऽस्तीति द्वैतापत्तिः । किं च यदि तज्जीवानां मूलस्वरूपं तर्हि तत्सर्वदा प्राप्तमेवेति कथं मोक्षावस्थायां तत्प्राप्तिर्वर्ण्यत इति चेन्न । मूलस्वरूपप्राप्तिरित्यस्य मूलस्वरूपेतरस्याप्रतीतिरित्यर्थपर्यवसानेन द्विविधस्यापि दोषस्याभावात् । वस्तुतस्तु षष्ठीतत्पुरुषनिष्पन्नोऽर्थ एव प्रथमतो बुद्धिमारोहतीति तदङ्गीकारेऽपि न क्षतिः । ननु मोक्षावस्थायामपि विषयविषयिभावसत्त्वेन द्वैतापत्तिरिति चेद्भ्रान्तोऽसि । कारणस्य हि कार्यप्राक्काले सत्त्वमावश्यकम् । कार्यकाले तु तदस्तु वा मास्तु तत्र नाग्रहः । तथा च तत्त्वविषयकज्ञानं मोक्षकारणमिति मोक्षावस्थातः प्राक्सत्त्वं तस्यावश्यकम् । तदा च द्वैताभासस्याङ्गीकृतत्वेन न द्वैतापत्तिर्दोषः ।

3:12. [objection] The conclusion that liberation is only from the knowledge of reality is granted. But is that reality, through the knowledge of which there is liberation, knowable or not? In the first case, if it is knowable, there is duality even in the state of liberation because the relation of subject and object exists and so there is just the same situation [i.e. duality]. In the last case, the knowledge of reality is difficult to demonstrate.

[reply] Here, some construe in this manner: the word "tattvajñāna" is not a determinative compound where the first member is in the genitive case (ṣaṣṭhītatpuruṣa), but it is an appositional compound

(karmadhāraya), in accordance with economy of expression due to the maxim: "the chief who is a Niṣāda".⁴ So the sense is that Knowledge is reality and liberation is from that [Knowledge]. The meaning is that Knowledge, which is the nature of reality i.e. the source of everything, is in the form of awareness free from distinction and that alone is the fundamental nature of all the individual souls. Hence liberation is through the attainment of that [Knowledge which is the fundamental nature].

[objection] Even if that is the case, there is the relation of the attainment and what is to be attained in regard to liberation and so there is the occurrence of duality. Moreover, if that [Knowledge] is the fundamental nature of individual souls then it is certainly always attained, so how is the attainment of that [Knowledge which is the fundamental nature] being described in regard to the state of liberation?

[reply] No, because the defect, though twofold, does not exist because this: "attainment of the fundamental nature" has its final conclusion in the meaning: "the non-cognition of what is other than the fundamental nature". In reality, however, only the meaning produced by the genitive tatpuruṣa firstly occurs to the mind and so there is no fault even in the acceptance of that.

[objection] There is the occurrence of duality, since the relation of subject and object exists even in the state of liberation.

[reply] You are confused. For the existence of the cause at a time prior to the effect is a necessity. But at the time of the effect there can be no insisting: "that [cause] must either exist or not". Accordingly, knowledge which has reality as its object is the cause of liberation and so the existence of that [cause i.e. knowledge having reality as its object] prior to the state of liberation is a necessity. Then [subsequent to the knowledge of reality], the occurrence of duality is not a defect because the appearance of duality is admitted.

3.13.

अथ तत्त्वज्ञानं कया विधया मोक्षकारणं भवतीति चेदित्थम् । मोक्षो हि मुक्तिः । सा च कस्मादित्यवध्यपेक्षायां मोक्षस्य बन्धप्रतिद्वन्द्विभूतत्वेन येन बन्ध-
 स्तस्मान्मोक्ष इत्यर्थादेव लभ्यते । बन्धश्चायं संसा-
 तत्त्वज्ञानस्य मोक्षसाध- रबन्धः । संसारश्चेदं चराचरं सर्वं जगत् । तस्मा-
 नत्वम् न्मोक्ष उपपादनीयः । किं च संसारः कर्ममूलकः ।
 तथा च कर्मणः सकाशादपि मोक्ष उपपादनीय
 एव । एवं कस्य तत्त्वं मोक्षार्थं ज्ञातव्यमित्याकाङ्क्षायां मोक्षस्य बन्धप्रतिद्वन्द्वि-
 भूतत्वेन बन्धसाधनीभूतस्य संसारस्य तन्मूलभूतकर्मणश्च तत्त्वं ज्ञातव्यमित्युप-
 पादनीयम् । किं च तमेवं विद्वानमृत इह भवति (वृ० पू० ६) इतिश्रुति-
 मूलकं ' आत्मज्ञानान्मोक्षः ' इत्यपि लोके प्रवादो दृश्यते । तथा च तत्त्वज्ञाना-
 न्मोक्ष इत्यत्र तत्त्वपदेन आत्मरूपमेव तत्त्वं ग्राह्यमित्यप्युपपादनीयमेव । तदु-
 च्यते । तत्त्वं सत्यं परमार्थं इति पर्यायाः । कारणं च कार्यस्य तत्त्वम् । परमा-
 त्मैव च सर्वस्य कारणम् । अतः स एव सर्वस्य तत्त्वभूतः ।

3.13. Then in what manner is the knowledge of reality the cause for liberation? In this manner: liberation means freedom. In regard to the determination: that [freedom] is from what?. it is gained only from the meaning that because liberation is the opposite of bondage, due to which there is bondage, liberation is from that. This bondage is the bondage due to transmigratory existence. Transmigratory existence comprises this whole world, animate and inanimate. Liberation from that [transmigratory existence] has to be demonstrated. Moreover, transmigratory existence is based upon action. And so liberation from action too, certainly has to be demonstrated. Thus in the expectation: "the reality of what must be known for the sake of liberation?", because liberation is the opposite of bondage, it has to be demonstrated that the reality of transmigratory existence which is the means of bondage and the reality of action which is the basis of that [transmigratory existence] must be known.

Furthermore, even the popular expression observed in the world: "liberation is from the knowledge of the Self", has its basis in the

sacred text: "the one who knows That in this manner becomes immortal here" (Nr.Pū.1.6.). So it also must be definitely demonstrated that the reality to be understood by the word "reality" here: "liberation is from the knowledge of reality" is only the nature of the Self. Therefore it is said that "reality", "truth" and "absolute truth" are synonyms. The cause is the reality of the effect and the supreme Self alone is the cause of everything. Therefore, that [supreme Self] alone is the reality of everything.

3.14.

अथ कथं कारणं कार्यस्य तत्त्वं भवति । उच्यते । श्रुतौ 'यथैकेन मृत्पिण्डेन परमार्थतो मृदात्मना विज्ञातेन सर्वं मृन्मयं घटशरावोदञ्चनादिकं विज्ञातं स्यात्तथैकेन परमात्मना विज्ञातेन सर्वं जगद्विज्ञातं भवति' कार्यस्य कारणं तत्त्वम् (छा० ६ । १) इत्युच्यते । अत्र यद्यपि मृत्पिण्डज्ञाने जाते घटे ऽदृष्टेऽयं घट इति ज्ञानं न भवति अतः कथं घटशरावादिकं विज्ञातं स्यात्तथाप्ययं न दोषः । मृत्पिण्डज्ञानेन घटो हि विज्ञातो भवत्येव । घटे 'अयं घट' इति यज्ज्ञानं तज्ज्ञानमित्युच्यते । घटे एव 'इयं मृत्' इति यज्ज्ञानं तद्विज्ञानमित्युच्यते । विशिष्टं ज्ञानं विज्ञानम् । यद्यपि घटज्ञाने जाते जलाहरणादिकार्यं कर्तुं शक्यते तथापि न तद्विज्ञानम् । ज्ञाने विशिष्टत्वं च सूक्ष्मदृष्ट्या कार्यविशेषकरत्वम् । जलाहरणादि तु न तथा । यथा वृक्षे ज्ञाते तदधो विश्रान्तिः । परं तु तस्मिन्नेव वृक्षे अमुकौषधिरित्येवं ज्ञाते रोगविनाशादिकं विशिष्टं कार्यं क्रियते ।

3.14. Now, how is the cause the reality of the effect? That is being told. It is stated in the sacred text⁵: "just as through a single ball of clay which is known in reality to consist of clay, all that is made of clay such as pots, dishes and pitchers etc. would be known, so too, through the one supreme Self which is known, the entire world is known". In regard to this, [if it is objected] even if the knowledge of the ball of clay has arisen, there is no knowledge that "this is a pot" when the pot is not seen⁶, therefore how could the pots and dishes etc. be known?, [our reply is] still, this is not a defect. Because a pot certainly becomes known through the knowledge of the ball of clay. In regard to a pot, the knowledge that "this is a pot"

is called "knowledge" (jñāna). In regard to the same pot, the knowledge that "this is clay" is called "knowledge" (viññāna). Viññāna means a particular knowledge. Though when the knowledge of the pot has arisen it is possible to do an action such as fetching water, still, that is not viññāna. The particularity in knowledge is the bringing about of a particular action by keen observation. But the fetching of water etc. is not like that. For instance, when a tree is known, there is rest below it. But when that tree is known to be a certain type of medicinal plant, a particular action is performed such as the removal of sickness.

comment

The Advaitin maintains that when the material cause is known, all its effects are as good as known. Abhyankar raises the objection that even if the material cause is known how can there be knowledge of all the unseen effects? He answers this by distinguishing between two types of knowledge: jñāna or the ordinary knowledge such as "this is a pot" and viññāna which is a particular knowledge such as the apprehension that all the products of clay, seen or unseen, must be nothing but clay in a particular form.

Advaitins generally use the words jñāna and viññāna as synonyms, however where they occur together as in Gītā 3.41; 6.8 and 7.2, they are distinguished in a manner similar to Abhyankar's division.⁷

3.15.

यत्र यो मुख्यो भागस्तदेव तत्र तत्त्वम् ।

घटे च सारभूतो भागो मृदेव । यथा रत्नादिसंरक्षणार्थं करण्डकः क्रियते । तत्र चाधस्तनपात्रादुपरितने पात्र उद्घाटिते रत्नं दृश्यते । करण्डकस्तु पलालवत् । तथा घटो नामरूपात्मकः करण्डकः । पलालस्येव च नामरूपयोः पृथक्कारे घटे केवलं मृदेव दृश्यते । अतो घटे सारभूतो भागो मृदेव । एवं मृत्तिकादिष्वपि तत्कारणमेव सारभूतो भागः । 'ते यदन्तरा तद्ब्रह्म' (छा० ८ । १४ । १) इतिश्रुतिरप्येतदेव कथयति । ते इत्यनेन पूर्वोक्तयोर्नामरूपयोः परामर्शः । यद्यपि मृत्तिकयेव घटेन पात्रसंशुद्ध्यादिकार्यं कुर्वन्नोकोपहास्यो भवति तथापि ते लोकास्तत्राज्ञा एव । यतो मृद्रूपेण क्रियमाणमेव मुख्यं कार्यम् । यतो घटो विनष्टो वाऽविनष्टो वा पूर्णो वैकदेशो वा सच्छिद्रो वाऽसच्छिद्रो वा नूतनो वा जीर्णो वा सर्वदा तत्कर्तुं शक्यम् । न तु जलाहरणादि । अन्यत्र च नेत्रस्फुरणे नेत्रसुवर्णसंयोगरूपं सुवर्णकार्यं सौवर्णेनाङ्गुलीयकेनापि कुर्वन्नोपहास्यो भवति । मणौ वा लोष्ट्रे वा अहौ वा हारे वा समदृशां साधूनां यो महिमातिशयस्तत्र तत्र वर्ण्यते

स तत्कारणीभूततत्त्वज्ञानमूलक एव । तेषु कारणदृष्टयैव साधूनां व्यवहारात् । एवं कार्यस्य तत्त्वं कारणमिति सिद्धम् ।

3.15. That which is the principal part of a thing is alone the reality in regard to that thing. In regard to a pot, the part which is the essence is only the clay. For example. A small bamboo box is made for the purpose of safe-keeping jewels etc. and in regard to that, when the upper part of the receptacle is removed from the lower part of the receptacle the jewel is seen. But the small bamboo box is [just] a type of cane. Similarly, the pot is [like] the bamboo box which consists of name and form and just as in the case of the cane, when there is the separation of name and form the mere clay alone is seen in regard to the pot.⁸ Therefore, the part which is the essence in regard to the pot is only the clay. In the same way, even in regard to clay etc. the part which is the essence is indeed the cause of that [clay etc.]. The sacred text too, communicates this very thing: "what is within those two is Brahman" (Ch.8.14.1.).⁹ By this [word] "those two" there is the recollection of the previously mentioned name and form.

Although doing an action such as cleansing a vessel with a pot, like with clay, is ridiculous to people, still those people are certainly ignorant in that matter. Because the principal action is only being done with a form of clay. For that is always able to be done, whether the pot is destroyed or not destroyed, full or partly full, containing holes or without holes, new or old. But not fetching water etc. In another case, in regard to the twitching of the eye, doing the work of gold, in the form of connecting the gold to the eye, even with a golden ring belonging to the finger, is not to be ridiculed. The pre-eminent greatness of holy people who look equally on a jewel or a clod of earth, a snake or a garland is described in various places and that [greatness] is only based upon the knowledge of reality, which is their respective cause. Because holy people transact only

with their vision in the cause of those things. So it is established that the cause is the reality of the effect.

comment

The illustrations of cleansing the vessel with a clay pot, instead of with just clay, and touching the gold-ring to the eye are meant to show that because the material cause is the reality of the effect, the effect can be utilized for the sake of the cause.

- 3.16. नन्वस्तु कार्यस्य तत्त्वं तदुपादानकारणम् । परंतु तज्ज्ञानेन कार्यनाशः कथं स्यात् । न हि मृत्तिकाज्ञानेन घटो विनश्यति । तथा च संसारतत्त्वभूतस्य संसारबीजस्यात्मनो ज्ञानेऽपि संसारस्य विद्यमानाशस्य सान्वयत्वम् नत्वात्कथं मोक्षोपपत्तिः । किं च नाशः सर्वत्रैव सान्वयः । घटादिनाशेऽपि कपालादिरूपेण तदन्वयदर्शनात् । काष्ठे दग्धेऽपि भस्माङ्गरादि दृश्यते । एतद्दृष्टान्तेन तन्नायसि पतितस्योदविन्दोः सद्यो जायमानो विनाशोऽपि सान्वय एवेत्यनुमेयम् । तदुक्तम्—

‘उदविन्दो च सिन्धौ च तोयभावो न भिद्यते ।

निरस्तेऽप्ययसो विन्दावस्ति तस्यान्वयोऽम्बुधौ ॥’ (गौ०पा०का०)

इति । तथा च संसारनाशेऽपि बीजरूपेण तदन्वयस्य सत्त्वात्सुतरां मोक्षानुपपत्तिरिति चेन्मैवम् । संसारनाशो हि न घटादिनाश इवावयवविश्लेषरूपः । तादृशो विनाशः सान्वयोऽस्तु नाम । ज्ञानेन जायमानः प्रातिभासिकवस्तुविनाशस्तु निरन्वय एव । न हि रज्जुज्ञानेन प्रातिभासिके सर्पे विनष्ट आन्तरस्य बाह्यस्य वा कस्यापि सर्पावयवस्य स्वरूपेणान्यरूपेण वा रज्ज्वां लेशतोऽप्यन्वयो दृश्यते । अयं च विनाशस्तत्त्वज्ञानेनैव भवति । प्रातिभासिकसर्पस्य हि रज्जुरेव तत्त्वम् । यद्यपि मृत्तिकाज्ञानेन घटो न विनश्यति तथापि मृत्तिकाज्ञाने जाते मृत्सत्त्वेयं न ततोऽतिरिक्ता घटसत्तेति ज्ञानादिनाशो जातप्राय एव । पृथगस्तित्वप्रतीत्यभाव एव हि नाशः ।

- 3.16. [objection] Granted, the reality of the effect is its material cause. But by the knowledge of that [reality being the material cause], how can there be the destruction of the effect? Because a pot is not destroyed by the knowledge of the clay. Accordingly, even upon the knowledge of the Self which is the reality of transmigratory existence, being the seed of transmigratory existence, how is there logical possibility of liberation since transmigratory existence still exists? Furthermore, destruction possesses continuation indeed everywhere. Because even upon the destruction of a pot etc. its continuation is

seen in the form of pieces etc. Even when a log of wood is burnt the ashes and charcoal etc. are seen. Through these illustrations it can be inferred that even the destruction occurring instantly for a drop of water which has fallen on heated iron certainly possesses continuation.

Hence it has been told:

the nature of water does not differ in a drop
of water and in the ocean. Even when a drop is
evaporated from iron, its continuation is in
the ocean.

So liberation is all the more logically untenable because even upon the destruction of transmigratory existence its continuation exists in the form of its seed.

[reply] It is not so. Because the destruction of transmigratory existence is not in the manner of a separation of the component parts like the destruction of a pot etc. It is granted that destruction of that type possesses continuation. But the destruction of an object existing only in appearance, which takes place through knowledge, is certainly without continuation. Because when a snake which exists only in appearance is destroyed by the knowledge of the rope, the continuation, even slightly, of some part of the snake -whether internal or external, in its own form or in another form- is not seen on the rope. This destruction is only through the knowledge of reality. Because the reality of a snake existing only in appearance is just the rope. Although the pot is not destroyed by the knowledge of clay, still, destruction has certainly almost happened from the knowledge: "this is only the existence of clay, the existence of the pot is not different from that". Because destruction is only the absence of the cognition of having a separate existence.

3.17. ननु घटनाशे मृदूरूपेणान्वयो दृश्यत इति नाशः सान्वय-
स्तथा प्रातिभासिकसर्पविनाशे रज्जुरूपेणान्वयो दृश्यत इति तत्रापि नाशः

सान्वय एवेति चेदस्तु । उक्तरीत्या हि सान्वयत्वे स्वीक्रियमाणे संसारनाशे सत्यात्मरूपेण तदन्वयसत्त्वेऽपि न मोक्षे काचिदनुपपत्तिः । इदं सर्वं यदयमात्मा (बृ० २ । ४ । ५) इति श्रुत्या चैतदेव प्रतिपादितम् । एवं रीत्या तत्त्वज्ञानेन सर्वत्र संसारे कार्यमात्रस्य कारणसत्त्वापेक्षया पृथक्सत्त्वाभावेऽवगते मूलकारणीभूताविद्यासत्त्वमवशिष्यते । तावत्पर्यन्तं च ज्ञाता ज्ञानं ज्ञेयं चेति त्रिपुटी चावशिष्यते । तदुत्तरं च तत्रापि किं तत्त्वमिति विचारे ज्ञानमात्रमवशिष्यते । न ज्ञाता न ज्ञेयं नाप्यविद्या । उपपादयिष्यते चेदमग्रे । एतदेव च निर्विशेषं निर्विपर्यं निराश्रयं ब्रह्मस्वरूपभूतं ज्ञानम् । अयमेव मोक्षः ॥ ५ ॥

3.17. [objection] Upon the destruction of a pot, continuation is seen in the form of clay, so destruction possesses continuation. Similarly, upon the destruction of a snake existing only in appearance, continuation is seen in the form of rope, so destruction certainly possesses continuation there also.

[reply] Let it be so. Because when the destruction of transmigratory existence is accepted as possessing continuation in the manner mentioned, although the continuation of that [transmigratory existence] exists in the form of the Self, there is no logical impossibility whatsoever in regard to liberation. This very point has been taught by the sacred text: "all this which is, is this Self" (Brh. 2.4.6.).

In this way, by the knowledge of reality, when it is understood that a mere effect everywhere in transmigratory existence has no separate existence with regard to the existence of the cause, the existence of Ignorance -which is the primary cause- remains. And so far, the threefold factor of knower, knowledge and the thing to be known remains. Following that, upon the investigation: "what is the reality even with regard to that [threefold factor]?", mere Knowledge remains, but not the knower, nor an object to be known, nor even Ignorance. This will be demonstrated later on. And this very Knowledge: free from distinction, without an object and a locus, is the nature of Brahman. This is indeed liberation.

3.18. मोक्षसाधनीभूतब्रह्मज्ञानसंपादनाय ब्रह्मविचारः कर्तव्यः । तत्र कोऽधि-
कारीति चेत् उच्यते—

संसाराब्धौ येन लब्धं साधनानां चतुष्टयम् ।
तस्यैव ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा नौकावदुपयुज्यते ॥ ६ ॥

3.18. An investigation about Brahman must be undertaken for bringing about the knowledge of Brahman which is the means of liberation. If it is asked: "who is the qualified person with regard to that [investigation]?", it is said:

The desire to know Brahman is of use, like a boat upon the ocean of transmigratory existence, only for the one who has gained the fourfold means, 6.

3.19.

साधनचतुष्टयं च प्राक्प्रदर्शितमेव (पृ० १९ प०९) । अथातो ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा
(ब्र० सू० १ । १ । १) इति सूत्रेऽथशब्द आन-
ब्रह्मजिज्ञासाधिकारी न्तर्यार्थकः । ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा च योग्यताबलाद्यत्पूर्व-
वृत्तमपेक्षते तदानन्तर्यं सोऽथशब्दो बोधयति ।
तत्र चोक्तं साधनचतुष्टयमेव पूर्ववृत्तम् । अनारभ्याधीते हि तस्मिन्सूत्रेऽथशब्द-
प्रतिपाद्यानन्तर्याक्षिप्तं पूर्ववृत्तं योग्यताबलादेव निर्णेतव्यं भवति ।

3.19. The fourfold means have been previously explained (1.52.). The word "then" in the sūtra: "Then, therefore the desire to know Brahman" (B.S.1.1.1.) has the meaning of "immediate succession". The desire to know Brahman, on account of the strength of compatibility of meaning, requires a pre-requisite, the word "then" communicates the immediate succession to that [pre-requisite]. The pre-requisite is only the fourfold means which have been told. Because when that sūtra is studied as a detached subject, the pre-requisite implied by "immediate succession", which is taught by the word "then", is to be ascertained only from the strength of the compatibility of meaning.

comment

Both Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja interpret the word "then" (atha) in the

sense of: "immediate succession" (ānantarya).¹⁰ Immediate succession pre-supposes a prior event, so the sūtra: "Then, therefore the desire to know Brahman" indicates that the desire to know Brahman will arise as a consequence of the gain of a prior condition. Śaṅkara considers the prior condition to be the attainment of the fourfold qualifications (sādhana-catuṣṭaya), but not the study of the ritual portion of the Veda which forms the subject matter of Jaimini's sūtras. These sūtras elucidate dharma and so have a different subject matter and result from the sūtras of Bādarāyaṇa which inquire into the nature of Brahman.¹¹

Rāmānuja maintains that the sūtra works of Jaimini and Bādarāyaṇa constitute a single scripture and just as the Veda is a single sacred text possessing two sections, dealing with action and knowledge, so too there is one scripture of Vedic analysis (mīmāṃsā) which treats of each of these two sections.¹² Accordingly, Rāmānuja holds that the study of the ritual portion of the Veda, as embodied in the sūtras of the Pūrvamīmāṃsā, must be the pre-requisite to enter into the inquiry concerning Brahman.

3.20. ननु कथमेतदनारभ्याधीतमित्युच्यते । पूर्वोत्तरमीमांसयोः संभूयैकशास्त्रत्वात् । 'संहितमेतच्छारीरकं जैमिनीयेन षोडशलक्षणेनेति शास्त्रैकत्वसिद्धिः' इति वदता वृत्तिकारेणापि कर्मब्रह्ममीमांसयोरेकशास्त्रत्वमुक्तम् । श्रीभाष्ये (पृ० २ प० २०) प्येवमुक्तम् । षोडशलक्षणेनेत्यत्र लक्षणशब्दोऽध्यायवाची । संकर्षकाण्डेन सह जैमिनीयस्य षोडशलक्षणत्वम् । युक्तं चैकशास्त्रत्वम् । उभयत्रापि धर्मस्यैव प्रतिपाद्यमानत्वात् । पूर्वमीमांसायां साध्यरूपः क्रियादिधर्मः प्रतिपाद्यते । उत्तरमीमांसायां तु सिद्धो धर्मो ब्रह्मरूपः । संगतिविशेषश्च तयोः श्रीभाष्ये (पृ० ३ प० १) प्रदर्शितः । स यथा—स्वाध्यायोऽध्येतव्य इत्यध्ययनविध्यनुसारेण गृहीतात्स्वाध्यायादापाततः स्वर्गादिफलजनकानि कर्माणि बुद्ध्वा तत्स्वरूपप्रकारविशेषनिर्णयाय पुरुषः पूर्वमीमांसाश्रवणे स्वयमेव प्रवर्तते । तत्र च कर्मणामस्थिरफलत्वं निश्चित्य स्वाध्यायैकदेशोपनिषदाक्येषु ब्रह्मज्ञानस्यापाततः स्थिरफलप्रतीतेस्तन्निर्णयायोत्तरमीमांसायां प्रवर्तते । तथा चैकशास्त्रत्वं युक्तमिति ।

3.20. [objection] How is this [sūtra] said to be studied as a detached subject? Because the prior and later mīmāṃsā, being combined, is a single scripture. The author of the Vṛtti¹³, too, has said that the karma and brahmanīmāṃsā constitute a single scripture, by saying: "this [treatise] dealing with the embodied soul is connected with the sixteen chapters belonging to Jaimini, thus there is establishment of a single

scripture" (Śrī.B. Para.3. p.4.). It has been told in the same manner in the Śrībhāṣya also. The word lakṣaṇa here [in the above quotation]: "ṣoḍaśalakṣaṇena" signifies a chapter. Together with the Saṅkarsakāṇḍa, [the treatise] belonging to Jaimini consists of sixteen chapters.

The nature of being a single scripture is correct, because dharma alone is being taught even in both places.¹⁴ Dharma which consists of action etc and is of the nature of what is to be accomplished is taught in the prior mīmāṃsā. Whereas in the later mīmāṃsā, the dharma is accomplished and is of the nature of Brahman. The particular connection of the two [types of dharma] has been explained in the Śrībhāṣya (Śrī.B. Para.4,5. p.5f). That is as follows:¹⁵ having understood at first glance that actions produce results such as heaven, because one's own portion [of the Veda] has been apprehended according to the injunction of study: "one's own portion has to be learnt", a person naturally applies himself to hearing to the prior mīmāṃsā for the ascertainment of the particular nature and mode of those [Vedic passages]. There [in the Veda], having ascertained that actions have an impermanent result and because it is understood at first glance, in the passages of the Upaniṣads which form a part of one's own portion, that the knowledge of Brahman has a result which is permanent, he applies himself to hearing the later mīmāṃsā for the ascertainment of that [result]. Accordingly, the nature of being a single scripture is correct.

- 3.21. अत्रोच्यते । नात्रैकशास्त्रत्वं संभवति । पूर्वमीमांसासूत्रकारो जैमिनिरुत्तर-
मीमांसासूत्रकारश्च वादरायण इत्येवं सूत्रकारभेदात् । न केवलं सूत्रकारभेदः ।
किं तु प्रतिपाद्यविषयश्च भिन्नः । पूर्वमीमांसायां कर्मरूपो विषयः प्रतिपाद्यः ।
उत्तरमीमांसायां तु ज्ञानरूपः । परस्परविरोधश्चानयोः कर्मज्ञानयोर्दृश्यते । आत्मै-
क्यज्ञाने कर्मणः सुतरामसंभवात् । किं चोत्तरमी-
मांसाप्रतिपाद्यो विषयो जैमिनेरसंमत एव । यतः
स्वर्गादिमाप्तिरेव परमपुरुषार्थ इति जैमिनिमतम् ।
अपि च किमत्र मीमांसाद्वयानुगतमेकं रूपमेक-

मीमांसाद्वयस्य नैकशास्त्र-
त्वम्

शास्त्रत्वप्रयोजकम् । विचारत्वमिति चेद्व्याकरणन्यायादीनामप्येकशास्त्रत्वं स्यात् ।
तथा च यथा प्रतिपाद्यविषयभेदेन व्याकरणन्यायादीनां शास्त्राणां भेदस्तथा
पूर्वोत्तरमीमांसयोरपि भेद एवोचितः ।

3.21. [reply] As to this, it is said: the nature of being a single scripture is impossible here. Because there is a difference of authors of the sūtras: Jaimini is the author of the prior mīmāṃsā sūtras and Bādarāyaṇa is the author of the later mīmāṃsā sūtras. Not only is there a difference of authors of the sūtras, but the subject matter to be taught is different. The subject matter to be taught in the prior mīmāṃsā is action. Whereas in the later mīmāṃsā it is knowledge. And a mutual opposition is seen between these two: action and knowledge. Because action is all the more impossible in regard to the knowledge of the oneness of the Self. Moreover, the subject matter to be taught in the later mīmāṃsā is certainly not accepted by Jaimini. Because the view of Jaimini is that the attainment of heaven etc. is alone the ultimate human goal. Furthermore, what is the one form which persists in the twofold mīmāṃsā and is the determining factor for a single scripture? If [you say] it is the nature of being an investigation, [our reply] is that grammar, logic etc. should also constitute a single scripture. Accordingly, just as there is a difference among scriptures such as grammar and logic on account of the difference of the subject matter to be taught, so too the difference between the prior and later mīmāṃsā is also certainly correct.

3.22.

अथोभयत्रापि: धर्मस्यैव प्रतिपाद्यमान-
त्वेनैकशास्त्रत्वमिति चेन्न । ब्रह्मणो धर्मत्वाभावात् ।

ये च वेदविदो विप्रा ये चाध्यात्मविदो जनाः ।

ते वदन्ति महात्मानं कृष्णं धर्मं सनातनम् ॥ (भा० सभा० ३८।२३)

इत्यत्र श्रीकृष्णपरमात्मानि धर्मशब्दप्रयोगस्तु धर्मप्रयोजकत्वेनौपचारिकः ।

प्रचुरप्रयोगाभावेन शक्तयन्तरकल्पनाया अन्याय्यत्वात् । काचित्कप्रयोगस्य लक्षणयैवोपपत्तेः । अन्यथा लक्षणाया निर्विषयत्वापत्तिः । किं च ब्रह्मणो धर्मत्वं पूर्वमीमांसासूत्रकारस्यैवासंमतम् । चोदनालक्षणोऽर्थो धर्मः (जै० सू० १ । १ । २) इति हि धर्मलक्षणं जैमिनिना प्रतिपादितम् । तद्ब्रह्मणि सुतरां न संभवति । यदि धर्मविचारत्वेनैकशास्त्रत्वं जैमिनेरिष्टं स्यात्तर्हि तेन सिद्धसाध्यभेदेन द्विविधधर्मसाधारणं धर्मलक्षणं कृतं स्यात् । तथा च शास्त्रकर्तुरेवैकशास्त्रत्वं यत्र नाभिमतं तत्रान्यैरेकशास्त्रमेकशास्त्रमित्येवं बहुकृत्वोऽप्युद्योषे कृते न किमपि सिद्ध्येत् । अमुमेव धर्मशब्दार्थं जैमिनिप्रतिपादितं मनसिकृत्य विवरणप्रमेयसंग्रहे (पृ० २६५ प० १७) उक्तम्—‘ यदि वेदान्तेषु विधिः स्यात्तर्हि कैव षोडशलक्षणी धर्ममीमांसा प्रसज्येत ’ इति । न च मीमांसेति समाख्याया एकत्वादेकशास्त्रत्वमिति वाच्यम् । व्याकरणेति समाख्याया एकत्वेऽप्यैन्द्रचान्द्रादेर्भेदात् । एतेन संहितमेतच्छारीरकं जैमिनीयेन षोडशलक्षणेनेति शास्त्रैकत्वसिद्धिरिति वृत्तिकारोक्तमपास्तम् । अत एव शास्त्रपट्टसंकलने

कपिलस्य कणादस्य गौतमस्य पतञ्जलेः ।

व्यासस्य जैमिनेश्चापि शास्त्राण्याहुः षडेव हि ॥

इत्येवं पूर्वोत्तरमीमांसयोर्भेदेन परिगणनं संगच्छते ।

3.22. [objection] Then there is a single scripture because dharma alone is being taught even in both places.

[reply] No, because Brahman does not have the characteristic of dharma. However the use of the word dharma in regard to the supreme Self, Śrī Kṛṣṇa, here:

The sages who know the Veda and the people who know the Self say that Kṛṣṇa is the great Self, the eternal dharma (Mbh.Ā.3.86.22.)¹⁶

is figurative because he is the instigator of dharma. For the supposition of another direct meaning is incorrect since there is no ample usage. Because a usage that is met with occasionally has logical possibility only by implication. Otherwise implication has no scope.

Furthermore, Brahman having the characteristic of dharma is certainly not accepted by the author of the prior mīmāṃsā sūtras. Because the definition of dharma taught by Jaimini is: "dharma is a thing characterized by a scriptural injunction" (J.S.1.1.2.) and that

is all the more impossible in regard to Brahman. If a single scripture would have been agreeable to Jaimini on account of there being [a single] investigation of dharma, then because of that difference between "accomplished" and "to be accomplished" a definition of dharma should have been made which was common to both types of dharma. So where a single scripture is not accepted by the very author of the scripture, when others make a proclamation there, even many times: "the scripture is one, the scripture is one" it does not prove anything. Having kept in mind that very meaning of the word dharma taught by Jaimini, it is said in the Vivaraṇaprameyasaṅgraha: "if there could be an injunction in the Vedānta [ie., Upaniṣads], then only one investigation about dharma, consisting of sixteen chapters, should follow."

It should not be said that there is a single scripture because the name "mīmāṃsā" is just one. [reason] Because although the name "grammar" is one, there is a difference between [the grammatical treatises] Aindra, Cāndra etc. On account of this, what has been said by the author of the Vṛtti: "this [treatise] dealing with the embodied soul is connected with the sixteen chapters belonging to Jaimini, thus there is establishment of a single scripture" is rejected. For this very reason, the enumeration in the Śāstraṣaṭkasaṅkalana agrees with the difference between the prior and later mīmāṃsā:

They say that the scriptures are only six: of
Kapila, Kaṇāda, Gautama, Patañjali, Vyāsa and
of Jaimini also.

comment

Advaitins conclude that the Pūrvamīmāṃsā of Jaimini and the Uttaramīmāṃsā of Bādarāyaṇa are different scriptures because (1) the qualified person (adhikārin) is different in each case. For the Pūrvamīmāṃsā, the qualified person is one who is desirous of performing ritual actions and seeks to attain results such as heaven. With regard to the Uttaramīmāṃsā, the qualified person is free from other desires on account of the desire for liberation. (2) There is a difference of

subject matter (viṣaya). In the Pūrvamīmāṃsā the subject matter is dharma which is something to be accomplished and which is characterized by the performance of rituals such as Jyotiṣṭoma. In the Uttaramīmāṃsā the subject matter is Brahman which is already accomplished and which cannot be enjoined. This difference is clearly evident in the first sūtra of each treatise: "Then, therefore the desire to know dharma" and "Then, therefore the desire to know Brahman". (3) There is a difference of result (prayojana). With regard to the Pūrvamīmāṃsā, the result is the knowledge of what is to be done, or the gain of heaven etc. through the performance of the rituals. For the Uttaramīmāṃsā, however, the result is the knowledge of Brahman which is liberation.¹⁷

3.23.

संगतिविशेषविचारश्च

निष्फलः । यतः संगतिर्नैकशास्त्रत्वप्रयोजिका । किं तर्हेकशास्त्रत्वोपपादिका । प्रमाणान्तरेण निर्णीते ह्येकशास्त्रत्वे संगतिमन्तरेण कथमेकशास्त्रत्वमित्याक्षेपश्चेत्तन्निरासाय संगतिविशेषविचार उपयुज्यते । एवं शास्त्रभेदे सिद्धेऽथातो ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा (ब्र० सू० १ । १ । १) इत्यस्यानारभ्याधीतत्वं सिद्धम् । तथा चाथशब्दप्रतिपाद्यानन्तर्याक्षिप्तं पूर्ववृत्तमुत्तरभाविनीं ब्रह्मजिज्ञासामालोक्य तदनुगुणं किञ्चिद्योग्यताबलादेव निर्णेतव्यं भवति ।

3.23. The investigation of the particular connection has no result. Because connection is not the determining factor for a single scripture. What is it then? It supports a single scripture. Because when a single scripture has been ascertained through another means of knowledge, then if there is the objection: "how can there be a single scripture without a connection?", the investigation of the particular connection is useful for the removal of that [objection]. So when the difference of scripture is established, this [sūtra]: "Then, therefore the desire to know Brahman" (B.S.1.1.1.) is established as being studied as a detached subject. Accordingly, having perceived that the desire to know Brahman will occur subsequent to the pre-requisite implied by "immediate succession" which is to be taught by the word "then", something conformable to that [desire to know Brahman] is to be ascertained only from the strength of compatibility of meaning.

3.24. ननु योग्यतावलाद्गृह्यमाणमपि पूर्ववृत्तं कर्मज्ञानं कुतो न गृह्यत इति चेत्—
 भवेदेतदेवं यदि कर्मसमुच्चिताज्ज्ञानान्मोक्षः स्यात् । नतु तथा । कर्मज्ञानयोर्विरोधेन
 समुच्चयासंभवात् । विविदिषन्ति यज्ञेन दानेन (वृ० ४ । ४ । २२) इति
 श्रुतावपि सन्प्रत्ययप्रयोगाद्यज्ञादिकर्मणामात्मज्ञाने-
 कर्मज्ञानं न पूर्ववृत्तम् च्छासाधनत्वं प्रतीयते नतु ज्ञानसाधनत्वम् ।
 नतरां ज्ञानोत्तरकालिकमोक्षसाधनत्वम् । ब्रह्मजि-
 ज्ञासायामुद्गीथादिविचारस्तु प्रासङ्गिकतया कृतो न तु मुख्यत्वेन । तेन न तद-
 नुरोधेन कर्मज्ञानस्य पूर्ववृत्तत्वं कल्पनीयम् । यथा महर्षिर्धवद्वा (ब्र० सू० २ ।
 २ । ११) इति सूत्रे कारणविजातीयकार्योत्पत्तौ दृष्टान्तत्वेन महर्षिर्धादिपरिमा-
 णोक्तिरिति नैतावता तदनुरोधेन वैशेषिकशास्त्रज्ञानस्य पूर्ववृत्तत्वं कल्प्यते
 तद्वत् ।

3.24. [objection] Why is knowledge of action not taken to be the pre-requisite, as it is also understood on account of the strength of compatibility of meaning ?

[reply] This would be so, if liberation could result from knowledge combined with action. But that is not the case. For action and knowledge have no possibility of combination on account of their opposition. Even in the sacred text: "they desire to know through sacrifices, charity..." (Brh.4.4.22.), because of the use of the desiderative affix (san) the actions such as sacrifice are recognized as the means for the desire of Self-knowledge, not as the means of knowledge. There is never a means of liberation which depends upon a time subsequent to knowledge.

But the investigation of the chanting of the Veda etc. in respect of the desire to know Brahman is done as something incidental, not as primary. The knowledge of action cannot be assumed to be the pre-requisite [just] because that [investigation of chanting etc.] is in accordance with it [the desire to know Brahman]. Just as in the sūtra: "Or [the world must originate from Brahman] like the great and long..." (B.S.2.2.11.), the mention of the size such as great and long is on account of being an illustration about the origination of an effect different from the cause. So the knowledge of the Vaiśeṣika

scripture is not assumed to be the pre-requisite because this much [big and long triads being produced from minute and short dyads] is in accordance with that [the production of an effect different from the cause]. It is like that [with regard to the mention of chanting etc and the pre-requisite of the knowledge of ritual action].

3.25. यत्तु 'अधीतसाङ्गसशिरस्कवेदस्याधिगताल्पास्थिरफलकेवलकर्मज्ञानतया संजातमोक्षाभिलाषस्यानन्तस्थिरफलब्रह्मजिज्ञासा ह्यनन्तरभाविनी' (श्रीभा० पृ० १ प० १३) इत्युक्तं: तत्रोच्यते । अथशब्दप्रतिपाद्यमानन्तर्यं ब्रह्मजिज्ञासायां यन्निरूपितं तत्पूर्ववृत्तं प्रदर्शयितुं हीयं तेषामुक्तिः । सूत्रे च ब्रह्मजिज्ञासारूपं पश्चाद्भावि वस्तु सूत्रकृद्भिर्निर्दिष्टम् । तेन च स्वान्विताथशब्दप्रतिपाद्यानन्तर्यसहकृतेन पूर्ववृत्तस्याक्षेपः कर्तव्यः । यच्च तस्मान्नियतपूर्वभावि तदेव तेनाक्षेपुं शक्यते न तु व्यभिचरितम् । कर्मज्ञानं तु व्यभिचरितमेव । विनापि कर्मज्ञानं ब्रह्मजिज्ञासायाः शक्यत्वात् । लोके तथा दृष्टत्वाच्च । यद्यप्यधिगताल्पास्थिरफलकेवलकर्मज्ञानतया संजातमोक्षाभिलाषस्यानन्तस्थिरफलब्रह्मजिज्ञासा ह्यनन्तरभाविनी (श्रीभा० पृ० १ प० १३) इति ग्रन्थेन नियमो बोधितस्तथापि प्रकृते स नियमो नोपयुज्यते । यतस्तादृशस्थित्युत्तरं ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा नियता भवतु नतु ब्रह्मजिज्ञासायाः पूर्वं तादृशस्थितिर्नियता । यद्यत्र सूत्रकृद्भिस्तादृशस्थितिर्निर्दिष्टा स्यात्तथा च स्वनियतपश्चाद्भाविन्या ब्रह्मजिज्ञासाया आक्षेपः कर्तव्यः स्यात्तर्हि तादृशनियमस्योपयोगः स्यान्न तु प्रकृतस्थले । किंच 'अधिगताल्पास्थिरफलकेवलकर्मज्ञानतया संजातमोक्षाभिलाषस्य' इत्युक्तवत्तस्तवाप्येतत्संमतमेव यत्तादृशकर्मज्ञानं मोक्षाभिलाषमन्तरेण ब्रह्मजिज्ञासां न संपादयतीति । अन्तरेण तु तादृशकर्मज्ञानं मोक्षाभिलाषस्तां संपादयत्येव । तथा चान्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां मोक्षाभिलाषस्यैव पूर्ववृत्तत्वमवगम्यते । स चास्मदुक्तसाधनचतुष्टयान्तर्गत एव ।

3.25. But what has been said (Śrī.B.Para.2.p.2.):

For the person who has studied the Veda along with its auxiliaries and along with what is at its head [the Upaniṣads] and whose desire for liberation has arisen due to the knowledge that mere action has a result which is trifling and transient, the desire for the knowledge of Brahman -the result of which is limitless and permanent- is sure to follow immediately afterwards.

In regard to that, it is said: "immediate succession", which is to be taught by the word "then", is ascertained in regard to the desire to know Brahman. His [Rāmānuja's] statement is meant to show the pre-requisite to that [immediate succession]. And in the sūtra (B.S. 1.1.1.), the author of the sūtras has shown that the thing which will occur subsequently is the desire to know Brahman. And because that [desire to know Brahman] is associated with "immediate succession", which is to be taught by the word "then" which is connected to itself [i.e. the meaning of "immediate succession"], the postulation of a pre-requisite has to be made. And what is the invariable cause of that [effect] is alone able to be postulated by that [effect], but not what has deviated. The knowledge of ritual action has certainly deviated, because the desire to know Brahman is possible even without the knowledge of ritual action. And because in the world it is seen to be the case.

Although an invariable rule is made known by the text:

whose desire for liberation has arisen due to the
knowledge that mere action has a result which is
trifling and transient, the desire for the
knowledge of Brahman -the result of which is
limitless and permanent- is sure to follow
immediately afterwards

nonetheless, that invariable rule is not applicable to the topic. Because the desire to know Brahman would be established subsequent to such a rule, but such a rule is not established prior to the desire to know Brahman. If the author of the sūtras would have specified such a rule here and because of that [rule] the postulation of the desire to know Brahman, which would occur subsequently as it is connected with itself [i.e. the rule], could have been made then there would have been application for such an invariable rule, but it is not in the topic under consideration.

Furthermore, without the desire for liberation, the knowledge of such ritual action does not bring about the desire to know Brahman. This has certainly been accepted even by you who have said: "whose desire for liberation has arisen due to the knowledge that mere action has a result which is trifling and transient". But without the knowledge of such ritual action, the desire for liberation certainly brings about that [desire to know Brahman]. So by continuity and discontinuity, only the desire for liberation is understood to be the pre-requisite. And that is certainly included within the fourfold means told by us.

3.26. यत्तु 'न्यायानुगृहीतस्य वाक्यस्यार्थनिश्चयकत्वादापातप्रतीतोऽप्यर्थः संशय-
विपर्ययौ नातिवर्तते । अतस्तन्निर्णयाय वेदान्तवाक्यविचारः कर्तव्य इति चेत्त-
थैव धर्मविचारोऽपि कर्तव्य इति पश्यतु भवान् ? (श्रीभा० पृ० ४ प० २०)
इत्युक्तं तत्रोच्यते । यद्यप्यनेन दृष्टान्तेन धर्मविचारस्य कर्तव्यत्वं प्राप्तं तथापि
वेदान्तवाक्यविचारात्प्राग्धर्मविचारस्यावश्यकर्तव्यता नैव सिध्यति । तदासिद्धौ
हि तस्य पूर्ववृत्तत्वेनाक्षेपो दुर्लभ एव । किंच येषां कर्मणोऽस्थिरफलत्वबुद्ध्या
कर्मविचारस्यानावश्यकत्वेन तत्रोदासीनता जायते तेषां मध्ये कस्यचिद्ब्रह्मज्ञा-
नस्य स्थिरफलत्वबुद्धिश्वेत्तन्निर्णयायानधीतपूर्वमीमांसाशास्त्रस्यापि ब्रह्मविचारे
प्रवृत्तिः संभवति । तस्मात्साधनचतुष्टयमेव पूर्ववृत्तमिति सिद्धम् ।

3.26. But what has been said (Śrī.B.Para.6.p.7.):

[objection by Advaitin] Because a sentence supported by reasoning is what determines the meaning, a meaning, though understood at first glance, is not above doubt and error. Therefore an investigation of the Vedānta sentences has to be done for the ascertainment of that [meaning].

[reply] You should see that an investigation of dharma, too, has to be undertaken in just the same way.

In regard to that, it is said: although by this example the necessity of

an investigation of dharma is arrived at, still, that the investigation of dharma has necessarily to be undertaken prior to the investigation of the Vedānta sentences is certainly not established. Indeed, when that is not established, the postulation of it as the pre-requisite is certainly difficult to be achieved.

Moreover, because of the idea that ritual action has a transient result, the investigation of ritual action is not a necessity and indifference to it arises for people. Among those, if someone has the idea that the knowledge of Brahman has a permanent result, then to ascertain that [result] the undertaking of an investigation about Brahman is possible even though such a person has not studied the prior mīmāṃsā scripture. Therefore it is established that the fourfold means are alone the pre-requisite.

3.27.

साधनचतुष्टयसंपत्त्यनन्तरं च महावाक्यादिभ्यो जायमानं ज्ञानं यदि केवलं
शाब्दं ज्ञानमेव तर्हि तन्नाविद्यानिवर्तकम् । किं तु महावाक्यादिभ्यो जायमान-
आत्मसाक्षात्कारा- मात्मप्रत्यक्षमविद्यानिवर्तकम् । ज्ञानत्वव्याप्य-
दविद्यानिवृत्तिः जात्योः शाब्दत्वप्रत्यक्षत्वयोः संकरस्तु न दोषा-
वहः । उपाधेयसंकरेऽप्युपाध्योरसंकरात् । वाक्य-
मपि प्रत्यक्षज्ञानहेतुर्भवत्येव । दशमस्त्वमसीत्यादौ यथा ।

3.27. Following the acquisition of the fourfold means, knowledge arises from the "great statements" etc. If the knowledge is merely verbal then it does not remove Ignorance. But the perception of the Self arising from the "great statements" etc. removes Ignorance. But the mixture of what is verbal and what is perceptual, which are two classes pervaded by knowledge, does not lead to a defect. Because even though there is the mixture in the locus [knowledge] there is no mixture of the attributes [perception and verbal testimony]. Even a sentence is certainly the cause of perceptual knowledge, just as in the case of "you are the tenth" etc.

comment

There is an unstated objection here. Perceptual knowledge reveals

an object directly, such as the perception of a book. However verbal knowledge produces only indirect knowledge, such as the book is over there on the table. If you say that verbal testimony gives direct knowledge then there would be confusion of the two means of knowledge.

Abhyankar answers by saying that all varieties of knowledge such as perceptual knowledge, verbal testimony, inferential knowledge etc. are pervaded (vyāpya) by knowledge which is the pervader (vyāpaka). Though they all share the common locus (upādheya) of knowledge, there is no mixture of the attributes (upādhi) i.e. the varieties of knowledge. Just as, for example, individuals retain their separate characteristics while sharing the common locus of humanity. So while knowledge is common to all types of knowledge, each particular type remains separate and thus there is no confusion between perceptual knowledge and verbal testimony.

Advaitins consider that verbal testimony can generate mediate or perceptual i.e. direct knowledge depending on whether the thing to be denoted is remote (parokṣa) or immediate (aparokṣa). In the case of the statement "heaven exists", verbal testimony can only produce mediate knowledge since heaven is something remote. However if the thing to be revealed is immediate to experience, then verbal testimony can give direct knowledge. In the case of the boy who was seeking the tenth member of his group, having forgotten to count himself while he was counting the other nine, the statement that: "you are the tenth" should cause direct knowledge.¹⁸ In the same way, Advaitins maintain that the "great sentences" of the Upaniṣads have the capacity to generate immediate knowledge because Brahman is the very essence of the individual.¹⁹

3.28.

एतदेव महावाक्या-

दिभ्यो जायमानमात्मप्रत्यक्षमात्मा वा अरे द्रष्टव्यः (वृ० २ । ४ । ५) इत्यनया श्रुत्या विधीयते । द्रष्टव्यः साक्षात्करणीयः । द्रष्टव्य इत्युक्तम्, परंतु कथं दृश्ये-
तेत्याकाङ्क्षायां दर्शनसाधनत्वेन श्रोतव्यो मन्तव्यो निदिध्यासितव्यः (वृ०
२ । ४ । ५) इत्यत्र श्रवणादिकं विधीयते । न च श्रवणं शाब्दज्ञानसाधनं न
दर्शनसाधनमिति कथं दर्शनसाधनत्वेन श्रवणविधानमिति वाच्यम् । वाक्यमपि
प्रत्यक्षज्ञानहेतुर्भवत्येवेत्यनुपदमेवोक्तत्वात् । एतेन ' अविद्यानिवृत्तये वेदान्ता-
क्यैर्विधित्सतं ज्ञानं न वाक्यार्थज्ञानमात्रम् । तस्य विधानमन्तरेणापि वाक्यादेव
सिद्धेः । तावन्मात्रेणाविद्यानिवृत्त्यनुपलब्धेश्च' (श्रीभा० पृ० ७५० १३) इति
परास्तम् । वाक्ये श्रुते तदर्थज्ञानाय विध्यनपेक्षायामपि श्रवणे प्रवृत्त्यर्थं विधेरा-
वश्यकत्वात् । प्रत्यक्षत्वानाक्रान्तेन केवलशाब्दज्ञानेनाविद्याया अनिवृत्तिस्त्वस्मा-
कमपि संमतैव । यत्तु भेदवासनायामनिरस्तायां महावाक्यादिभ्योऽविद्यानिवर्त-

कज्ञानोत्पत्तिर्न भवतीत्याशङ्क्य 'सत्यां सामग्र्यां ज्ञानानुत्पत्त्यनुपपत्तेः' (श्रीभा-
 पृ० ७ प० १८) इत्युक्तं तदिष्टापत्तिग्रस्तम् । ज्ञाने जाते तु न सद्य एव विदे-
 हमुक्तिरिति नियमः । ज्ञानेनाप्यविनष्टस्य प्रारब्धकर्मणः फलभोगसमाप्तिपर्यन्तं
 भेदज्ञानानुवृत्तेः सत्त्वात् । आप्तवाक्यादिभ्यश्चन्द्रैकत्वनिश्चयेऽपि चक्षुर्दोषस्यावि-
 नष्टत्वे द्विचन्द्रज्ञानानुवृत्तिवत् । परं तु तद्विद्यमानमपि भेदज्ञानं छिन्नमूलत्वान्न
 बन्धाय भवति ।'

3.28. This very perceptual knowledge of the Self which arises from the "great statements" etc. is enjoined by this sacred text: "the Self, my dear, should be seen" (Brh.2.4.5.). "Should be seen" means that it should be made directly evident. With regard to the expectation that: "should be seen" has been said, but how should it be seen?", listening etc. is enjoined as the means for seeing: "it should be heard, thought about and meditated upon" (Brh.2.4.5.). It should not be said: listening is the means for verbal knowledge it is not a means for "seeing", so how can there be the prescription of listening as the means of "seeing"? [reason] Because what you have just said is immediately after [what we have shown]: "even a sentence is certainly the cause of perceptual knowledge" (3. 27.). On account of this, [the following statement in the Śrībhāṣya , Para.12. p.12]²⁰ is refuted:

the knowledge intended to be enjoined by the Vedānta sentences for the removal of Ignorance is not merely the knowledge of the meaning of the sentences, because that is accomplished just from the sentence even without an injunction and because there is no perception of the removal of Ignorance merely by that [knowledge of the meaning].

Because an injunction is necessary for the sake of engaging in listening, though when the sentence is heard there is no requirement of an injunction to understand its meaning. However we also certainly accept that there is no removal of Ignorance by merely verbal knowledge which

is not possessed of immediacy.

Having raised the doubt; when the mental impression of difference has not been dispelled, there is no production of knowledge from the "great sentences" etc. which removes Ignorance. What has been said [by way of reply] (Śrī.B.Para.12.p.12.): "because there is no logical possibility of the non-production of knowledge when the means [for its production] are present" is accepted as the desired conclusion. But when knowledge has arisen, there is no rule that liberation free from the body takes place immediately. Because the knowledge of difference continues to persist until the completion of the experience of the result of action which has begun to operate (prārabdhakarma) which is not destroyed even by knowledge. Just like the knowledge of a second moon persists if the defect of the eye is not eliminated, even upon the ascertainment from the statements of competent people etc. that there is a single moon. But that knowledge of difference, though remaining, does not lead to bondage because its root [i.e. Ignorance] has been cut.

3.29.

यत्तु 'सत्यपि वाक्यार्थज्ञानेऽनादिवासनाया भेदज्ञानमनु-
वर्तत इति भवता न शक्यते वक्तुम् । भेदज्ञानसामग्र्या अपि वासनाया मिथ्यारूपत्वेन ज्ञानोत्पत्त्यैव निवृत्तत्वात् । ज्ञानोत्पत्तावपि मिथ्यारूपायास्तस्या अनिवृत्तौ निवर्तकान्तराभावात्कदाचिदपि नास्या वासनाया निवृत्तिः' (श्रीभा० पृ० ७ प० २०) इत्युक्तं तन्न । ज्ञानेन या भेदवासनाया निवृत्तिर्भवति सा न ज्ञानसमकालं सर्वथा निवृत्तिः । किं तु ज्ञानसमकालं निवृत्त्यारम्भः । ततो भेदवासनाया न वृद्धिर्नापि पूर्ववत्स्थितिः । कारणाभावात् । प्रत्युत क्रमेण क्षीयमाणा स्वत एव सर्वथा विनश्यति न निवर्तकान्तरमन्यत्किंचिदपेक्षते । यत्तु 'वासनाकार्यं भेदज्ञानं छिन्नमूलमथ चानुवर्तत इति वालिशभाषितम्' (श्रीभा० पृ० ८ प० ४) इत्युक्तं तदेव वालिशभाषितवद्दृश्यते । यतो यथा छिन्नमूलो वृक्षश्छेदसमकालमेव न म्लानो भवति किं तु छेदसमकालं म्लानेरारम्भ एव जायते ततः केनचित्कालेन सर्वथा म्लानो भवति शुष्को भवति पुनः प्ररोहायोग्यश्च भवति तथात्र स्वीकारे बाधकाभावात् । यत्तु 'भेदवासनाया अनादिकालोपचितत्वेनापारिमितत्वात्तद्विरोधिभावनायाश्चाल्पत्वादनया तन्निरसनानुपपत्तेः' (श्रीभा० पृ० ८ प० ९) इत्युक्तं तच्चिन्त्यम् । क्वचिद्भूगृहादौ भूगृह-

व्यापकमपि बहुकालविद्यमानमपि च तिमिरं सद्यः प्रवेशितोऽल्पोऽपि दीपो विना-
शयति तद्वद्भेदेवासनाया निराससंभवात् । तथा च महावाक्यादिजन्यात्मसा-
क्षात्कारादविद्यानिवृत्तिरिति सिद्धम् ।

3.29. But what has been said (Śrī.B.Para.12.p.13.):

It is not possible for you to say that the knowledge of difference persists because of a beginningless mental impression (vāsanā) even when there is knowledge of the meaning of the [Upaniṣad] sentences. Because the mental impression, which is also the means for the knowledge of difference, ceases just by the rise of knowledge since it is false. If there is no cessation of that [mental impression of difference], which is something false, even upon the production of knowledge, then there would be no cessation of this mental impression at any time because there is no other removing agency.

That is not correct. The cessation of the mental impression of difference is through knowledge and that cessation does not take place completely at the same time as knowledge. But there is commencement of the cessation at the same time as knowledge. Following that, there is no increase of the mental impression of difference nor even does it remain as before since it is without a cause. Rather, wasting away gradually, it completely disappears of its own accord. It does not require another removing agent which is something different.

But what has been said (Śrī.B.Para.12.p.13):

that the knowledge of difference, the effect of the mental impression, has its basis removed and then still persists is a puerile statement.

That only seems like a puerile statement. Because just as a tree whose root has been cut does not become withered at the very same time as

the cutting but the commencement of withering certainly occurs at the time of cutting and then, after some time, it becomes completely withered and dried and incapable of sprouting again, it is similar here [with regard to the removal of the knowledge of difference] because there is nothing to negate its acceptance.

But what has been said (Śrī.B.Para.12.p.13.):

because the mental impression of difference is immeasurable as it has accumulated from beginningless time, and because the contemplation contrary to it is insignificant, there is no logical possibility of its removal by this [contemplation].

That is questionable. Because even a small lamp brought into some underground room etc. instantly removes the darkness even though it pervades the underground room and even though it has been present there a long time, similarly, there is the possibility of the removal of the mental impression of difference. Thus it is established that there is cessation of Ignorance on account of the direct apprehension of the Self brought about by the "great sentences" etc.

3.30.

महावाक्यादिजन्यात्मसाक्षात्कारश्चानवरतात्मभावनया भवति । अयमेवा-
 त्मसाक्षात्कारोऽनुविद्य विजानाति (छा० ८ ।
 आत्मसाक्षात्कारसाध- ७ । १) निचाय्य तन्मृत्युमुखात्प्रमुच्यते (का० २
 नम् ३ । १५) आत्मा वा अरे द्रष्टव्यः (वृ० २ । ४ ।
 ५) इत्यादिश्रुतिषु विजानाति निचाय्य द्रष्टव्य
 इत्यादिशब्दैः प्रतिपाद्यते । विज्ञाय प्रज्ञां कुर्वीत (वृ० ४ । ४ । २१)
 इत्यत्राप्येवमेव । आत्मजिज्ञासापरिसमाप्तिकरं ज्ञानं प्रज्ञाशब्देनोच्यते । आत्म-
 साक्षात्कारस्थिरीकरणमिति यावत् । तत्साधनीभूतानवरतात्मभावनया चोमि-
 त्थेवात्मानं ध्यायत (मु० २ । २ । ६) आत्मानमेव लोकमुपासीत (वृ० १ । ४ ।
 १५) आत्मा० निदिध्यासितव्यः (वृ० २ । ४ । ५) इत्यादिश्रुतिषु
 ध्यायतेत्यादिशब्दैरुच्यते । आवृत्तिरसकृदुपदेशात् (ब्र० सू० ४ । १ । १)
 इति सूत्रेणाप्येतदेवोच्यते । एवमासां श्रुतीनां सामीचीन्येनैकवाक्यता संपद्यते ।
 एतेन ' वाक्यार्थज्ञानादन्यदेव ध्यानोपासनादिशब्दवाच्यं ज्ञानं वेदान्तवाक्यैर्वि-

धित्सितम्' (श्रीभा० पृ० ८ । ११) इत्यपास्तम् । प्रत्यक्षतापन्नस्य वाक्यार्थ-
ज्ञानस्य मोक्षसाधनत्वेन प्रागभिहितत्वात् ।

3.30. The direct apprehension of the Self brought about by the "great statements" etc. is due to the continuous contemplation of the Self. This direct apprehension is taught by words such as: "he understands", "having understood" and "should be seen" in the sacred texts such as: "having found out, he understands" (Ch.8.7.1.), "having understood that [Self] he is freed from the jaws of death" (Kaṭha.3.15.), "the Self, my dear, should be seen" (Bṛh.2.4.5.). It is the same here also: "having known, he should bring about wisdom" (Bṛh.4.4.21.). Knowledge which brings about the completion of the desire to know the Self is said by the word "wisdom".²¹ The meaning is: [wisdom] makes the direct apprehension of the Self steady. The continuous contemplation of the Self which is the means for that [steady knowledge] is said by words such as: "you should meditate" etc. in the sacred texts such as: "meditate upon the Self as Om" (Mu.2.2.6.), "contemplate upon the Self [as your own] world" (Bṛh.1.4.15.), "the Self...should be meditated upon" (Bṛh.2.4.5.). This is indeed told by the sūtra also: "repetition [is necessary] since [the texts] instruct repeatedly" (B.S.4.1.1.). Thus the syntactical unity of these sacred texts is properly obtained. On account of this, [the statement in the Śrībhāṣya, Para.12.p.13.] is refuted:

the knowledge intended to be enjoined by the Vedānta sentences can be expressed by such words as "meditation", "contemplation" etc. and is certainly different from the knowledge of the meaning of the sentences.

Because the knowledge of the meaning of the sentence, which has acquired immediacy, was previously mentioned as the means for liberation.

comment

The production of direct knowledge through "continuous contemplation" is in accord with the views of Vācaspatimīśra as expressed in the Bhāmatī, see comment to 1.54.

3.31. यत्तु ' तदिदमपवर्गोपायतया विधित्सितं वेदनमुपासनमित्यवगम्यते । विद्युपास्त्योरव्यतिरेकेणोपक्रमोपसंहारदर्शनात् । मनो ब्रह्मेत्युपासीत (छा० ३ । १८ । १) इत्यत्र भाति च तपति च कीर्त्या यशसा ब्रह्मवर्चसेन य एवं वेद (छा० ३ । १८ । ३) ' (श्रीभा० पृ० ९ । ५) इत्याद्युक्तं तत्रैतन्मुच्यते । उपक्रमोपसंहारयोरेकवाक्यतायै विद्युपास्त्योरेकार्थतावश्यक्येति सत्यम् । किंतु सा विदेरुपासनार्थत्वेनेवोपास्तेर्वेदनार्थत्वेनापि सिध्यतीति 'वेदनमुपासनमित्यवगम्यते' इत्यस्य ' विद्युपास्त्योरव्यतिरेकेणोपक्रमोपसंहारदर्शनात् ' इत्ययं हेतुर्न संभवति । किं चोपासनं नामासकृद्वेदनमेव न त्वन्यत्किञ्चित् । तदनुरोधेन विदेरसकृद्वेदनार्थत्वं त्वस्माभिरपि स्वी क्रियत एव ।

3.31. But what has been said (Śrī.B.Para.13.p.15.):

this knowledge intended to be enjoined as the means for liberation is understood to be contemplation. Because the verbal roots vid and upās are seen in the beginning and at the conclusion to be used without distinction: "contemplate upon the mind as Brahman" (Ch.3.18.1.), "the one who knows in this manner shines and warms with glory, fame and divine splendour" (Ch.3.18.3.). Etc.

In regard to that, it is said in this manner: it is true that an identity of meaning between vid and upās is necessary for the syntactical unity of the beginning and the conclusion. But that [identity of meaning] is established either because knowledge (vid) has the meaning of contemplation or even because contemplation (upās) has the meaning of knowledge. Hence for this [proposition]: "knowledge is understood to be contemplation", this reason: "because the verbal roots vid and upās are seen in the beginning and at the conclusion to be used without distinction" is not possible. Furthermore, what is known as contemplation is only knowledge which is repeated, not anything else. But in accordance

with that [meaning of upāsana], we also certainly accept that vid has the meaning of knowledge which is repeated.

3.32. या चानवरतभावना 'ध्यायत' (मु० २ । २ । ६) इत्यादिशब्दैः श्रुति-
पूक्ता सैव ध्रुवा स्मृतिरित्युच्यते । ध्यै चिन्तायामिति धात्वर्थानुसारेण ध्यैधात्व-
र्थस्य ध्यानस्य तैलधारावदविच्छिन्नस्मृतिसंतानरूपत्वात् । यच्च 'ध्रुवा स्मृतिः
स्मृतिलम्बे सर्वग्रन्थीनां विप्रमोक्षः' (श्रीभा० पृ० ९ । १२) इत्युक्तं तच्च
ध्रुवा स्मृतिः स्वजन्यात्मसाक्षात्कारद्वारा सर्वग्रन्थिविप्रमोक्षसाधनमित्येवं स्यात् ।

भिद्यते हृदयग्रन्थिश्छिद्यन्ते सर्वसंशयाः ।

क्षीयन्ते चास्य कर्माणि तस्मिन्दष्टे परावरे ॥ (मु० २।२।८)

इति श्रुतौ तस्मिन्दष्टे इत्यनेनात्मसाक्षात्कारस्यैव ग्रन्थिविप्रमोक्षसाधनत्वेन
श्रवणात् । यत्तु भिद्यत इति श्रुत्यनुरोधेन ध्रुवस्मृतेर्दर्शनरूपत्वं 'सा च स्मृति-
दर्शनसमानाकारा' (श्रीभा० पृ० ९ । १४) इत्युक्तं तन्न । उक्तरीत्यैक-
वाक्यतासंभवे स्मृतेर्दर्शनरूपत्वकल्पनाया अन्याय्यत्वात् । यच्च तत्रोपप्लम्भकत्वेन
'भवति च स्मृतेर्भावनाप्रकर्षाद्दर्शनरूपता' (श्रीभा० पृ० ९ । १८) इत्युक्तं
तदपि न । तत्र दर्शनस्य दर्शनाभासरूपत्वात् । किं च दर्शनसामग्रीसत्त्वे दर्श-
नस्य सत्यत्वेऽपि दर्शनहेतूनां साहाय्यदानेन ध्रुवा स्मृतिर्दर्शनहेतुर्भवेन्न तु
दर्शनरूपा । किं च दर्शनसामग्रीसत्त्वेऽनुभवभिन्नाया अपि स्मृतेः प्रत्यक्षानुभवत्वं
स्वीकुर्वता त्वयाऽनुभवविशेषस्यैव महावाक्यादिजन्यस्य शाब्दज्ञानस्य प्रत्यक्षा-
नुभवत्वं न स्वी क्रियत इति महदाश्चर्यम् ।

3.32. The continuous contemplation told in the sacred texts by words
such as: "you should meditate" (Mu.2.2.6.) is said to be "steady
remembrance". Because meditation, which is the meaning of the verbal
root dhyai in accordance with the meaning of the root: "dhyai in the
sense of thinking", is in the form of a continuity of remembrance
uninterrupted like the flow of oil. What has been said: "steady
remembrance. Upon the gain of remembrance there is the release of all
knots" (Ch.7.26.2.) must be thus: steady remembrance is the means for
the release of all knots through the direct apprehension of the Self
which is to be produced by itself [i.e. by steady remembrance].
Because only the direct apprehension of the Self is heard as the means
for the release of the knots, by this [statement]: "when that One is
seen" occurring in the sacred text:

When that One who is high and low is seen, the

knot of the heart is untied, all doubts are

dispelled and his actions are destroyed (Mu.2.2.8.).

But what has been said (Śrī.B.Para.14.p.16) is that steady remembrance is of the nature of "seeing" in accordance with the sacred text:

"[the knot of the heart] is untied" (Mu.2.2.8.):

and that remembrance has the same form as "seeing".

That is not so. Because when there is no syntactical unity in the manner previously mentioned, the supposition that remembrance is of the nature of "seeing" is not correct. And what has been said as a support in that matter (Śrī.B.Para.14.p.16.):

remembrance is of the nature of "seeing" because
of the intensity of contemplation.

That is also not the case. Because "seeing" there [in regard to remembrance] has the nature of being a semblance of "seeing". Moreover, in regard to the existence of the means of "seeing", even if the "seeing" is real, steady remembrance would be a cause of "seeing" by giving assistance to the causes of "seeing", but it is not of the nature of "seeing". Furthermore, in regard to the existence of the means of seeing, it is a great wonder that verbal knowledge, which is produced by the "great sentences" etc. and which is certainly a mode of experience, is not accepted as perceptual experience by you who accept that remembrance, though different from experience,²² is a perceptual experience.

3.33. यत्तु 'एवं प्रत्यक्षतापन्नामपवर्गसाधनभूतां स्मृतिं विशिनष्टि-

नायमात्मा प्रवचनेन लभ्यो न मेधया न बहुना श्रुतेन ।

यमेवैष वृणुते तेन लभ्यस्तस्यैष आत्मा विवृणुते तन्नं स्वाम् ॥ (का० २।२३)

इति' (श्रीभा० पृ० १० । ४) इत्युक्तं तच्चिन्त्यम् । अस्यां श्रुतौ स्मृते-
रुल्लेखाभावेन 'स्मृतिं विशिनष्टि' इत्युक्तेरसामञ्जस्यात् ।

3.33. But what has been said (Śrī.B.Para.15.p.17.):

In this manner [the sacred text] distinguishes remembrance, which has acquired the status of direct perception, as the means of liberation: "this Self cannot be gained by exposition, nor by intelligence, nor through much hearing. Whom this [Self] chooses, by him it can be gained. This Self reveals its own form to him" (Kāṭha.2.23.).

That is questionable. Because the statement: " [the sacred text] distinguishes remembrance" is inaccurate since there is no mention of remembrance in this text.

3.34. यत्तु ' एवरूपा ध्रुवानुस्मृतिरेव भक्तिशब्देनाभिधीयते । उपासनपर्यायत्वा-
 भक्तिशब्दार्थः ङ्गक्तिशब्दस्य । अत एव श्रुतिस्मृतिभिरेवमभिधी-
 यते तमेव विदित्वाऽति मृत्युमेति (श्वे० ३ । ८)
 तमेवं विद्वानमृत इह भवति (नृ० पू० उ० ६)
 नान्यः पन्था अयनाय विद्यते (श्वे० ३ । ८)

नाहं वेदैर्न तपसा न दानेन न चेज्यया (गी० ११ । ५३)
 भक्त्या त्वनन्यया शक्य अहमेवंविधोऽर्जुन ।
 ज्ञातुं द्रष्टुं च तत्त्वेन प्रवेष्टुं च परंतप । (गी० ११ । ५४)
 पुरुषः स परः पार्थ भक्त्या लभ्यस्त्वनन्यया । (गी० ८ । २२) '

(श्रीभा० पृ० १० । १९) इत्युक्तं तन्न । एवरूपा ध्रुवानुस्मृतिर्हि प्रत्यक्षता-
 पन्ना स्मृतिः । सा तु न भक्तिः । भक्त्या त्वनन्ययेति त्वयैवोदाहृतेन गीता-
 वाक्येन विरोधात् । तत्र ज्ञाने दर्शने तत्त्वेन प्रवेशे च साधनत्वेन
 भक्तिर्निर्दिश्यते । प्रत्यक्षतापन्नायाः स्मृतेरेव भक्तित्वे तु तस्या
 दर्शनरूपत्वेन दर्शनसाधनत्वासंभवात् । तर्हि का भक्तिरिति चेत्प्रेमविशेष-
 रूपा मनोवृत्तिरिति गृहाण । किंच त्वदुक्तस्यात एवेत्यस्य कोऽर्थः । ध्रुवानुस्मृ-
 तेर्भक्तिशब्देनाभिधानादेवेति वा भक्तिशब्दस्योपासनपर्यायत्वादेवेति वा ।
 उभयथाऽपि तमेवं विदित्वेत्यादिश्रुतीनामुपन्यासस्तत्साधकत्वेन नोपयुज्यते ।
 श्रुतिषु भक्तेरनुल्लेखात् ।

3.34. But what has been said (Śrī.B.Para.15.p.18.):

Steady remembrance of this kind is expressed by
 the word devotion. Because the word devotion
 (bhakti) is a synonym for contemplation

(upāsana). For this very reason, it is expressed by

the sacred texts and the tradition in this way:

"Having known Him alone, one passes beyond death" (Śv.3.8.), "The one who knows Him in this manner becomes immortal here" (Nṛ.Pū.1.6.), "there is no other path for going [beyond death]" (Śv.3.8.), "Not by Vedas, nor by austerity, nor by charity, nor by sacrifice can I [be seen]" (G.11.53.), "But by undivided devotion, O Arjuna destroyer of your enemy, I can, in this form, be known and seen in reality and entered into" (G.11.54.), "But that supreme Person, O son of Pṛthā, can be gained by undivided devotion" (G.8.22.).

That is not correct. Because "steady remembrance of this kind" means remembrance which has acquired the status of direct perception (supra. 3.33. Śrī.B.). But that [remembrance which has acquired the status of direct perception] is not devotion. Because there is contradiction with the Gītā passage which you have just cited: "But by undivided devotion". There, devotion is pointed out as the means for knowledge, for seeing in reality and entry. But if only remembrance which has acquired the status of direct perception is devotion, because that [remembrance] is of the nature of "seeing" there is no possibility of it being the means for "seeing". Then if [you ask] "what is devotion?", [our reply is] understand it to be a mental modification having the form of a particular type of love.

Furthermore, what is the meaning of this: "For this very reason" (supra.) which you mentioned? Is it because only steady remembrance is expressed by the word devotion, or because only the word devotion is a synonym for contemplation? Even both ways, the mention of the sacred texts: "Having known Him alone" etc. is not applicable for proving them since there is no allusion to devotion in [these] sacred texts.

- 3.35. यत्तु ' वेदनस्य ध्यानरूपस्याहरहरनुष्ठीयमानस्याभ्यासाधेयातिशयस्या-
 प्रायणादनुवर्तमानस्य ब्रह्मप्राप्तिसाधनत्वात्तदुत्पत्तये सर्वाण्याश्रमकर्माणि याव-
 ज्जीवमनुष्ठेयानि ' (श्रीभा० पृ० ११।८)
 ज्ञानोत्तरं न कर्मण इत्युक्तं तत्रोच्यते—आ प्रायणादनुवर्तमानत्वं
 आवश्यकत्वम् यदेतद्ब्रह्मप्राप्तिसाधनस्य वेदनस्योच्यते तत्सर्व-
 त्रावश्यकमेवाथ वा काचित्कम् । नाद्यः । मरणा-
 त्प्रागप्यद्वैतात्मसाक्षात्कारसंभवेन तादृशसाक्षात्कारोत्तरं तादृशज्ञानिदृष्ट्या वस्तुतो
 भेदस्याभावेनोक्तवेदनस्यासंभवात् । अथ तदानीमपि शरीरमनःप्रभृत्युपा-
 धीनां सत्त्वेनेतरबद्धजीवदृष्ट्या ज्ञानिकर्तृकं वेदनं संभवतीति चेन्न । तस्य
 ब्रह्मप्राप्त्युत्तरकालभाविनो ब्रह्मप्राप्तिसाधनत्वाभावात् । अन्त्ये त्विष्टापत्तिरेव ।
 यस्य प्रतिबन्धसत्त्वेनास्मिञ्जन्मानि नात्मसाक्षात्कारः किंतु जन्मान्तरे तस्य
 मरणपर्यन्तं वेदनावृत्तेरावश्यकत्वात् । तदेतदुक्तम्—' आ प्रायणात्त्रापि हि
 दृष्टम् ' (ब्र० सू० ४।१।१२) इति । तुषनिवृत्तिपर्यन्तं तण्डुलावघात-
 स्येवात्मसाक्षात्कारपर्यन्तं वेदनावृत्तेरावश्यकत्वेन कस्यचिन्मरणपर्यन्तं तदुत्तरं
 जन्मान्तरेऽपि च वेदनं दृष्टमित्यर्थः । अथवा न तत्सूत्रमात्मविद्याविषयकम् ।
 किंत्वभ्युदयफलकविद्यान्तरविषयकमिति बोध्यम् । एवं चात्मसाक्षात्कारपर्यन्तं
 वेदनावृत्तिः सिद्धा ।

3.35. But what has been said (Śrī.B.Para.16.p.18.):

because knowledge -which is in the form of meditation,
 being performed daily, whose excellence is kindled
 through repetition and which continues until death -
 is the means for the attainment of Brahman, for the
 production of that [knowledge] all the actions
 relating to the stages of life are to be performed
 as long as one lives.

In regard to that, it is said: the knowledge which is the means for
 the attainment of Brahman is said to be continued until death, is
 that [continuation] necessary everywhere or occasionally? Not the
 first, because there is the possibility of the direct apprehension of
 the non-dual Self even prior to death and since, following such
 direct apprehension, difference does not exist in reality according
 to the vision of that person who has such knowledge, therefore the
 knowledge mentioned is not possible. [if you say] Because the limiting
 adjuncts such as body, mind etc. exist even at that time [after the

direct apprehension of the Self], the knowledge, having the person possessing knowledge as its agent, is possible according to the vision of other bound souls. [we reply] No. Because that [knowledge] would relate to a time subsequent to the attainment of Brahman and so it is not the means for the attainment of Brahman. However in the case of the last [alternative], it is certainly the desired conclusion. Because obstructions exist for a person there is no direct apprehension of the Self in this birth, therefore the repetition of knowledge is necessary for him until death in another birth. This has been told: "Until the moment of death, because it is seen there also [in the scripture]" (B.S.4.1.12.). The meaning is that knowledge [ie., meditation] is seen to exist for someone until the time of death or even in another birth following that, because the repetition of knowledge is necessary until the direct apprehension of the Self just as the threshing of grain is necessary until the disappearance of the husk. Alternatively, that sūtra does not refer to Self-knowledge but is to be understood as referring to another knowledge whose result is [worldly] prosperity.²³ Thus the repetition of knowledge until the direct apprehension of the Self has been established.

3.36. साक्षात्कारोत्तरं च न कर्मणः कश्चिदुपयोगः । न केवलमुपयोगाभावः । किं तु तदानीं भेदस्य सत्यत्वेन प्रतिभासाभावात्कर्मणोऽसंभव एव । लोकसंग्रहार्थं लोकदृष्ट्या क्रियमाणं च कर्म न विद्यायां तत्फले मोक्षे वा कंचिद्विशेषमाधत्ते । कर्म तु बद्धावस्थायां चित्तशुद्ध्यात्मजिज्ञासाद्वारा विद्योत्पत्तावुपयुज्यते । 'अग्निहोत्रादि तु तत्कार्यायैव तद्दर्शनात्' (ब्र०सू०४।१।१६) इति सूत्रेणाप्येतदेवोक्तम् । तत्कार्यायैव विद्याख्यकार्यायैव । 'विविदिपन्ति यज्ञेन' (वृ० ४ । ४ । २२) इति श्रुतौ तथा दर्शनादिति तदर्थः । 'सहकारित्वेन च' (ब्र० सू० ३।४।३३) इति सूत्रस्याप्येतदेव तात्पर्यम् । चोऽप्यर्थे । विद्यासहकारित्वेनापि सत्त्वशुद्धिद्वारा विद्यासाधनत्वेनापि नित्यकर्माप्यनुष्ठेयानीति तदर्थः ।

3.36. After the direct apprehension [of the Self] the [prescribed] action has no use whatsoever. Not only is it of no use, but there is certainly no possibility of action because difference does not appear

to be real at that time. And action which, according to the view of the people, is being done for the sake of the welfare of the world does not impart anything special to knowledge or to liberation which is the result of that [knowledge]. Whereas in the state of the bound [souls], action is useful for the production of knowledge through the desire for Self-knowledge due to the purification of the mind. This has certainly been told by the sūtra also: "But Agnihotra etc. are certainly for that result, for it is seen to be so [in the Upaniṣads]" (B.S.4.1.16.). The meaning of that [sūtra] is: "certainly for that result" means certainly for the result known as knowledge. "For it is seen" to be so in the sacred text: "they desire to know through sacrifice..." (Brh.4.4.22.). This is certainly the purport of the sūtra: "Also on account of co-operativeness" (B.S.3.4.33.) as well. The meaning of that [sūtra] is: "And" (ca) has the sense of "also". "Also on account of co-operativeness" to knowledge i.e., the obligatory actions are to be performed also on account of being means to knowledge through purification of the mind.

3.37. यच्च विवेकादिसाधनसप्तकमुक्तं (श्रीभा० पृ० ११ । १५) तदस्मदभिमत-
साधनचतुष्टयादिसाधनेषु यथायोगमन्तर्भवति । कामानभिष्वङ्गरूपस्य विमो-
कस्य ज्ञाने, अभ्यासस्य निदिध्यासने, अनवसादस्य दैन्याभावरूपस्य समाधाने,
अनुद्वर्षस्यातिसंतोषाभावरूपस्यापि समाधानेऽन्तर्भावः । चित्तशुद्धेश्च ज्ञानसा-
धनत्वेन तथा स्वसाधनीभूतस्य कायशुद्धिरूपस्य विवेकस्य, पञ्चमहायज्ञाद्यनुष्ठा-
नरूपक्रियायाः, सत्यार्जवादिकल्याणानां चाक्षेपः सुलभ एव ।

3.37. The sevenfold means beginning with discrimination which have been mentioned (Śrī.B.Para.16.p.19.) are included, according to suitability, in the means such as the "fourfold means" accepted by us. There is the inclusion of freeness of mind (vimoka), in the form of absence of attachment to desires, in control of the mind (śama). There is the inclusion of repetition (abhyāsa) in meditation (nididhyāsana). There is the inclusion of non-dejection (anavasāda), in the form of an absence

of dejection, in single pointed concentration of mind (samādhāna). Non-exultation (anuddharṣa), in the form of absence of excessive satisfaction, is also included in single pointed concentration of mind. And because purification of the mind is a means for knowledge, on account of that [purification of mind], the postulation of discrimination (viveka) in the form of purification of the body which is a means for itself [purification of mind] and the postulation of ritual action (kriyā) in the form of the performance of the five great sacrifices etc. and the postulation of virtues (kalyāṇa) such as truth, straightforwardness etc. is certainly feasible.

- 3.38. एवं साधनसहितस्य विहितकर्मानुष्ठानं चित्तशुद्धिद्वाराऽऽत्मजिज्ञासां जनयति ।
यत्तु ' एवं नियमयुक्तस्याश्रमविहितकर्मानुष्ठानेनैव
कर्मण उपयोगः विद्यानिष्पत्तिरित्युक्तं भवति' (श्रीभा० पृ० १२।
७) इत्युक्तं तन्न । मोक्षसाधनीभूतात्मैक्यविद्या-
निष्पत्तौ द्वैतप्रतिभासमूलककर्मानुष्ठानस्य केनापि प्रकारेणोपयोगासंभवात् ।
विशिष्टाद्वैतवादिनो भवतो मते चात्मोपासनारूपकर्मण आत्मविज्ञानसाधनत्वेऽ-
प्यग्निहोत्रादिविहितकर्मणश्चित्तशुद्धिद्वारैवात्मविज्ञानसाधनत्वं संभवतीति ' आश्रम-
विहितकर्मानुष्ठानेनैव विद्यानिष्पत्तिः' इत्युक्तिश्चिन्तयैव । एवं च कर्मणश्चित्तशुद्धि-
द्वाराऽऽत्मैक्यज्ञानसाधनत्वेऽपि साक्षात्साधनत्वाभावेन न विद्यायाः कर्माङ्गकत्वं
नतरां कर्मसमुच्चितत्वम् ।

3.38. Thus for a person who is possessed of the means, the performance of stipulated actions produces the desire for Self-knowledge through the purification of the mind. But what has been said (Śrī.B.Para.17.p.21.):

Thus what has been said is that there is the production of knowledge only through the performance of actions stipulated according to the stages of life, on the part of a person who observes the prescribed rules.

That is not so. Because the performance of [ritual] actions, which is based upon the appearance of duality, has no possibility of use in any manner whatsoever for the production of knowledge of the oneness of the Self which is the means of liberation. According to your view, that of

an exponent of Viśiṣṭādvaita, even though action in the form of contemplation upon the Self is the means for Self-knowledge, stipulated action such as Agnihotra etc. is possible to be a means for Self-knowledge only through purification of the mind. Thus the statement: "there is the production of knowledge only through the performance of actions stipulated according to the stages of life" is certainly questionable. So even though action is a means for the knowledge of the oneness of the Self through purification of the mind, because it is not directly the means for that [knowledge], knowledge does not have action as a component, even less is [knowledge] combined with action.

3.39.

ननु

विद्यां चाविद्यां च यस्तद्वेदोभयं सह ।

अविद्यया मृत्युं तीर्त्वा विद्ययाऽमृतमश्नुते ॥ (ई० ११)

इति श्रुतौ सहशब्देन विद्याकर्मणोः साहित्यमुच्यते । अविद्याशब्देन कर्मणोऽभिधानादिति चेत्-भ्रान्तोऽसि । अत्र सहशब्दाविद्याकर्मणोर्न समुच्चयः भावात् । यतोऽत्र 'स ह' इति पदद्वयमेवोचितम् । यस्तद्वेदेति यच्छब्दस्य नियमेन तच्छब्दापेक्षणात् । अथ सहशब्दाभावेऽपि चशब्दद्वयेन साहित्यं बोध्यत एवेति चेत्-उच्यते । सहशब्देन चशब्दद्वयेन वा बोध्यमानं विद्याकर्मणोः साहित्यं वेदन एव । यस्तद्वेदेति निर्देशात् । न तु तयोः फलदाने । वेदनेऽपि च तत्साहित्यं यदृच्छया यस्य कस्यचिदेव । यो वेदेति निर्देशात् । न तु सर्वेषां मनुष्याणां साहित्येनैव वेदनमिति नियमः । यथैतद्वयं तत्त्वतो वेत्ति सोऽनेन साधनद्वयेन तत्तत्कार्यं साधयतीति श्रुतेस्तात्पर्यम् । तत्र मृत्युतरणोपायः कर्म । अमृतप्राप्त्युपायो ज्ञानम् । मृत्युशब्देन च मृत्युप्रापकाः कामादयो मनोमला गृह्यन्ते । एतदुक्तं भवति-फलाभिसंधिरहितेन विहितकर्मणा कामादींश्चित्तमलान्दूरीकृत्य चित्तं संशोध्य मोक्षाधिकारी भूत्वा विद्यया मोक्षं लभत इति । तथा च नेयं श्रुतिर्ज्ञानकर्मसमुच्चयसाधिका । प्रत्युतास्माच्छ्रुतिवाक्यात्कर्मणश्चित्तशुद्धावेवोपयोग इत्यवगम्यते ।

3.39. [objection] The combination of knowledge and action is indicated by the word "together" (saha) in the sacred text:

He who knows both knowledge and non-knowledge

together, having crossed over death through

non-knowledge, attains the immortal through
 knowledge (Ísa.11.).

Because action is referred to by the word "non-knowledge".

[reply] You are mistaken. For there is no word "together" here. Because here, the pair of words: "sa" and "ha" is alone correct. Because the word yat in: "He who knows [both] these" invariably requires the word tat. [if you say] Even in the absence of the word "together", the combination is certainly made known by the twofold occurrence of the word "and". [we reply] The combination of knowledge and action which is made known by the word "together" or by the twofold occurrence of the word "and" is only in knowledge. Because there is the specification: "He who knows [both] of these". But [the combination] of those two is not for producing a result. And even in knowledge their combination only occurs for someone by chance. Because there is the specification: "He who knows". But there is no rule that: knowledge for all people is only through combination.

The purport of the sacred text is that he who truly knows this pair accomplishes their respective effects by this twofold means. In regard to those two, [ritual] action is the means of crossing over death. Knowledge is the means for the attainment of the immortal. Impurities of the mind such as desire etc. are understood by the word "death" as they lead to death. This is what has been told: having removed the impurities of the mind such as desires etc. through [performing] the stipulated action without attachment to the result, having purified the mind and become qualified for liberation, he gains liberation through knowledge. So this sacred text does not prove the combination of knowledge and action. On the contrary, it is understood from this passage of the sacred texts that the use of action is only for the purification of the mind.

3.40.

ननु तर्हि ज्ञानिना जनकेन

इयाज सोऽपि सुबहून्यज्ञानव्यपाश्रयः ।

ब्रह्मविद्यामधिष्ठाय तर्तुं मृत्युमविद्यया ॥ (वि० पु० ६।६।१२)

इत्येवं कर्म किमर्थं कृतामिति चेत्—उच्यते । जनकस्य मनोमलाः पूर्वं ज्ञानेन दग्धप्राया एव । तथापि निर्वापिताङ्गनरतुल्या येऽवशिष्टास्तानपि क्षपयितुं यज्ञादिकं कर्म चकारेति तत्तात्पर्यम् । अनेन चैतादृशा अपि चित्तमला विघातका इति बोध्यते । किं च ज्ञानिनोऽपि सतस्तस्य चित्तशुद्धिस्थिरतायै लोकसंग्रहार्थं वा कर्मणि प्रवृत्तिः संभवतीत्यपि बोध्यम् ।

3.40. [objection] Then for what purpose did Janaka, who possessed knowledge, perform action? -

He who had recourse to knowledge, even though abiding in the knowledge of Brahman, he performed many sacrifices to cross over death by non-knowledge (Viṣ.P.6.6.12).

[reply] Janaka's impurities of mind were nearly all previously burnt by knowledge. Still, those that remained were like cooled charcoal and he performed action such as sacrifice to put an end even to those. That is the purport.²⁴ By this it is made known that such impurities of the mind too are impediments. Moreover it is also to be understood that undertaking action is possible even for one who possesses knowledge: for the steadfastness of his purity of mind or for the welfare of the world.

3.41.

यत्तु ' नित्यानित्यवस्तुविवेकादयश्च मीमांसाश्रवणमन्तरेण न संपत्स्यन्ते । फलसाधनेतिकर्तव्यताधिकारिविशेषनिश्चयादृते कर्मस्वरूपतत्फलतत्स्थिरत्वा- स्थिरत्वात्मनित्यत्वादीनां दुरवबोधत्वात् ' (श्री- ब्रह्मजिज्ञासायां न कर्म- भा०पृ० १३५०५) इत्युक्तं तन्न । वस्तुनो नित्यत्वा- मीमांसाया अवश्यापेक्षा नित्यत्वादिकं गुरुमुखादिभ्यः श्रुतवतो विश्वासेन च तदेव निश्चितं भावयतः कर्मस्वरूपाद्यनिर्ण- येऽपि जैमिनिऋतमीमांसाश्रवणमन्तरेणापि च साधनचतुष्टयसंपन्नत्वसंभवात् । लोके च तादृशानामात्मजिज्ञासादर्शनाच्च । विश्वासो हि किं न साधयति । यथा यज्ञादिकर्म स्वर्गादिसाधनमिति गुरुमुखादिभ्यः श्रुतवतस्तत्र विश्वासेन कर्मानुष्ठानमपि मीमांसाश्रवणमन्तरेण लोकैः क्रियमाणं संदृश्यते तद्वत् ।

3.41. But what has been said (Śrī.B.Para.18.p.22f.):

The discrimination between what is permanent and what is impermanent etc. will not be accomplished without the study of the mīmāṃsā. Because the nature of [ritual] action, its result, its constancy or inconstancy, the permanence of the self etc. is difficult to be understood without the ascertainment of the particular result, means, procedure and qualified person.

That is not so. Because a person who has heard from his teacher etc. about the permanency or the impermanency etc. of a thing and on account of trust considers that it is indeed ascertained, has the possibility of being endowed with the "fourfold means" even without the ascertainment of the nature of action etc. and even without the study of the mīmāṃsā written by Jaimini. And because in the world such people are seen to have the desire for Self-knowledge. For what does trust not accomplish? For example, for a person who has heard from his teacher etc. that: "action such as sacrifice is the means to heaven etc.", even his performance of the action is observed by people as done without study of the mīmāṃsā on account of his trust there [in the words of the teacher].

3.42.

नन्वेवं

साधनचतुष्टयसंपत्तावपि साधनचतुष्टयस्य ब्रह्मजिज्ञासासाधनत्वं मीमांसाश्रवण-
मन्तरेण न संपत्स्यते । श्रुतमीमांसो हि विनियोजकानि श्रुतिलिङ्गादीनि प्रमा-
णान्यवबुध्यमानस्तस्मादेवंविच्छान्तो दान्त उपरतस्तिक्षुः समाहितो भूत्वाऽऽ-
त्मन्येवात्मानं पश्येत् (बृ० ४ । ४ । २३) इत्यादौ शमादीनामात्मदर्शने
विनियोगं कर्तुं शक्नोति नान्य इति चेन्मैवम् । श्रुत्यादीनां विनियोजकत्वं हि न
जैमिनिनाऽपूर्वं प्रतिपाद्यते । किं तु लोकसिद्धमेवानूद्यते । अन्यथाऽश्वमानयेत्यादौ
द्वितीयांश्रुत्याऽश्वस्यानयनाङ्गत्वमित्यश्रुतमीमांसेनैतद्वाक्यं श्रुतवताप्यश्वस्यानय-
नाङ्गता न बुध्येतेति बहुव्याकुली स्यात् । तथा च शब्दशक्तिस्वभावसिद्ध
एव विनियोग इति साधनचतुष्टयस्य जिज्ञासासाधनत्वं व्युत्पन्नेन जैमिनिकृत-

मीमांसाश्रवणं विनाप्यवगन्तुं शक्यते । एतेन 'एषां साधनत्वं च विनियोगाव-
सेयम् । विनियोगश्च श्रुतिलिङ्गादिभ्यः । स च तार्तीयः' (श्रीभा० पृ० १३ प०
८) इत्यपास्तम् ।

3.42. [objection] Even upon the accomplishment of the fourfold means in the manner mentioned, the fourfold means will not become the means for the desire to know Brahman without the study of the mīmāṃsā. Because one who has studied the mīmāṃsā and who understands the things which bring about the employment [i.e. the use of a certain thing such as a mantra for a certain purpose] i.e. the means of knowledge such as direct scriptural statement, inferential signs etc.²⁵ is able to undertake the employment of [the values] such as control of the mind etc. in [the sacred texts] such as: "Therefore he who knows as such, having become calm, self-controlled, withdrawn, enduring and concentrated, should see the Self in the self" (Brh.4.4.23.) for the apprehension of the Self. But another person [who has not studied the mīmāṃsā] is not able to do that.

[reply] It is not so. Because direct scriptural statement etc. which bring about the employment [of a certain thing for a certain purpose] are not taught as something new by Jaimini. But only what is established in the world is being referred to. Otherwise, in the case of [a statement] such as: "bring the horse", the horse being the ancillary of bringing would not be understood even by one who has heard this sentence because he has not studied the mīmāṃsā that the horse is ancillary to bringing since an accusative is stated. Hence there would be much confusion. Accordingly, the employment is only established by the nature of the signification of the word. So one who is proficient [i.e. one who knows the connection of a word and its meaning] is able to know that the fourfold means are the means for the desire to know, even without study of the mīmāṃsā written by Jaimini. On account of this, [the statement in the Śrī.B.Para.18.p.23]:

That these [the fourfold means] are the means has to be determined from their employment. The employment [has to be determined] from direct scriptural statement, inferential signs etc. and that is contained in the third [chapter of the Pūrvamīmāṃsā] is refuted.

3.43.

नन्वेवमुत्तरमीमांसाश्रवणं विनापि गुरुमुखादिभ्य आत्माव-
गतिः स्यादिति चेत्—अस्तु । नैतावताऽऽत्मजिज्ञासापेक्षया नियमेन पूर्ववृत्तत्वं ।
जैमिनिष्कृतकर्ममीमांसायाः संभवति । न च 'तस्मादेवंवित्' (वृ० ४ । ४ ।
२३) इति श्रुतावेवंविदित्यनेनात्मज्ञानमनूद्य ततः शमादिसाधनैरात्मानं साक्षात्कु-
र्यादित्युक्तत्वात्कथं शमादीनां जिज्ञासासाधनत्वमवगम्यत इति वाच्यम् ।
उक्तश्रुतौ शमादीनामात्मसाक्षात्कारसाधनत्वोक्तावपि तेषां जिज्ञासासाधनत्व-
स्यानिषेधात् । आत्मज्ञानमनूद्येत्यपि न सम्यक् । एवंशब्दस्य पूर्वोक्तपरामर्श-
कत्वेन ' एवंवित् ' इत्यस्य ' आत्मा कर्मतत्फलसंबन्धशून्यः ' इत्यापाततो
जानन्नित्यर्थात् । किंच ' प्रशान्तचित्ताय शमान्विताय ' (मु० १ । २ । १३)
इतिश्रुतौ श्रवणात्पूर्वभावित्वं शमादीनां स्पष्टमेवोच्यते । तेन च तेषामात्मविचा-
रापेक्षया पूर्ववृत्तत्वं सिध्यति । आत्मविचारश्च श्रवणादिरूपः । श्रवणादिकाले
तदुत्तरमपि च शमादय आवश्यका एवेति त्वन्यत् ।

3.43. [objection] In the same way, could there be knowledge of the Self from the teacher etc. even without the study of the later mīmāṃsā ?

[reply] Certainly. On account of this, the mīmāṃsā of action written by Jaimini is not necessarily the pre-requisite with regard to the desire for Self-knowledge. It should not be said: how can control of the mind etc. be understood as the means for the desire to know? Because having referred to Self-knowledge by this: "he who knows as such" in the sacred text: "Therefore he who knows as such" (Brh.4.4.23.), it is subsequently said that one should directly apprehend the Self by the means such as control of the mind etc. [reason] Because even in the statement in the sacred text cited i.e. that control of the mind etc. are the means for the direct apprehension of the Self, they are not rejected as means for the desire to know. [The statement] "having referred to

Self-knowledge" is also not correct. Because the word "as such" (evam) calls to mind what was previously said, therefore the meaning of this: "he who knows as such" is knowing at first glance [i.e. in a general way] that the Self is free from the connection to action and its result.

Furthermore, control of the mind etc. is very clearly mentioned as the prior condition to listening [to the teaching], in the sacred text: "[to him who approaches properly], whose mind is calm and who is possessed of tranquility" (Mu.1.2.13.). For that reason, those [fourfold means] are established as the pre-requisite with regard to Self-inquiry. Self-inquiry is in the form of listening etc. Control of the mind etc. are certainly necessary at the time of listening etc. and even after that. But that is another thing.

3.44.

यत्तु 'उद्गीथाद्युपासनानां कर्मस्वरूपाधिगमापेक्षा सर्वसंमता' (श्रीभा० पृ० १३ प० १३) इत्युक्तं तदस्तु नाम । तथापि कथं जैमिनिवृत्तपूर्वमीमांसाया आत्मविचारापेक्षया नियमेन पूर्ववृत्तत्वं संभवति । तामन्तरेणापि सामान्यतः कर्मस्वरूपाधिगमसंभवात् । उद्गीथादिविचारस्य प्रासङ्गिकत्वाच्च न तेन पूर्ववृत्तत्वं निश्चेतुं शक्यमित्यपि प्रागुक्तं (पृ० ६० प० ४) न विस्मर्तव्यम् ॥ ६ ॥

3.44. But what has been said (Śrī.B.Para.18.p.23.):²⁶

The contemplations upon the Udgītha etc. are admitted by all to be dependent upon the understanding of the nature of [ritual] action.

That is granted. Still, how is the prior mīmāṃsā written by Jaimini necessarily the pre-requisite with regard to Self-inquiry? Because an understanding of the nature of [ritual] action, in a general way, is possible even without that [Pūrvamīmāṃsā]. And because the investigation of the Udgītha [i.e. the chanting of the Veda] is incidental it cannot determine the pre-requisite, so what has been previously mentioned too (3.24.) is not to be forgotten.

- 3.45. ब्रह्मजिज्ञासायां साधनचतुष्टयसंपन्नोऽधिकारी प्रदर्शितः । तेन च मोक्षसि-
द्धयर्थमात्मज्ञानं संपादनीयम् । तत्र कीदृश आत्मेति चेत्—उच्यते ।
आत्मा प्रोक्तो निर्विशेषो माया तच्छक्तिरीरिता ।
जीवस्तत्प्रतिबिम्बः स्यादीशः सोपाधिकः स्मृतः ॥ ७ ॥

3.45. The one who has acquired the fourfold means has been shown to be qualified for the desire to know Brahman. And by that person, Self-knowledge is to be accomplished for the attainment of liberation. With regard to that, if [you ask]: "what is the nature of the Self?", it is told:

The Self has been taught as being free from distinction, māyā is said to be its power. The individual soul must be a reflection in that [māyā], the Lord is considered to possess a limiting adjunct. 7.

comment

The author states the view of the Vivaraṇa with regard to the nature of the soul and the Lord. See 1.32. and comment.

Abhyankar now commences the examination of Rāmanuja's Mahāsiddhānta.

- 3.46. परमात्मा निर्विशेष इति मायावादिनां सिद्धान्तः । यत्तु 'निर्विशेषवस्तुवादि-
भिर्निर्विशेषे वस्तुनीदं प्रमाणमिति न शक्यते वक्तुम् । सविशेषवस्तुविषयत्वा-
त्सर्वप्रमाणानाम्' (श्रीभा० पृ० २८ प० २) इत्युक्तं तत्रोच्यते । प्रमाणानां
आत्मनि प्रमाणम् प्रमाणान्तरविषयत्वं स्वी क्रियते न वा । आद्ये
तेषामपि प्रमाणान्तराणां प्रमाणान्तरविषयत्वं
वाच्यमित्यनवस्थापातः । अन्त्ये प्रमाणान्तरा-
विषयत्वात्प्रमाणानामप्रमाणत्वं स्यात् । तथा सति व्यवहारलोपप्रसङ्गः । अथ
यदि न प्रमाणानामप्रमाणत्वं किंतु प्रमाणसिद्धत्वमेव । तदर्थं च न प्रमाणान्त-
रापेक्षा । किंतु दीपस्य स्वप्रकाशत्वमिव प्रमाणानां स्वयंप्रमाणत्वमेवेति चेत्तर्हि
सर्वप्रमाणोपजीव्यस्य परमात्मनः स्वयंप्रमाणत्वं कुतो नेष्यते ।

3.46. The conclusion of the exponents of māyā is that the supreme Self is free from distinction. But what has been said (Śrī.B.Para.28.p.45.):

The exponents of a thing free from distinction are

not able to say that "this is the means of knowledge" in regard to a thing free from distinction. Because all means of knowledge have as their object a thing possessing distinction.

In regard to that, it is said: are the means of knowledge accepted as being the object of another means of knowledge or not? In the first case, even those other means of knowledge must be said as the object of another means of knowledge and so there is an infinite regress. In the latter case, the means of knowledge would not have the nature of being a means of knowledge since they are not the object of another means of knowledge. If that is the case, there would be the failure of ordinary relations.

[objection] Suppose the means of knowledge have no invalidity, but are certainly established as the nature of being a means of knowledge. And for that purpose there is no requirement of another means of knowledge, but like a light is self-luminous, the means of knowledge are certainly themselves a means of knowledge.

[reply] Then why is the supreme Self, who is the support of all the means of knowledge, not accepted as having self-validity?

comment

Against Rāmānuja's objection that there is no means of knowledge (perception, inference or verbal testimony) for an entity free from distinction, Abhyankar raises the question: does a means of knowledge need to be verified by another means of knowledge or is it intrinsically valid? If a means of knowledge like perception requires demonstration by another means of proof such as inference, then the validity of the inference would also need to be demonstrated by yet another means of proof etc. However if a means of knowledge is not demonstrated by another means of knowledge then on what grounds can we say that it is a means of knowledge? For example if, as Vedāntins accept, the visual sense organ operating through the material eye is of a subtle nature and hence unknown, then how does one know that it exists? It can be proved to exist since it is the object of inference: the visual sense exists because it illumines an object and whatever illumines an object

must exist.

The Viśiṣṭādvaitin responds by stating that knowledge should be accepted as intrinsically valid and a means of knowledge does not require verification from another source of knowledge. The Advaitin accepts this, since it is his own position, and argues that if a means of knowledge is inherently valid, the existence of Brahman is all the more validated since Brahman is by nature self-evident (svayamprakāśa) awareness without which there could be no operation of a means of knowledge.

This is an initial argument. Strictly speaking it does not answer Rāmānuja's objection that a means of knowledge does not apprehend anything which is free from distinction. Abhyankar now addresses this point.

3.47.

किं च प्रमा-
णानि न स्वविषयत्वेन परं ब्रह्म बोधयन्ति । तदुक्तं विष्णुपुराणे 'यस्मि-
न्ब्रह्मणि सर्वशक्तिनिलये मानानि नो मानिनां निष्ठायै प्रभवन्ति' (वि० पु०
६।८।५७) इति । मानिनां प्रामाणिकानां मानानि प्रमाणानि निष्ठायै परिच्छे-
दाय न प्रभवन्ति समर्थानि न भवन्तीति तदर्थः । किं तु यतः प्रमाणान्यस्तित्वं
प्राप्तानि ततः प्रमाणप्रमेयादिसर्वव्यवहारोपजीव्यं किञ्चित्स्यादित्येवं दूरत एव
स्थित्वा स्वमूलकारणत्वेन सूचयन्ति । न ह्येतावताऽप्रमाणत्वं तस्य । यथा
रूपवद्वस्तुप्रकाशने समर्थो दीपः रूपवन्तमप्यन्धकारं स्वयं दूरत एव स्थित्वा सूच-
यति तद्वत् । तथा च श्रुतौ 'तमसः परस्तात्' (श्वे० ३ । ८) इत्युच्यते ।
यथा च स्वद्योतस्थं तेज आदित्यं प्रकाशयितुमसमर्थं तथा सर्वप्रकाशक आदि-
त्योऽपि परं ब्रह्म प्रकाशयितुमसमर्थः । एतदभिप्रायेणैव श्रुतौ 'ज्योतिषां ज्योतिः'
(वृ० ४ । ४ । १६) इत्युच्यते ।

3.47. Furthermore, the means of knowledge do not reveal the supreme Brahman as their object. That has been told in the Viṣṇupurāṇa:

The means of knowledge, on the part of those who possess the means of knowledge, are not capable of the determination of Brahman the abode of all power... (Viṣ.P.6.8.57.).

The meaning of that is: māninām are those who possess the means of knowledge, mānāni are the means of knowledge, niṣṭhāyai means for determination, na prabhavanti signifies that they [the means of

knowledge] are not capable. But because the means of knowledge have gained existence [from Brahman], therefore, while remaining at a distance, they indirectly indicate as their own root cause that there must be something which is the support of all empirical transactions consisting of the means of knowledge and objects of knowledge etc. That [i.e. the sacred texts] are certainly not invalid merely because of this. Just like a light, which has the capacity to illuminate a thing possessing colour, while itself remaining at a distance indicates that darkness also has [black] colour. It is similar to that. Accordingly, it is said in the sacred text: "beyond darkness" (Śv.3.8.). And just as the light of a firefly is unable to illumine the sun, so too, even the sun which illumines everything is unable to illumine the supreme Brahman. With the same purport as this it is said in the sacred text: "light of lights" (Bṛh.4.4.16.).

comment

Rāmānuja argues that all means of knowledge only make known an object which possesses distinguishing characteristics. Perception reveals its object as possessing the attributes of colour etc. Because inference is based upon perceptual data, it too can only give knowledge of a thing possessing distinction. Verbal testimony is derived from words which can denote either a class concept (jāti) such as the word "cow", or a quality (guṇa) like "white or blue", or an action (kriyā) such as "moving", or a name (saṃjñā i.e. as revealing a substance, svarūpa) like "Devadatta".²⁷ So verbal testimony too is incapable of denoting something free from distinction.

Advaitins accept that words cannot communicate an entity which is free from distinction through their primary expressive power (śakti). The texts such as: "from which [Brahman] words return..." (Tai.2.9.) also convey this meaning. However apart from the primary expressive power, words can also communicate through a secondary or implied signification (lakṣaṇā). Advaitins consider that Brahman, free from distinction, can be directly revealed through certain Upaniṣad statements which function by way of implication, subsequent to the establishment in the texts of the necessary context for the implication to be understood. For example the "great sentence": "you are That" (Ch.6.8.7.) communicates by means of an implied signification (see

comment to 1.48.

Similarly, the scriptural statement defining the nature of Brahman: "Brahman is real, Knowledge and limitless" (satyaṃ jñānam anantaṃ brahma. Tai.2.1.) conveys its meaning through implication.²⁸ The words "real" (satyam) and "Knowledge" (jñānam) are in grammatical apposition (sāmānādhikaranyā) with the word "limitless" (anantam). Because of such apposition, the words "real" and "Knowledge" relinquish the limited meanings generally associated with these words while still retaining their root sense (satya from as "to be" and jñāna from jñā "to know"). So the word "real" in association with the word "limitless" cannot signify something finite and hence it implies only the root meaning free of all limitations i.e. existence per se (sanmātra). So too the word "Knowledge" directly denotes mental states which are an attribute of the intellect,²⁹ but on account of apposition with the word "limitless" it gives up this limited meaning and implies only the root sense of the verb free from any other ascription, i.e. awareness per se (cinmātra). Thus the nature of Brahman is implied, but not directly denoted, by the sentence: "satyaṃ jñānam anantaṃ brahma."³⁰

3.48. परं ब्रह्म स्वभिन्नशक्तिमत् स्वापेक्षयाऽभिन्ना या शक्तिस्तदाश्रयम् । शक्ते-
 आत्मशक्तिर्माया रनुद्भूतत्वादीदृशं तादृशमिति वक्तुमशक्यं निर्गुणं
 निर्विशेषमेकं सद्रूपम् । सृष्टिकाले च सा शक्तिः
 स्वाश्रयमुपजीव्योद्भूताम्बुनः सकाशाद्बुद्बुदवद्भिन्नैव भवति । अतस्तत्प्रतिवि-
 जीवेश्वरौ मात्मानं मन्यते । एवं तादृशशक्तिपरिणामभूतं
 जगच्च परमात्मनः सकाशाद्भिन्नं मन्यते । उद्भू-
 तशक्तिमद्ब्रह्मैश्वरपदवाच्यम् । अयं चेश्वरः सगुणः सविशेष उद्भूतशक्त्या
 कल्पितः । ननु किमर्थमयं शक्त्या कल्पित इति मन्यते । अयमेव मुख्योऽस्तु न
 तु तदतिरिक्तं निर्गुणं निर्विशेषं किञ्चित् । जगदुत्पत्तिस्वितिलयानां तेनैव सिद्धे-
 रिति चेन्न । परमात्मस्वरूपं हि श्रुत्येकसमधिगम्यं
 आत्मनो निर्गुणत्वम् यथाश्रुत्येवाङ्गीकार्यम् । श्रुतौ च क्वचिन्निर्गुणं
 क्वचित्सगुणं च वर्ण्यते । द्विविधश्रुतिनिर्वाहायो-
 क्तरीतिरेव साधीयसी ।

3.48. The supreme Brahman possesses a power which is non-different from itself and it is the locus of that power which is non-different with regard to itself. [Brahman] is one, in the form of existence, free from qualities and free from distinction and is unable to be stated as "such

and such" because its power has not been manifested. At the time of creation, that power, which has been manifested depending upon its own locus, becomes as though different like bubbles from water. For this reason, the individual soul who is reflected in that [power] considers the Self to be different from the supreme Self, even though [the supreme Self] is himself. In the same manner, he considers the world, which is the transformation of such a power, to be different from the supreme Self. Brahman, possessing the power which has been manifested, can be expressed by the word Lord. On account of the manifested power, this Lord is superimposed as possessing quality and distinction.

[objection] One thinks: why has this [Lord] been superimposed by the power? This [Lord] alone must be principal. There is nothing different from Him which is free from quality and free from distinction. For the accomplishment of the origination, sustenance and dissolution of the world is only through Him.

[reply] No. Because the essential nature of the supreme Self can be understood only through the sacred texts and it has to be accepted only according to the sacred texts. In the sacred text, at some place the freedom from qualities is stated and at some [other] place the possession of qualities is stated. The way that has been told is certainly more correct for adherence to the two types of sacred texts.

comment

See comment to 1.9.

3.49.

ननु निर्गुणश्रुतेर्हेयगुणराहित्ये तात्पर्यमस्त्विति चेन्न । गुणशब्दस्य सामान्यमुखप्रवृत्तस्य संकुचितार्थत्वे मानाभावात् । किं च निर्गुणश्रुत्या परमात्मानि गुणानां निषेधः प्रतिपाद्यते । निषेधस्य च प्राप्तिपूर्वकत्वात्परमात्मानि गुणप्राप्तिर्वक्तव्या । सा च न प्रत्यक्षेण । परमात्मनः प्रत्यक्षविषयत्वाभावात् । किं त्वनुमानेन । परमात्मनो जगत्सर्गास्थितिलयकर्तृत्वं ज्ञात्वा तेन हेतुना सर्गाद्युपयोगिनां सर्वज्ञत्वादीनां गुणानां तत्रानुमानं संभवति । न तु हेयगुणानां केनापि प्रकारेण तत्रानुमानसंभवः । तथा च हेयगुणानां प्राप्त्यभावेन कथं तन्निषेधे निर्गुणश्रुतेस्तात्पर्यं कल्पयितुं शक्यते ।

3.49. [objection] The purport of the sacred texts [teaching] freedom from qualities must be in the absence of qualities which are to be abandoned.

[reply] No. Because the word "quality" which is used in a universal and primary sense has no authority to be used in a restricted meaning. Moreover, the negation of qualities in the supreme Self is taught by the sacred texts [denoting] freedom from qualities. And because negation is preceded by attainment, the attainment of qualities in the supreme Self has to be stated. That [attainment] is not through perception, because the supreme Self is not an object of perception. But it is through inference. Having known the supreme Self to be the agent of the creation, sustenance and dissolution of the world, due to that reason, the inference of qualities such as omniscience which are useful for creation etc. is possible there [in the supreme Self]. But there is no possibility of an inference there [in the supreme Self], in any manner whatsoever, of qualities which are to be abandoned. So because there is no attainment of qualities which are to be abandoned, how can the purport of the sacred texts [denoting] freedom from qualities be supposed to refer to their negation?

3.50.

किंच यो यो विशेषः स

स सामान्यप्रकृतिको यथा घटशरावादयस्तत्सामान्यभूतमृत्प्रकृतिका इतिव्याप्ति-
मूलकेनानुमानेनापि निर्विशेषमेव सिध्यति । तदुक्तं व्यासचरणैः 'सामान्यमात्रोपसं-
हारे च कृतोपक्षयमनुमानं न विशेषप्रतिपत्तौ समर्थम्' (योगसू० भा० १ । २५) इति ।

3.50. Furthermore, freedom from distinction is certainly established even by inference which is based upon the pervasion: any distinction has the nature of the universal. Just as a pot, earthenware dish etc. has the nature of clay which is their universal. That has been told by the venerable Vyāsa: "inference is entirely used up in comprehending the mere universal, it has no capacity to ascertain a distinction" (Y.S.B.1.25.).

3.51. निर्विशेषशुद्धब्रह्माङ्गीकारादेव 'यतो वाचो निवर्तन्तेऽप्राप्य मनसा सह' (तै० २ । ४) इति श्रुतिसंगतिः । अन्यथा ब्रह्मणः सगुणत्वेन वाग्विषयत्वात्तथा रामानुजीयैरङ्गीकाराच्च तदसंगतिः स्यात् । न च गुणानामसंख्यत्वेनेयत्वाया अभावात्कात्स्न्येन वाग्विषयत्वाभाव इति तच्छ्रुतित्वात्पर्यामिति वाच्यम् । अप्राप्येतिपदस्वारस्यभङ्गनपत्तेः । गुणानामन्तमप्राप्येति व्याख्यानं त्वध्याहारसंस्वीकारात्किष्टम् । अप्राप्येत्यस्य कर्माकाङ्क्षायां वाङ्निवृत्त्यवधित्वेन यत् इति यच्छब्दनिर्दिष्टस्यैव प्रत्यासत्या लाभाच्च । न चाप्राप्येत्यस्य कर्माकाङ्क्षायां यच्छब्दनिर्दिष्टस्य कृत्स्नगुणविशिष्टस्य परमात्मन एवाक्षेपो भवतु । तत्र च वाक्कर्तृकप्राप्त्यभावो विशेष्ये परमात्मानि बाधितस्तादृशेषणीभूतेषु गुणेष्वपि बाधितो विशेषणविशेषणे गुणगतकात्स्न्ये पर्यवसितो भविष्यति । 'विधिप्रतिषेधौ विशेषणे पर्यवस्यतः सति विशेष्ये बाधे' इति न्यायादिति वाच्यम् । परमात्मनः कृत्स्नगुणविशिष्टत्वेन तत्राप्रकृतत्वात् । उक्तन्यायेन निर्वाहस्यागतिकगतित्वाच्च । एतेन 'यतो ब्रह्मानन्दात्सकाशात्तस्य पारमप्राप्य वाचां मनसश्च निवृत्तिरित्यर्थः' इत्यपास्तम् । 'ते ये शतं प्रजापतेरानन्दाः स एको ब्रह्मण आनन्दः' (तै० २ । ८) इत्येवं ब्रह्मानन्दे वाग्विषयतायाः श्रुत्यैव स्वयमङ्गीकृतत्वाच्च । मनुष्यानन्दस्य जीवैरनुभूतत्वेनोत्तरोत्तरं शतगुणितक्रमेण ब्रह्मानन्दस्य मनसा कल्पयितुं शक्यत्वाच्च । निर्गुणस्य तु वस्तुनो लोके काप्यनुभवाभावेन निर्गुणं ब्रह्म न मनसा कल्पयितुं शक्यम् ।

3.51. There is harmony with the sacred text: "from which [Brahman] words return along with the mind, having not reached" (Tai.2.4.) only because of the acceptance of Brahman as pure and free from distinction. Otherwise, because Brahman possesses qualities it is therefore an object of speech and because the followers of Rāmānuja accept it in that manner there would be incongruity with that [text].

It should not be said that the purport of that sacred text is the absence of being an object of speech in totality, for there is the absence of being "just so much" since the qualities are innumerable. [reason] Because there is the consequence of the loss of self-evidence of the word "having not reached". But the explanation: "having not reached the limit of qualities" is artificial because of the acceptance of the need to supply an ellipsis. And because in the expectation of a grammatical object for this [word] "having not reached", there is the attainment through contiguity only of what has been specified by the

word "which" i.e. "from which" (yatah) since it is the limit for the return of speech.

It should not be said that in the expectation of a grammatical object for this [word] "having not reached", there can be the postulation only of the supreme Self who is distinguished by all qualities and who is specified by the word "which". In regard to that, the absence of attainment of the agency of speech is negated in the supreme Self who is the substantive and it is negated even in the qualities which are the distinguishing attributes of that [supreme Self] and it will terminate in the attribute of an attribute i.e. in the totality belonging to the qualities. For there is the maxim: when the substantive is negated, the positive statement and the negation terminate in the distinguishing attribute.³¹ [reason] Because the supreme Self, as distinguished by all qualities, is not relevant to the topic there. And because the final explanation through the maxim which was stated is a last resort. On account of this, [the explanation]: "from which (yatah) means from the bliss of Brahman, there is the return of speech and mind having not reached (aprapya) the limit of that [bliss of Brahman]" is refuted.³² And because the bliss of Brahman is accepted as an object of speech by the sacred text itself: "the bliss of Prajāpati one hundred [times] is one [measure of the] bliss of Brahman" (Tai.2.8.). And because human bliss is experienced by individual souls, therefore the bliss of Brahman is able to be conceived by the mind by way of multiplication hundreds of times higher and higher. But Brahman free from qualities cannot be conceived by the mind, for there is no experience anywhere in the world of a thing free from qualities.

3.52.

न च त्वदभिमत्स्य निर्विशेषब्रह्मणोऽपि 'निर्गुणम्'
(चू० ७) इति श्रुत्या प्रतिपादितत्वेन वाङ्निवृत्तिश्रुतिरसंगतेति वाच्यम् । वाचो
निवर्तन्त इत्यस्य वाचो विधिमुखेन प्रतिपादयितुं न प्रभवन्तीत्यर्थात् । निर्गुण-
मिति श्रुतिस्तु नेदृशमिति प्रतिपादयति । किं तु केवलं गुणान्निषेधति । अवश्यं

चैतद्विज्ञेयम्। इतरथा 'वाचो निवर्तन्ते' इति श्रुतिः स्वयमेव वागविषयत्वेन रूपेण
ब्रह्म प्रतिपादयन्ती मूकोऽहमित्युक्तिरिव व्याहता स्यादिति ॥ ७ ॥

3.52. It should not be said that the sacred text [denoting] the return of speech is inconsistent since even Brahman free from distinction, which you accept, is taught by the sacred text: "free from qualities" (Cū.7.). [reason] Because the meaning of this: "words return" is that words are unable to teach by way of a positive statement. But the sacred text: "free from qualities" does not teach [that Brahman] is "like this" but it negates qualities entirely. This must necessarily be understood. Otherwise the sacred text: "words return", itself teaching Brahman in a form while it is not an object of speech, would be contradicted like the statement "I am mute". 7.

3.53. यदपि 'यस्तु निर्विशेषं वस्तु स्वात्तुभवसिद्धमिति स्वगोष्ठीनिष्ठः समयः
सोऽप्यात्मसाक्षिकसविशेषानुभवादेव निरस्तः' (श्रीभा० पृ० २८ प० ४)
इत्युक्तं तत्रोच्यते—

सामान्या धीर्निर्विशेषा न धीत्वात्सविशेषता ।

निर्विशेषे प्रमाणं स्यादागमः सोऽपि लौकिकः ॥ ८ ॥

3.53. Although it has been said (Śrī.B.Para.28.p.45.):

The tenet relating to their own school, that an entity free from distinction is established by one's own experience, is also refuted. Because there is only the experience of what possesses distinction with the self as the witness.

With regard to that, it is said:

Universal knowledge is not free from distinction, because it is knowledge. Scripture must be the means of knowledge for what is free from distinction. That [scripture] too is of an

3.54. नास्माभिरिदमहमदर्शमित्यादिलौकिकः सविशेषोऽनुभवः परमात्मशक्तिपारि-
णामभूतजगदन्तर्गतोऽपह्नूयते । किंतु विशेषस्य सामान्यप्रकृतिकत्वाल्लौकिकस-
विशेषानुभवमूलप्रकृतिभूतो निर्विशेषोऽनुभवस्त्वयाऽपह्नूयत इति वैचित्र्यम् ।
यो यो विशेषः स स सामान्यप्रकृतिकः, यथा घटशरावादयस्तत्सामान्यभूतमृत्प्र-
कृतिका इति व्याप्तिस्तु सर्वत्राव्यभिचारितैव । लौकिकं ज्ञानं मनोवृत्तिविशेषरूपं
साश्रयं सविषयं सविकल्पकं च विशेषरूपम् । तदपेक्षया साश्रयं सविषयं निर्वि-
कल्पकं सामान्यम् । तदपेक्षया निर्विषयं साश्रयं सामान्यम् । ज्ञानं हि प्रथमत आश्र-
मपेक्षते ततो विषयम् । तदपेक्षयापि निराश्रयं सामान्यम् । अत्र च धियो धीत्वं
वर्तते । तदपेक्षयापि सद्रूपं सामान्यम् । यत्र च धीत्वमपि न विद्यते । एतन्मूलक
एवानुभूतिरेव सतीति सिद्धान्तः । प्रसिद्धश्चायं निर्विशेषानुभवस्तुरीयावस्थायाम् ।

3.54. We do not deny the experience possessing distinction, which is
of an ordinary nature such as "I saw this", as it is included within
the world which is a modification of the power of the supreme Self.
But because a distinction has the nature of the universal, it is most
strange that you deny the experience free from distinction which has
the nature of being the basis of the experience of an ordinary nature
possessing distinction. The pervasion is everywhere certainly without
deviation; any distinction has the nature of the universal. Just as
a pot, earthenware dish etc. has the nature of clay which is their
universal.

Ordinary knowledge is a particular mental modification and its
special nature is that it possesses a locus, an object and is
determinate. With regard to that, the universal possesses a locus,
an object and is indeterminate. With regard to that, the universal is
without an object and possesses a locus. Because knowledge depends
firstly upon a location and then upon an object. Even with regard to
that, the universal is without a locus. And here, knowledge just has
the nature of being knowledge [as such]. Even with regard to that,
the universal is in the form of existence and it is where even
knowledge as such does not exist. The conclusion based just upon this

is that awareness is indeed existence.³³ This experience free from distinction is well known in the "fourth state".

comment

Abhyankar attempts to demonstrate that knowledge (dhī), which is a particular mental modification, has its substratum in awareness (anubhūti) which is free from distinction (nirviśeṣa) and of the nature of existence (sadrūpa). He enumerates five "stages", each of greater universality than the preceding.

- (1) ordinary knowledge which possesses a locus (āśraya), an object (viśaya) and is of a determinate nature (savikalpaka). For example the knowledge relating to Brahman possessing qualities (saguṇabrahman) possesses a locus i.e. the thinker and an object i.e. Brahman with qualities. It is determinate since there is knowledge of the relation of attribute and substantive (viśeṣanaviśeṣyabhāva).
 - (2) With regard to that, the universal possesses a locus and an object but is indeterminate. For instance the knowledge relating to Brahman free from qualities (nirguṇabrahman) possesses a locus i.e. the thinker and an object i.e. Brahman. It is indeterminate because Brahman is without quality and so there is no attribute-substantive relation.
 - (3) The third stage possesses a locus but has no object. In the cognition: "I have knowledge" (dhīmān) the "I" is the locus but there is no object of knowledge.
 - (4) The universal with reference to that is just that knowledge as such exists.
 - (5) Finally, the absolute universal is in the form of self-evident existence. Because the mental modification has entirely resolved (as in deep sleep) even knowledge as such does not appear. The conclusion is that mere awareness which is of the nature of existence remains as the substratum of all mental activity.
- With regard to the "fourth state", see comment to 1.40.

3.55. यच्च ' केनचिद्युक्त्याभासेन सविशेषान्निष्कृष्यमाणो निर्विशेषोऽनुभवः सत्तातिरेकिभिः स्वासाधारणैः स्वभावविशेषैर्निष्कृष्टव्य इति निष्कर्षहेतुभूतैः सत्तातिरेकिभिः स्वासाधारणैः स्वभावविशेषैः सविशेष एवावतिष्ठते' (श्रीभा० पृ० २८ प० ७) इत्युक्तं तदपि चिन्त्यम् । निष्कर्षो हि पृथक्करणम् । यथा पक्षिणः सकाशात्पशोः । तच्च पशुत्वेन, पक्षाभावेन वा भवति । न हि निष्कर्षो भावरूपेणैव केनचित्स्वभावेन भवतीति राजाज्ञास्ति । तत्र पक्षाभावेन सविशेषत्वं पशोर्न वक्तुं शक्यते । पशुत्वेन तदस्तीत्यन्यदेतत् । तथा च निर्विशेषानुभवस्य विशेषाभावेन पृथक्करणे सविशेषत्वं कथमापाद्यते । नीरूपस्य वायोस्ते-

जोवन्नापेक्षया रूपाभावेन निष्कर्षे कृते सति तत्र रूपाभावेनैव रूपवत्त्वं चालोऽपि न प्रत्येति। विशेषाभावेनापि विशेषवत्त्वेऽङ्गीकृते त्वभावस्य भावत्वापत्तौ स्वरूपहानिरेव स्यात्। अत एव श्रीमद्व्यासचरणैर्योगसूत्रभाष्ये (पा० १सू०९) ' अनुत्पत्तिधर्मा पुरुष इत्युत्पत्तिधर्मस्याभावमात्रमवगम्यते न पुरुषान्वयी धर्मः ' इत्युक्तम् ।।

3.55. What has been said (Śrī.B.Para.28.p.45.):³⁴

an experience free from distinction, which is distinguished from what possesses distinction by some semblance of reasoning, has to be distinguished by natural distinctions peculiar to itself which are different from existence. So the possession of distinction certainly remains due to natural distinctions peculiar to itself which are different from existence and which are the reason for distinguishing.

That too is questionable. Because distinguishing means separating. Like [separating] an animal from a bird. That [separating] is due to the nature of being an animal or due to the absence of wings. For there is no royal decree that distinguishing is only through some nature which exists. In regard to that [distinguishing of an animal], an animal cannot be said to possess distinction due to the absence of wings. That [possession of distinction] is due to the nature of being an animal. This is another matter. Thus in separating an experience free from distinction due to the absence of a distinction, how does the possession of distinction occur? When air which has no form is distinguished due to the absence of form with regard to fire, water and food, even a child does not believe that there is the possession of form there [in air] due to the very absence of form. But if the possession of a distinction is accepted even due to the absence of distinction, then in the occurrence of what is non-existent becoming

existent, there would certainly be loss of the essential nature. For this reason, the venerable Vyāsa has said in the commentary upon the Yogasūtras: " 'the puruṣa has the attribute of not being born', the mere absence of the attribute of being born is understood. Not an attribute connected to the puruṣa" (Y.S.1.9.).

comment

The purport of the argument is that distinguishing between things can be brought about either through the presence of an attribute or through the absence of an attribute. Hence a cow can be distinguished from a bird due to the absence of having wings. However an entity cannot be said to possess a distinction merely on the ground that it does not possess an attribute.

3.56. न च विशेषप्रकृतिभूतत्वेन मायावाद्यभिमताया निर्विशेषानुभूतेर्विशेषप्रकृतित्वरूपो विशेषोऽवर्जनीय इति वाच्यम् । विशेषप्रकृतित्वस्य विशेषरूपत्वे पुनरपि तादृशविशेषप्रकृतित्वमन्यो विशेष इत्यनवस्थापातात् । तथा च यथा रामानुजमते ब्रह्मणः सविशेषत्वेऽपि सविशेषत्वमेव विशेषश्चेत्तादृशविशेषसहितत्वमन्यो विशेष इत्यनवस्थावारणाय सविशेषत्वं न विशेष इत्यङ्गीकार्यं तथैव मायावादिमतेऽपि विशेषप्रकृतित्वं न विशेष इत्यधीत्वादयो न विशेषाः ङ्गी क्रियते । अथ सविशेषत्वं न विशेषः किंतु विशेषराहित्याभावमात्रमिति चेद्विशेषप्रकृतित्वमपि भासमानविशेषानधिष्ठानत्वाभावमात्रमिति गृहाण । एवं धीत्वं न भावरूपो धर्मः । किंतु जडत्वाभावमात्रम् । तथा स्वयंप्रकाशत्वमपि परप्रकाशत्वाभावमात्रमेव । एतेन ' धियो हि धीत्वं स्वयंप्रकाशता च ' (श्रीभा० पृ० २८ प० १२) इति सविशेषत्वापादनमपास्तम् । एवं नित्यत्वं विनाशाभावमात्रम् । एकत्वं द्वितीयाभावमात्रमिति बोध्यम् । ' निर्गुणम् ' (चू० ७ । २) ' निरञ्जनम् ' (श्वे० ६ । १९) इत्यादिरागमश्च निर्विशेषे वस्तुनि प्रमाणम् ।

3.56. It should not be said that because awareness free from distinction is accepted by the exponents of māyā as having the distinction of being the material cause, a distinction in the form of the distinction of being the material cause cannot be avoided. [reason] Because there is the fault of infinite regress: if the distinction of being the material cause is a distinction, then once again such a

distinction which is the nature of being the material cause is [yet] another distinction. And so, like in the view of Rāmānuja, although Brahman possesses distinction it has to be accepted that the possession of distinction is not a distinction in order to avoid the infinite regress; if the possession of distinction is itself a distinction, the possession of such a distinction is [yet] another distinction, in just the same way, according to the view of the exponents of māyā as well, the distinction of being the material cause is accepted as not being a distinction.

If [you say] that the possession of distinction is not a distinction, but it is merely the absence of being devoid of distinction, [we say] that you must accept that the distinction of being the material cause too is merely the absence of not being the substratum of the distinctions which appear. Thus the quality of being knowledge is not a positive attribute, but it is merely the absence of being inert. Similarly, self-luminosity too is merely the absence of being illumined by another. Due to this, the establishing of the possession of distinction (Śrī.B.Para.28.p.46.): "because knowledge has the quality of being knowledge and the quality of self-luminosity" is refuted. In the same way, it is to be understood that the quality of being eternal is merely the absence of destruction. The quality of being one is merely the absence of a second. The scripture, such as: "free from qualities" (Cū.7.2.), "without taint" (Śv.6.19.) is the means of knowledge for an entity free from distinction.

comment

The purport of the discussion about the distinction of being the material cause, is that if the nature of being the material cause is considered to be a distinction, then there should be a cause for that distinction and again a cause for that distinction and so there is no finality.

3.57. यत्तु 'शब्दस्य तु विशेषेण सविशेष एव वस्तुन्यभिधानसामर्थ्यम् । पदवाक्यरूपेण प्रवृत्तेः । प्रकृतिप्रत्यययोगेन हि पदत्वम् । प्रकृतिप्रत्यययोरर्थभेदेन पदस्यैव विशिष्टार्थप्रतिपादनमवर्जनीयम् । पदभेदश्चार्थभेदनिवन्धनः । पदसंघातरूपस्य वाक्यस्यानेकपदार्थसंसर्गविशेषाभिधायित्वेन निर्विशेषवस्तुप्रतिपादनासामर्थ्यान्न निर्विशेषवस्तुनि शब्दः प्रमाणम्' (श्रीभा० पृ० २८ प० १९) इत्यनेन ग्रन्थेन निर्विशेषवस्तुनः

निर्विशेषस्यापि शब्दात्प्र- शब्दप्रमाणकत्वाभावप्रतिपादनं तत्सर्वं यदा शब्दो
तीतिः वाच्यवृत्त्या विधिमुखेन स्वरूपलक्षणतश्च किञ्चि-
द्वस्तु प्रतिपादयितुं प्रवर्तते तदैव नान्यथा । तथा हि । शब्दस्यार्थप्रतिपादनेऽनेके
प्रकारा दृश्यन्ते । शब्दो हि क्वचिद्विधिमुखेनार्थं प्रतिपादयति क्वचिन्निषेधमुखेन ।
तथा क्वचित्स्वरूपलक्षणेन क्वचित्तटस्थलक्षणेन । एवं क्वचिद्वाच्यवृत्त्या क्वचिद्वि-
क्षणयेति । यद्यपि व्यञ्जना वृत्त्यन्तरं तथापि तत्र शक्तिलक्षणान्यतरदावश्य-
कमेवेति न तस्या विविक्तं किञ्चिदप्युदाहरणम् । तत्र निर्विशेषं वस्तु ' ईदृशं
तादृशम्' इति वक्तुमशक्यमिति यद्यपि शब्दो विधिरूपेण निर्विशेषं वस्तु प्रतिपा-
दयितुं न शक्नोति तथापि निषेधरूपेण प्रतिपादयितुं शक्नोत्येव । यथा निर्गुणम्
(चू० ७ । २) निरञ्जनम् (श्वे० ६ । १९) अशब्दमस्पर्शम् (का० १३ ।
१५) इत्यादि । अत्र च लक्षणावृत्त्या शब्दो निर्विशेषं ब्रह्म बोधयति ।
निर्गुणादिपदवाच्यत्वस्यापि वस्तुतस्तत्राभावात् । तथा यद्यपि शब्दो निर्वि-
शेषं वस्तु स्वरूपलक्षणतो न प्रतिपादयति तथापि तटस्थलक्षणतः प्रतिपादयितुं
शक्नोत्येव । यथा ' यतो वा इमानि भूतानि जायन्ते ' (तै० ३ । १ । १)
इत्यादि । यद्यप्येतत्तटस्थलक्षणं सोपाधिकस्य सविशेषस्य ब्रह्मणस्तथापि तदुप-
जीव्यस्य निर्विशेषस्य तद्द्वारा संभवतीति बोध्यम् । आगमप्रतिपाद्यत्वं
चैतल्लोकदृष्ट्या बोध्यम् । आगमस्यापि लौकिकत्वात् । श्रुतौ परमार्थसत्त्वा-
भावस्य 'वेदा अवेदाः' (वृ० ४ । ३ । २२) इति श्रुत्यैव स्वयं प्रतिपादनात् ॥८॥

3.57. But what is being taught by this text (Śrī.B.Para.28.p.46.):

Verbal testimony, especially, has the capacity of denoting only an entity possessing distinction.

Because it functions through words and sentences.

Now a word is due to the connection of the stem and the affix. Since the stem and the affix have a

difference in meaning, the imparting of a

qualified meaning on the part of the word itself

cannot be avoided. And the difference among words

is based upon the difference of meanings. Because

a sentence is a collection of words, it denotes a

particular combination of the meanings of several words and therefore has no capacity for teaching about an entity free from distinction. [Hence] verbal testimony is not a means of knowledge for an entity free from distinction

is that an entity which is free from distinction does not have verbal testimony as its means of knowledge. That is when a word undertakes to teach about something through primary signification, by way of a positive statement and from essential definition. Not otherwise.

To explain. A word is seen to have many ways of teaching a meaning. Because a word teaches a meaning at some place by way of a positive statement and somewhere [else] by way of negation. So too, somewhere by way of an essential definition and somewhere [else] through an incidental definition. In the same way, somewhere through the primary signification and at some place through implication. Although suggestion is another type of signification, still, it necessarily gives either of the two: the express meaning or an implied meaning, so it does not illustrate anything different.³⁵

There [in respect of the usage of words], an entity free from distinction cannot be said as: "such and such", so although a word is unable to teach an entity free from distinction through a positive statement, still, it is certainly able to teach through negation. For instance: "free from qualities" (Cū.7.2.), "without taint" (Śv.6.19.), "without sound, without touch" (Kaṭha.1.3.15.) etc. Here [in respect of negation], a word communicates Brahman free from distinction through secondary signification [i.e. implication]. Because even the primary meaning of the words "free from qualities" etc. does not exist there [in Brahman] in reality. So too, although a word does not teach an entity free from distinction through an essential definition, still, it is certainly able to teach through an incidental definition. For example: "from which these beings are born" (Tai.3.1.1.) etc.

It must be understood that although this incidental definition is for Brahman who possesses a limiting adjunct and has distinction, still, by means of that [Brahman possessing distinction], it is possible to be for [Brahman] free from distinction which is the support of that [Brahman possessing distinction]. This [incidental definition] taught by the scripture has to be understood according to the ordinary view, because even the scripture is of an ordinary nature.³⁶ For the absence of absolute existence in regard to the sacred texts is taught by the sacred text itself: "the Vedas are no longer Vedas..." (Brh.4.3.22.).

comment

Abhyankar states that Brahman cannot be directly denoted through the primary signification of a word (vācyavṛtti), for a word primarily expresses either a class concept, a quality, an action, or a name (see comment 3.47.). He also maintains that a positive statement (vidhi) is unable to reveal Brahman, for such a statement would communicate by way of a subject-predicate construction denoting the relation of an attribute and its possessor. A positive statement has no applicability since Brahman is said to be free from attributes.

Abhyankar also considers that the nature of Brahman cannot be revealed through an essential definition, i.e. a definition by means of the essential nature (svarūpalakṣaṇa). Such a definition requires that the essential nature of the thing be offered as the definition (svarūpam eva lakṣaṇam).³⁷ The essential nature can itself be the definition if there is an assumed distinction between the defining characteristics and the thing to be defined, so once again there is a relation of attributes and their possessor.³⁸ Although this relation is only a conceptual formulation for the purpose of the definition, Abhyankar presumably classes svarūpalakṣaṇa along with the previous two modes because of the above reason.

However the principal view is that the nature of Brahman can be revealed through an essential definition.³⁹ In his commentary upon the passage: "Brahman is real, Knowledge and limitless" (Tai.2.1.), Śaṅkara states on six occasions that the passage is intended to provide the definition of Brahman.⁴⁰ Śaṅkara considers that such a passage reveals the essence of Brahman through the implied meaning of the words⁴¹ (see comment to 3.47.).

Rāmānuja's contention is that verbal testimony cannot be a means of knowledge for something free from distinguishing characteristics since it

functions through words which possess a distinct meaning and sentences which express a particular relation between the different meanings of the words. Advaitins reply that even if a sentence does express such a relation, there is no rule that the object of the purport of the sentence must possess the distinctions belonging to the various words. The purport of a sentence can be different from what is denoted by the relation of the words. For instance, if I express disapproval at my friends plan of dining with my enemy by telling him: "go eat poison" (viṣam bhukṣva), the intention is not that he should eat poison but that he should not eat with such a person. A sentence can also express a non-relational meaning. For example: "this is that Devadatta" conveys a non-relational sense because the relation denoted by "this" referring to the present place and time and the relation expressed by "that" referring to a past place and time are both negated so that the sentence points to the bare substantive ⁴² (see comment to 1.45. Thus while a sentence can convey a relational meaning, it need not always do so.⁴³ The deciding factor is the purport.

- 3.58. यत्तु 'प्रत्यक्षस्य निर्विकल्पकसविकल्पकभेदभिन्नस्य न निर्विशेषस्तुनि
प्रमाणभावः' (श्रीभा० पृ० २९ प० १) इत्युक्तं तत्रोच्यते—
सन्मात्रग्राहि संप्रोक्तं प्रत्यक्षं निर्विकल्पकम् ।
भेदसंस्थानजातीनां नान्योन्यात्मकता भवेत् ॥ ९ ॥

3.58. But what has been said (Śrī.B.Para.29.p.47.):

Perception, which is divided due to the difference between indeterminate and determinate, is not a means of knowledge for an entity free from distinction.

In regard to that, it is said:

Perception which is indeterminate is declared as apprehending pure existence. Difference, configuration and the generic character cannot be mutually of the same nature. 9.

- 3.59. रामानुजीयैरङ्गीकृतस्य निर्विकल्पकस्य स्वकपोलकल्पितत्वेन तस्य निर्विशेष-

वस्तुनि प्रमाणभावो मा भूनाम । वस्तुतो निर्विकल्पकं तु विकल्पेन रहितम् ।
विकल्पश्च नामजात्यादिविशेष एवेति तद्रहितं प्रत्यक्षं निर्विकल्पकम् । यथाऽयं
देवदत्त इति विशेषज्ञानात्प्राक् तदपेक्षया सामान्यज्ञानमयं ब्राह्मण इति । ततः
प्राक् तदपेक्षया सामान्यज्ञानमयं मनुष्य इति । ततोऽपि पूर्वं तदपेक्षया सामान्य-
ज्ञानमयमुन्नतः पदार्थ इति । ततोऽपि पूर्वमिदं किंचिदिति । अत्र यथाकथंचिच्छ-
ब्देन प्रदर्शनीयमित्येव किंचिच्छब्दोपन्यासः । न तु तज्ज्ञानस्य किंचित्त्वधर्मप्र-
कारकत्वम् । प्रायभिरुज्ञाने कोऽपि धर्मो न
निर्विकल्पकप्रत्यक्षस्य भासत इत्येवेदं किंचिदितिशब्दप्रयोगतात्पर्यम् ।
सन्नात्रप्राहित्वम् तथैवानुभवात् । इदमेव हि वस्तुतो निर्विकल्प-
कम् । अस्य च निर्विशेषवस्तुनि प्रमाणभावः
संभवत्येव । तुरीयावस्थायां हि तथैव प्रत्यक्षम् । सुप्तोत्थितस्य ह्यहमिदमिति
विशेषज्ञानात्प्राक् क्षणं योऽनुभवो यत्र ज्ञातृज्ञेययोरपि ज्ञानात्पार्थक्येन न प्रतीति-
स्तद्रूपं हि तत् ।

3.59. Because the indeterminate [perception] accepted by Rāmānuja is something constructed by his own imagination it most certainly could not be a means of knowledge for an entity free from distinction. But in actual fact, indeterminate means free from distinction. A distinction is just the particular name, generic character etc., so the perception free from that is indeterminate [i.e. free from any distinction].

For example. Prior to the particular knowledge "this is Devadatta", there is the general knowledge with regard to it, i.e. "this is a brāhmaṇa". Prior to that, there is the general knowledge with regard to it, i.e. "this is a man". Even before that, there is the general knowledge with regard to it, i.e. "this is a tall thing". Even before that, [there is the idea] "this is something". There is the mention of the word "something" only because somehow or other it has to be shown by a word. But not because the knowledge of that [indeterminate thing] has the attribute of "somethingness" as its mode. The purport of the use of the words "this is something" is just that in the initial knowledge no attribute whatsoever appears. Because experience is exactly in that manner. This alone is what is known in reality as indeterminate. And this is certainly possible to be a means of

knowledge for an entity free from distinction.

For perception is exactly in that manner in the fourth state. The momentary experience, prior to the distinct knowledge "I and this" on the part of the person who has awoken from sleep, in which there is no cognition of even the knower or the known separately from Knowledge is indeed that ["fourth state"].

3.60. यत् 'निर्विकल्पकमेकजातीयद्रव्येषु प्रथमपिण्डग्रहणम् । द्वितीयादिपिण्डग्रहणं सविकल्पकमित्युच्यते । तत्र प्रथमपिण्डग्रहणे गोत्वा-
निष्प्रकारकमेव निर्वि- देरनुवृत्ताकारता नः प्रतीयते । द्वितीयादिपिण्डग्र-
कल्पकम् ह्येष्वेवानुवृत्तिप्रतीतिः' (श्रीभा० पृ० २९ प०
९) इत्युक्तं तदयुक्तम् । इदं किञ्चिदित्यादिनिर्विशे-
पप्रतीतेः प्रसिद्धाया अपलापायोगात् । निर्विकल्पकशब्दे विकल्पशब्दस्यानुवृत्त्य-
र्थकत्वे प्रमाणाभावाच्च । किञ्च तादृशप्रत्यक्षभेदद्वयस्य निरनुवृत्तिकसानुवृ-
त्तिकशब्दाभ्यामेव व्यवहारो युक्तो न तु निर्विकल्पकसविकल्पकशब्दाभ्याम् ।
किं च प्रथमप्रतीतिजन्यः संस्कारो यस्य नष्टस्तस्य द्वितीयप्रतीतावप्यनुवृत्तिर्न
प्रतीयत इति द्वितीयप्रतीतेरपि निर्विकल्पकत्वं स्यात् । अपि च गवादेः प्रथमप्र-
तीतादेव सामान्यलक्षणप्रत्यासत्त्या सकलगोव्यक्त्यलौकिकप्रत्यक्षमिति वैशेषि-
करीत्यभ्युपगमे तस्य सविकल्पकत्वं स्यादिति यत्किञ्चिदेतत् ।

3.60. But what has been said (Śrī.B.Para.29.p.47.):

Indeterminate [perception] is the apprehension of the first object among things belonging to the same class. Determinate is said as the apprehension of the second object etc. Upon the apprehension of the first object, the "cowness" etc. is not recognized as a form which persists [in other cows]. There is the cognition of it persisting only in the case of the apprehension of the second object and so on.

That is not correct. Because the well known cognition free from distinction such as "this is something" has no connection with concealment. And because there is no means of knowledge for the word

"distinction" (vikalpa) in the word "indeterminate" (nirvikalpaka) to have the meaning of persisting.

Furthermore, an expression of the twofold difference of that type of perception is correct only through the two words: not having [something] persisting and having [something] persisting, but not through the words: indeterminate and determinate. Moreover, for a person whose mental impression produced by the first cognition [of the object] has vanished, its persisting even in the second cognition is not recognized and so even the second cognition would be indeterminate. Moreover, upon the acceptance of the way of the Vaiśeṣikas: that there is the extraordinary perception of all individual cows through contact with the universal characteristic in the very first cognition of a cow etc., that [perception] would be determinate. So this is a mere trifle.

comment

Advaitins criticize Rāmānuja's explanation of indeterminate (nirvikalpaka) perception (see text, 2.44.) because his interpretation does not coincide with the meaning of the word "indeterminate". When a cognition has as its object a distinction such as a name, generic character etc. then it is a determinate perception. When it is without such distinction, it is an indeterminate perception (see text, 3.59.).⁴⁴

According to Rāmānuja, the distinction between indeterminate and determinate perception lies in the fact that in the former the generic character is not recognized as persisting in other members of the same class whereas in the latter perception it is known to persist. However in both types of perception there is the cognition of such distinctions as name and generic character etc., so that even in indeterminate perception there is the apprehension: "this is Devadatta", "this is a brāhmaṇa" etc. Advaitins argue that due to the cognition of such distinctions, Rāmānuja's "indeterminate" perception is only determinate perception and the use of the word "indeterminate" to characterize it is incorrect.⁴⁵

The mention of the "way of the Vaiśeṣikas" i.e. the explanation employed by Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika for the determination of the generic character or an invariably concomitant relation (vyāpti), is not applicable here since the Viśiṣṭādvaitins do not hold this view.⁴⁶

- 3.61. यत्तु 'प्रत्यक्षस्य सविशेषविषयत्वेन प्रत्यक्षाद्विदृष्टसंबन्धविशिष्टविषयत्वाद्-
 अनुमानेन निर्विशेष- ३० प० १९) इत्युक्तं तदपि चिन्त्यम् । यो
 वस्तुसिद्धिः यो विशेषः स सामान्यप्रकृतिको यथा घटशरा-
 वादयो भेदास्तत्सामान्यभूतमृत्प्रकृतिका इति प्रा-
 गुक्त (पृ०७१।प०१) व्याप्तिसत्त्वादिशेषे सामान्यप्रकृतिकत्वेऽनुमिते निर्विशेषस्य
 सामान्यस्य सिद्धत्वात् ।

3.61. But what has been said (Śrī.B.Para.29.p.49.):

Because perception refers to what possesses
 distinction, inference also refers to what
 possesses distinction because its object is
 qualified by the connection to what has
 been seen through perception etc.

That too is questionable. Because the universal is established as
 free from distinction when a distinction is inferred to have the nature
 of the universal, due to the existence of the pervasion previously
 mentioned (3.54): any distinction has the nature of the universal .
 Just as the differences such as a pot, earthenware dish etc. have the
 nature of clay which is their universal.

comment

The particulars have the nature of their universal, but the
 universal is inherently free from the attributes of the particular.
 While a pot has the nature of the clay, its universal, the latter
 is not inherently connected to the form of a pot. The clay too has
 the nature of its universal, i.e. its material cause such as atoms etc.
 That universal has the nature of its universal and so on until there
 is the termination in the highest universal: pure existence which
 contains all distinctions and yet possesses no distinction.

- 3.62. ये तु 'वस्तुगतस्वभावविशेषैस्तदेव वस्तु निर्विशेषमिति
 वदन्नननीवन्ध्यात्वप्रतिज्ञावत् स्ववाग्विरोधित्वमपि न जानाति' (श्रीभा०पृ०३१
 प०२) इत्युपहासं कुर्वन्ति तैरयमुपहासः कस्य कृत इति त एव प्रष्टव्याः । माया-
 वादिनस्तु भासमानविशेषानधिष्ठानत्वाभावमात्रेण निर्विशेषं वस्तु वदन्ति न तु
 केनचिदपि स्वभावविशेषेणेति । तादृशं च निर्विशेषं ब्रह्म तुरीयावस्थार्या निर्विक-

ल्पकप्रत्यक्षेण गृह्यत इत्यनुपदमेवोक्तम् । अत्र च ज्ञातृज्ञेययोरप्यनवभास एव । किं त्विदं प्रत्यक्षं सन्मात्रग्राहि । न तु भेदविषयम् । अत्र च ग्राह्यग्राहकभेदोऽपि नास्ति किमुत विषयगतो भेदः । सन्मात्रग्राहीत्युक्तिरौपचारिकी । तथा 'निर्विशेषं ब्रह्म निर्विकल्पकप्रत्यक्षेण गृह्यते' इत्युक्तिरप्यौपचारिकी । एतदेवाद्वैतं 'सदेव' (छा० ६ । २ । १) इत्यादिश्रुतिभिः प्रतिपाद्यत इति शास्त्रप्रत्यक्षयोरविरोध एव । निर्विशेषानुभूतिरूपमिदं ब्रह्मोद्भूतयाऽनाद्यविद्यारूपतच्छब्दतया रूपान्तरं प्राप्तमिव ज्ञातृज्ञेयसहितं यद्भासते तदेवेदं किञ्चिदित्यादिकं लौकिकं निर्विकल्पकादिकं प्रत्यक्षम् । घटोऽयं न पट इत्यादिलौकिकप्रत्यक्षे तु ग्राह्यग्राहकभेदो घटपटादिभेदश्च भासत एव ।

3.62. But those who ridicule (Śrī.B.Para.29.p.49.):

[a person] who says that the very thing is free from distinction on account of the natural distinctions belonging to the thing does not know the contradiction in his own speech. It is like the assertion about the barrenness of [one's own] mother.

They must certainly be asked: this ridicule is about whom? The exponents of māyā say that an entity is free from distinction merely through the absence of not being the substratum of the distinctions which are appearing. But not because of some natural distinction.

It was just mentioned (3.59.) that such a Brahman, free from distinction, is apprehended through indeterminate perception in the fourth state. Here, there is certainly no appearance of even the knower or the known. But this perception apprehends pure existence. It does not have difference as its object. And here, even the difference of apprehended and apprehending does not exist, what to speak of difference belonging to the object. The statement: "apprehends pure existence" is figurative. So too, even the statement: "Brahman, free from distinction, is apprehended through indeterminate perception" is figurative. This very non-duality is taught by the sacred texts such as: "Existence alone..." (Ch.6.2.1.), thus there is certainly no contradiction between scripture and perception. This Brahman, whose nature is awareness free from distinction and which has as though

acquired another nature associated with the knower and the known because its power in the form of beginningless Ignorance is manifested, is the indeterminate etc. perception of an ordinary nature such as: "that which appears, that is something". But in the ordinary perception such as: "this is a pot, not a cloth", the difference of apprehended and apprehending and the difference between the pot and the cloth etc. certainly appears.

comment

Advaitins also consider deep sleep to be a perceptual experience free from distinction. For upon waking there is the recollection: "I did not know anything" and the cause of such a recollection can be inferred to be indeterminate perception since there is no recollection without an experience.⁴⁷

3.63. ननु भेदो विकल्पासहत्वाद्दुर्निरूपः । तथा हि—भेदस्तावन्न वस्तुनः स्वरूपम् ।
 वस्तुस्वरूपे गृहीते स्वरूपव्यवहारवत्सर्वस्मान्भेद-
 भेदस्य दुर्निरूपत्वम् व्यवहारप्रसक्तेः । न च स्वरूपे गृहीतेऽपि भिन्न
 इति व्यवहारस्य प्रतियोगिसव्यपेक्षत्वात्तत्स्मर-
 णाभावेन तदानीमेव न भेदव्यवहार इति वाच्यम् । स्वरूपमात्रभेदवादिनो हि
 प्रतियोगिसव्यपेक्षा च नोत्प्रेक्षितुं क्षमा । स्वरूपभेदयोः स्वरूपत्वाविशेषात् ।
 यथा स्वरूपव्यवहारो न प्रतियोग्यपेक्षः, भेदव्यवहारोऽपि तथैव स्यात् । हस्तः
 कर इतिवद्घटो भिन्न इति पर्यायत्वं च स्यात् । नापि धर्मः । धर्मत्वे सति
 तस्य स्वरूपाद्भेदोऽवश्याश्रयणीयः । अन्यथा स्वरूपमेव स्यात् । भेदे च तस्यापि
 भेदस्तद्धर्मस्तस्यापीत्यनवस्था । भेदान्तराकल्पने तु प्राथमिको भेदः स्वाश्रया-
 द्भिन्न इति व्यवहारो न स्यात् । स्वस्मिन्स्वरूपव्यवहारहेतुत्वासंभवात् । किं च
 जात्यादिधर्मविशिष्टवस्तुग्रहणे सति भेदग्रहणं भेदग्रहणे सति जात्यादिधर्मवि-
 शिष्टवस्तुग्रहणमित्यन्योन्याश्रयः । एवं च भेदो दुर्निरूप इति चेदस्तु ।

3.63. [objection by Rāmānuja's opponent]⁴⁸ Difference is difficult to determine since it does not admit [definite] alternatives. To explain: in the first place, difference is not the essential nature of the object. Because when the nature of the object is apprehended, just as there is the expression of its nature, there would be the expression of its difference from everything. It should not be said that even when the essential nature is apprehended, because the expression "different"

depends upon a counter correlate, there is no expression of difference at that very time because there is no recollection of that [counter correlate]. [reason] Because the requirement of a counter correlate is not able to be observed for one who holds that difference is nothing but the essential nature. For the essential nature and difference are in essence the same. Just as the expression of the essential nature does not require a counter correlate, the expression of difference too should be just the same. And "pot" and "different" should be synonyms like "hand" (hasta) and "hand" (kara).

Nor even is [difference] an attribute. If it is an attribute, its difference from the essential nature has to be necessarily accepted. Otherwise it would be the same as the essential nature. In the case of difference, there would be difference even for that [first difference] which is an attribute of that [first difference] and for that [second difference] also. Thus there would be an infinite regress. But⁴⁹ if there is no supposition of another difference, there could be no expression that the initial difference is different from its own locus. For there is no possibility of a cause for the expression [i.e. that it is different] for itself with regard to itself.

Furthermore, there is the apprehension of difference when there is apprehension of the object qualified by attributes such as generic character etc. and there is apprehension of the object qualified by attributes such as generic character etc. when there is the apprehension of difference. So there is mutual dependence. Thus difference is difficult to determine.

[reply by Advaitin] So be it.

comment

The position of the Advaitins, as represented by Maṇḍanamīśra,⁵⁰ is that perception does not have difference for its object. The object of perception is pure existence (sanmātra). Difference, as a reality, cannot be proved through any means of knowledge. Conversely, Rāmānuja maintains that a thing qualified by the generic character is the object

of perception. The perception of the generic character is the cause for a statement of difference about the object itself or something else, because the generic character requires a counter correlate.⁵¹

According to the Advaitin, perception simply reveals the object, it has no capacity to differentiate one object from another. A perception such as: "this is a pot", "this is a cloth" apprehends mere being defined by the form of pot or cloth. The perceptual objects are limiting adjuncts of existence which persists as the reality in all cognitions.⁵² The Advaitin contends that a statement about the difference of a pot from cloth is not within the scope of a perceptual means of knowledge since perception apprehends only the bare object. Nor can it be established through another means of knowledge such as inference.⁵³ Though difference is something well known in the world (lokaprasiddha), the Advaitin maintains that it is not proved through a means of knowledge (pramāṇaprasiddha).⁵⁴

The argument presented in the text to demonstrate the difficulty in arriving at the nature of difference can be exemplified by a statement like: "the pot is different from the book". Is the difference which belongs to the pot identical with the essential nature of the pot or is it an attribute of the pot? If it is the essential nature, then upon the mention of its nature there would be the mention of its difference from everything and the further statement that it is "different" would be unnecessary. Also, the essential nature cannot be identical with difference because the mention of the essential nature i.e. pot, does not require the mention of a counter correlate. However the mention of "difference" does require a counter correlate for it creates the expectation of something which there is difference from. Hence they cannot be identical.

Nor is difference an attribute of the pot. For if difference (d) is an attribute of the essential nature then there must be another difference (d¹), which is an attribute of the first difference, in order to distinguish the first difference from the essential nature. Otherwise it would be identical to the essential nature. So too, another difference (d²), which is an attribute of d¹, is necessary in order to distinguish d¹ from d. To distinguish d² from d¹ another difference has to be postulated and so there would be an infinite regress (anavasthā).

Finally, the argument is put forward that an attempt to establish difference involves the fallacy of mutual dependence (anyonyāśraya) because difference is established when there is apprehension of the

object qualified by its generic character, but without first apprehending the difference of a pot from a book it is not possible to know that "this has the generic character of a pot".⁵⁵

3.64. न च दुर्निरूपत्वे घटोऽयं न पट इत्यादिभेदप्रतिभासः कथमुपपद्यत इति वाच्यम् । न हि प्रतिभासे परमार्थसद्वस्तुनोऽपेक्षा । शुक्तिरजताद्यवभासानुपपत्तेः । 'बुद्धीनां सालम्बनत्वमात्रनियमात्' (श्रीभा० पृ० ५६ प० १७) इति वदता त्वयापि तथैवाङ्गीकृतम् ! किं चेदं भेदस्य दुर्निरूपत्वं तस्याविद्याकार्यत्वं प्रत्याययति । यत्तु भेदो न दुर्निरूप इत्याशयेन 'संवेदनवद्रूपादिवच्च परत्र व्यवहारविशेषहेतोः स्वस्मिन्नपि तद्व्यवहारहेतुत्वं मायावादिभिरभ्युपेतं भेदस्यापि संभवत्येव' (श्रीभा० पृ० ३१ प० ९) इत्युक्तं तन्न । वैपण्यात् । रूपं हि स्वाश्रये घटे चाक्षुषत्वं जनयत्स्वस्मिन्नपि चाक्षुषत्वं जनयति । परं तु तदेव रूपं स्वाश्रये घटे रूपवानिति व्यवहारं जनयदपि न स्वस्मिस्तादृशं व्यवहारं जनयति । एवं ज्ञानमपि स्वविषये घटे प्रकाशमानत्वे स्वस्मिन्प्रकाशमानत्वे च कारणं भवति । परं तु तदेव ज्ञानं स्वाश्रय आत्मनि ज्ञानवानिति व्यवहारं जनयदपि न स्वस्मिस्तादृशं व्यवहारं जनयति । आश्रयाश्रयिभावस्य भेदाधीनस्य स्वस्कन्धारोहणवत्स्वस्मिन्नसंभवात् । तथायं घटगतः पटप्रतियोगिको भेदः स्वाश्रये घटे पटाद्भिन्न इति व्यवहारं जनयन्नपि न स्वस्मिन् भिन्न इति व्यवहारं जनयेत् । भिन्नो नाम भेदवानेव ।

3.64. It should not be said that if [difference] is difficult to determine, how is the appearance of difference logically possible in the manner that: "this is a pot, not cloth" etc.? [reason] Because in an appearance there is no requirement for the thing to be absolutely real. For there is no logical possibility of the appearance of silver upon a pearl-oyster etc. You also have accepted it to be exactly the same by saying (Śrī.B.Para.47.p.86): "because cognitions invariably have an object". Moreover, the difficulty of determining difference proves that it is an effect of Ignorance.

But what has been said with the intention that difference is not difficult to determine (Śrī.B.Para.30.p.50.):

Just as awareness and colour etc. are accepted by the exponents of māyā to be the cause for a particular expression elsewhere and the cause for an expression even in regard to themselves,

it is certainly possible for difference as well.

That is not so. Because there is dissimilarity. Because colour produces visibility in a pot which is its locus and it produces visibility even in regard to itself. But that very colour, though producing the expression "possessing colour" in regard to the pot which is its locus, it does not produce such an expression about itself. In the same manner, Knowledge also is the cause for the illumination of the pot which is its object and it is the cause for its own illumination. But that very Knowledge, though producing the expression "possessing Knowledge" in regard to the Self which is its locus, it does not produce such an expression about itself. Because the state of locus and its possessor, which is dependent upon difference, is impossible in oneself, like mounting upon one's own shoulders. Similarly, this difference belonging to the pot which has cloth as its counter correlate, though producing the expression "different from cloth" in regard to the pot which is its locus, it cannot produce the expression "different" about itself. What is known as "different" is only what possesses difference.

comment

The Advaitin has argued that if difference is identical to the essential nature there is no need to use the word difference at all. If it is an attribute, then an infinite regress would occur. In reply, Rāmānuja states that there is no fault of infinite regress because just as colour reveals its locus as possessing colour and reveals itself, or just as awareness reveals its locus as possessing awareness and also reveals itself, so too, difference reveals difference and reveals itself as well.

Abhyankar answers that the illustration of colour or awareness does not establish the point. Colour, for example, reveals its locus as possessing colour: "this pot has colour" but it cannot reveal itself as having colour. So too, even if difference is able to reveal another thing as possessing difference such as a pot, it is not able to reveal itself as having difference.

- 3.65. यत्तु 'संस्थानमेव जातिः' (श्रीभा० पृ० ३२ प० १३) 'गोत्वादिजातिरेव भेदः' (श्रीभा० पृ० ३२ प० १५) इत्युक्तं तच्चिन्त्यम् । संस्थानस्य जातिव्यञ्जकत्वात् । संस्थानं नामावयवरचनाविशेषः । न संस्थानं जातिश्च हि स एव जातिः । अणूनां महतां दीर्घग्रीवा- पृथगेव षामुन्नतमुखानां विस्तीर्णोदराणां च विविधानां घटानां संस्थानस्य प्रतिव्यक्ति भिन्नस्यानुभवात् । संस्थानानां मिथः केनचिद्धर्मेण साम्यमस्तीत्यन्यदेतत् । द्वयोः कार्षापणयोः संस्थानस्यात्यन्तसाम्येऽप्यैक्याभावात् । एकस्मिन्कार्षापणे छिन्ने तदीय एवाकार- शिछन्नो भवति नान्यकार्षापणीयः । कार्षापणत्वजातिस्तु सर्वेषु कार्षापणेष्वेकैव । जातिरेव भेद इत्यपि न सम्यक् । जातेर्भेदबोधकत्वेन तदपेक्षया पार्थक्यात् । किं च जातेरेव भेदत्वे घटोऽयं न पट इति प्रयोगा- जातिर्भेदबोधिका नुपपत्तिः । घटशब्देनैव घटत्वजातेरुक्तत्वेन पुन न तु भेदः स्तदर्थकनञः प्रयोगायोगात् ।

3.65 But what has been said (Śrī.B.Para.30.p.51.):

the configuration is itself the generic character. The generic character such as cowness etc. is itself difference.

That is questionable. Because the configuration indicates the generic character. What is known as "configuration" is the particular arrangement of the component parts. That is certainly not itself the generic character. Because there is the experience that the configuration of various types of pots: those which are minute, large, have long necks, projecting mouths or broad bellies, is different with regard to each individual. It is quite another matter that there is a mutual similarity of the configurations due to some attribute. Because even though the configuration of two Kārṣāpaṇa coins has very great similarity it is not identical. When one Kārṣāpaṇa coin is chipped, only the form belonging to that is chipped and not [the form] belonging to another Kārṣāpaṇa. But the generic character of being a Kārṣāpaṇa coin is just one in all Kārṣāpaṇa coins.

"The generic character is itself difference" is also not correct. Because the generic character reveals difference, it is separate with

regard to that. Moreover if the generic character is itself difference, there is no logical possibility of the usage: "this is a pot, not cloth". Because since the generic character of potness is said just by the word pot, there is no possibility of the usage of a negative particle which again has that meaning [i.e. the generic character].

comment

Rāmānuja considers that the configuration (saṁsthāna) i.e. the distinctive form of the object, constitutes the generic character (jāti) of the object: for it is only the particular configuration, such as the dew lap of a cow, that is seen to inhere in all members of the same class.⁵⁶ Moreover, Rāmānuja equates generic character with the determination of difference, because upon the apprehension of the generic character such as cowness there is exclusion of all other classes like buffaloes etc.⁵⁷

In reply, it is argued that the configuration reveals the generic character but they are not identical. Though all the members of a class partake of a very similar configuration, their respective configurations are not identical: the configuration of Devadatta's cow does not itself exist in Yajñadatta's cow. The generic character, however, is identical.⁵⁸

Nor is generic character identical with difference. Rather, it is what reveals the difference of members of one class from those of another class. If the generic character and difference were identical then they should be synonyms and in the expression: "this is a pot, not cloth" the use of the negative particle is redundant since it too would refer to the generic character. Moreover, when the statement is uttered: "there is difference of a pot from a piece of cloth", nobody understands it to mean: "there is the generic character of a pot from a piece of cloth".⁵⁹ The mention of the configuration such as: "this is a wide brimmed pot", or the generic character: "pot" does not require the statement of a counter correlate. However the word "difference" requires a counter correlate (because of the expectation: "different from what?"), so the configuration or the generic character cannot be identical to difference.⁶⁰

3.66.

किंच १ गोत्वं, भेदः,

अभेदनिवृत्तिश्चेत्येते त्रयोऽर्था मिथो भिन्नाः क्रमेण
ज्ञायन्ते, उत २ त्रयमप्येकमेव, अथवा ३ गोत्वं भेदश्चैकोऽभेदनिवृत्तिः
पृथक्, आहोस्विद् ४ भेदोऽभेदनिवृत्तिश्चेत्यनयोरेक्यं गोत्वं पृथक् । एवमेते

चत्वारः कल्पाः । तत्र प्रतीतिशरणैस्त्रयोऽप्यर्था भिन्नाः स्वीक्रियन्त इत्याद्यः कल्पः । 'एक एवार्थः । लाघवात् । प्रतीतिस्तु शब्दस्वाभाव्यात्तथा तथा भवति' इति द्वितीयः । प्रतीतिर्लाघवं चेत्युभयानुसारिणां तृतीयचतुर्थौ । तत्र रामानुजीयानां तृतीयः । गोत्वादिरेव भेदः (श्रीभा० पृ० ३२ प० १५) भेदग्रहणेनैव ह्यभेदनिवृत्तिः (श्रीभा० पृ० ३३ प० १) इति वदद्भिः स्पष्टमेव तथाङ्गीकारात् । परं तु तदपेक्षया चतुर्थो युक्तः । अभेदो हि भेदाभावः । तदभावोऽभेदनिवृत्तिः । भेदाभावाभाव इति यावत् । अभावाभावस्य प्रतियोगित्वरूपत्वं सर्वजनीनमेव । तत्र भेदस्याभेदनिवृत्त्या सहैक्यं प्रसिद्धं परित्यज्य गोत्वस्य भेदेन सहैक्यमप्रसिद्धमपि स्वी क्रियत इति कोऽयं रामानुजीयानां पन्थाः ।

3.66. Furthermore, are these three meanings: cowness, difference and the cessation of non-difference known to be mutually different respectively? Or are the three just one? Alternatively, are cowness and difference one and is the cessation of non-difference separate? Or perhaps there is the identity of these two: difference and the cessation of non-difference and cowness is separate? Thus there are these four alternatives. With regard to those, the first alternative is that those who rely upon cognition accept the three meanings to be different. The second is that the meaning is just one, on account of simplicity. But the cognition is like that due to the natural character of words. The third and fourth are for those who follow both cognition and simplicity. With regard to those, the third is the view of Rāmānuja since it is very clearly accepted to be so by his saying (Śrī.B.Para.30.p.51.): "cowness etc. is itself difference", and (Śrī.B.Para.31.p.52.): "Because there is the cessation of non-difference only through the apprehension of difference". But with regard to that, the fourth is correct. Because non-difference is the absence of difference. The absence of that [non-difference] is the cessation of non-difference. The meaning is: the absence of the absence of difference. The absence of an absence is certainly well known to all as the nature of being a counter correlate. With regard to that, having given up the identity of difference with the cessation of non-difference, which is

well known, the identity of oneness with difference is accepted even though it is not well known. Thus what is this doctrine of Rāmānuja?

3.67.

किं च जातेः प्रतियोग्यनपेक्षत्वेन भेदस्य च प्रतियोगिसापेक्षत्वेन भेदस्यावर्जनीयत्वमेव । न च यथैकस्यैव देवदत्तस्य देवदत्तशब्दवाच्यत्वे प्रतियोग्यनपेक्षत्वं पित्रादिशब्दवाच्यत्वे च तत्सापेक्षत्वं दृश्यते तद्वदत्र स्यादिति वाच्यम् । तत्र व्यक्तेरेकत्वेऽपि देवदत्तत्वपितृत्वयोरुपाध्योर्भेदात् । अत्र त्वेकस्यां घटव्यक्तौ घटभिन्नशब्दप्रवृत्तिनिमित्तयोर्घटत्वभेदयोरुपाध्योरेवाभेदस्त्वयेष्यते । तथा च घटभिन्नशब्दयोः पर्यायता स्यात् । किंच जातिमात्रभेदवादिनो हि प्रतियोगिसव्यपेक्षा नोत्प्रेक्षितुं क्षमा । किंच घटत्वादिजातिरेव भेदश्चेत्तस्य भेदस्य प्रतियोग्यपेक्षायां कः प्रतियोगी । घटत्वावच्छिन्नस्तदनवच्छिन्नो बोधयं वा । आद्ये षटाद्भेदप्रतीतिर्न स्यात् । घटत्वमेव भेद इति तत्प्रतियोगित्वस्य घटत्वावच्छिन्ने वक्तुमशक्यत्वाच्च । अत एव न तृतीयः । द्वितीये त्वेकस्माद्घटाद्घटान्तरे भेदप्रतीतिर्न स्यात् ।

3.67. Furthermore, because the generic character does not require a counter correlate and because difference requires a counter correlate the difference [between the two] is certainly unavoidable. It should not be said that just as the one Devadatta is not seen to require a counter correlate if addressed by the word "Devadatta" and he is seen to require it if he is addressed by the word "father" etc., it could be just like that here [with regard to the oneness of the generic character and difference]. [reason] Because there [in the illustration], even though the individual is one there is difference of the adjuncts of being Devadatta and being a father. But here [in the topic], in one individual pot you accept only the non-difference of the adjuncts of potness and difference which are the reasons for the usage of the words "pot" and "different". Thus the two words "pot" and "different" should be synonyms. Moreover, the dependence upon a counter correlate is not able to be observed for one who is the exponent of difference being nothing but the generic character.

Furthermore, if the generic character such as potness is itself difference, then in the expectation of a counter correlate for that difference, what is the counter correlate? Is it qualified by potness, or not qualified by it or both? In the first case, there could be no

cognition of a difference from cloth. And that is because it is not possible to say that: "potness is itself difference" if the counter correlate of that [potness] is qualified by potness. For this very reason it is not the third. Whereas in the second case there could be no cognition of the difference of one pot from another pot.

comment

If the generic character of potness is itself difference, and difference requires a counter correlate, is the counter correlate qualified by potness or not? If it is, then one cannot say that a pot is different from something else because the pot has itself as the counter correlate. If the counter correlate is not qualified by potness, then one could not say that "this pot is different from that pot" because the pot does not have potness as its counter correlate. So the generic character and difference cannot be the same.

3.68. यत्तु 'अपि च सन्मात्रग्राहित्वे षटोऽस्ति षटोऽस्तीति विशिष्टविषया प्रतिपत्ति-
विरुध्यते। यदि च सन्मात्रातिरोक्तिवस्तुसंस्थानरूपजात्यादिलक्षणो भेदः प्रत्यक्षेण
न गृहीतः किमित्यश्वार्थी महिषदर्शनेन निवर्तते। सर्वासु प्रतिपत्तिषु सन्मात्रमेव विष-
यश्चेत्प्रतिपत्तिविषयसहचारिणः सर्वे शब्दा एकैकप्रतिपत्तिषु किमिति न स्मर्यन्ते।
किं चाश्वे हस्तिनि च संवेदनयोरेकविषयत्वेनोपरितनस्य गृहीतग्राहित्वाद्विशेषा-
भावाच्च स्मृतिवैलक्षण्यं न स्यात्। प्रतिसंवेदनं विशेषाभ्युपगमे प्रत्यक्षस्य विशि-
ष्टविषयत्वमेवाभ्युपगतं भवति। सर्वेषां संवेदनानामेकविषयतायामेकेनैव संवेदने-
नाशेषग्रहणादन्धवधिराद्यभावश्च प्रसज्येत। न च चक्षुषा सन्मात्रं गृह्यते। तस्य
रूपरूपिरूपैकार्थसमवेतपदार्थग्राहित्वात्। नापि त्वचा। स्पर्शवद्वस्तुविषयत्वात्।
श्रोत्रादीन्यपि न सन्मात्रविषयाणि। किं तु शब्दरसगन्धलक्षणविशेषविषया-
ण्येव। अतः सन्मात्रस्य ग्राहकं न किंचिदिह दृश्यते' (श्रीभा० पृ० ३१ प०
१४-पृ० ३२ प० ७) इत्युक्तं तन्निष्फलम्। अलौकिकप्रत्यक्षस्य सन्मात्र-
ग्राहकस्योक्तत्वात्। लौकिकप्रत्यक्षस्य विशिष्टविषयत्वं त्वस्माभिरङ्गी क्रियत
एवेति किमर्थं तत्प्रदर्शनार्थमियान्विस्तर इति ॥ ९ ॥

3.68. But what has been said (Śrī.B.Para.30.p.50.):

Moreover, if [perception] apprehends bare existence, the cognition referring to what is qualified such as: "the pot is", "the cloth is" is contradicted. And if difference, characterized by the generic character etc.

in the form of the configuration of the object and which is different from bare existence, is not apprehended by perception, why does a person who seeks a horse turn away upon seeing a buffalo? If bare existence alone is the object in all cognitions, why are all the words which are associated with the objects of those cognitions not remembered in each particular cognition? Furthermore, since the two cognitions, referring to a horse and an elephant, have the one object, and since there is no distinction because the latter [cognition] apprehends what has [already] been apprehended, there would be no difference [of the latter cognition] from memory. If a distinction is accepted for each cognition, then perception is accepted as referring only to what is qualified. If all cognitions refer to the one object, the result would be the absence of being blind or deaf since everything is apprehended by just one cognition.

Bare existence is not apprehended by the eye. Because it apprehends colour, the possessor of the colour, and things inherently connected with the same object as the colour. Nor by the sense of touch. Because its scope is objects possessing tangibility. The sense of hearing etc. too do not have bare existence for their object. But their objects are only things distinguished by the characteristics of sound, taste and smell. Therefore nothing is seen here which apprehends bare existence.

That is worthless. Because it has been told that the perception which is not of an ordinary nature apprehends bare existence. But we certainly accept that the perception of an ordinary nature refers to what is qualified. So why is there so much prolixity for the sake of

showing that?

comment

The Advaitin does not deny the perceptual distinctions pertaining to ordinary relations (vyāvahārika), which are brought about by limiting adjuncts. What is denied, is the ascription of an absolute status to such perceptions.⁶¹

The "perception which is not of an ordinary nature" (alaukika) refers to the indeterminate perception of the "fourth state" (turīya-avasthā) (see 3.62.) and to the non-relational knowledge acquired from the sacred texts (see 1.45. and comment).

3.69. यत्तु 'निर्विशेषसन्मात्रस्य च प्रत्यक्षेणैव ग्रहणे तद्विषयागमस्य प्राप्तविषय-
कत्वेनानुवादकत्वमेव स्यात् । सन्मात्रब्रह्मणः प्रमेयभावश्च ' (श्रीभा० पृ० ३२
प० ७) इत्युक्तं तत्राह—

सन्मात्रं न प्रमेयं स्याज्जगतोऽपरमार्थता ।
संविदेव सती सा च न परेण प्रकाशते ॥ १० ॥

3.69. But what has been said (Śrī.B.Para.30.p.51.):

If bare existence free from distinction is apprehended just by perception, then the scripture, whose object is [to reveal] that, would be only a repetition since it refers to what is [already] attained. And Brahman, which is bare existence, would be an object of knowledge.

In regard to that, it is said:

Pure existence cannot be an object of knowledge.
The world does not have an absolute reality,
Awareness is identical to existence and that
[awareness] is not manifest by another thing.¹⁰

3.70. निर्विशेषसन्मात्रं ह्यलौकिकनिर्विकल्पकप्रत्यक्षसिद्धं न तु लौकिकेन सवि-
कल्पकेन निर्विकल्पकेन वा प्रत्यक्षेण गृह्यते । तथाभूतं च तत्तादृशप्रत्यक्षात्प्राग-

ज्ञातमेव शास्त्रेण बोध्यत इति शास्त्रस्य नानुवादकत्वम् । भवन्मतेऽपि सर्वान्तर्या-
मित्वेनाज्ञात एव परमात्मा 'य आत्मानि तिष्ठन्' (श० ब्रा० १४।६।७।३०)
इत्यादिशास्त्रेण ज्ञाप्यत इति सममेव । अलौकिकनिर्विकल्पकप्रत्यक्षं च प्रमातृप्रमेय-
भावरहितमेवेति न सन्मात्रब्रह्मणः प्रमेयभाव इति प्रागुक्त (७४ । ११) मेव ।

3.70. Pure existence free from distinction [i.e. Brahman] is indeed established by indeterminate perception which is not of an ordinary nature. But it is not apprehended by ordinary perception whether determinate or indeterminate. And such a thing [indeterminate perception not of an ordinary nature], which is certainly unknown prior to such a perception of that [Brahman, pure existence free from distinction], is made known by the scripture. Thus the scripture does not repeat what is already known. According to your view also, the supreme Self who is certainly unknown as the inner-controller of all, is made known by the scripture such as: "He who abides in the self" (Ś.Brā.14.6.7.30.). Thus the situation is certainly the same. It was mentioned previously (3. 62.) that the indeterminate perception which is not of an ordinary nature is completely free from the relation of subject and object of knowledge. Thus Brahman, which is pure existence, is not an object of knowledge.

comment

The Veda is the means of knowledge about matters which fall outside the scope of the perceptually based means of knowledge.⁶² If Brahman, pure existence free from all distinction, can be revealed by ordinary perception then the Veda would only repeat what can be acquired through another means of knowledge. The Advaitin could reply that ordinary perceptual experience reveals pure existence qualified by adjuncts such as a pot etc. But Brahman, free from all distinction, can only be apprehended through the non-relational knowledge produced by the immediate apprehension of the Upaniṣad texts which teach the nature of Brahman and its identity with the individual soul. At such a time, the apprehending mental mode (antaḥkaranavṛttyavacchinnaṁ caitanyam)⁶³ attempts to assume the form of the object of apprehension i.e. Brahman, awareness as such. Since awareness is not an object as everything is its

object, the mental mode cannot objectify Brahman. It is said to be non-relational or impartite (akhandākāra) because there is no a knower-known relation but only the knowledge that the object of that mental mode is the essence of the knower.

- 3.71. यत्तु घटादीनामपारमार्थ्यमसहमानैरुक्तं 'द्वयोर्ज्ञानयोर्हि विरोधे बाध्यबाधकभावो बाधितस्यैव व्यावृत्तिः । अत्र घटपटादिषु देशकालभेदेन विरोध एव नास्ति । यस्मिन् देशे यस्मिन् काले यस्य सद्भावः प्रतिपन्नस्तस्मिन् देशे तस्मिन् काले तस्याभावः प्रतिपन्नश्चेत्तत्र विरोधाद्बलवतो बाधकत्वं बाधितस्य च निवृत्तिः । देशान्तरकालान्तरसंबन्धितयाऽनुभूतस्यान्यदेशकालयोरभावप्रतीतौ न विरोध इति कथमत्र बाध्यबाधकभावः । अन्यत्र निवृत्तस्यान्यत्र निवृत्तिर्वा कथमुच्यते । रज्जुसर्पादिषु तु तद्देशकालसंबन्धितयैवाभावप्रतीतेर्विरोधो बाधकत्वं व्यावृत्तिश्चेति देशकालान्तरदृष्टस्य देशकालान्तरव्यावर्तमानत्वं मिथ्यात्वव्याप्तं न दृष्टमिति न व्यावर्तमानत्वमात्रमपारमार्थ्ये हेतुः' (श्रीभा० पृ० ३३ प० ६.) इति, तत्रेत्यमुच्यते—जीवब्रह्मणोर्भेदाभेदविषये ब्रह्मणः सविशेषत्वनिर्विशेषत्वविषये च रामानुजीयानां मायावादिनां च मतभेदेऽपि चित्पदार्थः स्वरूपेणापरिणामी नित्यश्चेति निर्विवादम् । तथा भूतभौतिकादिर्जडपदार्थः स्वरूपेण परिणाम्यनित्यश्च । तथा स्वप्नस्थरथादयः शुक्तिरजतादयश्च जडा एव तत्तत्कालावसायिनस्तत्तत्पुरुषमात्रानुभाव्या इत्यपि निर्विवादम् । एवं वस्तुस्थितावविवादे सति केवलं नाममात्रे विवादः । स यथा—चित्, जडाः, स्वप्नस्थरथादयश्चेति त्रयोऽप्यपरमार्थशब्दवाच्या उत त्रयोऽपि परमार्थशब्दवाच्या अथवा त्रयाणां मध्ये कश्चित्परमार्थशब्दवाच्योऽन्योऽपरमार्थशब्दवाच्य इति ।

जगन्मिथ्या

- 3.71. But what has been said by those who do not tolerate that pots etc. have no absolute reality (Śrī.B.Para.31.p.52f.):

For when there is a contradiction between two cognitions, there is the relation of sublated and sublating and there is certainly the exclusion of what is sublated. Here in regard to pots and cloth etc. there is certainly no contradiction because there is a difference of place and time. If the existence of a thing is ascertained at a certain place and time and its non-existence is ascertained at that [same] place and time, because of the contradiction there the stronger sublates and there is exclusion of the sublated.

There is no contradiction if that which is experienced as connected with a certain place and time is known to be non-existent at another place and time. So how is there the relation of sublated and sublating in this case? Or how is it said that there is the exclusion at one place of what has been excluded somewhere else. But in the case of the rope-snake etc., there is contradiction, sublating and exclusion because the cognition of non-existence certainly has connection with that [same] place and time. So what is seen at a certain place and time being excluded at another place and time is not seen to be invariably concomitant with falsity. Thus mere exclusion is not the reason for unreality.

In regard to that, it is said in this manner: although there is a difference of view between the followers of Rāmānuja and the exponents of māyā in regard to whether the individual soul and Brahman is different or non-different and as to whether Brahman possesses distinction or is free from distinction, there is no dispute that the category of consciousness does not undergo change in its essential nature and that it is eternal. Similarly, [there is no dispute] that the category of the inert, consisting of the elements and elementals etc., undergoes change in its essential nature and is non-eternal. So too, it is also undisputed that the chariots etc. existing in a dream and the silver upon a pearl-oyster etc. are certainly inert and last for their respective times and can be experienced by the respective persons. Thus when there is no dispute about reality, the dispute is only in the mere name. That [dispute] is for instance: can the three [categories] "consciousness", "the inert things" and "chariots etc. existing in a dream" be expressed by the word "not absolutely real", or can the three be expressed by the word "absolutely real"? Alternatively, can a certain one among the three be expressed by

the word "absolutely real" and can another be expressed by the word "not absolutely real"?

3.72. तत्राऽऽद्यः कल्पः शून्यवादिनां माध्यमिकानाम् । स च न युक्तः । किं नामापर-
मार्थत्वम् । परमार्थभिन्नत्वमिति चेत्किमस्ति किञ्चिद्वस्तु परमार्थशब्दवाच्यम् ।
सति हि किंश्चित्परमार्थे वस्तुनि परमार्थशब्देन नञः समास उपपद्यते
नान्यथा । किञ्च शून्यवादे केनापि क्वचिदपि किञ्चिदपि न दृश्येतेति सर्वस्य
लोकव्यवहारस्य लोपः प्राप्नोति । आकस्मिकोत्पत्तिवादश्च न युक्तिसहः । द्वितीयः
कल्पो रामानुजीयानाम् । सोऽपि न युक्तः । तथा हि । किं नाम परमार्थत्वम् ।
अविनाशित्वं चेत्परमार्थत्वेन त्वदाभिमतेषु घटादिषु स्वप्नस्थरथादिषु चाव्याप्तिः ।
प्रतीयमानत्वं परमार्थत्वं चेत्प्रतीयमानत्वापरपर्यायं परमार्थत्वं घटादिषु स्वप्न-
स्थरथादिषु चास्तां नाम न नः किञ्चिच्छिद्यते । प्रतीयमानमेवास्माभिरपरमार्थ-
शब्देनोच्यते । यद्यपि ब्रह्मापि प्रतीयमानं तथापि प्रतीतिरूपमेव तत्परमार्थम् ।
प्रतीयमानं सविज्ञेयं त्वौपाधिकमपरमार्थं जीवस्वरूपवत् । 'अविज्ञातं विज्ञानताम्'
(के० ११-३) इति श्रुतेः । अथ सत्यत्वं परमार्थत्वं चेत्किं नाम सत्यत्वम् ।
असत्यत्वाभावश्चेदसत्यत्वज्ञानाधीनं सत्यत्वं सत्यत्वज्ञानाधीनं चासत्यत्वमि-
त्यन्योन्याश्रयः ।

3.72. Among those, the first alternative belongs to the Mādhyamikas who are the exponents of emptiness. And that [first alternative] is not correct. What now is "not absolutely real"? If [you say] that it is different from what is absolutely real, then what is some thing which can be expressed by the word "absolutely real"? Because the compound of a negative particle with the word "absolutely real" [i.e. a-paramārtha] is logically possible when there is some thing which is absolutely real. Not otherwise. Moreover in the teaching of emptiness, nothing could be seen anywhere by anyone. So the cancellation of all worldly transactions follows. And the teaching of random origination does not withstand reason.

The second alternative belongs to the followers of Rāmānuja. That too is not correct. To elaborate. What now is "absolutely real"? If [you say] it is the nature of being imperishable, then there is inadequate pervasion of the proposition in regard to pots etc. and

chariots etc. existing in a dream which you accept as absolutely real. If [you say] that absolutely real consists in being perceived, then absolutely real, which has being perceived as another synonym, should certainly continue in regard to pots etc. and chariots etc. existing in a dream. We do not lose anything. We certainly refer to "being perceived" by the word "not absolutely real". Although Brahman also is perceived, nevertheless it is only as the nature of cognition and that is absolutely real. But what is perceived possessing distinction pertains to a limiting adjunct and is not absolutely real, like the nature of being an individual soul. For there is the sacred text: "it [Brahman] is unknown [as an object] for those who know well" (Ke.2.3.). If [you say] that truth is absolute reality, what then is truth? If [you say] it is the absence of untruth, then there is mutual dependence: truth is dependent upon the knowledge of untruth and untruth depends upon the knowledge of truth.

3.73.

अथ मिथ्यात्वाभावः परमार्थत्वमिति चेत्किमिदं मिथ्यात्वम् । वाधितत्वमेव मिथ्यात्वमिति चेद्रज्जुसर्पस्थले सर्पज्ञानस्य वाधितत्वं ' रज्जुसर्पादिषु तु ' (श्रीभा० पृ० ३३ प० १३) इति ग्रन्थेन त्वयैवोक्तमिति सर्पज्ञानस्य मिथ्यात्वापत्तिः । इष्टापत्तौ तु ' रज्ज्वादौ सर्पादिविज्ञानं सत्यमेव भयादिहेतुः ' (श्रीभा० पृ० ५६ प० १२) इति त्वदीयैवोक्तिर्विरुध्यते । किंच रज्जुसर्पस्थले विषयस्य सर्पस्य वाधितत्वमिष्यते न वा । आद्ये त्वदाभिमतसत्त्व्यातिस्तत्र न सिध्यति । अन्त्ये विषयाणामेव मिथ्यात्वम् (श्रीभा० पृ० ५६ प० ६) इत्युक्तिविरोधः । किंच सत्त्व्यातिवादिनस्तत्र सते रज्जुसर्पादिस्थले सर्पादेरपि सत्त्वेन मिथ्यात्वाभावान्मिथ्यात्वस्य क्वापि प्रसिद्धत्वाभावेन मिथ्यात्वाभावो दुर्वचः । अभावज्ञानस्य प्रतियोगिप्रसिद्धिसापेक्षत्वात् । तथा च मिथ्यात्वाभावरूपं परमार्थत्वं दुर्वचम् ।

3.73. If [you say] that absolutely real is the absence of falsity, what is this falsity? If [you say] falsity is just the nature of being negated, then in the case of the rope-snake, you yourself have said in the text (Śrī.B.Para.31.p.52f.Supra.): "But in the case of the rope-snake etc." that the knowledge of the snake is negated. Thus the

knowledge of the snake would be false. But in regard to the desired conclusion, your very own statement (Śrī.B.Para.47.p.86.): "the knowledge of a snake etc. upon a rope etc. is definitely real, being the cause of fear etc." is contradicted.

Furthermore, in the case of the rope-snake, is the snake which is the object [of the cognition] considered to be negated or not? In the first case, the "apprehension of the real" which you admit is not established there [with regard to the snake]. In the latter case, there is the contradiction of the statement (Śrī.B.Para.47.p.85.): "only the objects [of the cognition] are false".

Furthermore, according to your view, that of an exponent of the "apprehension of the real". because the snake etc. also exists in the case of rope-snake etc. therefore there is no falsity and since falsity is not established anywhere the absence of falsity is difficult to be stated. Because knowledge of an absence is dependent upon the establishment of a counter correlate. Thus it is difficult to say that absolutely real is the absence of falsity.

3.74.

किंच ' न व्यावर्तमानत्वमात्रमपार-
 माध्यं हेतुः ' (श्रीभा० प० ३३ प० १६) इति चदत्तस्तव व्यावर्तमानत्ववि-
 शेषोऽपारमाध्यं हेतुत्वेनेष्ट एव । व्यावर्तमानत्वविशेषश्च तद्देशकालसंबन्धितयैव
 व्यावर्तमानत्वरूपः । स च रज्जुसर्पादेरिति कथं सत्ख्यातिः सिध्यति । किंच
 रज्जुज्ञानसर्पज्ञानयोर्विरोधो विषयद्वारैव वाच्यः । स न संभवति । त्वन्मते
 बुद्धीनां सालम्बनत्वमात्रनियमेन बुद्धेस्तद्विषयास्तित्वावश्यंभावानपेक्षत्वात् ।
 द्वयोर्ज्ञानयोरेकक्षणवृत्तित्वासंभवेन विरोध इति चेत् ' रज्जुज्ञानमेव बाधकं
 सर्पज्ञानमेव बाध्यम् ' इत्यत्र विनिगमनाविरहः । किंच रज्जुसर्पादौ घटादौ
 च को विशेषः । रज्जुसर्पः पूर्वं नाभूत् पश्चान्न भविष्यति । केवलं मध्ये
 प्रतीयते, घटादिरपि तथैव । रज्जुसर्पः पश्चात् ' नायं सर्पः ' इति बाध्यते ।
 घटादिरपि नाशोत्तरं कपालाद्यवस्थायाम् ' नायं घटः ' इति बाध्यते ।

3.74. Furthermore, for you who say (Śrī.B.Para.31.p.53.Supra.): "mere exclusion is not the reason for unreality", a particular type of exclusion is certainly accepted as the reason for unreality. The

particular type of exclusion is in the form of an exclusion which "certainly has connection with that [same] place and time". And that [particular exclusion] is for the rope-snake etc., so how is the "apprehension of the real" established?

Furthermore, the contradiction between the cognition of the rope and the cognition of the snake can be said only by means of the object. That [contradiction] is not possible. Because according to your view cognitions invariably depend merely upon an object, therefore a cognition does not necessarily depend upon the existence of that object. If [you say] there is contradiction of the two cognitions because of the impossibility of [both] existing at a single instant, then there is want of a decision between the two alternatives here, i.e. the knowledge of the rope is what sublates and the knowledge of the snake is what is sublated.

Furthermore, what is the distinction between the rope-snake etc. and a pot etc? The snake upon the rope did not exist previously and will not exist later. It is only recognized in between. The pot etc. is also exactly the same. The snake upon the rope is subsequently negated: "this is not a snake". The pot etc. is also negated: "this is not a pot" in the condition of the fragments following its destruction.

3.75.

ननु

पश्चाज्जायमानेन नायं सर्प इति बाधेन 'प्रतीतिकालेऽप्ययं सर्पो नाभूत्' इत्येवं प्रातीतिकालिकोऽपि बाध्यते न तथा घट इति चेत्तस्याः प्रातीतिकालिकसत्तायाः क्षणिकतुल्यत्वेन न तथा घटादेः पारमार्थिकत्वं शक्यं निश्चेतुम् । वस्तुतस्तु प्रातीतिकालिकस्यापि घटादेस्तत्त्वज्ञानदृष्ट्या बाधोऽस्त्येव । वद्वजीवदृष्ट्या बाधो नास्तीति चेत्—किं तेन । रज्जुसर्पस्थलेऽपि भ्रान्तदृष्ट्या बाधाभावस्य सत्त्वात् । किं च रज्जुसर्पदृष्ट्या भयादिनाऽन्यत्र गमने बाधो नास्तीत्येतावता स किं सर्पः सत्यो भवति । यदि तत्र बाधयोग्यताऽस्त्येव, केवलमन्यत्र गमनेन रज्जुयाथार्थ्यज्ञानं नास्तीत्यतो न बाधस्तिर्हि वद्वस्य परमात्मयाथार्थ्यज्ञानं नास्तीत्यतो न बाध इति तुल्यम् ।

3.75. [objection] Because of the negation: "this is not a snake" which

arises subsequently, even what relates to the time of the cognition is negated in the manner; "this snake did not exist even at the time of the cognition". The pot is not like that.

[reply] Since that existence relating to the time of the cognition is equivalent to an instant, the absolute reality of a pot etc. cannot be ascertained through that [i.e. the momentary existence at the time of cognition]. But in reality, there is certainly the negation of a pot etc., even at the time relating to its cognition, due to the insight through the knowledge of reality. If [you say] that there is no negation according to the insight of a bound soul, [we reply] what is the use of that? Because even in the case of the rope-snake, the absence of negation exists according to the observation of deluded persons.

Furthermore, is that snake real just by this alone: "there is no negation on account of going elsewhere due to fear etc. through the observation of the snake upon the rope"? If there is indeed the capability of negation there, only because of running elsewhere there is no knowledge of the rope as it is and so there is no negation, then for a bound soul [i.e. who does not seek to know the truth] there is no knowledge of the supreme Self as it is and therefore there is no negation [of the world which is capable of being negated]. So it is equal.

- 3.76. ननु तत्त्वज्ञानिदृष्ट्या घटादेर्बाधोऽस्तीत्यत्र किं प्रमाणमिति चेदुच्यते । प्रातीतिकालिकोऽपि हि सर्पः पश्चात्तनजायमानबाधविषयो जगतो बाधः भवतीत्यत्र कारणं हि प्रतीतिकालेऽपि सर्पस्य सर्पस्वरूपेणासत्त्वम् । सर्पस्य सत्ता हि रज्जुसत्तैव नान्या । तथा मृत्सत्तैव घटसत्ता नान्या । नहि सत्ताद्वयं प्रतीयते । न वा घटकाले मृत्सत्ताया अभावो वक्तुं शक्यः । एवं मृदादिसत्तापि हि तत्कारणसत्तातो नातिरिक्ता भवति । तथा च प्रातीतिकालिकस्यापि घटादेर्बाधो युक्त एव । किं च रज्जुसर्पस्थले प्रातीतिकालिकः सर्प एव बाध्यते न तु सर्पप्रतीतिर्बाध्यते । तस्याः सत्यत्वस्य त्वयैवोक्तत्वात् (श्रीभा० पृ० ५६ प० १२) । घटादिविषये तु न केवलं तत्त्वज्ञानोत्तरं घटादिर्बाध्यते किंतु घटादिप्रतीतिरपि बाध्यते । यतो घटप्रतीतिर्नाम घटाकारोऽन्तःकरणपरिणामः । तस्य च तादात्म्येन ब्रह्मस्वरूपसाक्षात्कारोत्तरम-

सत्त्वात् । तथा च यत्र केवलं विषयो बाध्यते तत्र तस्यापरमार्थत्वं चेद्यत्र प्रती-
त्या सह विषयो बाध्यते तत्र तस्य परमार्थत्वं सुतरां न स्यात् । किं चापरमार्थं
वस्तु किंचिदस्ति न वा । आद्यं दुर्बचम् । त्वन्मतेऽस्तित्वस्य परमार्थत्वव्याप्त-
त्वादपरमार्थत्वस्य काप्यसंभवात् । द्वितीये 'अनाशी परमार्थश्च' (वि० पु०
२ । १४ । २४) इत्यादौ परमार्थशब्दोक्त्या किमधिकं कृतं स्यात् ।

3.76. [objection] [You say] that there is the negation of a pot etc.
due to the insight of a person who knows reality. What is the means of
knowledge in this matter?

[reply] Indeed a snake, though relating to the time of cognition,
becomes the object of the negation arising subsequently. Now the cause
here is that the snake does not exist as a snake even at the time of
cognition. Because the existence of the snake is only the existence of
the rope, not something different. Similarly, the existence of a pot is
only the existence of the clay, not something else. A twofold existence
is certainly not recognized. Nor can it be said that the existence of
the clay is absent at the time of the pot. In the same manner, even the
existence of the clay etc. is certainly not different than the
existence of its cause. Thus the negation of a pot etc., even relating
to the time of the cognition, is certainly correct.

Furthermore, in the case of the rope-snake, only the snake
relating to the time of the cognition is negated, but the cognition of
a snake is not negated. Because you yourself have stated the reality
of that [cognition] (Śrī.B.Para.47.p.86.). But in regard to a pot etc.,
not only is the pot etc. negated following the knowledge of reality but
the cognition of a pot etc. is also negated. Because what is known as
the cognition of a pot is the form of the pot, which is a modification
of the internal-organ. And that [modification of the internal-organ
which has the form of a pot] does not exist following the direct
apprehension of the essential nature of Brahman on account of identity.
Thus if there is no absolute reality where only the object is negated,

to a still greater extent there must be no absolute reality where the object is negated along with the cognition.

Furthermore, is there some thing which is not absolutely real or not? The first is difficult to be said. Because according to your view, existing is concomitant with being absolutely real and therefore there is no possibility anywhere of what is not absolutely real. In the second case, what more can be done since there is the mention of the word "absolutely real" in: "imperishable and absolutely real" (Viṣ.P.2. 14.24.) etc.

comment

In the case of the cognition of a rope as a snake, Rāmānuja says that the snake which is the object of the cognition is negated, but the knowledge of the cognition of a snake is not negated. Abhyankar states that after the knowledge of Brahman, both the object and its cognition are negated because there is no longer the cognition of a pot etc. as a pot since there is the knowledge of identity i.e. the absence of anything having a separate existence apart from Brahman.

3.77. मायावादिनां तु तृतीयः कल्पः । निर्विशेषं ब्रह्म परमार्थमन्यदपरमार्थमिति ।
यतस्तदेव परमार्थं यन्न क्वचिदपि कदाचिदपि
परमार्थत्वनिरवचनम् निषिध्यते । 'अनुवर्तमानत्वात्सत्परमार्थं इति
सिद्धमेव' (श्रीभा० पृ० ३३ प० १६) इति
त्वयाप्युच्यत एव । सद्रूपेऽर्थे परमत्वं च निरवधिकातिशयवच्यम् । यत्सत्तायाः
क्वचिदपि कदाचिदपि न निषेधः । 'पटो न घटः, घटो न पटः' इत्येवं सर्वेषां
घटादीनां निषेधप्रतियोगिता दृश्यते । यस्य लेशतोऽपि न निषेधस्पर्शस्तदेव वस्तुतः
परमार्थशब्दभागिति तद्व्यतिरिक्तं सर्वं प्रतीयमानपरमार्थमेव । तथाच व्यावर्त-
मानत्वमात्रमेवापरमार्थ्ये हेतुरिति सिद्धम् । एतेन 'न व्यावर्तमानत्वमात्रमपा-
रमार्थ्ये हेतुः' (श्रीभा० पृ० ३३ प० १६) इति परास्तम् । निषेधस्पर्शेनापि
परमत्वहानेर्दुर्वारत्वात् । निषिध्यमानस्यापि परमार्थत्वं वदता परमार्थशब्दप्रवृ-
त्तिनिमित्तमेव न ज्ञायते ।

3.77. The third alternative belongs to the exponents of māyā. Brahman free from distinction is absolutely real and what is other is not absolutely real. Because that alone is absolutely real which is not negated anywhere at any time. You also have certainly said (Śrī.B.Para.31.

p.53.)⁶⁴ : "existence is absolutely real since it persists, is certainly established." There is greatness and the possession of unlimited pre-eminence in an object having the form of existence. Because there is no negation of existence anywhere at any time. All things such as pots etc. are seen to be counter correlates of negation in the manner: "the cloth is not a pot", "the pot is not cloth". What has no contact with negation, even a fraction, is alone entitled, in reality, to the word "absolutely real". Thus everything which is perceived to be different from that is certainly not absolutely real. Consequently it is established that mere exclusion is indeed the reason for unreality. On account of this, [the statement] (Śrī.B.Para.31.p.53): "mere exclusion is not the reason for unreality" is refuted. Because even by contact with negation the loss of greatness is unavoidable. By saying that even what is negated is absolutely real, the very reason for the use of the word "absolutely real" is not understood.

comment

See comment to 1.19. and 1.21.

3.78. यत्तु ' अनुभूतिसद्विशेषयोश्च विषयविषयिभावेन भेदस्य प्रत्यक्षसिद्धत्वाद-
वाधितत्वाच्चानुभूतिरेव सतीत्येतदपि निरस्तम् ' (श्रीभा०पृ०३३प०१८) इत्युक्तं
तत्रोच्यते—अनुभूतिसद्विशेषयोर्विषयविषयिभावेन भेदो हि लौकिकप्रत्यक्षसि-
द्धोऽस्माभिरङ्गी क्रियत एव । या च लौकिकप्रत्यक्ष-
सदनुभूत्योरैक्यम् रूपानुभूतिः सैव सतीति नास्माभिरुच्यते ।
लौकिकप्रत्यक्षस्य काल्पनिकत्वात् । न हि रज्जु-
सर्पस्थले सर्प एव रज्जुः । किंतु तादृशसर्पाधिष्ठानं रज्जुः । तथा च सकललौकि-
कसविषयानुभूत्यधिष्ठानभूता या निर्विषयानुभूतिः सैव सती ।

3.78. But what has been said (Śrī.B.Para.31.p.53.):

Because awareness and a particular existence have a subject-object relation and since the difference is established by perception and is not negated, this [statement] too: "awareness is identical to existence" is refuted.

In regard to that, it is said: because awareness and a particular existence have a subject-object relation, we certainly accept that difference is established by the perception which is of an ordinary nature. We do not say that the awareness in the form of ordinary perception is identical to existence. Because the perception of an ordinary nature contains mental constructions. In the case of the rope-snake, the snake is not identical to the rope. But the rope is the substratum of such a snake. Accordingly, the awareness free from objects, which is the substratum of all ordinary awareness which relates to objects, is identical to existence.

3.79.

किंच—'अनुभूति-

सद्विशेषयोर्विषयविषयिभावेन' इति वदताऽनुभूतिसत्सामान्ययोर्विषयविषयिभावः स्वीक्रियते न वा । आद्ये सद्विशेषयोरिति विशेषपदोक्तिर्व्यर्था स्यात् । द्वितीयेऽनुभूतिसत्सामान्ययोर्विषयविषयिभावभावे त्वन्मतानुसारेण सत्सामान्यस्यानुभूतिरूपत्वाभावे च सत्सामान्यस्य प्रमाणसिद्धत्वं न स्यात् । तदेव हि प्रमाणसिद्धं यत्प्रमाणविषयं स्वयं प्रमाणं वा । अथ सत्सामान्यस्याप्रमाणत्वमिष्टमेवेति चेत्तथात्वे सद्विशेषयोरिति विशेषपदोक्तेर्वैयर्थ्यं तदवस्थमेव । किं चानुभूतिसत्सामान्ययोर्विषयविषयिभावभावे को हेतुः । प्रायशः सर्वे वस्त्वनुभूतिविषयभावं भजते । एवं सत्यपि यतः सत्सामान्यमनुभूतिविषयभावं न भजतेऽतस्तत्र तस्य सत्सामान्यस्यानुभूत्या सहाधेद एव कारणमित्यनिच्छताप्यच्छमतिना स्वीकार्यम् । किं चेयं सद्विशेषविषयानुभूतिः स्वयं सद्रूपाऽसद्रूपा वा । आद्येऽनुभूतिरेव सतीति स्वीकृतं स्यात् । अन्त्ये स्वयमसती कथं सद्विशेषे प्रमाणभावं भजेत् ।

3.79. Furthermore, by saying: "because awareness and a particular existence have a subject-object relation", is a subject-object relation accepted between awareness and universal existence or not? In the first case, the mention of the word "particular" in: "a particular existence" would be meaningless. In the second case, in the absence of a subject-object relation between awareness and universal existence and in the absence, according to your view, of universal existence having the nature of awareness, then universal existence cannot be established through a means of knowledge. Because that alone is established by a means of

knowledge which is an object of a means of knowledge or is itself a means of knowledge. If [you say] that universal existence is indeed accepted as not being [itself] a means of knowledge, then if such is the case the mention of the word "particular" in: "a particular existence" is meaningless and there is the same situation as before.

Furthermore, what is the reason for the absence of a subject-object relation between awareness and universal existence? Generally, every entity possesses the state of being an object of awareness. Even if this is so, because universal existence does not possess the state of being an object of awareness, therefore a clear minded person must accept, even though not wishing to do so, that the reason for that is only the non-difference of universal existence with awareness.

Furthermore, is this awareness, whose object is a particular existence, in the form of existence itself or not? In the first case, it must be accepted that "awareness is identical to existence". In the last case, not existing itself, how could it possess the state of being a means of knowledge for a particular existence?

- 3.80. यत्तु 'विषयप्रकाशनवेलायां ज्ञातुरात्मनोऽनुभूतेः स्वयंप्रकाशत्वेऽपि न सर्वेषां सर्वदा तथैवेति नियमोऽस्ति । परानुभवस्य हानोपादानादिलिङ्गकानु-
 अनुभूतेः स्वप्रकाश- मानज्ञानविषयत्वात् । स्वानुभवस्याप्यतीतस्याज्ञा-
 त्वम् सिपमिति व्यवहारदर्शनाच्च' (श्रीभा० पृ० ३४
 प० १) इत्युक्तं तन्निष्फलम् । न हि मायावादिभिर्लो-
 किक्रियाः सविषयानुभूतेः स्वयंप्रकाशत्वनियम उच्यते येनैतत्खण्डनं युज्येत ।
 तथा न तस्याः सविषयानुभूतेरनुभाव्यत्वाभावनियमः । किं तु सर्वाधिष्ठानभू-
 ताया ब्रह्मशब्दवाच्याया निर्विषयानुभूतेर्न कदापि परप्रकाशयत्वं न च कदाचि-
 दप्यनुभाव्यत्वमित्येव । एतेन 'स्वगतातीतानुभवानां परगतानुभवानां चानु-
 भाव्यत्वेनाननुभूतित्वमसङ्गत्' (श्रीभा० पृ० ३४ प० ६) इत्याद्युक्तमपास्तम् ।

- 3.80. But what has been said (Śrī.B.Para.32.p.53.)⁶⁵:

although the awareness of the self, the knower, is self-luminous at the time of illumining the object, there is no rule that it is like that at all times

for all people. Because the experience of another person is an object of knowledge by inference, having as its sign [their] rejecting and accepting etc. And because even for one's own past experience the expression is seen: "I knew".

That is worthless. The exponents of māyā certainly do not say that there is a rule as to the self-luminosity of the awareness which possesses an object and is of an ordinary nature. If such was the case, this refutation would be correct. Similarly, there is no rule that the awareness possessing an object is unable to be experienced. But the awareness free from objects, which is the substratum of everything and can be expressed by the word Brahman, cannot be illumined by another at any time and can never be experienced. On account of this, what has been said (Śrī.B.Para.32.p.53.):

because one's own past experiences and the experiences belonging to others are able to be experienced, the result is that [such experiences] would not be of the nature of awareness

etc. is refuted.

comment

Abhyankar states that Rāmānuja's argument is irrelevant. The Advaitins position is that awareness illumines the prior non-existence, presence and subsequent disappearance of all mental states (vṛttijñāna). Therefore the Advaitin does not contend that mental states consisting of cognitions such as "I knew", memory, etc. are not eternal, not self-luminous and are able to be experienced. The Advaitin maintains that the awareness which illumines mental activity is self-luminous and cannot be objectified by the mental modes. If awareness could be illumined by another awareness then an infinite regress (anavasthā) would be unavoidable. There are also difficulties if it is accepted that awareness can be experienced. For if awareness is experienced by another awareness then an infinite regress would result. If that is sought to be avoided by postulating that awareness is experienced by another awareness and the second awareness is experienced by the first, then

there would be mutual dependence (anyonyāśraya). If awareness knows itself, then there is the contradiction of the simultaneous relation of subject and object (karmakartṛbhāvavyāghāta).⁶⁶ Hence the Advaitin considers that mental states are illumined by awareness, but awareness is self-evident and cannot be objectified.

A remark concerning the aptness of Rāmānuja's argument is necessary. In the Mahāpūrvapakṣa, Rāmānuja presented the Advaitins views with admirable perspicuity. However in his refutation of the pūrvapakṣa, Rāmānuja does not always confront the position he has described but argues, as in the present case, against a position which the Advaitins do not seek to dispute.⁶⁷ Further instances of this will be noted in the following pages.

3.81. यदपि ' अनुभूतेरनुभाव्यत्वेऽपि गगनकुसुमादेरिवाज्ञानाविरोधित्वमपि प्रसज्यत एव ' (श्रीभा० पृ० ३४ प० २०) इत्युक्तं तत्राननुभाव्यत्वाज्ञानाविरोधित्वयोर्व्याप्तिर्न निश्चेतुं शक्यते । अनुकूलतर्काभावात् । दृष्टान्तश्चायुक्तः । धर्मिभूतं गगनकुसुममेव न ज्ञायते दूरे तद्धर्मभूतमज्ञानाविरोधित्वादि । यतोऽज्ञानाविरोधित्वमज्ञानकालेऽस्तित्वमेव नान्यत् । तत्र कुसुमस्यैवास्तित्वं नास्ति कुतस्तद्धर्मस्यास्तित्वं कुतस्तरां तज्ज्ञानम् ॥ १० ॥

3.81. What has also been said (Śrī.B.Para.32.p.54.)⁶⁸:

If awareness is unable to be experienced, the non-contradiction to ignorance certainly follows, like for a sky-flower etc.

In regard to that, an invariable concomitance cannot be ascertained between the inability to be experienced and non-contradiction to ignorance. Because there is no conformable reasoning. And the illustration is not correct. The sky-flower, which possesses the attribute [of non-contradiction to ignorance], is itself not known so the non-contradiction to ignorance etc. which are its attributes are far removed. Because non-contradiction to ignorance is only the existence at the time of ignorance and nothing else. With regard to that [existence at the time of ignorance], the flower certainly has no existence so how does its attribute exist and how a fortiori is there knowledge of it?

- 3.82. यदुक्तम् ' अनुभूतिप्रागभावस्य ग्राहकाभावादभावो न शक्यते वक्तुम् ।
अनुभूत्यैव ग्रहणात् ' (श्रीभा० पृ० ३५ प० ३) इति, तत्राह—

नित्या सामान्यानुभूतिरेका निर्बिषया च सा ।
सुप्तौ नाहंभावभानं मुक्तौ नैव च संसृतिः ॥ ११ ॥

- 3.82. What has been said (Śrī.B.Para.33.p.55.)⁶⁹:

It cannot be said that there is no prior non-existence of awareness since there is no apprehender [of the prior non-existence]. Because there is the apprehension by awareness itself.

In regard to that, it is said:

The awareness which is universal is eternal, it is one and without an object. There is no appearance of "I-ness" in deep sleep and there is certainly no transmigration in liberation.¹¹.

- 3.83. अनुभूतिप्रागभावस्य ग्राहकमनुभूतिसामान्यमनुभूतिविशेषो वा । नाद्यः ।
अनुभूतिसामान्यस्वरूपव्याघातात् । किञ्चिद्विषय-
अनुभूतेर्न प्रागभावः ग्राहिकाया अनुभूतेरनुभूतिविशेषत्वात् । न द्वितीयः ।
किमियं प्रागभावग्राहिका विशेषानुभूतिः स्वप्राग-
भावं गृह्णाति सामान्यानुभूतिप्रागभावं वा । आद्य इष्टापत्तिः । न हि विशेषा-
नुभूतेरनित्यत्वे वयं विवदासः । अन्त्ये सामान्यानुभूतिप्रागभावग्राहिकेयं विशे-
षानुभूतिः सामान्यानुभूतिं विषयीकृत्यैव तत्प्रागभावं गृह्णीयात् । अभावज्ञानस्य
प्रतियोगिज्ञानसापेक्षत्वात् । सामान्यानुभूतेर्ग्रह्यत्वे तु तस्याः सामान्यस्वरूपव्या-
घातः । ज्ञानविषयीभूताया अनुभूतेरनुभूतिविशेषत्वात् ।

- 3.83. Does universal awareness or a particular awareness apprehend the prior non-existence of awareness? Not the first, on account of contradiction with the essential nature of universal awareness. Because the awareness which apprehends some object is a particular awareness. Nor is it the second. Does this particular awareness which apprehends prior non-existence apprehend its own prior non-existence or the prior

non-existence of universal awareness? The first is the desired conclusion. We certainly do not dispute about the impermanence of a particular awareness. In the last case, this particular awareness which apprehends the prior non-existence of universal awareness can apprehend its prior non-existence only having objectified universal awareness. Because the knowledge of non-existence depends upon the knowledge of the counter correlate. But if universal awareness can be apprehended, there is contradiction with its essential nature being universal. Because the awareness which is an object of knowledge is a particular awareness.

comment

With regard to the apprehension of the prior non-existence of awareness, the Advaitin can put forward a number of other possible alternatives: is the prior non-existence apprehended by oneself or by another? Not by oneself, because if one exists it is not possible to apprehend one's own non-existence. If one does not exist, there is no possibility of apprehension. Nor by another, because awareness is not the object of another and it cannot be apprehended by anything other than awareness since everything else is insentient.⁷⁰

3.84.

किं चानुभूतिसामान्यस्य

प्रागभाव एव नास्ति दूरे तद्ग्रहणम् । एतदुक्तं भवति—सर्वाधिष्ठानभूता निराश्रया निर्विषया ब्रह्मशब्दवाच्या याऽनुभूतिस्तदेवानुभूतिसामान्यम् । सामान्यस्य परा काष्ठा । यदपेक्षयाऽन्यत्सामान्यं किञ्चिदपि नास्ति । अत एव तत्र स्वगतसजातीयविजातीयभेदरूपस्त्रिविधोऽपि भेदो ज्ञातोऽज्ञातो वा वस्तुतो नास्ति । यतो भेदजनका विशेषाः । विशेषो हि सामान्यपूर्वक एव । सामान्यं तु विशेषस्य प्रागवस्था । यत्र लेशतोऽपि विशेषो नास्ति तत्र कथं त्रिविधोऽपि भेदोऽस्तित्वं लभेत । एतेनानुभूतिसामान्यस्य नानात्वं प्रत्युक्तम् ।

3.84. Furthermore, the prior non-existence of universal awareness certainly does not exist, so the apprehension of it is far away. This is what is said: the awareness which is the substratum of everything, without a location, without an object, which can be expressed by the word Brahman, is alone universal awareness. It is the supreme limit of

what is universal. With regard to which, there is no other universal whatsoever. For this very reason, even the threefold difference, whether known or unknown, in the form of difference which belongs to itself, pertains to its own class or to another class, does not exist there [in universal awareness] in reality. Because distinctions create difference. A distinction is certainly preceded by the universal, whereas the universal is the prior condition for a distinction. Where a distinction, even very slightly, does not exist, how could the threefold difference have existence there? On account of this, the manifold nature of universal awareness has been replied to.

comment

Because awareness as such is without distinguishing characteristics, there is no factor to establish that awareness is manifold by nature.

3.85.

तस्य चानुभूतिसामान्यस्य प्रागभावोऽपि न वक्तुं शक्यते । कालतो मर्यादितस्यैव हि प्रागभावः । कालतो मर्यादा च विशेषस्यैव न सामान्यस्य । वस्तुकृतस्यैव देशकृतस्यैव च कालकृतस्यापि विशेषस्य सत्त्वात् । अनुभूतिसामान्ये च वस्तुविशेषरूपः काल एव नास्ति कुतः कालकृतो विशेषः कुतस्तरां तन्मूलकोऽनुभूतिप्रागभावः । अनुभूतिसामान्ये हि न द्यौर्नान्तरिक्षं न भूतलं न पातालं न सूर्यो न विद्युन्न चन्द्रतारकं न तमो न ज्योतिर्न वायुर्न दिवसो न रात्रिर्न संध्ये न कालो न शरीरं नेन्द्रियं न प्राणो न मनो न रूपं न जातिर्न संबन्धो न समुद्रो न गिरयो न ज्ञातृत्वं न ज्ञेयत्वं न धर्मो न धर्मो न कोऽपि विशेषः । न तदनुभूतिसामान्यं कस्याचिद् ग्राह्यं नापि कस्याचिद्ग्राहकम् ।

3.85. The prior non-existence of that universal awareness cannot even be said. Because prior non-existence is only for what has been limited by time. A limit by time is only for a distinction, not for the universal. Because just as a distinction exists brought about by the object and the location, so also it is caused by time. Time, in the form of a particular entity, certainly does not exist in universal awareness, so how can a distinction be caused by time and how a fortiori can there be the prior non-existence of awareness which is based upon

that? For in universal awareness there is no heaven, no sky, no earth, nor the lower regions, there is no sun, no lightning, nor the moon and stars, there is neither darkness nor light, nor air, neither day nor night, nor the two twilight times, there is no time, no body, no sense organ, no vital breath, no mind, no form, no species, no connection, no ocean, no hills, neither knowership nor object of knowledge, no possessor of attributes nor an attribute, nor any distinction whatsoever. Nor can that universal awareness be apprehended [as an object] by someone, nor does it apprehend something.

3.86.

नन्वेवं सर्वविशेषाणामभावे 'अनुभूतिसामान्यम्'

इत्यपि व्यवहारो न स्यात् । सामान्यस्य विशेषापेक्षत्वादिति चेत्सत्यमेतत् । निरूपकैस्तद्वस्तु केनचिच्छब्देन प्रदर्शनीयमित्येतावतैवायं व्यवहारो न तु तत्राभिनिवेष्यम् । तथा चानुभूतिसामान्येन कथं स्वप्रागभावः स्वानित्यत्वं स्वानानात्वादिकं वा प्रकाशयेत् । अप्रकाशितं च नास्त्येव । अस्तित्वे प्रमाणाभावात् । अथ तेनानुभूतिसामान्येन स्वानित्यत्वं स्वैकत्वं स्वप्रकाशत्वादिकं चापि न प्रकाशयेतेति चेदिष्टमेवैतत्संगृहीतम् । न त्वेतावता तस्यानुभूतिसामान्यस्यानित्यत्वादिकं किमपि शङ्कनीयम् । संबन्धित्येत्यस्य 'नानित्या' इत्येव तात्पर्यम् । एवं संबिदेका स्वप्रकाशेत्यस्य नानात्वाभावे परप्रकाशयत्वाभावे च तात्पर्यं बोध्यमिति । एतेन 'योग्यानुपलब्ध्यैव प्रागभावः समर्थितः' (श्रीभा० पृ० ३५ प० २३) इति निरस्तम् । अनुपलब्धिप्रमाणस्य रामानुजीयैरनङ्गीकाराच्च । तस्य प्रत्यक्षेऽन्तर्भूतत्वेऽपि वर्तमानकालिकविषयाभावेन प्रत्यक्षस्यात्रापवृत्तेः ।

3.86. [objection] In the absence of all distinctions there could not even be the expression "universal awareness", because a universal requires a particular.

[reply] This is true. This entity has to be shown by some word by those who are explaining. So this expression exists only to this extent, but there is no obstinacy in that matter. Accordingly, how could universal awareness reveal its own prior non-existence, its own impermanence or its own multiplicity etc? And what is unrevealed certainly does not exist, since there is no means of knowledge for its existence. Then [if you say] that universal awareness could not reveal

its own permanence, its own oneness and its own self luminosity etc. also, [we reply] this is accepted as indeed desirable. But just because of this, it must not be at all suspected that universal awareness is impermanent etc. The purport of this: "awareness is permanent" is only that it is not impermanent. Similarly, the purport of this: "awareness is one and self-luminous" should be understood in the sense of the absence of multiplicity and the absence of being illumined by another. On account of this, [the statement] (Śrī.B.Para. 34.p.56.): "prior non-existence is established just by non-cognition which is fit [to be perceived]" is refuted. And because Rāmānuja does not accept the means of knowledge known as "non-cognition". Even if that [non-cognition] is included within perception, perception has no application here because of the absence of an object at the present time.

comment

Abhyankar puts forward three reasons against Rāmānuja's contention that the prior non-existence of awareness can be known by the non-cognition of what is fit to be perceived (yogyānupalabdhi) (see comment, 1.50).

The first argument is of a rather technical nature. Non-cognition of what is fit to be perceived is the apprehension of the non-existence of an object, such as a pot, due to the knowledge that if the pot were present it could be perceived and since it is not perceived it cannot be present. The absence of the pot has the existence of the pot as its counter correlate (pratiyogin) and the knowledge of the pot's non-existence depends upon whether the counter correlate, i.e. the pot, is capable of being perceived if it were present. So the knowledge of the absence of the counter correlate is the reason for the non-cognition of the pot. With regard to the prior non-existence of awareness, Abhyankar states that the intended meaning of the statement "awareness is permanent" is that awareness is not impermanent. To say that awareness is permanent means that awareness has permanence as a positive attribute. However to say that there is the absence of impermanence in awareness does not denote a positive attribute, for the absence of something is not itself a distinction (cf., 3.55.). Hence the absence of an attribute cannot serve as a counter correlate, which must necessarily be capable

of being cognized in order that its non-existence can be stated. Abhyankar reasons that the impermanence of awareness cannot be proved by non-cognition because the counter correlate is not capable of being apprehended.

A statement as to the absence of a thing directly refers to the locus of the absence. For instance when it is said: "there is no pot on the table", the non-existence of the pot refers directly to the table, i.e. the locus (anuyogin). Advaitins consider that the statement such as: "there is no attribute of impermanence in awareness" refers directly to the locus, i.e. awareness, in the manner that: the absence of impermanence is in awareness.

3.87.

यत्तु

‘ किं च प्रत्यक्षज्ञानं स्वविषयं घटादिकं स्वसत्ताकाले सन्तं साधयत्तस्य न सर्वदा सत्तामवगमयद्दृश्यत इति घटादेः पूर्वोत्तरकालसत्ता न प्रतीयते । तदप्रतीतिश्च संवेदनस्य कालपरिच्छिन्नतया प्रतीतेः । घटादिविषयमेव संवेदनं स्वयं कालानवच्छिन्नं प्रतीतं चेत्तत्संवेदनविषयो घटादिरपि कालानवच्छिन्नः प्रतीयत इति नित्यः स्यात् ’ (श्रीभा० पृ० ३६ प० १) इत्युक्तं तन्निष्फलम् । सविषयाणामनुभूतिविशेषाणां कालपरिच्छिन्नत्वेऽपि बाधकाभावात् । किं चाग्रे ‘ क्षेत्रज्ञावस्थायां कर्मणां संकुचितस्वरूपं ज्ञानं तत्तत्कर्मानुगुणतरतमभावेन वर्तते । तच्चेन्द्रियद्वारेण व्यवस्थितम् । इममिन्द्रियद्वारा ज्ञानप्रसरमपेक्ष्योदयास्तमयव्यपदेशः प्रवर्तते ’ (श्रीभा० पृ० ४५ प० १७) इति स्वयमेव ज्ञानस्य नित्यत्वं प्रतिपादितमिति पूर्वापरस्वग्रन्थविरोधः ।

3.87. But what has been said (Śrī.B.Para.34.p.56.):

Furthermore, the perceptual knowledge which proves that its object, such as a pot, exists at the time of its own existence is not seen to make known the existence of that [pot etc.] at all times. Thus the existence of the pot at a prior and subsequent time is not recognized.

And the non-cognition of that is because perceptual consciousness is cognized as limited by time. If perceptual consciousness, which has pots etc. as its object, is itself cognized as not limited by time then the object of perceptual consciousness such as the pot etc. is also recognized as not limited by time and so

it would be eternal.

That is worthless. Because there is no negating factor [in regard to our stated position] even though the particular modes of awareness which possess objects are limited by time.

Furthermore, you yourself have subsequently taught that Knowledge is permanent (Śrī.B.Para.40.p.70.)⁷¹:

In the state of the knower of the field [i.e. the body], Knowledge has a contracted nature due to karma on account of the state of gradation according to the various actions. And that [state of expansion or contraction] is regulated by means of the senses. The designation as to the rising and setting [of Knowledge] occurs having regard to this flow of Knowledge by means of the senses.

Thus there is contradiction between the earlier and later portions of your own work.

3.88. यत्तु 'न च निर्विषया संवित्काचिदस्ति । अनुपलब्धेः । विषयप्रकाशन-
स्वभावतयैवोपलब्धेरेव हि संविदः स्वयंप्रकाशता समर्थिता' (श्रीभा० पृ० ३६
प० १०) इत्युक्तं तच्चिन्त्यम् । विशेषा हि सामान्यपूर्वका एवेति नियमस्य लोक-
प्रसिद्धस्यानुपदमेवोक्तस्यानपलपनीयत्वात् । स्वयंप्रकाशत्वतात्पर्यस्योक्तत्वाच्च ।

3.88. But what has been said (Śrī.B.Para.34.p.57.):

Awareness is not without an object at any time.

Because such a thing is not known. Indeed, awareness is established as self-luminous only because apprehension itself has the nature of illumining objects.

That is questionable. Because the rule which is well known in the world and which has just been mentioned previously: distinctions are certainly preceded by the universal, cannot be denied. And because

the purport as to the meaning of self-luminosity has been told (cf. 3.86.).

3.89.

यदपि 'स्वापमदमूर्च्छासु सर्वविषयशून्या केवलैव संवित्परिस्फुरतीति न वाच्यम् । योग्यानुपलब्धिपराकृतत्वात् । तास्वपि दशास्वनुभूतिरनुभूता चेत्तस्याः प्रबोधसमयेऽनुसंधानं स्यात् । न च तदस्ति' (श्रीभा० पृ० ३६ प० १५) इत्युक्तं तदसंगतम् । स्वयं निर्विषयाया अस्याः संविदः संविदन्तर-विषयत्वाभावेन हि तदनुपलब्धिर्न तु तस्या अभा-
 केवलायाः संविदः वात् । न हि पिशाचस्य प्रत्यक्षाविषयस्यानुपलब्धा-
 स्फुरणम् वपि तस्य योग्यानुपलब्धिपराकृतत्वं मन्यन्ते ।
 योग्यपदस्य ह्येतत्कृत्यम् । तदुक्तं भाषापरिच्छेदे—

'अस्ति चेदुपलभ्येतेत्येवं यत्र प्रसज्यते ।

सा योग्यानुपलब्धिः स्यादभावज्ञानकारणम्' (भा० प० ६२) इति ।

निर्विषयायाः संविदः संविदन्तरविषयत्वाभावेन 'अस्ति चेदुप-
 लभ्येत' इत्येवं प्रसक्त्यभावात् । इयं चानुभूतिर्नानुभूता भवति । अनुभू-
 त्यन्तरविषयत्वाभावात् । तथा च मायावादिभिरस्वीकृतमस्यामनुभूतावनुभूता-
 त्वं हठादारोप्य 'तास्वपि दशास्वनुभूतिरनुभूता चेत्तस्याः प्रबोधसमयेऽनुसं-
 धानं स्यात्' इति प्रबोधसमयेऽनुसंधानापादनं कथं संगतिं लभेत ।

3.89. What has also been said (Śrī.B.Para.34.p.57.):

It cannot be said that in sleep, intoxication and swoon, awareness shines forth completely alone, free from all objects. Because [this view] is negated by non-cognition which is fit [to be perceived]. If awareness is experienced in those states also, there should be the recollection of that [awareness] at the time of waking. And that is not the case.

That is incongruous. Because this awareness, which is itself free from objects, is not the object of another awareness, there is the non-cognition of it [i.e. awareness]. But not because that [awareness] does not exist. Even upon the non-cognition of a demon, which is not an object of perception, they do not consider it to be negated by non-cognition which is fit [to be perceived].⁷² For the word "fit" means "this can be done". That has been told in the Bhāṣāpariccheda :

Where it follows that: "if it exists it should be experienced", that would be non-cognition fit [to be perceived] and that is the cause for the knowledge of non-existence. (Bhā.P.62.).⁷³

Because the awareness free from objects is not the object of another awareness, therefore there is no applicability [for the statement]: "if it exists it should be experienced". And this awareness is not experienced. Because it is not the object of another awareness. So having forcibly imposed on this awareness the nature of being experienced, which the exponents of māyā do not accept, how could the effecting of recollection at the time of waking: "if awareness is experienced in those states also, there should be the recollection of that [awareness] at the time of waking" gain congruity?

3.90.

किं चास्या

अनुभूतेर्निर्विषयत्वान्न संस्कारजनकत्वम् । अनुभूतिर्हि स्वाश्रये स्वविषयसंस्कारं जनयति । न ह्यस्या अनुभूतेराश्रयस्तदानीं कोऽपि भाति, नापि विषयः । तत्कथमियं संस्कारं जनयेत् । एतेन 'अस्मरणनियमोऽनुभवाभावमेव साधयति' (श्रीभा० पृ० ३६. प० २०) इति प्रत्युक्तम् । अस्मरणनियमस्य संस्काराभावमूलकत्वात् । सविषयज्ञानेष्वपि न सर्वेषां संस्कारजनकत्वनियमः । पथि गच्छतोदासीनतया दृष्टेषु गृहवृक्षेत्रारामादिषु सर्वेषां स्मरणनियमादर्शनात् ।

3.90. Furthermore, this awareness does not produce a mental impression [during sleep] because it is without an object. For awareness produces the mental impression of its object in its own locus. No locus whatsoever appears for this awareness at that time, nor even an object. Therefore how could this [awareness] produce a mental impression? Due to this, [the statement] (Śrī.B.Para.35.p.57.): "there is a rule that non-recollection proves only the absence of experience" is answered. Because the rule about non-recollection is based on the absence of a mental impression. Even in regard to cognitions possessing objects there is no rule that everything produces a mental impression. Because in

regard to the houses, trees, fields and gardens etc. seen by a person going unconcernedly on the road, there is no rule seen as to the memory of everything.

3.91. यत्तु 'न केवलमस्मरणनियमादनुभवाभावः । सुप्तोत्थितस्येयन्तं कालं न किञ्चिदहमज्ञासिपमिति प्रत्यवमर्शेनैव सिद्धेः' (श्रीभा० पृ० ३७ प० १) इत्युक्तं तन्न सम्यक् । सौप्तिकज्ञानस्य सविषयत्वाभावेन तादृशप्रत्यवमर्शोपपत्तेः । नञो ज्ञाधात्वर्थान्वयेऽपि तत्कर्षणि निषेधपर्यवसानम् । यथा वनं गच्छति देवदत्ते देवदत्तो न ग्रामं गत इत्यत्र तद्वत् । किं सुप्तौ नाहंभावः च सौप्तिकज्ञाने विषयस्येवाश्रयस्याप्यहमर्थस्य प्रातिभानं नास्ति । अतोऽपि तादृशप्रत्यवमर्शोपपत्तिः । ननु 'अर्थान्तराननुभवस्यार्थान्तराभावस्य चानुभूतार्थान्तरास्मरणहेतुत्वं न संभवति' (श्रीभा० पृ० ३७ प० ४) इत्युक्तमिति चेद्भ्रान्तोऽसि । अनुभूतिर्हि स्वाश्रये स्वविषयसंस्कारं जनयित्वैव स्मरणहेतुर्भवति । तथा चानुभूतिर्यस्यार्थान्तरस्याननुभवे यस्य चार्थान्तरस्याभावे सति संस्कारजनन एवासमर्था तादृशार्थान्तरस्याननुभवस्तादृशार्थान्तराभावश्चास्मरणहेतुर्भवत्येव । विषयाननुभव आश्रयाभावे चानुभूतिः कस्य संस्कारं क्व जनयेत् । किं च 'न किञ्चिदवेदिषम्' इत्याकारको ज्ञानप्रत्यवमर्शाभावः सौप्तिकानुभवाभावसाधकत्वेनाभिप्रेत उत 'न किञ्चिदवेदिषम्' इत्याकारको ज्ञानाभावप्रत्यवमर्शस्तत्साधकत्वेनाभिप्रेतः । आद्ये 'प्रबोधसमयेऽनुसंधानं नास्ति' (श्रीभा० पृ० ३६ प० १७) इत्युक्तमेव पुनरुक्तं स्यात् । तथा च न केवलमिति ग्रन्थासंगतिः । द्वितीये ज्ञानाभावस्य प्रत्यवमर्शश्चेत्सुप्तौ ज्ञानाभावोऽनुभूयत एव । प्रत्यवमर्शो हि स्मरणम् । तच्चानुभूतस्यैव । ज्ञानाभावः सुप्तावनुभूतश्चेत्सुप्तावनुभवः सिध्यतीति प्रत्युत तत्रैव बाधकम् । सोऽयं घट्टकुटीप्रभातन्यायः ।

3.91. But what has been said (Śrī.B.Para.35.p.57f.):

Not only is absence of experience on account of the rule of non-recollection. Because [absence of experience] is established by the very reflection of a person who has risen from sleep: "during that time I did not know anything".

That is not correct. For there is the logical possibility of such a reflection because the knowledge obtained in sleep does not possess an object. Although the negative particle [not, na] is grammatically connected to the meaning of the verbal root "know" (jñā), the negation

relates to its object. Just like; when Devadatta goes to the forest, Devadatta did not go to the village. It is just like that. Moreover, just as there is no appearance of an object in the knowledge obtained in sleep, there is no appearance of a locus also i.e. the sense of "I". For that reason too, there is the logical possibility of such a reflection.

[objection] It is said (Śrī.B.Para.35.p.58.)⁷⁴:

the non-experience of one object and the non-existence of another object cannot possibly be the cause for the non-recollection of yet another object which was experienced.

[reply] You are confused. Because awareness is the cause for recollection only by producing the mental impression of its object in its own locus. So when there is no experience of one object and no existence of another object, awareness is certainly incapable of producing a mental impression. [Hence] the non-experience of that one object and the non-existence of that other object is indeed the cause for non-recollection. When there is no experience of an object and no existence of a locus, of what could awareness produce a mental impression and where?

Furthermore, is the absence of the reflection with regard to knowledge, which has the form: "I did not know anything", intended to prove the absence of experience obtained in sleep, or, is the reflection of the absence of knowledge having the form: "I did not know anything" meant to prove that [i.e. the absence of experience while in sleep]? In the first case, what has already been said (Śrī.B.Para. 34.p.57.Supra.)⁷⁵: "there is no recollection at the time of waking" would be said again. So there is incongruity of the text: "Not only...". In the second case, if there is reflection of the absence of knowledge, the absence of knowledge in deep sleep is certainly experienced.

Reflection means recollecting. And that is only for what has been experienced. If the absence of knowledge is experienced in deep sleep, then experience in deep sleep is established. So, on the contrary, you [Rāmānuja] alone are negated. This is the maxim of "day-break near the toll-station".⁷⁶

- 3.92. निर्विषयानुभूतेरुत्पत्त्यभावादन्त्येऽपि विकारा न भवन्ति । विकारान्तराणामुत्पत्तिव्याप्तत्वेनोत्पत्त्यभावेऽसंभवात् । यत्तु 'प्रागभावे व्यभिचारात्' (श्रीभा० पृ० ३७ प० १६) इत्युक्तं तन्न । प्रागभावविनाशस्य विकारत्वाभावात् । अवस्थान्तरापत्तिर्हि विकारः । न चाभावस्यावस्थान्तरं संभवति । किं च सत्कार्यवादे कार्यस्योत्पत्तेः प्रागपि कारणरूपेण सत्त्वात्प्रागभाव एव दुर्वचः । कुतस्तत्र व्यभिचारः । सत्कार्यवादश्च रामानुजीयैरपि स्वीकृत एव ।

3.92. Because the awareness which is free from objects has no origination, there are no other modifications also.⁷⁷ Because other modifications are not possible if there is no origination since they are pervaded by origination. But what has been said (Śrī.B.Para.35.p.58): "because there is deviation in regard to prior non-existence." That is not so. Because the destruction of prior non-existence is not a modification. For a modification is the gain of another state and another state is not possible for what is non-existent.

Furthermore, according to the teaching that the effect exists in the cause (satkāryavāda), prior non-existence is certainly difficult to be stated; because there is existence in the form of the cause even prior to the origination of the effect. How could deviation be there [in prior non-existence which is not itself a valid concept]? And the teaching that the effect exists in the cause is certainly accepted by Rāmānuja too.

comment

The Advaitin maintains that what has no origin is free from the sixfold modifications⁷⁸ commencing with birth and ending with

destruction. Advaitins consider that since the prior non-existence of awareness cannot be proved, awareness is free from all modifications which depend firstly upon origination. Rāmānuja argues against this view by saying that even what has no origination, such as prior non-existence, can certainly perish. For the prior non-existence of an object, though beginningless, is destroyed at the moment the object comes into being. The Advaitin replies that the argument cannot be supported by the illustration of prior non-existence because modifications are possible only for things which exist. If something which does not exist is able to be destroyed, then even the non-existent horns of a rabbit would be able to be destroyed.⁷⁹

Rāmānuja puts forward another argument. Advaitins hold that unlike prior non-existence, Ignorance (avidyā) is something positive in nature (bhāvarūpa). But they also maintain that Ignorance is beginningless yet capable of being destroyed. Therefore the Advaitins position that what is free from origin is free from destruction is contradicted. Abhyankar now takes up this point.

- 3.93. यत्तु ' भावरूपा मायावाद्यभिमतताऽविद्याऽनुत्पन्नैव विविधविकारास्पदं तत्त्वज्ञानोदयादन्तवती चेति तस्यामनैकान्त्यम् ' (श्रीभा० पृ० ३७ प० १८) इत्युक्तं तदसंगतम् । तथा हि सामान्यानुभूतिरूपं ब्रह्म निर्विशेषम् । तच्छक्तिरविद्यापदवाच्या । सा च न ततो भिन्ना । भेदस्य विशेषमूलकत्वात् । अत एव ब्रह्मरूपा सा शक्तिर्नित्यैव । तादृशशक्तिपरिणामस्त्वव्यक्तादिः । स च कर्ममूलकः । तादृशशक्तिपरिणामस्य कर्मणश्च मिथः कार्यकारणभावेऽपि नान्योन्याश्रयदोष आपादनीयः । तयोर्द्वयोरपि बीजाङ्कुरन्यायेन प्रवाहानादित्वात् । बीजाङ्कुरयोर्द्वयोरुत्पत्तौ सत्यामप्युत्पत्तौ प्राथम्यं कस्योति नावधार्यते । अतोऽगत्या प्रवाहानादित्वं स्वीकार्यम् । प्रवाहानादित्वं च नोत्पत्त्यभावः । किंतूत्पत्तिकालानवधारणम् । उत्पत्तिकालानवधारणं च द्विविधम् । क्वचित्कालसत्त्वेऽपि तदज्ञानात् । क्वचिच्च कालाभावादेव तदज्ञानात् । आद्यं बीजाङ्कुरविषये । अव्यक्तादिर्यो ब्रह्मशक्तिपरिणामस्तद्विषये द्वितीयम् । अव्यक्तमहदहंकारोत्पत्त्यनन्तरमेव दिक्कालादिविशेषवस्तुत्पत्तेः । मोक्षावस्थायामपि नित्या ब्रह्मरूपा शक्तिरस्त्येव । अव्यक्तादिस्तत्परिणामो विनश्यति । मोक्षावस्थायामपि योऽविद्यानाश उच्यते तत्राविद्यापदेनाव्यक्तादिः शक्तिपरिणामो गृह्यते । तत्त्वज्ञानेन जायमानोऽव्यक्तादिपरिणामविनाशश्च तादृशपरिणामाभानरूपः । अभानं च क्वचिद्वस्तुन एवासत्त्वात् क्वचिद्वस्तुसत्त्वेऽपि तदभानात् । क्वचिच्च वस्तुभानेऽपि मिथ्यात्वेन भानात् । भानमपि मिथ्यात्वेन जायमानमभानमेव । आद्यं यथा रज्जुयाथात्म्यज्ञानोत्तरं सर्पस्याभानम् । द्वितीयं यथा सुषुप्तौ घटादेरभानम् । तृतीयं यथाऽऽदर्शे स्वमुखभानम् । अव्यक्तादेर्ब्रह्मशक्तिपरिणामस्याभानं च

जीवन्मुक्तावादर्शे स्वमुखभानवदेव । विदेहमुक्तौ तु सुषुप्तौ घटादेरभानवत् । इत्थं सिद्धान्तस्थितौ सत्यां 'यदनुत्पन्नं तदधिनाशि' इति व्याप्तेरविद्यायां व्यभिचारापादनं तत्राविद्यापदेन ब्रह्मशक्तिरभिप्रेयत उत तत्परिणामोऽव्यक्तादिरभिप्रेयते । आद्ये सा नान्तवती । अन्त्ये सा नानुत्पन्ना । ततः कथमत्र व्यभिचारः पदमादधीत ।

3.93. But what has been said (Śrī.B.Para.35.p.59.)⁸⁰:

Ignorance, which is accepted by the exponents of māyā as a positive entity, is certainly unoriginated, it is the seat of manifold modifications and it comes to an end because of the knowledge of reality. So there is inconclusiveness of reasoning in respect of that [Ignorance].

That is incongruous. To elaborate: Brahman, which is of the nature of universal awareness, is free from distinction. The power of that [Brahman] may be expressed by the word "Ignorance" (avidyā). And that [power] is not different from that [Brahman]. Because difference is based upon a distinction. For this reason, that power, having Brahman as its nature, is indeed eternal. The Unmanifest etc. is the modification of such a power. And that [modification] is based upon karma. The defect of mutual dependence cannot be brought about even though the modification of such a power and karma have a mutual cause-effect relation. Because even both of them are a beginningless series according to the maxim of the seed and the sprout. Even in regard to the origination of both the seed and the sprout, "which is the first to originate?" is not determined. Therefore a beginningless series has to be accepted since there is no other recourse.

A beginningless series does not mean the absence of origination. But the non-ascertainment of a time of origination. The non-ascertainment of a time of origination is twofold: due to the ignorance of it even though the time exists somewhere and due to the ignorance of it because

of the very absence of the time [of origination] anywhere. The first is with regard to the seed and the sprout. The second is with regard to the Unmanifest etc. which is the modification of the power of Brahman. Because the origination of particular things such as the directions, time etc. is only after the origination of the Unmanifest, Mahat and Ahañkāra.

Even in the state of liberation the power which has Brahman as its nature is certainly eternal. The Unmanifest etc., which is the modification of that [power], is destroyed. The destruction of Ignorance is said in the state of liberation and there [in liberation] the Unmanifest etc., which is the modification of that power, is what is understood by the word "Ignorance". The destruction of the modification beginning with the Unmanifest, which occurs due to the knowledge of reality, is in the form of the non-appearance of such modification. Non-appearance is because (1) the object itself does not exist anywhere, (2) even though the object exists somewhere it does not appear, (3) even though the object appears somewhere its appearance is false. Even the appearance which occurs as something which is false is certainly non-appearance. The first is just like the non-appearance of the snake following the knowledge of the true nature of the rope. The second is just like the non-appearance of a pot etc. in deep sleep. The third is just like the appearance of one's face in a mirror. In regard to liberation while living, the non-appearance of the Unmanifest etc., which is the modification of the power of Brahman, is just like the appearance of one's face in a mirror. But in liberation free from the body, [the non-appearance of the Unmanifest etc.] is like the non-appearance of a pot etc. in deep sleep.

When the established conclusion exists in this manner, [the opponent] brings about a deviation in regard to Ignorance because of the invariable concomitance: "what is unoriginated is without

destruction". In respect of that [deviation], is the power of Brahman intended by the word "Ignorance" or is the Unmanifest etc., which is its modification, intended? In the first case, that [power] has no end. In the last case, that [Unmanifest etc.] is not unoriginated. Therefore how can deviation make an impression here?

3.94. यत्तु 'यदप्यनुभूतिरजत्वात्स्वस्मिन्विभागं न सहत इति तदपि नोपपद्यते । अजस्रैवात्मनो देहेन्द्रियादिभ्यो विभक्तत्वात् । अनादित्वेन चाभ्युपगताया अविद्याया आत्मनो व्यतिरेकस्यावश्याश्रयणीयत्वात्' (श्रीभा० पृ० ३८ प० १) इत्युक्तं तत्सर्वं दत्तोत्तरम् (पृ० ८२) । यत्र 'स्वसत्तयैव स्वाश्रयं प्रति कस्यचिद्विषयस्य प्रकाशनं हि संवेदनम् । स्वयंप्रकाशता तु स्वसत्तयैव स्वाश्रयाय प्रकाशमानता । प्रकाशश्च चिदचिदशेषपदार्थसाधारणं व्यवहारानुगुण्यम् । सर्वकालवर्तमानत्वं हि नित्यत्वम् । एकत्वमेकसंख्यावच्छेदः' (श्रीभा० पृ० ३८ प० १२) इतिग्रन्थेन संवेदनस्य, स्वयंप्रकाशतायाः, प्रकाशस्य, नित्यत्वस्य, एकत्वस्य च स्वरूपभेद उक्तः स विशेषावस्थायां न तु तन्मूलभूतसामान्यस्वरूपे । न हि घटशरावोदञ्चनादिभेदो मृदवस्थायां दर्शयितुं शक्यते ।

3.94. But what has been said (Śrī.B.Para.35.p.59.):

Though [it was said] (Mahāpūrvapakṣa.Para.27.p.42) that awareness does not admit division within itself on account of having no beginning, that too is not logically possible. Because the Self, which is certainly without beginning, is differentiated from the body, sense organs etc. And because the Self has necessarily to be accepted as different from Ignorance which is accepted as beginningless.

All that has been answered (see 3.84.). And by the text (Śrī.B.Para.36.p.60.):

Consciousness is the illumining of some object to its own locus solely through its own existence. Whereas self-luminosity is the nature of illumining for its own locus solely through its own existence. Illuminating

[in the previous two definitions] is common to all things sentient and insentient in conformity with everyday usage. Eternity is existing at all times.

Oneness is limitation by the number one.

a difference of essential nature is said for consciousness, self-luminosity, illumining, eternity and oneness. That [difference of essential nature] is in the state of the particulars but not in the nature of the universal which is the basis of those [particulars]. The difference among pots, earthenware dishes, lids etc. is certainly not able to be shown in the state of clay.

comment

Abhyankar's response to both these objections is to restate that the awareness pertaining to mental activities, i.e. vyrttijñāna, can be seen to possess distinctions. However distinctions exist only in relation to a universal. Advaitins maintain that awareness which is universal, i.e. awareness which is free from all mental modifications such as memory etc.,⁸¹ is the unchanging substratum of all particular awareness.⁸² This awareness is not differentiated by anything because everything has been superimposed on it. 000

With regard to the second quotation, Rāmānuja argues that awareness must possess distinction since Advaitins themselves say that awareness is self-luminous, eternal, one by nature etc. and hence these must constitute the attributes of awareness. Apart from the argument of the particular in relation to the universal, Advaitins can also respond to this objection by affirming Rāmānuja's own prima facie view.⁸³ Advaitins maintain that a thing which is known cannot be an attribute of the knower, because it is an object of knowledge.⁸⁴ Since awareness is not the object of another awareness (cf., 3.80.comment) it cannot be seen to possess distinguishing features. Any distinguishing attributes perceived in awareness are objects of knowledge and not identical to awareness. Hence awareness must be free from distinction. What the Advaitin means by "eternal" etc. is only that the absence of being non-eternal exists in Brahman (cf., 3.86.comment, final para.).

3.95. यत्तु ' संविदि तु स्वरूपातिरेकेण जडत्वादिप्रत्यनीकत्वमित्यभावरूपो भावरूपो वा धर्मो नाभ्युपेतश्चेत्तन्निषेधोक्त्या किमपि नोक्तं भवेत् ' (श्रीभा०

पृ० ३८ प० १८) इत्युक्तं तच्चिन्त्यम् । अभावस्य धर्मरूपत्वाभावात् । धर्मो
 हि धर्म्यपेक्षया सूक्ष्मं धर्मिणः सामान्यावस्थं
 संविदो निर्विशेषत्वम् रूपम् । अत एवाकाशादिविशेषापेक्षया सूक्ष्मे-
 भ्यस्तत्सामान्यावस्थेभ्यः शब्दतन्मात्रादिभ्यः
 सकाशादाकाशादिविशेषाणामुत्पत्तिरुक्ता सांख्यशास्त्रे । इतरैः प्रायस्तथाङ्गी-
 कृता च । तथा च कथमभावरूपो धर्म इत्युच्यते ।।

3.95. What has been said (Śrī.B.Para.36.p.60.):

But if the opposite of being inert etc. is not accepted
 as an attribute of awareness -whether of a positive or
 negative kind- as something different from the essential
 nature, then nothing would be said by its negation.

That is questionable. Because a negative entity is not an attribute.
 An attribute is a form which is subtle with regard to the possessor of
 the attribute and its condition is universal to the possessor of the
 attribute. For this very reason, in the treatise of the Sāṅkhya the
 origination of the particulars such as space etc. is said to be from
 the tanmātras of sound etc. which are subtle with regard to the
 particulars like space and have a condition which is universal to them.
 And it is generally accepted as such by others. So how is it said that
 an attribute can be of a negative kind?

3.96.

किंच ' संविदि जडत्वादयो
 ज्ञेयधर्मा न सन्ति ' इति वाक्येन न भावरूपः कश्चन धर्मो विधीयते नाप्य-
 भावरूपः । किं तु जडत्वादयो धर्माः केवलं निषिध्यन्त इत्येव तद्वाक्यार्थः ।
 ' घटो नास्ति घटाभावोऽस्ति ' अनयोर्वाक्ययोरर्थभेदः प्रसिद्ध एव । पदार्थसं-
 सर्गो हि वाक्यार्थः । घटो नास्तीत्यत्र घटस्यास्त्यर्थेऽन्वयः । तस्य च नञर्थेन
 संबन्धः । घटाभावोऽस्तीत्यत्र तु घटस्याभावेऽन्वयः । तस्य चास्त्यर्थे । एवं
 संसर्गभेदे वाच्यवृत्त्यां वाक्यार्थभेदोऽवर्जनीय एव । लक्षणा तु बाधसत्त्व एवेति
 न लक्षणयाप्यत्र वाक्यार्थैक्यं शङ्कनीयम् । अत एव ' त्वं नासि ' ' त्वदभा-
 वोऽस्ति ' इत्यत्र पुरुषव्यवस्था, ' घटा न सन्ति घटाभावोऽस्ति ' इत्यत्र वचन-
 व्यवस्था च संगच्छते । अत एव च विधिवाक्यान्निषेधवाक्यं पार्थक्येन
 गणयन्ति वाक्यार्थविदः ।

3.96. Furthermore, by the sentence: "there are no knowable attributes, such as inertness etc., in awareness" no positive attribute whatsoever is enjoined nor a negative one. But attributes such as inertness are completely negated. This alone is the meaning of that sentence.

The difference in meaning between these two sentences is certainly well known: "the pot does not exist", "the non-existence of the pot exists". The meaning of a sentence is the syntactical connection between the meanings of the words. In "the pot does not exist", the grammatical connection of the pot is in the sense that "it exists" and there is the connection of that [pot existing] with the meaning of the negative particle. But in "the non-existence of the pot exists", the grammatical connection of the pot is in non-existence and [there is the connection] of that [non-existing pot] in the sense that "it exists". Thus the difference in the meaning of the sentences is certainly unavoidable since the express meaning is in regard to a difference in the syntactical connection.

Implication, however, is only if a contradiction exists. So an identity of the meaning of the sentences cannot be suspected here even through implication. For this very reason, the respective difference for a person: "you do not exist", "your non-existence exists" and the respective difference of the sayings: "the pots do not exist", "the non-existence of the pots exists" is correct. And it is for this reason that the knowers of the meaning of sentences [i.e. Mīmāṃsakas] consider a prohibitive statement separately from an injunctive statement.

comment

Abhyankar has argued that a negative entity i.e. the non-existence of a thing such as a pot upon a table, does not constitute an attribute of the locus. Moreover a statement which negates attributes such as: "there are no knowable attributes like inertness in awareness" does not admit attributes of any kind in awareness, but is only intent upon negating their existence. For the negative particle "not" (na) only refers to the attributes of inertness etc. and then negates them, but it

does not affirm their absence.

3.97.

किं चासमस्तनञः क्रियान्वय एव साधुत्वमिति
वैयाकरणानां निकाये प्रसिद्धम् । तथा चाहुः—

संबोधनान्तं, कृत्वोर्थाः, कारकं, प्रथमो वतिः ।

धातुसंबन्धाधिकारनिष्पन्नमसमस्तनञ् ॥

तथा यस्य च भावेन षष्ठी चेत्युदितं द्वयम् ।

साधुत्वमष्टकस्यास्य क्रिययैवावधार्यताम् । (वै० भू० का० १६-१७) इति ।

तथा च कथं घटो नास्तीत्यत्र घटाभावप्रतीतिः । एतेन

‘ न वेद्यं वित्तिधर्मः स्यादिति यत्प्रागुदीरितम् ।

तेनापि साधितं किञ्चित्संयिदोऽस्ति न वा त्वया ।

अस्ति चेत्पक्षपातः स्यान्नचेत्ते विफलः श्रमः ’ ॥ (सं०सि०पृ०९७)

इति सिद्धित्रयोक्तमपास्तम् ।

3.97. Furthermore, it is well known in the school of the grammarians that a negative particle which is not in a compound is correct only in grammatical connection with an action. Accordingly, they say:

This eightfold group can be determined as correct only [through connection] with an action: at the end of the vocative case, the meanings of "so many times", the grammatical cases expressing an action, the primary attribute of similarity, what is derived from the governing rule about the connection of the meaning of verbal roots, a negative particle which is not in a compound, so also the group of two said as the

locative and the genitive absolute. (Vai.Bhū.Sāra.16-17.)⁸⁵

So in "the pot does not exist", how is there the cognition of the absence of the pot? On account of this, what is said in the Siddhitraya:

It was previously said: what is known cannot be an attribute of Knowledge. Even by this, is anything established by you about awareness or not? If it is, there would be partiality [toward your own

views] If not, your effort has no result (Sam.Si.Para.37.p.113.)
is set aside.⁸⁶

3.98. यत्तु 'संवित्सिध्यति वा न वा । सिध्यति चेत्सधर्मता स्यान्नो चेत्तुच्छता गगनकुसुमादिवत् । सिद्धिरेव संविदिति चेत्कस्य कं प्रतीति वक्तव्यम् । यदि न कस्यचित् कंचित्प्रति सां तर्हि न सिद्धिः ' (श्रीभा० पृ० ३९ प० १) इत्युक्तं तत्रोच्यते—या च सिद्धिः कस्यचित्कंचित्प्रत्येव वक्तुं शक्यते स व्यवहारानुगुणः सिद्धिविशेषः । यच्च सर्वेषां सिद्धिविशेषाणां मूलभूतं प्राणप्रदं च सिद्धिसामान्यं सैव संवित् । न तस्या आश्रयापेक्षा । नापि निरूपकापेक्षा । सामान्या संविदे-वात्मा । न त्वात्मधर्मः संवित् । आधाराधेयभावस्यापि विशेषावस्थायामेव सत्त्वेन सामान्यावस्थायां धर्मधर्मिभावस्य वक्तुमशक्यत्वात् । विशेषाणां च सामान्यपूर्वकत्वनियमेनोक्तसामान्यरूपमवश्याश्रयितव्यमनपलपनीयमेवेति प्रा-गुक्तं (पृ० ६९) न विस्मर्तव्यम् । एवं च ' अनुभूतिरिति स्वाश्रयं प्रति ' (श्रीभा०:पृ० ३९ प० ९) इत्यादिना ग्रन्थेनानुभूतेरात्मधर्मत्वादि यदुक्तं तत्सर्वं विशेषावस्थायामस्तु नाम न तु सामान्यावस्थायामिति बोध्यम् ॥ ११ ॥

3.98. But what has been said (Śrī.B.Para.36.p.60.):

Is awareness established [as existent] or not? If it is established, it must possess attributes. If it is not, it is bereft of existence like a sky-flower etc. If [you say] awareness is itself the proof, [we reply] that [the proof] is to be said for whom and in reference to what? If that [awareness] is not for someone and in reference to something then it is not the proof.

In regard to that, it is said: the proof which can be spoken of as indeed "for someone" and "in reference to something" is a particular proof conformable to ordinary relations. And the universal proof, which is the basis and the giver of life to all particular proofs, is indeed awareness. That [awareness] has no dependence upon a locus. Nor does it depend upon determining [an object]. The Self is identical to universal awareness. Awareness is not an attribute of the Self. Because the relation of attribute and its possessor cannot be said in the state of the universal since even a relation of locus and located exists only

in the state of the particular. And because distinctions are invariably preceded by the universal, the nature of the universal which has been told must be necessarily adhered to and certainly cannot be denied. That has been previously mentioned (3.50.) and should not be forgotten. So what has been said about awareness being an attribute etc. of the Self by the text (Śrī.B.Para.36.p.61.): "Awareness is that which... in reference to its locus" etc. should all be understood as accepted in the state of the particular but not in the state of the universal.

3.99.

संवित्सामान्यमेवात्मा नाहमर्थः स ईरितः ।

अहंभावः कल्पितः स्यान्मोक्षेऽहंधीः सुखं च न ॥ १२ ॥

3.99.

The Self is indeed awareness which is universal.

That [Self] is not said to be the sense of "I".

"I-ness" must be superimposed. In liberation

there is neither the notion of "I" nor happiness.12.

3.100.

यत्तु 'संविन्नाम काचिच्चिराश्रया निर्विषया वाऽत्यन्तानुपलब्धेर्न संभवति' (श्रीभा० पृ० ४० प० ४) इत्युक्तं तन्न । प्रागुक्तं (पृ० ८२)-रीत्या निर्विषयाया निराश्रयायाः सामान्यानुभूतेरवश्यं स्वीकार्यत्वात् । किं च केयं सामान्यानुभूत्यभावसाधिकाऽनुपलब्धिः । प्रत्यक्षज्ञानाभावश्चेत्परशरीरगतानां जीवानामप्रत्यक्षत्वेनासत्त्वापत्तिः । अथ नेयमत्यन्तानुपलब्धिः । शरीरचेष्टयाऽनुमानेन तत्र जीवोपलब्धेरिति चेदत्रापि विशेषाणां सामान्यपूर्वकत्वानियमेनानुमानप्रमाणं कुतस्ते बुद्ध्यारूढं न भवति । या च निर्विषया निराश्रयानुभूतिः सैव सर्वेषु लोकेष्वहं जानामीत्यादिप्रत्ययेष्वनुवर्तते । ज्ञानसामान्यमनुवर्तते । आश्रयविशेषो विषयविशेषश्च कल्पित एव ।

आत्मनो ज्ञानस्वरूपत्वम् तथा च ज्ञानाश्रयत्वेन भातोऽहमर्थोऽपि कल्पित

एवेति न स आत्मा । किं तु निराश्रयो निर्वि-

षयश्चिद्रूप एवात्मा । अतति व्याप्नोतीत्यात्मा । सामान्यं हि विशेषान् व्याप्नोति । यथा घटशरावादीन्मृत्तिका व्याप्नोति । अतः सर्वापेक्षया यत्सामान्यं तदेव परमार्थत आत्मस्वरूपम् ।

3.100. But what has been said (Śrī.B.Para.37.p.62.):

Something known as awareness, without a locus or an object, is not possible because there is the absolute non-cognition [of such a thing].

That is not so. Because universal awareness, without a locus and an object, must be necessarily accepted according to the manner previously told (3.84.f.). Moreover, what is this non-cognition which proves the non-existence of universal awareness? If [you say] it is the absence of perceptual knowledge, [we reply] since there is no perception of the individual souls in other bodies, they would be non-existent. But if [you say] this is not absolute non-cognition, because there is the cognition of an individual soul there [in another body] by an inference due to the motion of the body. [reply] Here too [in respect of awareness], why does the means of knowledge by inference: "because distinctions are invariably preceded by the universal" not occur to your mind?

The awareness which is without an object and a locus certainly persists in all ordinary cognitions such as "I know". The Knowledge which is universal persists. The particular locus and the particular object are only superimposed. So even the sense of "I" which appears as the locus of Knowledge is only superimposed and hence it is not the Self. But the Self is just in the form of consciousness, without a locus and an object. [The word] Self (ātman) is derived from "it goes" (atati) in the sense that "it pervades" (vyāpnoti). Because the universal pervades the distinctions, just as the clay pervades pots, earthenware dishes etc. Therefore that which is universal with regard to everything is alone, in reality, the essential nature of the Self.

3.101.

अथ को विशेषः किं च सामान्यमिति चेदुच्यते—

परमाणवः सामान्यम् । द्व्यणुकादयो विशेषाः । रूपरसादयो गुणाः सामान्यम् ।
गुणी विशेषः । एवमितरत्रापि धर्माः सामान्यं धर्मी विशेषः । सूक्ष्मं सामान्यं
स्थूलं विशेषः । आन्तरोऽर्थः सामान्यं बाह्योऽर्थो विशेषः । निराकारं ज्ञानमात्रं
सामान्यम् । कल्पितेनाकारेण युक्तं साकारं ज्ञानं विशेषः ।

‘अर्थेनैव विशेषो हि निराकारतया धियाम्’

इत्युक्तेः । तथा च सर्वोपेक्षया यत्सामान्यं स एवात्मा । तथा हि-मृत्तिका घटश-
रावादयो विशेषाः । मृत्तिका सामान्यमिति हि प्रसिद्धमेव । एवं मृदादिषु परमाणवः
सामान्यम् । सूक्ष्मत्वात् । परमाणुष्वपि पृथिवीपरमाण्वपेक्षया जलपरमाणवः
सामान्यम् । सूक्ष्मतरत्वात् । महाभूतेषु चात्यन्तसूक्ष्मत्वादाकाशं सामान्यम् ।
आकाशादिमहाभूतापेक्षया तद्गुणाः शब्दस्पर्शादयः सामान्यम् । शब्दतन्मात्रादी-
नामाकाशाद्यपेक्षयापि सूक्ष्मत्वात् । एवं सकलधर्म्यपेक्षया तद्धर्माः सामान्यम् ।
तेष्वपि पञ्चमहाभूतेषु तद्धर्मेषु च बाह्यार्थपेक्षयाऽऽन्तरार्थाः सामान्यम् । आन्त-
रार्थाश्च बुद्धौ कल्पिता इति ज्ञानविशेषा एव ते । तदपेक्षया यज्ज्ञानसामान्यं
यदीदृशं तादृशमिति वक्तुं न शक्यते स आत्मा । यत्र धर्मधर्मिभावोऽपि नैव
भासते । अत एव निर्विशेषचिन्मात्र आत्मेत्युक्तम् । स एव च सर्वान्वौद्धा-
न्धर्मान्, तद्वारा धर्मिणः, आन्तरद्वारा च बाह्यार्थान्, तेष्वपि सूक्ष्मद्वारा स्थूलान्,
सत्रापि च मृत्तिकादिद्वारा घटादींश्च सर्वान् व्याप्नोति । सामान्यस्य च विशेष-
कारणत्वेनात्मनः सर्वकारणत्वात् ‘जन्माद्यस्य यतः’ (ब्र० सू० १।१।२)
इति तल्लक्षणं सिद्धम् । बाह्यार्थस्य चान्तरार्थमूलकत्वात्कार्ये च कारणसजाती-
यत्वकल्पनस्यैवौचित्यात्कारणीभूतस्यान्तरार्थस्येव बाह्यार्थस्य सकलजगतः क-
ल्पितत्वमेव युक्तमित्यपरमार्थत्वं च सिद्धम् । एवं च ज्ञानसामान्यमात्मेति
स्थितम् ।

3.101. If [you ask] what is a distinction and what is a universal? [reply]
It is said: the minute particles (paramāṇu) are the universal. The dyads
(dvyaṇuka) etc. are the distinctions. The qualities such as colour and
taste etc. are the universal. The possessor of qualities is the
distinction. So also the attributes elsewhere are the universal and the
possessor of attributes is the distinction. What is subtle is universal.
What is gross is a distinction. An internal object [i.e. a thought] is
universal and an external object is a distinction. Mere Knowledge
without form is universal. Knowledge which has form, i.e. which possesses
a form which has been superimposed, is a distinction. For there is the
statement: "a distinction is only due to an object, because cognitions
have no form" (Nyā.Ku.4.4.). So that which is the universal with regard
to everything is alone the Self.

To explain: it is indeed well known that the modifications of clay,
such as pots, earthenware dishes etc., are the distinctions and clay is

the universal. Similarly, the minute particles are the universal with regard to clay etc., because they are subtle. Even among minute particles the minute particles of water are universal with regard to the minute particles of earth, because they are more subtle. And among the great elements space is universal because it is absolutely subtle. With regard to the great elements like space, their qualities such as sound and touch etc. are universal. Because the tanmātras of sound etc. are subtle even with regard to space etc.

In the same manner, with regard to all the possessors of attributes their attributes are universal. Even in respect of those five great elements and their attributes, the internal objects [i.e. thoughts] are universal with regard to external objects. And the internal objects are superimposed on the intellect, so they are only particulars of Knowledge. With regard to those [particular modes of Knowledge] the Knowledge which is universal is what cannot be said as "such and such" and that is the Self. It is where even the relation of attribute and its possessor certainly does not appear. For this very reason it is said that the Self is pure consciousness free from distinction.

That very [Self] pervades all the attributes belonging to the intellect, by means of those it pervades the possessors of the attributes. By means of the internal it pervades the external objects. Even among those [external objects] it pervades the gross by means of the subtle. And even there [in regard to gross objects] it pervades everything such as pots etc. by means of clay etc. Because the universal is the [material] cause of the distinction, therefore the Self is the [material] cause of everything. Hence the definition of that [Self] is established: "the birth etc. of this [world] is from which [Brahman]" (B.S.1.1.2.).

Because the external object is based upon the internal object and because the supposition that the effect belongs to the same class as the cause is alone proper, it is correct that the external object, i.e. the

entire world, is certainly superimposed just as the internal object which is the cause [is superimposed]. Thus it is proved [that the world] is not absolutely real. And it is similarly established that the Self is Knowledge which is universal.

3.102. आश्रयोपाधिका विषयोपाधिकाश्च ये ज्ञानविशेषास्ते सर्वे कल्पिता एवेत्याश्रयो विषयश्च युष्मदर्थ एव । धीविशेषसिद्धो युष्मदर्थ इत्येव वस्तुतो युष्मदर्थस्य लक्षणम् । नायं युष्मदर्थो व्यावहारिकयुष्मदर्थवदस्मदर्थसापेक्षः । तदाग्रहे तु विशेषावस्थोन्मुखं धीसामान्यमेवास्मदर्थ इत्युच्यताम् । व्यावहारिकोऽस्मदर्थस्त्वहंप्रत्ययसिद्धो युष्मदर्थश्च युष्मत्प्रत्ययसिद्ध इत्यत्र न विवादः ।

3.102. The particular types of Knowledge [i.e. particular Knowledge], which have a locus as their adjunct and an object as their adjunct, are all only superimposed and so the locus and the object are only an object. In reality, the definition of an object is only: an object is established by a particular cognition. This object does not depend upon an "I" like the conventional expression "you". But if there is an insistence of that ["I", i.e. the need for a subject] then let it be said that the "I" is only cognition in general ready for the state of the particular. But the "I" relating to conventional expression is established by the cognition "I" and the object is established by the cognition "you" thus there is no dispute in this matter.

comment

The topic now under discussion is whether the word "I" reveals the true nature of the Self, as the Viśiṣṭādvaitins consider, or whether it only indicates the essential Self as the Advaitins claim.

According to Advaitins, the word "I" has two meanings: a primary (mukhyārtha) and a secondary or implied meaning (lakṣyārtha). The primary meaning reveals the knower (pramātr) qualified by the superimposition of identity with the intellect, mind, senses and body in the manner: "I know", "I hear", "I am happy", "I am fat", "I am thin", "I am a man" etc. The implied meaning of the word "I" is the unchanging awareness which is the "witness" (sākṣī) of the presence and absence of all mental events. It is only this implied meaning which is expressed in

such statements as: "I am Brahman" (Brh.1.4.10.)⁸⁷ (see comment, 1.47., 1.50.).

According to the Advaitin, the primary meaning of "I" is objectified by the Self and hence, like other objects, it is not the essential Self. Abhyankar defines this objective portion of the Self as whatever is "established by a particular cognition". With regard to the following sentence: "This object (yuṣmadartha) does not depend upon an "I" like the conventional expression "you"", the meaning is that the word "you" (yuṣmad literally means "you") does not possess this sense in the present context but is used to express the idea that everything other than awareness is an object and hence is not the Self. However if, for the purpose of argument, one insists that because there is the use of the word "you" i.e. yuṣmad, there is necessarily the requirement of a counter correlate i.e. the relation to an "I", then the author says let that counter correlate be only cognition in general prior to any particular knowledge i.e. "I have knowledge".

3.103. किं तु व्यावहारिकस्यास्मदर्थस्यापि 'धीविशेषसिद्धो युष्मदर्थः' इत्येवं युष्मदर्थलक्षणाक्रान्तत्वमस्त्येवेति 'अहं जानामीति सिध्यन्नहमर्थश्चिन्मात्रातिरेकी युष्मदर्थ एव' इति मायावाद्युक्तिर्निर्वधैव । एतेन 'अहं जानामीति सिद्धो ज्ञाता युष्मदर्थ इति वचनं जननी मे बन्ध्येतिव-
अहमर्थो नात्मा द्वयाहतार्थम्' (श्रीभा० पृ० ४१ प० ८) इत्यपा-
स्तम् । उक्ताभिप्रायाज्ञानात् । व्यावहारिकस्य
चाहं जानामीति धीविशेषसिद्धस्याहमर्थस्य न वस्तुत आत्मत्वम् । तस्य स्ववि-
शेषव्यापित्वेऽपि स्वसामान्याव्यापित्वेन सर्वव्यापित्वाभावात् । अत एव तस्य न
भत्यकृत्वम् ।

3.103. But even the "I" relating to conventional expression is certainly possessed of the definition of an object: an object is established by a particular cognition. So the statement of the exponents of māyā (Śrī.B. Para.37.p.62.): "the sense of "I" which is established [by the cognition] "I know" is only an object, different from pure consciousness" is certainly without negation. On account of this, [the statement] (Śrī.B. Para.37.p.63.):

The statement that the knower, who is established [by the cognition] "I know", is an object is contradicted

just like [the saying] "my mother is barren"

is set aside. Because of the ignorance of the intended meaning which has been told [above]. And the sense of "I" relating to conventional expression, which is established by the particular cognition "I know", is not in reality the Self. Because even though that [sense of "I"] pervades its own distinctions, it does not pervade everything since it does not pervade its own universal. For this reason, that [sense of "I"] is not inner [i.e. innermost].

comment

Rāmānuja's view is that the sense of "I" is none other than the inner-Self (Śrī.B.Para.37.p.62.): "If the sense of "I" is not the Self, the Self would not be inner. Because the internal is separated from what is external by the idea of "I"," Abhyankar's statements about whether the sense of "I" is "inner" (pratyak) are with reference to the above verse.

3.104. प्रति अञ्चतीति प्रत्यक् सर्वव्यापीत्यर्थः । प्रत्यक्शब्दश्चात्मशब्द-पर्याय एव । स्थावरजङ्गमेषु सकलवस्तुष्व्वात्मव्याप्तेः सत्त्वेऽपि ब्रह्मादिस्थावरान्तेषु शरीरेषु चित्प्रतिबिम्बभूतजीवरूपेण व्याप्तिरनुभवपथमारोहतीत्यतो लोके जीवः प्रत्यक्शब्देनात्मशब्देन च व्यवहियते । स च जीवो ज्ञानव्यञ्जकाहंकारसांनिध्यात्स्वयमात्मानमहंभावापन्नं मत्वा ज्ञातारं मन्यते । तेनाहं जानामीति धर्मधर्मितया जायमाना व्यावहारिकी धीविशेषरूपा प्रत्यक्षप्रतीतिर्न विरुध्यते । एवं च

‘ अहमर्थो न चैवात्मा प्रत्यक्त्वं चापि तस्य न ’ इति सिद्धम् ।

3.104. "Inner" (pratyak) is derived from "turns towards" (prati + añcati) and means all pervading. The word "inner" is only a synonym for the word Self. Although pervasion by the Self exists in all things immovable and movable, the pervasion gains the realm of experience in the form of an individual soul, who is a reflection of consciousness in the bodies beginning from Brahmā and ending with immovable objects. Therefore the individual soul is designated in the world by the word "inner" and by the word Self. That soul, on account of proximity to the "I-notion" which manifests Knowledge, imagines itself to have acquired "I-ness" and considers itself to be the knower. Because of that, the immediate

cognition "I know" -which is a particular cognition relating to conventional expression and which arises through the relation of attribute and its possessor- is not contradicted.⁸⁸ Thus it is established: the sense of "I" is certainly not the Self, nor is it inner.⁸⁹

3.105. अव्यक्तपरिणामविशेषस्याहंकारस्याहंकारत्वमप्यत एवोपपद्यते । यतोऽय-
महंकारः स्वसांनिध्याद्ब्रह्मस्ततोऽहंभावानापन्नमपि
अहंकारस्वरूपम् जीवमहंभावापन्नं भासयति । अहंकारशब्दस्य
ह्यभूततद्भावेऽर्थे चिप्रत्ययमुत्पाद्य व्युत्पत्तिर्भवतापि
प्रदर्शितैव (श्रीभा० पृ० ५३ प० ११) । अहंकारो हि महत्त्वस्य साक्षात्प-
रिणामः । महत्त्वं हि बुद्धिरूपम् । अहंतेदं च बुद्धिविशेषौ । अतः स्वभावत
एवायमहंभावापन्नोऽहंकारः स्वसांनिध्याद्ब्रह्मस्ततोऽहंभावानापन्नमपि जीवमहंभावा-
पन्नं करोतीति युक्तम् ।

3.105. The "I-notion", which is a particular modification of the Unmanifest, has also the logical possibility of being the "I-notion" [literally the "I-maker"] for this very reason. Because this "I-notion", on account of its proximity, manifests the individual soul as having acquired "I-ness" although in reality it has not acquired "I-ness". Because the etymology of the word "I-notion" has certainly been shown by you also (Śrī.B.Para.45.p.81.): "having quoted the affix cvi in the sense of becoming what was not previously".⁹⁰ The "I-notion" is a direct modification of the mahattattva.⁹¹ The mahattattva is the intellect. "I-ness" and "this-ness" are distinctions of the intellect. Therefore it is correct that this "I-notion" which has acquired "I-ness" quite innately, on account of its proximity, makes the individual soul acquire "I-ness" even though in reality it has not acquired "I-ness".

3.106. अथ ' ब्रह्मस्ततोऽहंभावापन्नो जीवः । ब्रह्मस्ततोऽहंभावाना-
पन्नश्च देहादिः । अव्यक्तपरिणामविशेषश्चाहंकारो देहादिकमहंभावापन्नजीवसांनि-
ध्यादहंभावापन्नं ' करोति ' इति चेदव्यक्तपरिणामविशेषस्याहंकारस्याहंभावोऽ-
स्ति वा नवा । नास्ति चेत्सोऽव्यक्तपरिणामविशेषः कथं स्वस्मिन्नसन्तमहंभावं

जीवनिष्ठं देहादौ प्रदर्शयेत् । न हि हरिद्रा स्वस्मिन्नसन्तं रक्तिमानं जपाकुसुमस्थं
जपाकुसुमसंनिहितेऽपि स्फटिके प्रदर्शयितुं प्रभवति । अस्तिचेत्सोऽहंभावः स्वाभा-
विको नैमित्तिको वा । आद्ये तेनैव जीवे देहादौ चाहंभावोऽपत्तौ किमतिरिक्तं
जीवनिष्ठेनाहंभावेन । जीवेऽव्यक्तपरिणामविशेषाहंकारे चेत्युभयत्रापि स्वाभावि-
काहंभावकल्पने गौरवम् । किं च तथासति देहादौ सांनिध्यादिनिमित्तवशाद्दृश्य-
मानोऽहंभावो वस्तुतोऽव्यक्तपरिणामविशेषनिष्ठ एव न जीवनिष्ठ इत्यत्र नियाम-
काभावः । तथात्वे तु जीवोऽप्यहंकारपदवाच्यः स्यात् । तच्च तवाप्यनिष्ठम् । इष्टत्वे
तु मोक्षेऽहंकारविलयस्य त्वत्संमतत्वेन जीवविलयापत्तेः । नैमित्तिकश्चेत्सोऽहंभावो
जीवसांनिध्यादिति वक्तव्यम् । तादृशनैमित्तिकाहंभावविशिष्टोऽव्यक्तपरिणामवि-
शेषो यद्देहादावहंभावं प्रदर्शयति तर्हि वास्तविकाहंभावाश्रयजीवसांनिध्ये तदसां-
निध्ये वा । आद्ये जीवनिष्ठ एव देहादावहंभावः प्रदर्शयेत् किं मध्ये गडुभूतेनाव्यक्त
परिणामविशेषेण । अन्त्ये स्वस्मिन्नेवाविद्यमानमहंभावं कथं देहादौ प्रत्याययितुं
प्रभवेत् । अहंकारपदवाच्यत्वानुपपत्तिश्च ।

3.106. If [you say] that in reality the individual soul has acquired "I-ness" and in reality the body etc. has not acquired "I-ness". And the "I-notion", which is a particular modification of the Unmanifest, makes the body etc. acquire "I-ness" on account of the proximity [of the "I-notion"] to the individual soul who has acquired "I-ness".

[reply] Does the "I-notion", which is a particular modification of the Unmanifest, have "I-ness" or not? If it does not, how could that particular modification of the Unmanifest exhibit "I-ness" -which does not exist in itself and which is located in the individual soul- in the body etc? Turmeric [which is yellow] certainly cannot reveal the redness -which does not exist in itself and which belongs to a flower of the China rose- even in a crystal which is placed near the flower of the China rose.

. If it does, is that "I-ness" innate or the result of a cause? In the first case, when there is the logical possibility of "I-ness" in the individual soul and in the body etc. just because of that [its innate character], what is the point of "I-ness" being located separately in the individual soul? There is cumbrousness in the supposition that "I-ness" is innate even in both places: in the individual soul and in the "I-notion" which is a particular modification of the Unmanifest. Furthermore, if

that is the case [i.e. "I-ness" is innate to the soul and the "I-notion"], [then one could say that] the "I-ness" being seen in the body etc. on account of reasons such as proximity is in reality only located in the particular modification of the Unmanifest and is not located in the individual soul. Thus there is no determining factor here. But if such is the case [that there is no determining factor], even the individual soul would be able to be expressed by the word "I-notion". And that is not desired by you also. But if it is desired, because you hold that there is the destruction of the "I-notion" in liberation, the result would be the destruction of the individual soul.

If it is the result of a cause, it has to be said that "I-ness" is because of the proximity to the individual soul. The particular modification of the Unmanifest, qualified by "I-ness" which is the result of such a cause, is what exhibits the "I-ness" in the body etc. Does it [exhibit the "I-ness"] in proximity to the individual soul who is the real locus of "I-ness", or not in proximity to it? In the first case, the "I-ness" which is only located in the individual soul can be exhibited in the body etc. So what is the use of the superfluous "particular modification of the Unmanifest" in the middle? In the last case, how would it be able to make clear the "I-ness", which does not exist even in itself, in the body etc? And there is no logical possibility of being able to be expressed by the word "I-notion" [literally the maker of "I"].

3.107.

किं च जीवासांनिध्येऽहंकारस्यापि न स्थितिः। प्रेतीभूते देहेऽहंकारादर्शनात्। किं चास्मिन्नपि पक्षे जीवोऽहंकारपदवाच्यः स्यादिति प्रागुक्तदोषस्तदवस्थ एव। किंच जीवनिष्ठोऽहंभावः कस्मिंश्चिदेवाव्यक्तपरिष्णामविशेषे प्रतीयते न सर्वेष्वित्यत्र नियामकाभावः। तस्मादिदं भाववदहंभावोऽपि बुद्ध्यैव कल्पित इति वस्तुतोऽव्यक्तपरिष्णामविशेषनिष्ठ एव सोऽङ्गीकर्तव्यः। तादृशाहंभावाश्रयोऽव्यक्तपरिष्णामविशेष एवाहंकारः। स एव च देहादाविव जीवेऽप्यहंभावं प्रदर्शयति। युक्तं चैतत्। महत्त्वं ह्यव्यक्तपरिष्णामः। महत्त्वं च बुद्धिः। अहंतेदं च बुद्धिविशेषभूते इति न जीवात्मनि वास्तविकाहंभावो युक्तः।

3.107. Furthermore, if there is no proximity to the individual soul there is also no continuance of the "I-notion". Because the "I-notion" is not seen when the body has deceased. Moreover, even according to this view the individual soul would be able to be expressed by the word "I-notion". So the defect previously mentioned is just the same. Moreover there is no determining factor here that the "I-ness" located in the individual soul is recognized in only a certain particular modification of the Unmanifest [i.e. the "I-notion"] and not in all [the modifications].

Therefore, like "this-ness", "I-ness" too is superimposed just by the intellect. So in reality that ["I-ness"] must be accepted as only located in a particular modification of the Unmanifest. The "I-notion" is indeed the particular modification of the Unmanifest and it is the locus of that "I-ness". And that ["I-notion"] alone exhibits "I-ness" in the individual soul also, just as in the body etc. This is correct. Because the mahattattva is the modification of the Unmanifest and the mahattattva is the intellect. "I-ness" and "this-ness" are distinctions of the intellect. Therefore it is not correct that there is real "I-ness" in the individual self.

3.108. मोक्षावस्थायां चाहं जानामीत्यपि प्रतीतिर्न भवत्येव । तादृशप्रतीतिः
 प्रतीतिविशेषत्वेन कल्पितत्वात् । किं चाहं
 मोक्षे नाहंभावः जानामीति प्रतीतिर्धर्मधर्मिभावसापेक्षा । मोक्षे तु
 धर्मधर्मिभावोऽपि नास्त्येव । यतो धर्मधर्मिभावे
 स्वगतो भेदो भासते । भेदस्य च भयजनकत्वव्याप्यत्वनियमः प्रसिद्ध एव । भयं
 च तारतम्येन कचिन्महत्कचिन्मध्यमं कचिन्न्यूनं कचिन्न्यूनतरं कचिदुद्भूतं कचि-
 दनुद्भूतमित्यन्यत् । परं तु भेदस्थले भयलेशोऽपि नास्तीति दुर्वचम् । यतः पुत्रा-
 दापि भयं दृश्यते । स्वशरीरस्थादापि दन्तनखादेः सकाशाद्भयमनुभूयते । स्वश-
 ब्दादापि च भयं दृश्यते । यथा ' तत्राभिनिविष्टस्य मम मुखात्के शब्दा निर्ग-
 च्छन्तीति न जाने । अतस्तत्र गमनमेव न युक्तम् ' इति हि लोके प्रतीतिः । 'द्विती-
 याद्वै भयं भवति' इत्युक्तिश्चात एव संगच्छते । मोक्षावस्थायां तु 'अभयं वै जनक
 प्राप्तोऽसि' (वृ० ४ । २ । ४) इति श्रुतिर्भयगन्धोऽपि नास्तीति दर्शयति ।
 तस्मात्तत्र धर्मधर्मिभावो वक्तुमशक्यः । अत एव तत्र ज्ञातृज्ञेयभावो विषयविप-
 यिभावश्च न ।

3.108. In the state of liberation there is certainly not even the cognition "I know". Because such a cognition is superimposed as it is a particular cognition. Moreover, the cognition "I know" has dependence upon the relation of attribute and its possessor. But in liberation even the relation of attribute and its possessor certainly does not exist. For an internal difference is evident in the relation of attribute and its possessor. And the rule that difference is pervaded by the generation of fear is certainly well known. It is another matter that fear is in different degrees: somewhere great, somewhere middling, somewhere less, somewhere even less, at some place perceptible and at some place imperceptible. But in the case of difference it is difficult to be said that even a trace of fear does not exist. Because fear even of [one's own] son is seen. Fear of teeth and nails etc. is experienced even though they are part of one's own body. And even the fear of one's own words is seen. For there is a conviction in the world like: "I do not know: what words will come forth from my mouth while I am obstinate there? Hence the very going there is not proper." The statement: "fear is certainly on account of a second" is for this very reason correct.

But in the state of liberation, the sacred text: "Janaka, you have attained what is free from fear" (Bṛh.4.2.4.) shows that even a whiff of fear does not exist. Therefore the relation of attribute and its possessor cannot be said there [in liberation]. For this very reason, there is no knower-known relation and subject-object relation there.

3.109. नन्वेवं तत्र सुखानुभवोऽपि न स्यात् । तत्प्रतीतौ ह्यनुभूत्यनुभव-
वित्रोर्धर्मधर्मिभाषः, सुखानुभववित्रोर्ज्ञेयज्ञातृभावः, सुखानुभूत्योर्विषयविषयिभावश्च
विद्यत इति चेत्सत्यमेतत् । किं तर्हि तत्र सुखलेशोऽपि नास्ति । को ब्रूतेऽस्तीति ।
मोक्षावस्थाया निरतिशयोत्कर्षे किं निमित्तमिति चेद्दुःखात्यन्ताभाव इति गृहाण ।
तत्र सुखोक्तिस्तु 'भारापगमे सुखी संवृत्तोऽहमितिवद्दुःखाभावे सुखमुपचर्यते'
इत्यभिप्रायेण बोध्या । मोक्षार्थं प्रवृत्तिस्तु दुःखनिवृत्त्यर्थेव । एतेन

निरस्ताखिलदुःखोऽहमनन्तानन्दभाक् स्वराट् ।

भवेयमिति मोक्षार्थी श्रवणादौ प्रवर्तते ॥

इत्यपास्तम् । मुमुक्षोर्नियमेन तादृक्संकल्पस्यादर्शनात् । क्वचित्तथा संकल्पो
दृश्यत इत्याग्रहे तु दुःखात्यन्ताभावस्योपचारिकसुखत्वेन तत्रानन्तानन्दभ्रान्त्या
स योजनीयः ।

3.109. [objection] According to this way, even the experience of happiness would not exist there [in liberation]. Because in the cognition of that [happiness] a relation of attribute and its possessor exists between awareness and the experiencer, a relation of known and knower exists between happiness and the experiencer and a relation of subject and object exists between happiness and awareness.

[reply] This is true.

[objection] How then does not even a trace of happiness exist there?

[reply] Who says "it is"? If [you say] what is the reason for the unsurpassed excellence of the state of liberation? [we reply] Understand it to be the total absence of sorrow. But the statement of happiness there should be understood as having the intended meaning: happiness is used figuratively in the sense of the absence of sorrow, like "upon the removal of the burden I have become happy". But the activity for the sake of liberation has only the cessation of sorrow as its object. Due to this, [the verse] (Śrī.B.Para.37.p.62.):

The person desirous of liberation undertakes listening
[to the scriptures] etc. [with the idea]: "may I be
freed from all sorrow, the enjoyer of limitless
bliss, self-resplendent"

is set aside. Because as a rule, that type of resolve is not seen for a person who desires liberation. But in the insistence that a resolve like that is seen somewhere, it has to be thought of in connection with a false impression about the limitless bliss there. Because the total absence of sorrow is happiness in a figurative sense.

3.110.

नन्वेवमपि प्रागुक्तरीत्या मोक्षेऽहमर्थानुवृत्त्यभावेन 'अहमनन्तानन्दभाग्भवेयम्' इति संकल्पः कथमुपपद्यत इति चेद्भ्रान्तोऽसि । ईदृशसंकल्पोपपादनाय संकल्पकालेऽहंत्वेन प्रतीतस्य वस्तुनो मोक्षकाले सत्त्वमेव केवलमपेक्ष्यते न तु मोक्षकालेऽहंत्वेन प्रतीत्यपेक्षा । प्रतीतेरेव नापेक्षा किमुताहंत्वेन । तथा च संकल्पकाले प्रतीतस्याहमर्थस्य मोक्षावस्थायामनुवृत्त्यभावेऽपि न क्षतिः । 'अहमनन्तानन्दभाग्भवेयम्' इत्येव संकल्पः । न तु 'तदानीमहं तथाविधमात्मानमनन्तानन्दभाक्त्वेनानुसंध्याम्' इति । लोकेऽपि निद्रातः प्राक् 'अहं निद्रासुखमनुभवेयम्' इति क्वचित्संकल्पो दृश्यते । परं तु तत्रापि सुषुप्तिकाले 'अहमिदानीं सुखमनुभवामि' इत्यनुसंधानं न दृश्यते । एवं च मोक्षे नाहमर्थानुवृत्तिः । प्रागुक्तरीत्या मोक्षे भेदस्य कथमप्यभावेन धर्मधर्मिभावस्य वक्तुमशक्यतयाऽहमर्थानुवृत्तेरुपपादत्वाच्च । तथा च दुःखात्यन्ताभावायैव मोक्षे प्रवृत्तिरिति सिद्धम् ।

3.110. [objection] Even so, because there is no persistence of the sense of "I" in liberation in the way previously mentioned, how is the resolve: "may I be the enjoyer of limitless bliss" logically possible?

[reply] You are confused. For establishing a resolve such as this, the entity cognized as "I" at the time of the resolve is only required to be indeed existent at the time of liberation but there is no requirement of the cognition as "I" at the time of liberation. There is no requirement of cognition itself, how much less as being "I"? So there is no fault even though the sense of "I" cognized at the time of the resolve does not persist in the state of liberation.

The resolve is only: "may I be the enjoyer of limitless bliss", but not: "at that time, may I think of that sort of Self as enjoying limitless bliss". Even in the world, the resolve is seen somewhere prior to sleep: "may I experience the happiness of sleep". But even there, at the time of deep sleep, the recollection is not seen: "I am now experiencing happiness". So there is no persistence of the sense of "I" in liberation. And because the persistence of the sense of "I" is difficult to be demonstrated since the relation of attribute and its possessor cannot be stated due to the absence, in any way, of difference in liberation according to the way previously mentioned. Thus

it is established that an undertaking toward liberation is only for the total absence of sorrow.

- 3.111. लोकेऽपि पञ्जरस्थाः शुक्रादयो योग्यकाले स्वाद्वन्नं भक्षयन्तोऽपि वने कस्मिन्नपि काले किमपि फलं प्राप्स्यतीति संभावना-
मोक्षशब्दार्थः मात्रेण पञ्जरान्मोक्षमिच्छन्ति तत्र बन्धदुःखानिवृ-
त्त्यर्थमेव प्रयत्नो दृश्यते । ईदृशी च मोक्षावस्था
मुच्यते मोक्षण इति धात्वर्थानुगुणैव । मोक्षो हि मुक्तिः । सा च कस्मादप्यपसर-
णरूपा । न तु तत्र कस्यचिदन्यस्य प्राप्तिः । किं च बन्धमोक्षयोः परस्परप्रति-
द्वन्द्विभूतत्वेन तादृश एव मोक्षपदार्थो वक्तव्यो यो बन्धप्रतिद्वन्द्विभूतः । बन्धश्च
दुःखनियत इति दुःखविरोधिभूतदुःखात्यन्ताभावनियतो मोक्षः । न हि सुखं
दुःखविरोधि । सुखदुःखयोः सामानाधिकरण्यदर्शनात् । अत एव वैशेषिकैः
सुखदुःखयोर्द्वयोरपि गुणत्वेन पृथङ्निर्देशः कृतः । अन्यथा तमसस्तेजोऽभाव-
रूपत्वमिव सुखस्य दुःखाभावरूपत्वं दुःखस्य वा सुखाभावरूपत्वं तैः कल्पितं
स्यात् । दुःखात्यन्ताभावश्च लेशतोऽपि दुःखसत्त्वे न संभवतीति स एव दुःख-
विरोधी । तस्मादर्थस्वाभाव्यादपि दुःखात्यन्ताभावो मोक्षः सिध्यति ।

3.111. Even in the world, the parrots etc. living in cages, although eating tasty food at the proper time, desire liberation from the cage through the mere fancy that: it will gain some fruit at some time in the forest. The effort observed there is solely for the purpose of the cessation of the sorrow of bondage. And the state of liberation which is of this kind alone conforms to the meaning of the verbal root: muç in the sense of releasing. Because liberation means freedom. And that [freedom] is in the form of getting away from something. But there is no attainment of something else there.

Furthermore, because bondage and liberation are mutually opposed, the meaning of the word liberation must be said only like that: which is the nature of being opposed to bondage. And bondage is invariably connected with sorrow, so liberation is invariably connected with the total absence of sorrow since it is what is contradictory to sorrow. Happiness is certainly not contradictory to sorrow. Because happiness and sorrow are seen to possess co-existence. For this very reason, the

Vaiśeṣikas made a separate designation of both happiness and sorrow as qualities. Otherwise, like darkness is the absence of light, they would have conceived happiness to be the absence of sorrow or sorrow to be the absence of happiness. And the total absence of sorrow is impossible if even a trace of sorrow exists. So it [liberation] alone is contradictory to sorrow. Therefore liberation is proved to be the total absence of sorrow even from the natural sense [of the word].

3.112.

दुःख-

नियृत्तिश्चानुकूलप्रतिकूलान्वयविरहे स्वरूपेणावस्थितिः । रामानुजैरपि तथैव व्याख्यातम् (श्रीभा० पृ० १२९ प० ५) । अनुकूलप्रतिकूलान्वयविरहश्चानुकूलस्य प्रतिकूलस्य च स्वाद्वितीयस्य वस्तुन एवाभावेन वा, तादृशवस्तुनः सत्त्वेऽपि तत्संबन्धाभावेन वा, संबन्धसत्त्वेऽपि संबन्धप्रतिभासाभावेन वा भवति । तत्र द्वैतिनां मते मोक्षे द्वितीयस्य वस्तुनोऽभावो दुरूपपादः । तत्र 'द्वितीयाद्वै भयं भवति' इति न्यायेन भयसंभावनायामपि मोक्षे भयात्यन्ताभावः 'अभयं वै जनक प्राप्नोऽसि' (वृ० ४ । २ । ४) इति श्रुत्येकशरणतया श्रद्धाज्ञाड्येन कल्पनीयः स्यात् । अद्वैतिनां तु मते श्रुतिप्रतिपादितो मोक्षे भयात्यन्ताभावो युक्त्यैवोपपादितो भवति । द्वितीयाभावेन भयसंभावनाया अप्यसत्त्वात् । तथा च द्वितीयवस्तुनोऽभावस्याभयं वै जनक प्राप्नोऽसीति श्रुत्यनुगुणतया कथं मोक्षे सुखातिशयकल्पना युज्येत । सुखस्य द्वितीयसापेक्षत्वात् । किं च मोक्ष उत्कर्षातिशयो यथा दुःखात्यन्ताभावेन वक्तुं शक्यते न तथा सुखातिशयेनापि । यतोऽल्पेनापि दुःखेन महदपि सुखमभिभूयत इति प्रसिद्धं लोके । तथौपचारिकेणापि दुःखेन सुखाभिभव इतिहासादिषु प्रसिद्धः । औपचारिकं दुःखं च सुखाभावरूपम् । तादृशेनौपचारिकेणाप्यनपत्यताजन्मना दुःखेन दशरथः श्रीरामचन्द्रोत्पत्तेः प्राक् सर्वमपि राज्यादिर्बभूव व्यर्थं भावितवान् । अथौपचारिकमपि स्वल्पमपि च दुःखं यत्र नास्ति स एव सुखातिशय इति चेदेवं तर्हि सुखातिशयनिरूपणस्य दुःखात्यन्ताभावानिरूपणाधीनतयोभयसंमतेन दुःखात्यन्ताभावेनैवोपपत्तौ किं तत्रातिरिक्तसुखातिशयकल्पनया ।

3.112. The cessation of sorrow is remaining in one's own nature upon relinquishment of the connection to what is agreeable and disagreeable. It has been explained in exactly that manner by Rāmānuja too (Śrī.B.Para. 82.p.190.). The relinquishment of the connection to what is agreeable and disagreeable is because the object itself which has innate duality

and which is agreeable or disagreeable does not exist, or because even though such an object exists there is no connection to it, or because although the connection exists there is no appearance of the connection.

According to the view of the dualists in that matter, the absence of a second object in liberation is difficult to be demonstrated. There [in their view], although there is the possibility of fear because of the maxim: "fear is certainly on account of a second", the total absence of fear in liberation has to be supposed as the blind adherence to one's faith on account of only resorting to the sacred text: "Janaka, you have attained what is free from fear" (Bṛh.4.2.4.).

However according to the view of the non-dualists, the total absence of fear in liberation taught by the sacred texts is made logically possible by reasoning alone. Because even the possibility of fear does not exist in the absence of a second. So because the absence of a second object is in accordance with the sacred text: "Janaka, you have attained what is free from fear" how can the supposition of pre-eminent happiness in liberation be correct? Because happiness has dependence upon a second.

Furthermore, the exalted pre-eminence of liberation can be said as the total absence of sorrow but not likewise as pre-eminent happiness as well. Because it is well known in the world that even great happiness is overcome by just a little sorrow. Similarly, the overpowering of happiness by sorrow which is even of a figurative nature is well known in the traditional legends etc. Sorrow which is of a figurative nature is the absence of happiness. Prior to the birth of Śrī Rāmacandra, Daśaratha considered even all the splendour of the kingdom etc. to be worthless due to such sorrow arising from childlessness even though it was figurative.

If [you say]: where there is no sorrow, even of a figurative nature and even a small amount, that alone is pre-eminent happiness,

[we reply]: then if that is the case, because ascertaining pre-eminent happiness is dependent upon ascertaining the total absence of sorrow, when the logical possibility only through the total absence of sorrow is agreed upon by both of us what is the use of the supposition about pre-eminent happiness being different there [in liberation]?

3.113.

तदेवं मोक्षावस्थायां द्वैतगन्धस्यापि वक्तुम-
शक्यतया तत्राहमर्थानुवृत्तिर्दुर्घटा । अहमर्थप्रतीतेर्भेदमूलकधर्मधर्मिभावसापेक्ष-
त्वात् । मोक्षे प्रवृत्तिस्तु न सुखार्था किं तु दुःखनिवृत्त्यर्थेवेत्युपपादितमेव ।
यथा पादे कण्टकेन विद्धस्य तन्निःसारणे प्रवृत्तिस्तद्वत् । इयांस्तु विशेषः—कण्ट-
कनिःसारणोत्तरं दुःखनिवृत्तिः प्रतीयते । मोक्षे तु सापि नेति । एतेन दुःख-
निवृत्त्यर्थायां प्रवृत्तावपि मोक्षे दुःखनिवृत्तेः प्रतीततया तदानीं ज्ञातृज्ञेयभावोऽस्तीति
भेदो दुर्निवार इत्यपास्तम् । किं च न हि दुःखनिवृत्तिरनुकूलेति प्रार्थ्यते । किं
तु दुःखं प्रतिकूलमिति तन्निवर्तयितुमिष्यते । 'दुःखस्य प्रतिकूलतया तन्निवृ-
त्तिरिष्टा भवति नानुकूलतया' (श्रीभा० पृ० १२९ प० ४) इत्युक्तवतस्तवा-
प्येतत्संमतमेव । एतेन

अहमर्थो न चेदात्मा प्रत्यक्षं नात्मनो भवेत् (श्रीभा०पृ०४०प०१३)

इत्याद्युक्तं स्वकपोलकल्पनाजालमपास्तम् ॥ १२ ॥

3.113. Thus because even a whiff of duality cannot be said in the state of liberation, the persistence of the sense of "I" is impossible there. Because cognition as the sense of "I" has dependence upon the relation of attribute and its possessor which is based upon difference. So it is indeed proved that an undertaking toward liberation does not have happiness as its goal but its goal is only the cessation of sorrow. Just as for a person who is pierced in the foot by a thorn there is an undertaking for its removal. It is like that. But there is a distinction to this extent; the cessation of sorrow is recognized following the removal of the thorn. But in liberation even that [cessation of sorrow] is not [recognized]. On account of this, [the objection]:

although the undertaking has the cessation of sorrow
as its goal, because the cessation of sorrow is

cognized in liberation the relation of knower and known exists at that time. Hence difference is difficult to be prevented

is set aside.

Furthermore, the cessation of sorrow is certainly not wished for as "agreeable". But sorrow is "disagreeable", so it is desired to remove that. You [Rāmānuja] too have certainly accepted this when you said (Śrī.B.Para.82.p.90.): "because sorrow is disagreeable its cessation is desired, not because [its cessation] is agreeable." On account of this, the illusion conjured up by his own fancy which has been told beginning with (Śrī.B.Para.37.p.62.):

If the sense of "I" is not the Self, the Self would not be inner...

is set aside.

3.114. यत्तु

‘ स्वसंबन्धितया ह्यस्याः सत्तावितिज्ञातितादि च ।
स्वसंबन्धवियोगे तु ज्ञातिरेव न सिद्ध्यति ।
छेत्तुश्छेद्यस्य चाभावे छेदनादेरसिद्धिवत् । ’ (श्रीभा० पृ० ४० प० २१)

इत्यनेन ग्रन्थेनाश्रयभूताहमर्थापेक्षयैव ज्ञानस्य ज्ञानत्वमस्तित्वं चेत्युक्तं तत्रोच्यते—

3.114. By this text (Śrī.B.Para.37.p.63.):

This [consciousness] has existence and the nature of being consciousness etc. just on account of its connection to oneself. But upon separation of the connection to oneself, consciousness itself is not established. Just as there is no establishment of the act of cutting etc. in the absence of the cutter and the thing to be cut

what has been said is that Knowledge has the nature of being Knowledge and has existence only with reference to the sense of "I" who is the locus.

In regard to that, it is said:

3.115.

संदिदो नाश्रयापेक्षा न ज्ञातृत्वं तथात्मनः ।
ज्ञानस्वरूप एवात्मा ज्ञात्रन्तःकरणं भवेत् ॥ १३ ॥

3.115.

Awareness has no dependence upon a locus. Thus the Self does not have knowership. The Self has only Knowledge as its essential nature. The knower must be the internal-organ.13.

3.116. व्यावहारिकज्ञानविशेषविषये ज्ञानस्याश्रयापेक्षास्तु नाम । यच्च सर्वज्ञान-
मूलभूतमनुभूतिसामान्यं तस्याश्रयापेक्षा सुतरां न संभवति । आश्रयापेक्षया
तत्सिद्धिश्रेष्ठज्ञानसामान्यस्वरूपभङ्गपत्तेरित्यसकृदावेदितम् । किं च व्यवहारेऽपि
संविन्निराश्रया सृष्ट्यारम्भोत्तरं शब्दतन्मात्रादिभ्यस्तदाश्रयाणां
महाभूतानामुत्पत्तिः सांख्यैरुक्ता भवतापि स्वीकृता
च । तत्र कथमाश्रयानपेक्षया तेषां सिद्धिः । अथ
शब्दादयो गुणाः, न तथा ज्ञानम् । ज्ञानं तु छेदनादिवृत्तिक्रियेति चेत्तथासति
क्रियाया अनित्यत्वनियमेन ज्ञानस्याप्यनित्यत्वापत्तौ ' नित्यज्ञानाश्रय ईश्वरः '
इति त्वदीय एव सिद्धान्तो विरुद्धः स्यात् ।

3.116. It is granted that Knowledge has dependence upon a locus with respect to the particular Knowledge concerning ordinary relations. The awareness which is universal and which is the basis of all Knowledge is all the more impossible to be dependent upon a locus. It has been declared more than once that if the establishment of that is with reference to a locus, the result would be the destruction of the nature of Knowledge which is universal.

Furthermore, even in regard to conventional reality, the origination of the "great elements" from the tanmātras of sound etc. subsequent to the beginning of creation and their dependence upon them

[the tanmātras] has been told by the Sāṅkhyas and is accepted by you too. With regard to that, how is there the establishment of those [tanmātras] without reference to a locus? But if [you say] that sound etc. are qualities and Knowledge is not like that. But Knowledge is an action like cutting etc. [we reply] If that is so, because action is invariably impermanent, Knowledge too would be impermanent and your very own conclusion: "the Lord is the locus of eternal Knowledge" would be contradicted.

3.117.

यत्तु

‘ अतोऽहमर्थो ज्ञातैव प्रत्यगात्मेति निश्चितम् ’ (श्रीभा० पृ० ४१ प० २)

इत्युक्तं तत्र प्रत्यगात्मपदेन किं जीवात्मा
 आत्मनो न ज्ञातृत्वम् विवक्षितोऽथेश्वर उत निर्विशेषचिन्मात्रं ब्रह्म ।
 आद्ये द्वितीये च सिद्धसाधनम् । जीवेश्वरयोरव्य-
 क्तपरिणामविशेषाहंकारसांनिध्येनाहंभावाश्रययोर्ज्ञातृत्वस्यास्माभिरप्यङ्गीकारात् ।
 न तृतीयः । त्वया तदनङ्गीकारात् । तस्य निर्विशेषत्वेनाहंभावाश्रयत्वज्ञातृत्वा-
 देरसंभवाच्च । ज्ञातृत्वादेः कल्पितत्वेन ज्ञातृस्वरूपस्य विनाशित्वान्न ब्रह्म ज्ञातृ-
 स्वरूपम् । यत्तु ‘ विज्ञातारमरे केन विजानीयात् ’ (वृ० २ । ४ । १४, ४ । ५ ।
 १५) इति श्रुतिर्ब्रह्मणो विज्ञातृत्वमाहोति तत्र विज्ञातृत्वं कल्पितमेव श्रुतितात्प-
 र्यविषयीभूतम् । कल्पितज्ञातृत्वविशिष्टस्यापि ज्ञानं न केनापि साधनेन संभवति
 किमुत शुद्धस्य ज्ञातृत्वादिरहितस्येति । ज्ञातृत्वस्य सत्यत्वे ‘ विज्ञानं ब्रह्म ’ (वृ०
 ३ । ९ । २८) इतिश्रुतिविरोधः स्यात् ।

3.117. But what has been said (Śrī.B.Para.37.p.63.):

Therefore it is ascertained that the sense of
 "I", who is certainly the knower, is the inner
 Self.

With regard to that, is the individual self intended to be expressed by the word "inner Self", or the Lord, or Brahman which is pure consciousness free from distinction? In regard to the first and second, there is proving of what is already proved. Because the individual soul and the Lord are in proximity to the "I-notion" which is a particular modification of the Unmanifest, therefore knowership for both [the

individual soul and the Lord] which are the locus of "I-ness" is accepted by us as well. Nor is it the third. Because you do not accept that. And because that [Brahman] is free from distinction, therefore being the locus of "I-ness", being a knower etc. is impossible. Brahman is not a knower in its essential nature because knowership etc. is superimposed and therefore the nature of being a knower is perishable.

The sacred text: "by what, my dear, can one know the knower?" (Brh. 2.4.14., 4.5.15.) says that Brahman has knowership. But what is the object of the purport of the sacred text is that the knowership there [in Brahman] is only superimposed. Knowledge, even about what is qualified by the knowership which is superimposed, is not possible by any means. How much less about what is pure, free from knowership etc? If knowership is real, there would be contradiction with the sacred text: "Brahman is Knowledge" (Brh.3.9.28.).

3.118. यत्तु 'यथैकमेव तेजोद्रव्यं प्रभाप्रभाद्रूपेणावतिष्ठते..... एवमात्मा चिद्रूप एव चैतन्यगुणः' (श्रीभा० पृ० ४१ प० १४) इत्युक्तं तत्रोच्यते—एकमेवेत्यस्यैकजातीयमित्यर्थ उतैकत्वसंख्यावच्छिन्नमिति । आद्ये तेजस्त्वेनैकजातीयं तेजो यथा दीपस्तत्प्रभा चेत्युभयरूपं दृश्यते तथा ज्ञानत्वेनैकजातीयं ज्ञानमात्मा तद्गुणश्चेत्युभयरूपमित्यर्थः स्यात् । तथा सत्युभयोर्धर्मधर्मिणोर्ज्ञानयोरेकजातीयत्वेन धर्मभूतज्ञानस्येव धर्मिभूतज्ञानस्याप्याश्रयो विषयश्च वक्तव्यः । द्वैतिनां मते विषयस्य कथंचिद्वक्तुं शक्यत्वेऽप्याश्रयो दुरूपपाद एव । ज्ञानस्य ज्ञाश्रय आत्मैव वक्तव्यः । तथा च धर्मिभूतज्ञानमात्मस्वरूपं तदाश्रय-श्चात्मेत्यात्माश्रयः ।

3.118. But what has been said (Śrī.B.Para.38.p.64,65.):

Just as one and the same substance fire exists in the form of effulgence and what possesses effulgence.... in the same manner, the self has only consciousness as its nature and has consciousness as its quality.

In regard to that, it is said: is the meaning of this "one and the same" (1) belonging to the same class or (2) distinguished by the numeral denoting the fact of being one? In the first case, the meaning would be: just as fire, which belongs to a single class as the nature of fire, is seen to have both forms: as light and its effulgence, so too Knowledge belongs to a single class as the nature of Knowledge and has both forms: the self and its quality. If that is so, because both types of Knowledge, i.e. the attribute and its possessor, belong to a single class, a locus and an object must be stated even for the Knowledge which is the possessor of the attribute just like for the Knowledge which is an attribute. According to the view of the dualists, though an object can somehow be stated, a locus is certainly difficult to be demonstrated. Because the locus of Knowledge can only be said to be the self. Thus there is self-dependence: Knowledge which is the possessor of the attribute is the essential nature of the self and the self is its locus.

comment

According to Rāmānuja, the nature of the self (see text and comment, 2.10.) is analogous to a light and its effulgence. Light is a self-luminous substance possessing the quality of effulgence which illumines objects. Though the effulgence is a quality of the light, it is also a substance since it can exist elsewhere than its locus. The light is comparable to the substantive consciousness (dharmabhūtajñāna) of the self and its effulgence is like the self's attributive consciousness (dharmabhūtajñāna) which is a quality of the self and yet is also a substance as it can exist elsewhere than its locus.

Advaitins consider that this twofold conception of consciousness is based upon a false analogy. The substance known as fire (tejas) does not exist in the twofold form of effulgence and its possessor. On the contrary, fire is solely of the nature of effulgence. Even if effulgence is experienced separately from the light of a lamp or the sun etc., the latter are never experienced apart from effulgence and it is not possible to apprehend a possessor of the effulgence which is different from the effulgence.⁹² Hence Advaitins conclude that light is not other than effulgence itself.

Even if a difference is allowed between light and effulgence, it is

further argued that the analogy is inapplicable because fire (tejas) possesses the component parts (avayava) of effulgence and its possessor. But if consciousness is in the form of the self who has consciousness as its essence and its attribute, then the self possesses parts and therefore would be subject to change and consequent impermanence.⁹³

In addition to this, Abhyankar raises a series of arguments against the Viśiṣṭādvaitins view that consciousness has a twofold nature. Firstly, he asks whether Rāmānuja's expression "one and the same" (ekam eva) means that the substantive consciousness and the attributive consciousness belong to the same class in being consciousness, or whether it means that they are really one. If the former is the case, because there is no qualitative difference between the two they should possess the same characteristics and just as the attributive consciousness requires an object and a locus the substantive consciousness, too, would require an object and a locus. If it is said that the substantive consciousness, which is the self, has the self as its locus then there is the fallacy of self-dependence. Abhyankar proceeds to put forward further arguments to show that the conception of a substantive and an attributive consciousness is untenable.

3.119. आश्रयभूतस्यात्मनो ज्ञानस्वरूपात्मनश्च भेदे तु स आश्रय-
भूत आत्मा ज्ञानस्वरूपो वा जडो वा । आद्ये तस्यापि ज्ञानस्य पुनरन्य आश्रय
इत्यनवस्था । अन्त्ये स्वमतप्रच्युतिः । गुणभूतज्ञानस्यात्मस्वरूपभूतज्ञानस्य च
विजातीयत्वे तु ' एकमेव ' इत्युक्तिविरोधः । किं च भिन्नजातीयत्वाङ्गीकारेण
धर्मिभूतस्यात्मस्वरूपभूतज्ञानस्य निराश्रयस्य स्वीकारे निराश्रयनिर्विशेषज्ञान-
वादिभिर्मायावादिभिः किमपराद्धम् ।

3.119. But if there is a difference between the self who is the locus and the self whose essential nature is Knowledge, does the self who is the locus have Knowledge as its essential nature or is it inert? In the first case, once again there is another locus even for that Knowledge. Thus there is an infinite regress. In the last case, there is the loss of your own viewpoint.

But if the Knowledge which is a quality and the Knowledge which constitutes the essential nature belong to a different class, there is contradiction with the statement: "one and the same". Moreover, upon

accepting that the Knowledge which is the essential nature of the self and which is the possessor of the attribute is without a locus, due to the acceptance that it belongs to a different class, what is the fault of the exponents of māyā who teach that Knowledge is without a locus and free from distinction?

comment

If the substantive consciousness, which constitutes the essential nature of the self, is qualitatively the same as the attributive consciousness, then the former would require a locus like the latter. Thus all consciousness requires a locus. To avoid self-dependence, it could be said that the substantive consciousness and the self which is its locus are distinct. But if the self is not inert then it must have consciousness as its nature and consciousness requires a locus, so what is its locus? If another self is postulated as the locus, then it can be asked whether that self has consciousness as its nature or whether it is inert. If it has consciousness as its nature then that consciousness requires a locus and thus there would be an infinite regress.

If it is said that the substantive consciousness does not require a locus because it is qualitatively different from attributive consciousness, then there is the acceptance of the Advaitins position that consciousness does not require a locus.⁹⁴

3.120.

किं च 'अनुभूतिरिति स्वाश्रयं प्रति स्वस-

द्भावेनैव कस्यचिद्वस्तुनो व्यवहारानुगुण्यापादनस्वभावो ज्ञानावगतिसंविदाद्यपर-
नामा सकर्मकोऽनुभवितुरात्मनो धर्मविशेषो घटमहं जानामीममर्थमवगच्छामि
घटमहं संवेद्मीति सर्वेषामात्मसाक्षिकः प्रसिद्धः' (श्रीभा० पृ० ३९ प० ९) इति
ग्रन्थेन यज्ज्ञानस्य साश्रयत्वं साधितं तत्सर्वमत्र धर्मिभूतज्ञानं निराश्रयं स्वीकु-
र्वतो विरुद्धं स्यात् । किं च भिद्योविलक्षणज्ञानद्वयस्वीकारे तदुभयानुगतैक-
प्रवृत्तिनिमित्ताभावाज्ज्ञानशब्दस्य नानार्थत्वापत्तिः । किं च गुणभूतं ज्ञानमा-
त्मनः स्वाभाविकं नित्यं न च सर्वथा धर्मिणः सकाशाद्भिन्नम् । तथा च तेनैवा-
त्मनो जडत्वाभावे सिद्धे किमर्थं पुनस्त्वयाऽऽत्मस्वरूपभूतं ज्ञानं स्वीकृतम् ।
'विज्ञानमानन्दं ब्रह्म' (बृ० ३ । ९ । २८) इति श्रुत्युपपत्तयेऽगत्या स्वी क्रि-
यत इति चेच्छ्रुतिश्चेच्छरणं तर्हि तेनैव सिद्धौ कृतं गुणभूतज्ञानेन । शुद्धो घटो घटे
शुद्धो गुण इत्युभयविधव्यवहारो यथैकेनैव घटस्वरूपविशेषभूतेन शुद्धगुणेनोप-
पद्यते तद्वत् । किं च यदि गुणभूतज्ञानं धर्मिभूतज्ञानं चेत्यर्थद्वयं ज्ञानशब्दस्य
श्रुतेरभिप्रेतं स्यात्तर्हि निःसंशयप्रतिपत्तय उभयत्रैक एव ज्ञानशब्दो न प्रयुक्तः
स्यात् । तस्माद्धर्मभूतज्ञानं पृथक्, धर्मिभूतज्ञानं च पृथगिति भेदो न श्रुतिसंमतः ।

अथैकमेवेत्यस्यैकत्वसंख्यावच्छिन्नमित्यर्थश्चेत्तत्र धर्मधर्मिभावः कल्पित इत्या-
पतति । ततश्च धर्मधर्मिभावो वास्तविक इति त्वत्सिद्धान्तो विरुद्धः स्यात् ।

3.120. Furthermore, by the text (Śrī.B.Para.36.p.61.):

Awareness is the nature of bringing about some object to be in accord with conventional expression, solely by means of its own existence and in reference to its own locus. It is also known as "Knowledge" (jñāna), "comprehension" (avagati), "awareness" (samvid) etc.

It has an object, it is a particular attribute of the self who is the experiencer and it is well known to all as having the self as its witness: "I know the pot", "I understand this matter", "I am aware of the pot"

what has been established is that Knowledge possesses a locus. All that here [in the quotation] would be contradicted for one who accepts that the Knowledge which possesses the attribute is without a locus. Moreover in accepting that the twofold Knowledge is mutually distinct, the word "Knowledge" would have different meanings because there is no reason for a single usage [of the word "Knowledge"] persisting in both of those [two types which are mutually distinct].

Furthermore, the Knowledge which is a quality pertains to the nature of the Self and is eternal and is not at all different from the possessor of the attribute. So when absence of inertness is established for the self by that alone, what is the reason that you again accept a Knowledge which is the essential nature of the self? If [you say] it is accepted because of want of recourse for the logical possibility of the sacred text: "Brahman is Knowledge, bliss" (Brh.3.9.28.), [we reply] if the sacred text is the resort, then when there is establishment by that alone [i.e. the self is proved to be not inert just through the substantive consciousness] there is no need of the Knowledge which is a quality. For

example, both kinds of expression: "the pot is white", "there is a white quality in the pot" are logically possible by just the one quality white which is a qualification of the nature of the pot. It is like that. Moreover, if the sacred text had intended the word "Knowledge" to have a twofold meaning: Knowledge which is a quality and Knowledge which possesses the attribute, then for the ascertainment which is free from doubt the very same word "Knowledge" would not be used in both places. Therefore the difference, i.e. Knowledge which is an attribute is separate and the Knowledge which possesses the attribute is separate, is not accepted by the sacred texts.

But if [you say] that the meaning of this: "one and the same" [supra] is "distinguished by the numeral denoting the fact of being one", [we reply] that what transpires is that the relation of attribute and its possessor is superimposed there [in awareness]. And then your conclusion, i.e. the relation of attribute and its possessor is real, would be contradicted.

3.121. यत्तु 'संविदनुभूतिज्ञानादिशब्दाः संवन्धिशब्दा इति शब्दार्थविदः । न हि लोकवेदयोर्जानात्यादेरकर्मकस्याकर्तृकस्य च प्र-
 आत्मा ज्ञानस्वरूप एव योगो दृष्टचरः' (श्रीभा० पृ० ४३ प० ४)
 इत्युक्तं तच्चुच्छम् । तथा सति स्वरूपभूतज्ञाने
 ज्ञानशब्दप्रयोगो न स्यात् । रूढ्या चेन्ममापि तथैव । निर्विशेषानुभूतिरेवात्मेति
 प्रागुक्तमेव । प्रयोगश्च संविदात्मा, अजडत्वात् । यन्नैवं तन्नैवं यथा घटादि-
 रिति केवलव्यतिरेकी हेतुः । अजडत्वं चानन्याधीनप्रकाशस्वरूपत्वम् ।
 घटदीपसुखादयश्च न प्रकाशस्वरूपाः । प्रकाशश्च तेषां ज्ञात्रधीनः । ज्ञातापि न
 प्रकाशस्वरूपः । प्रकाशश्च तस्य कल्पितज्ञानाश्रयत्वमूलकः । अतः सोऽपि नात्मा ।
 किं तु ज्ञानरूप एवात्मा । ज्ञाता तु ज्ञानाश्रयत्वेन कल्पितो ज्ञानव्यञ्जकोऽहं-
 कार एव । एतेन 'स्वसत्ताप्रयुक्तप्रकाशत्वमिति चेत्तथासति दीपादिष्वनैकान्त्यम्'
 (श्रीभा० पृ० ४३ प० ८) इत्यादिग्रन्थेनाजडत्वस्य व्याख्यान्तरं
 कल्पयित्वा कृतं तत्खण्डनं प्रत्युक्तम् । एवं च जानाम्यहमित्येवमात्मविपयिणी
 प्रतीतिभ्रम एव । देहात्माभिमानवत् एव प्रतिभासनाज्जातृत्वं मिथ्यैव ।

3.121. But what has been said (Śrī.B.Para.38.p.66.):

The knowers of words and their meanings [grammarians] say that the words "awareness" (saṁvid), "consciousness" (anubhūti), "Knowledge" (jñāna) etc. are words which express relationship. In the world or in the Veda, the usage of "he knows" etc. is certainly not seen to be without an object and without a subject.

That is trifling. If that was the case, there could be no use of the word "Knowledge" in the sense of Knowledge which is the essential nature [i.e. the substantive consciousness]. If [you say that the use of the word "Knowledge" in respect of the substantive consciousness is] by convention, [reply] it is exactly the same for me as well. It has certainly been told previously that the Self is indeed awareness which is free from distinction.

The usage [i.e. a syllogism] is: awareness is the Self, because it is not inert. The reason has only negative concomitance: what is not in this manner [i.e. not the Self] then it is not thus [i.e. not not inert] like a pot etc. "Not being inert" means having a nature which is manifest without being dependent upon another thing. A pot, a light, happiness etc. are not by nature manifest. Their manifestation depends upon the knower. Even the knower is not by nature manifest. Its manifestation is based upon a locus of Knowledge which is superimposed. Therefore that [knower] too is not the Self. But the Self is only in the form of Knowledge. Whereas the knower, which is superimposed as the locus of Knowledge, is only the "I-notion" which manifests Knowledge. On account of this, that refutation which was done by conceiving another explanation of "not inert" in the text beginning (Śrī.B.Para.39.p.67.):

If [you, the Advaitin, say that "not being inert"] is: being manifest resulting from its own existence, [reply] if that is so, there is inconclusive reasoning [due to over extension] in respect of the light of a lamp etc.

has been answered. Thus the cognition which refers to the Self in the manner: "I know" is only error. Knowership is certainly false, because its appearance is only for the one who has the false presumption that the body is the Self.⁹⁵

comment

In the Mahāpūrvapakṣa (Para.27.p.43.) it is stated that awareness, which is self-manifest by nature, is the Self because awareness is not inert (ajada). The meaning is that everything which is other than awareness is insentient and so awareness alone can constitute the nature of the Self. In the Mahāsiddhānta (Para.39.p.67.), Rāmānuja inquires as to what the Advaitin means by "not inert" and he suggests the following definition: being manifest resulting from its own existence. He then proceeds to argue that such a definition is invalid because there is over extension in the case of the light of a lamp, for that too is manifest solely on account of its own existence.

However this definition is not acceptable to the Advaitin. Abhyankar explains that what is meant by "not inert" is: having a nature which is manifest without being dependent upon another thing.⁹⁶ There is no over extension in the case of the light of a lamp because its manifestation depends upon cognition on the part of the knower. Abhyankar also argues that the knower is not the Self because the manifestation of knowership is dependent upon superimposition.⁹⁷

3.122. अनुभूतिः परमार्थतो निर्विषया निराश्रया च सती भ्रान्त्या ज्ञातृतयाऽवभासते रजततयेव शुक्तिः । यत्तु ' एतदयुक्तम् । तथासत्यनुभवसामानाधिकरण्ये-
नानुभविताऽहमर्थः प्रतीयेतानुभूतिरहमिति । पुरोवस्थितभास्वरद्रव्याद्याकारतया रजतादिरिव । अत्र तु पृथगवभासमानैवेयमनुभूतिरर्थान्तरमहमर्थं विशिनाष्टिदण्ड इव देवदत्तम् । तथा ह्यनुभवाम्यहमिति प्रतीतिः । तदेवमस्मदर्थमनुभूतिविशिष्टं प्रकाशयन्ननुभवाम्यहमिति प्रत्ययो दण्डमात्रे दण्डी देवदत्त इतिप्रत्ययवद्विशेष-
णभूतानुभूतिमात्रावलम्बनः कथमिव प्रतिज्ञायेत ' (श्रीभा० पृ० ४४ प० ५) इत्युक्तं तदापाततः । न हि भ्रमकाले ' अनुभूतिरहम् ' इतिप्रतीत्यापादनं युज्यते । भ्रमकालेऽधिष्ठानस्य स्वरूपेण प्रतीत्यभावात् । तथाऽनुभवसामाना-
धिकरण्येनानुभविताऽहमर्थः प्रतीयेतेत्यप्ययुक्तम् । अधिष्ठानसामानाधिकरण्ये-
नैवारोप्यस्यानुभवविशिष्टाहमर्थस्य प्रतीयमानत्वात् । तथा ह्यनुभवाम्यहमिति प्रतीतावधिष्ठानभूतानुभूतिवैयधिकरण्येनानुभूतिरहमर्थस्य प्रतीतिरिति कथ-
मवगतं त्वया । न ह्यनुभवाम्यहमित्यत्राहमर्थविशेषणीभूतो योऽनुभवः स एवाधिष्ठानम् । किंतु सन्मात्रानुभूतिरेवाधिष्ठानम् । अहमर्थविशेषणीभूतोऽनुभ-

चञ्चलपरिणामविशेषः प्रातिभासिकान्तर्गत एव । ननु तर्हि यथेदं रजतमित्य-
त्राधिष्ठानस्येदंत्वेन प्रतीतिस्तथाऽत्राधिष्ठानस्य केन रूपेण प्रतीतिरिति चेत्सद्रूपे-
णेति गृहाण । अन्ततोऽस्तितायाः सर्वत्र सत्त्वात् । सतश्च सामानाधिकरण्येनैव
प्रतीतिः ॥

3.122. Awareness, in reality being without an object and a locus, appears as a knower on account of error just as a pearl-oyster appears as silver.⁹⁸ But what has been said (Śrī.B.Para.39.p.67,68.):

This is not correct. If that was the case, the sense of "I", i.e. the experiencer, would be recognized in co-existence with experience: "I am awareness". Just as silver etc. are in the form of the shining substances etc. existing before the eyes. But here, this awareness certainly appears as separate and qualifies another thing, the sense of "I", like a staff qualifies Devadatta. To elaborate: there is the cognition "I experience". Such being the case, how can the apprehension "I experience", which manifests the sense of "I" as qualified by awareness, be declared to depend upon mere awareness which is the qualifying attribute? It is like the apprehension "Devadatta has a staff" relates to the mere staff.

That is at first glance. The effecting of the cognition: "I am awareness" is certainly not correct at the time of error. Because at the time of error there is no cognition of the substratum in its essential nature. Likewise, it is also incorrect that: "the sense of "I", i.e. the experiencer, would be recognized in co-existence with experience." Because the sense of "I" who is qualified by experience and who is falsely imposed, is recognized as only in co-existence with the substratum. To elaborate: in the cognition "I experience" how is it understood by you that the cognition of the sense of "I", the experiencer, is without co-existence with awareness which is the substratum? Because the experience which is a qualifying attribute of the sense of "I" in: "I

experience" is certainly not the substratum. But the substratum is only awareness which is pure existence. The experience which is a qualifying attribute of the sense of "I" is a particular modification of the Unmanifest and it is certainly included in what is apparent.

[objection] Just as the cognition of the substratum here: "this is silver" is as "this", so too, in what form is the cognition of the substratum here [in "I experience"]?

[reply] Understand that it is in the form of existence. Because finally, "is-ness" exists everywhere. And for existence, there is cognition only in co-existence.

comment

Rāmanuja says the sense of "I" in the statement "I experience" is in co-existence, i.e. apposition (sāmānādhikaranyā) with experience. Abhyankar states that the sense of "I", which is superimposed, cannot be in co-existence with experience but can be co-existent only with the substratum of the superimposition. In the case of a statement based upon the superimposition of silver upon a pearl-oyster: "this is silver", the silver is in co-existence with the substratum "this". The experience qualifying the "I" in "I experience" is not the substratum, for it is of an apparent nature (prātibhāsika). This means that an experience cannot be the substratum because it exists only at the time of the knowledge of it. For instance after eating one cannot say: "what I experienced at the time of the meal I will experience now." Prātibhāsika, which is negated at the time of everyday life (vyavahāra), is of two types: the experience of happiness etc. which is real and the experience of silver on a pearl-oyster which is unreal.

Existence is the substratum because "is-ness" persists in all cognitions. In the case of existence, there is always the cognition of it in a relation of co-existence: "the pot is", "the cloth is".

3.123. किं चाधिष्ठानस्याहमर्थविशेषणीभूतज्ञानत्वेन प्रतीतिरिति सुतरां
वक्तुमशक्यम् । अधिष्ठानस्य निर्विशेषसन्मात्ररूपत्वेन तस्येतरविशेषणीभवनान-
नर्हत्वात् । एतेन 'आत्मतयाऽभिमतया अनुभूतेरपि मिथ्यात्वं स्यात् । देहात्मा-
भिमानवत् एव प्रतीतेः' (श्रीभा० पृ० ४४ प० १४) इत्युक्तमपास्तम् ।
अहमर्थविशेषणत्वेनाहं जानामीति प्रतीयमानाया अव्यक्तपरिणामविशेषभूताया

अनुभूतेर्मिथ्यात्वस्येष्टत्वात् । न हीयमधिष्ठानभूताऽनुभूतिः । तस्याः स्वमात्ररूपेण ज्ञेयत्वाभावेन प्रतीयमानत्वाभावात् । अत एव सा तत्त्वज्ञानेन बाधिता न भवति । यच्च प्रतीयते तदिदंकारास्पदमहंकारास्पदं वा वस्तु बाधार्हं भवति । न तु प्रतीतिरेव बाध्यते । प्रतीतिरप्यव्यक्तपरिणामविशेषभूता साश्रया सविषया च बाधार्हैव । न तु निर्विशेषसन्मात्ररूपा कस्यामप्यवस्थायां बाध्यते ।

3.123. Furthermore, it is all the more impossible to say that there is the cognition of the substratum as Knowledge which is the qualifying attribute of the sense of "I". Because the substratum is in the form of mere existence free from distinction, therefore it is not suitable to become the qualifying attribute of another thing. On account of this, what has been said (Śrī.B.Para.40.p.68.)⁹⁹:

Even the awareness which is accepted as the Self would be false. Because the cognition [that awareness is the Self] is only for one who has the false presumption that the body is the Self is set aside. Because the falsity of the awareness which is a particular modification of the Unmanifest and which is perceived as a qualifying attribute of the sense of "I": "I know", is accepted. But not this awareness which is the substratum. Because that [awareness] is not perceived since it is not cognizable as it exists in the form of mere being. For this very reason, that [awareness] is not sublated by the knowledge of reality. What is perceived, whether it is the locus of the notion of "this", or the locus of the notion of "I", is an object which is capable of sublation. But the cognition itself is not negated. Even cognition, which is a particular modification of the Unmanifest and which possesses a locus and an object, is certainly capable of sublation. But [awareness] which is in the form of pure existence free from distinction is not sublated in any state whatsoever.

comment

In the Mahāpūrvapakṣa (Para.27.p.43.) the Advaitin has argued that

knowership is false because it is superimposed upon the Self due to the erroneous idea that the body is the Self. In the Mahāsiddhānta (Para.40. p.68.) Rāmānuja contends that if the idea that the Self is a knower is false because it is based upon the erroneous presumption that the body is the Self, the idea that awareness is the Self would also be false since it arises in the same way as knowership.

Abhyankar replies that the awareness in the statement "I know" is a qualifying attribute of the sense of "I" and is not sought to be upheld as absolutely real. But the awareness which is the substratum of the mental mode of knowership is not an attribute of the knower and so it does not follow that because knowership is false the awareness which is the substratum is also false. To argue that awareness is false, because the idea that awareness is the Self arises for a person who has the erroneous presumption that the body is the Self, is not correct. Because the conviction that: "awareness is the Self" occurs only to one who does not have that erroneous presumption.¹⁰⁰

Rāmānuja further states (Para.40.p.68.) that if the Advaitin says awareness is not false because it is not negated, then knowership is not false because it too is not negated. Abhyankar responds by saying that any object of knowledge, whether external or internal, is capable of being negated. Knowership is negated at the time of deep sleep.¹⁰¹ Awareness, however, cannot be negated because it is not the object of another awareness (cf., 3.80. comment.). Only what is the object of awareness is capable of being negated.

- 3.124. यत्तु 'अन्तःकरणरूपस्याहंकारस्य न ज्ञातृत्वमुपपद्यते । देहस्येवाचेतनत्वप्रकृतिपरिणामित्वदृश्यत्वपराक्तत्वपरार्थत्वादियोगादन्तःकरणरूपहंकारस्य । चेतनासाधारणस्वभावत्वाच्च ज्ञातृत्वस्य' (श्रीभा० पृ० ४५ प० २) इत्युक्तं तन्न ।
 लौकिकं घटादिविषयकं ज्ञानं हि मानसी क्रिया
 अहंकारस्य ज्ञातृत्वम् मनोवृत्तिविशेषो मनसस्तत्तद्विषयाकारेण परिणामः । ज्ञातृत्वं च ज्ञानक्रियाश्रयत्वम् । तच्च
 मनस एव संभवति न त्वात्मनः । एतेन 'अन्तःकरणं न ज्ञातृ, अचेतनत्वाद्देहवत्' इत्यनुमानं निरस्तम् । ज्ञानस्य मनःपरिणामविशेषरूपत्वेन मनस्येव तत्संभवात् । आत्मा न ज्ञाता, अपरिणामित्वादित्यनुमानेनात्मनो ज्ञातृत्वाभावश्च सिध्यति । न च ज्ञातृत्वं ज्ञानगुणाश्रयत्वम् । क्रियावाचकाद्धातोरश्रये तृच्यत्ययः स्मर्यते व्याकरणे । ज्ञानक्रियैव ज्ञानगुणशब्देनोच्यते इति चेदस्तु नाम । तथापि विकारभूतस्य मनस एव सा न तु निर्विकारस्यात्मनः । यद्यप्यचेतनत्वप्रकृतिपरिणामित्वदृश्यत्वपराक्तत्वपरार्थत्वादिभिर्वहुभिर्धर्मैर्मनसो घटादिसाम्यं तथापि ज्ञातृत्वेन वैधर्म्याङ्गीकारे बाधकाभावः । यथा तैरेव धर्मैः शरीरस्य घटादिसाम्येऽपीन्द्रियाश्रयत्वेन चेष्टाश्रयत्वेन च वैधर्म्यं तद्वत् ।

3.124. But what has been said (Śrī.B.Para.40.p.69.)¹⁰²:

Knowership is not logically possible for the "I-notion" which is of the nature of the internal-organ. Because like the body, the "I-notion" which is of the nature of the internal-organ is associated with insentiency, it has the nature of being a modification of prakṛti, it is an object of knowledge, something outward, for the sake of others etc. And because the nature of knowership is specific to what is sentient.

That is not so. Because the ordinary Knowledge relating to pots etc. is an action pertaining to the mind, it is a particular mental modification and it is a transformation of the mind in the form of the respective object. Knowership is the nature of being the locus of the action of Knowledge. And that is possible only for the mind, not for the Self. On account of this, the inference: "the internal-organ is not the knower, because it is insentient, like the body" is refuted. Because [ordinary] Knowledge is a particular transformation of the mind, therefore there is the possibility of that [Knowledge] only in the mind. And the absence of knowership on the part of the Self is established by the inference: "the Self is not a knower, because it does not undergo transformation."

Knowership is not the nature of being the locus of the quality of Knowledge. In grammar, the agent affix (trc)¹⁰³ is said to be in the sense of the locus of the verbal root because it directly expresses an action. If [you say] that only the action of Knowledge is said by the word "quality of Knowledge", [we reply] then it is accepted. Still, that [action of Knowledge] is only for the mind which is characterized by change, not for the Self which is free from change. Although the mind has similarity to a pot etc. due to the many attributes such as insentiency, being a modification of prakṛti, being an object of knowledge, being outward and for the sake of others etc., nevertheless, there is no

negating factor in the acceptance of its dissimilarity as a knower. For example, although the body has similarity to a pot etc. due to those very attributes [just mentioned], there is dissimilarity in being the locus of the sense-organs and in being the locus of motion. It is like that.

comment

In respect of knowership, the Advaitins position (see 1.51. and comment) is that the Self is not in reality a knower. Knowership occurs due to the mutual superimposition of the Self and the internal-organ (antahkaraṇa). The internal-organ possesses a twofold modification; the first is a mental modification in the form of the subject (ahamvṛtti) and the other is the transformation into the various cognitions (idamvṛtti) which are objects to the knowing subject. The internal-organ possessing the modification in the form of the subject is called the "I-notion" (ahaṅkāra) and the internal-organ possessing the modification in the form of other cognitions is called "mind" (manas).¹⁰⁴ The statement that "I know" is the result of a mutual superimposition: the "I-notion" acquires sentiency on account of the superimposition of the awareness which is the Self and the Self becomes referable by the individual sense of "I" due to the superimposition of identity with the "I-notion". This superimposition is the pre-condition for all ordinary relations (vyavahāra). Following this fundamental superimposition, an expression such as: "I am happy" is due to the mutual superimposition of the Self, qualified in the above manner by the "I-notion", with the mind. The expression: "I am a man" is due to the mutual superimposition of the Self, qualified by the "I-notion", with the body.¹⁰⁵

Rāmānuja maintains that knowership is intrinsic to the self. Abhyankar replies that knowership cannot be intrinsic, for knowership means "being the locus of the action of Knowledge". Because cognitions are constantly changing in accord with their objects, the locus of these real cognitive changes could not be itself free from change. If the Self can undergo any transformation then it would not be a permanent entity.

Rāmānuja will now proceed to argue that knowership cannot be identical to the "I-notion" because the latter is an object of knowership in the same way as the physical body is an object of knowledge. Abhyankar responds by saying that a single entity can be both the knower and the object of knowledge if it possesses parts. Since the internal-organ consists of mental modifications, there is no contradiction in the relation

of knower and known with respect to the mental modes.

3.125. ईदशी मनोवृत्तिरूपा ज्ञानक्रिया च

मनसां वस्तुत एवानेकत्वादुपाधिभेदेन भेदाद्वा तत्तन्मनोगता विभिन्नैव । एक-
मनोगतापि च कालभेदेन भिन्नैव । तथा चैकज्ञानक्रियाकर्तृभूतस्य मनसोऽपर-
ज्ञानक्रियाकर्मत्वमविरुद्धमेव । एतेन ज्ञानकर्मणोविरोधादेव न ज्ञातृत्वम्
(श्रीभा०पृ० ४५ प० ७) इत्यपास्तम् । एकक्रियानिरूपितयोर्हि ज्ञातृत्वज्ञेयत्वयो-
र्विरोधः स्यात् । न तु भिन्नक्रियानिरूपितयोः । अन्यथा भवन्मतेऽप्यात्मनो ज्ञान-
कर्मणो विरोधादेव ज्ञातृत्वाभावप्रसङ्गो दुर्वार इति ॥ १३ ॥

3.125. Such an action of Knowledge, which is in the form of a mental modification, is certainly divided as it belongs to respective minds either because minds in reality are many or because of difference due to the distinction of limiting adjuncts. Even belonging to a single mind it [the action of Knowledge] is certainly different due to a difference of time. Thus the mind which is the agent with respect to one action of Knowledge is certainly not contradicted in being the object of another action of Knowledge. On account of this [the statement] (Śrī.B.Para. 40.p.69.): "there is no knowership [for the "I-notion"] because of the very contradiction of being an object of knowledge" is set aside. Because there would be contradiction between knowership and being an object of knowledge which are both ascertained in respect of the one action [of Knowledge]. But there is no [contradiction for the two] which are both ascertained by a different action [of Knowledge]. Otherwise, even according to your view the absence of knowership would be difficult to be prevented because of the very contradiction that the Self is an object of knowledge.

3.126.

अनित्यं व्यञ्जयेज्ज्ञानमहंकारो हि लौकिकम् ।

सुप्तावहंता न तथाप्यात्मनस्तत्र साक्षिता ॥ १४ ॥

3.126. The "I-notion" can manifest Knowledge which is non-eternal and of an ordinary nature. There is

no "I-ness" in sleep. Even so, the Self is the witness there. 14.

3.127. सा च ज्ञानक्रियाऽनित्यैव क्रियात्वात् । एतेन 'ज्ञानं चास्यात्मनो नित्यस्य स्वाभाविकधर्मत्वेन नित्यम्' (श्रीभा० पृ० ४५ अहंकारव्यङ्ग्यं ज्ञानमनित्यम् ५० १०) इत्यपास्तम् । ज्ञानक्रियाया अनित्यत्वादेव चोत्पन्नं ज्ञानं विनष्टं ज्ञानमिति व्यवहार उपपद्यते । न च ज्ञानं नित्यमेव । उत्पन्नं विनष्टमिति व्यवहारस्तु ज्ञानविकास-संकोचमूलको गौणः । कर्मणा च ज्ञानस्य संकोचविकासाविति वाच्यम् । सत्यामुपपत्तौ गौणत्वे प्रमाणाभावात् । किं च संकोचविकासौ ह्युपचयापचया-वेनेति ज्ञानस्य विकारित्वेनानित्यत्वप्रसङ्गस्तदवस्थ एव । किं चैवं जीवस्या-प्यनित्यत्वप्रसङ्गः । यतो ज्ञानमात्मनः स्वाभाविको गुण इति त्वयैवोक्तम् (श्रीभा० पृ० ४५ ५० ११) । स्वाभाविकगुणस्य ह्युपचयापचयावाश्रयोपच-यापचयावन्तरेण नैव संभवतः । कार्येषु भूतेषु गुणोपचये मूर्त्युपचयदर्शनात् ।

3.127. That action of Knowledge is certainly non-eternal, because it is an action. On account of this, [the statement] (Śrī.B.Para.40.p.69.)¹⁰⁶:

Knowledge is eternal, because it is a natural attribute of this eternal self

is set aside. The expression that "Knowledge is produced", "Knowledge is destroyed" is logically possible only because the action of Knowledge is non-eternal. It should not be said that: Knowledge is certainly eternal. But the expression "produced" and "destroyed" is figurative, as it is based upon the expansion and contraction of Knowledge. The contraction and the expansion of Knowledge is due to karma. [reason] Because there is no means of knowledge for it to be a figurative expression when the logical possibility exists [i.e. for the expression to be understood in its primary sense]. Moreover, "contraction and expansion" mean only "decrease and increase", so because Knowledge undergoes change it must be non-eternal and so there is just the same situation as before.

Furthermore, according to the above reasoning, the individual soul too would be non-eternal. Because you yourself have said [supra] that

Knowledge is a natural quality of the self. For the increase and decrease of a natural quality is certainly not possible without an increase and decrease of the locus. Because in regard to the elements which are effects, it is seen that there is an increase of the corporeal nature upon an increase of the quality.¹⁰⁷

3.128.

इदं
च मनोवृत्तिविशेषरूपं लौकिकं ज्ञानं प्रातिभासिकान्तर्गतमेव । अस्यैवाभिव्य-
ञ्जकोऽहंकारः स्वात्मस्थतया तदभिव्यनक्ति । आदर्शादिवत् । अभिव्यञ्जकानां
ह्ययं स्वभाव एव यत्स्वात्मस्थतयाऽभिव्यञ्ज्याभिव्यञ्जनम् । न त्वहंकारोऽनुभू-
तिस्वरूपं परमात्मानमभिव्यनक्तीति ब्रूमहे । परमात्मनोऽहंकारव्यञ्ज्यत्वाभा-
वात् । एतेन

‘शान्ताङ्गार इवादित्यमहंकारो जडात्मकः ।

स्वयंज्योतिषमात्मानं व्यनक्तीति न युक्तिमत्’ (श्रीभा० पृ० ४६ प० १६)

इत्यपास्तम् । न च लौकिकमपि मनोवृत्तिविशेषरूपं ज्ञानं प्रकाश-
स्वरूपतां दधात्येवेति कथमप्रकाशस्वरूपेण जडेनाहंकारेण तद्व्यञ्ज-
नमिति वाच्यम् । यतो नायं नियमः प्रकाशस्वरूपस्याप्रकाशस्वरूपेण
नैवाभिव्यञ्जनमिति । अप्रकाशस्वरूपेणापि जलादिना प्रकाशस्वरूपस्य
सूर्यस्याभिव्यक्तिर्दृश्यते ।

3.128. This ordinary Knowledge, which is in the form of a particular modification of the mind, is certainly included in what has an apparent nature. The "I-notion" which manifests only this [ordinary Knowledge], manifests it as located in itself [i.e. in the "I-notion"]. Like a mirror etc. For this is indeed the nature of the things which bring about a manifestation, i.e. the manifesting of what is to be manifested as located in themselves. We do not say that the "I-notion" manifests the supreme Self which is of the nature of awareness. Because the supreme Self is not able to be manifested by the "I-notion". On account of this, [the verse] (Śrī.B.Para.41.p.71.):

That the "I-notion", which is insentient by nature, manifests the Self which is self-luminous is without reason. Like [a statement that] a spent coal

manifests the sun (S.T.p.35.)

is set aside.

It should not be said that: even the ordinary Knowledge, which is in the form of a particular modification of the mind, certainly exhibits the nature of being luminous. So how is that [Knowledge] manifest by the insentient "I-notion" which is by nature not luminous? [reason] Because this is not a rule: "there is certainly no manifesting of what is luminous by nature by what is not luminous by nature." The manifestation of the sun which is by nature luminous, is seen by means of water etc. even though [water etc.] are by nature not luminous.

3.129. न चेदं लौकिकमपि ज्ञानं सर्वेषां जडानां प्रकाश-

कमस्तीति तस्य स्वप्रकाश्याहंकारेण कथमभिव्यक्तिरिति वाच्यम् । यतोऽयमपि न नियमो यत्स्वप्रकाशयेन स्वस्य नाभिव्यक्तिरिति । अन्धकारावृत्तेऽपवरके केनचित्सूक्ष्मरन्ध्रेण प्रविष्टानां रविकराणां स्वाभिव्यङ्ग्यकरतलेनाभिव्यक्तिदर्शनात् । यत्तु ' करतलप्रतिहतगतयो हि रश्मयो बहुलाः स्वयमेव स्फुटतरमुपलभ्यन्त इति तद्बाहुल्यमात्रहेतुत्वात्करतलस्य नाभिव्यञ्जकत्वम् ' (श्रीभा० पृ० ४७५०८) इति तन्न । करतलस्य चिरधारणेऽपि रश्मिबाहुल्याननुभवात् । रश्मयो हि बाधुपप्रत्यक्षविषयः । अतस्तद्बाहुल्यसत्त्वे तस्य बाहुल्यस्य प्रत्यक्षं स्यादेव । उत्तरोत्तरमसह्यता तु सूक्ष्मच्छिद्रद्वारा करतले रश्मीनां प्रवेशाधिक्येन भवति । अस्तु वा बाहुल्यम् । तथापि बाहुल्यसंपादनद्वारैव करतलस्य रश्म्यभिव्यञ्जकत्वमक्षतमेव ।

3.129. It should not be said that: even this ordinary Knowledge illumines all insentient things. So how is there the manifestation of that [Knowledge] by the "I-notion" which is illumined by [Knowledge] itself? [reason] Because this too is not a rule: "there is no manifestation of itself [e.g. of A] by what is to be illumined by itself [by A]." Because the manifestation of the sun's rays, which have entered through some small cavity into an inner apartment enveloped in darkness, is seen by the palm of the hand which is to be manifested by [the rays] themselves.

But what [has been said] (Śrī.B.Para.41.p.72.):

For the rays, which are obstructed in their motion by the palm of the hand, become numerous and are perceived

very clearly of their own accord. Thus the palm of the hand does not manifest [the rays] since it is the cause for their abundance only.

That is not so. Because there is no experience of an abundance of rays even though the palm of the hand is held a long time. For rays are objects of visual perception. Therefore if their abundance exists, that abundance must certainly be visible. But the increasing inability to endure [the rays] is because of the excessive penetration of the rays into the palm of the hand by means of the subtle perforations [on the skin]. Or let there be abundance. Still, [the manifestation of the rays by the palm of the hand] is not impaired; the palm of the hand manifests the rays only by bringing about an abundance.

3.130. यत्तु 'अस्य संविद्रूपस्यात्मनोऽहंकारनिर्वर्त्याभिव्यक्तिः किंरूपा । न तावदुत्पत्तिः । स्वतःसिद्धतयाऽनन्योत्पाद्यताभ्युपगमात् । नापि तत्प्रकाशनम् । तस्या अनुभवान्तराननुभाव्यत्वात्' (श्रीभा०पृ०४७प०११) इत्युक्तं तन्न । संविद्रूपस्यात्मनोऽभिव्यक्तेरस्माभिरनभ्युपगमात् । मनोवृत्तिविशेषरूपस्य ज्ञानस्य चानुभवान्तरानुभाव्यत्वमस्त्येवेति तत्प्रकाशनरूपा तदभिव्यक्तिः सुलभैव । यथाऽपवरके केनचिद्रन्ध्रेण प्रविष्टा अपि सूर्यरश्मयो यावन्निराश्रितास्तावन्न प्रकाशिता भवन्ति, यथा वा शब्दतन्मात्रादयो निराश्रिता न प्रकाशन्ते किं तु साश्रया एव तथेदं मनोवृत्तिविशेषरूपं ज्ञानमपि । यथा च करतलं स्वयमेव सूर्यरश्म्याश्रयो भूत्वा तैरेव स्वयमभिव्यक्तं सत्तान्प्रकाशयति तथा मन एवाहंकाररूपेण तादृशज्ञानाश्रयो भूत्वा तेनैव ज्ञानेन स्वयमभिव्यक्तं सत्तज्ज्ञानं प्रकाशयति ।

3.130. But what has been said (Śrī.B.Para.41.p.72.):

Of what nature is the manifestation which is brought about by the "I-notion" for this Self whose nature is awareness? It cannot be origination. Because it is accepted that [the Self] is produced by no other thing on account of being self-established. Nor is there illumination of that [Self whose nature is awareness]. Because that [awareness] cannot be

experienced by another experience.

That is not so. Because we do not accept the manifestation of the Self whose nature is awareness. And the Knowledge which is a particular modification of the mind is certainly able to be experienced by another experience. So the manifestation of that [Knowledge which is a particular mental modification], in the form of the illumination of that, is certainly feasible.

Just as the sun's rays, though they have entered into an inner apartment through some cavity, are not illumined as long as they are without a locus; or just as the tanmātra of sound etc. do not manifest when they are without a locus but only when possessing a locus; it is the same for this Knowledge also which is a particular modification of the mind. And just as the palm of the hand, having itself become the locus of the sun's rays and itself being manifested by those very rays, reveals them; so too, the mind alone in the form of the "I-notion" has become the locus of such Knowledge and itself being manifested by that very Knowledge it reveals that Knowledge.

comment

Abhyankar considers that Rāmānuja's objection is invalid because the Advaitin does not hold that the Self is manifested by the internal-organ. What Abhyankar states is that the Self, i.e. awareness as such, becomes reflected in the internal-organ and it is this reflection of awareness (cidābhāsa)¹⁰⁸ which illumines the internal-organ and is also manifested by the internal-organ in the form of the cognizer (ahaṁvṛtti) and the various types of cognition (idaṁvṛtti).

Rāmānuja proceeds to argue (Para.41.p.73.) that because awareness is not the object of another experience there is no means to assist the experience of that awareness, such as by the removal of any obstructive impurity (kalmaṣa). Abhyankar will reply that the mental modification (vṛtti), although itself a product of the primary Ignorance (mūlājñāna), is able to remove the obstructive impurity consisting of the ignorance of the Self. Hence the effecting of the experience of the Self is actually the removal of the ignorance of the ever present Self by means of an appropriate vṛtti.

3.131. तदिदमभिव्यक्तं ज्ञानं बोद्धगतं कल्मषमपनयति । कल्मषं चेदं न सर्वजगन्मूल-
भूतभावरूपाज्ञानरूपम् । किं तु तस्यैव ये परिणामविशेषा अल्पालपास्तच्छक-
लभूता इव येऽविद्याविशेषाः सर्पाभासकारणीभूतरज्ज्वज्ञानादयस्तद्रूपम् ।
एतदविद्याविशेषनिरासकं रज्जुज्ञानादिकं ज्ञानमपि मूलभूतभावरूपाज्ञान-
परिणामविशेष एव । यथा स्वप्नान्तरस्थद्वितीयस्वप्ननिरासिका जागृतिरपि
प्रथमस्वप्नान्तर्गतैव तद्वत् । तथा च यथा प्रथमस्वप्नान्तर्गतापि जागृतिर्द्वितीयस्वप्न-
निरासे समर्था तथा प्रातिभासिकजगदन्तर्गतमपि मनोवृत्तिविशेषरूपं लौकिकं
ज्ञानमाधुनिका येऽविद्याशकलविशेषास्तन्निरासे समर्थमेव । तस्यास्य लौकिकज्ञा-
नस्यायमहंकार आश्रयो भूत्वाऽभिव्यञ्जक इत्युक्तम् । स्वाश्रयतयाऽभिव्यञ्जन-
मभिव्यञ्जकानां स्वभावः । यत्तु 'नायमभिव्यञ्जकानां स्वभावः । प्रदीपादिष्व-
दर्शनात्' (श्रीभा० पृ० ४८ प० १९) इत्युक्तं तत्र । न हि प्रदीपो घटाद्याभि-
व्यञ्जकः । किं तु तत्प्रभा । तदुक्तं—

'स्यैव भासको दीपः स्वस्य चान्यस्य च प्रभा' इति ।

3.131. This Knowledge which is manifested removes the obstructive impurity centred on the knower. This obstructive impurity is not the Ignorance which is a positive entity and which is the basis of the entire world. But these [e.g. obstructive impurity etc.] are particulars of Ignorance, which are as it were minute particular modifications of that very [primary Ignorance] and are parts of it. The ignorance of the rope which is the cause for the appearance of the snake, etc. are of this nature. Even this knowledge, such as the knowledge of the rope etc. which removes a particular ignorance, is only a particular modification of the primary Ignorance which is a positive entity. For example, even the waking which removes a second dream which is [itself] contained in another dream is only included within the first dream. It is like that. So just as the waking, although included within the first dream, is capable of removing the second dream, so too, the ordinary Knowledge, though included within the world of appearance, is in the form of a particular modification of the mind i.e. these actual particular parts of Ignorance, and it is certainly capable of removing those. The "I-notion", having become the locus, is said to be the manifesting agent of this ordinary Knowledge. The nature of manifesting agents is to manifest

[things] as located in themselves [i.e. in the manifesting agent].

But what has been said (Śrī.B.Para.42.p.74.)¹⁰⁹:

This is not the nature of manifesting agents,

because it is not seen in the case of a light etc.

That is not so. Because a light is not the manifesting agent of a pot etc., but rather its effulgence. That has been told: "a light shines only for itself, the effulgence is for itself and for another."¹¹⁰

3.132. दर्पणादिरपि स्वात्मस्थतयैव मुखादीनभिव्यनक्ति । यत्तु ' न च दर्पणादि-
मुखादेराभिव्यञ्जकः । अपि तु चाक्षुपतेजःप्रतिफलनरूपदोषहेतुः ' (श्रीभा० पृ०
४८५० २१) इत्युक्तं तन्न । चाक्षुपतेजःप्रतिफलनद्वारा मुखाद्यभिव्यञ्जकत्वस्या-
क्षतेः । एवमहंकारस्य ज्ञानाश्रयत्वेन ज्ञानव्यञ्जकत्वाज्ज्ञातृत्वम् । जीवस्याप्यहं-
कारसांनिध्येनैवाहमर्थत्वं ज्ञातृत्वं च न तु वास्तविकम् । आत्मा तु ज्ञप्तिमात्र-
मेव । यत्तु ' अहंभावविगमे ज्ञप्तेर्न प्रत्यक्षवसिद्धिः ' (श्रीभा० पृ० ४९५० ८)
इत्युक्तं तन्न । ज्ञप्तावहंभावाभावेन स्वस्मै प्रकाशमानत्वाभावेऽप्यनन्याधीनप्र-
काशस्वरूपत्वरूपप्रत्यक्त्वस्य विद्यमानत्वात् ।

3.132. A mirror etc. too manifests a face etc. only as located within itself. But what has been said (Śrī.B.Para.42.p.74.):

A mirror etc. is not the manifesting agent of a

face etc. But it is the cause for the fault in

the form of the reflection of the ocular light.

That is not so. Because there is no impairment for [the mirror] being the manifesting agent of the face etc. by means of the reflection of the ocular light. In the same way, the "I-notion" is the knower because it manifests Knowledge through being the locus of Knowledge. The individual soul too is the sense of "I" and the knower only on account of proximity to the "I-notion", but not in reality. The Self, however, is only pure consciousness. But what has been said (Śrī.B.Para.42.p.75.):

In the absence of "I-ness", consciousness is not

established as being "inner".

That is not so. Because even though there is no illumining for oneself due

to the absence of "I-ness" in consciousness, being "inner" exists in the form of the essential nature which illumines without dependence upon another thing.

3.133. किं चाहंभावो नात्मनः स्वरूपम् । सुषुप्त्यादौ व्यभिचारात् । सुषुप्तौ ज्ञानस-
त्त्वेऽप्यहमर्थाभावेन ज्ञानस्य निराश्रयत्वान्न स्फुटप्र-
सुषुप्तौ नाहंभावः तिभासः । न च सुषुप्तावहमर्थसत्त्वेऽपि विषयराहि-
त्यान्न स्फुटं प्रतिभास इति वाच्यम् । प्रमाणाभा-
वात् । अज्ञानरूपविषयस्य सत्त्वाच्च । अहमर्थस्य ज्ञानाश्रयस्य विषयानपेक्षत्वाच्च ।
ज्ञानं ह्याश्रयविषयावपेक्षते न त्वाश्रयः साक्षाद्विषयमपेक्षते । किं च ज्ञानं प्रथमत
आश्रयमपेक्षते ततो विषयमित्यनुभवाद्विषयसंबन्धात्प्राग्भासमान आश्रयः कथं
विषयापेक्षप्रतीतिकः स्यात् । न च सुप्तोत्थितस्य 'सुखमहमस्वाप्सम्' इति
परामर्शात्सुषुप्तावहमर्थः सिध्यतीति भ्रमितव्यम् । यतोऽनेन परामर्शेन परामर्श-
कालेऽहमर्थत्वेन प्रतीतस्य जीवस्य सुषुप्तिकाले सत्त्वं सिध्येन्न तु तदानीमहमर्थ-
त्वेन तस्य प्रतीतिः सिध्येत् । शिखण्डिना जन्मान्तरे भीष्मवधाय तपस्तप्तमित्यु-
क्तावुत्तरस्मिञ्जन्मनि शिखण्डित्वेन प्रतीतस्य पूर्वास्मिञ्जन्मनि तपश्चर्याकाले सत्त्वं
मात्रं दृश्यते न तु तदानीं तस्य शिखण्डित्वम् ।

3.133. Furthermore, "I-ness" is not the essential nature of the Self. Because there is deviation in the case of deep sleep etc. Although Knowledge exists in deep sleep, there is no clear appearance because Knowledge is without a locus due to the absence of the sense of "I". It should not be said that: though the sense of "I" exists in deep sleep there is no appearance in a clear manner because it is without an object. [reason] Because there is no means of knowledge [to prove its existence in deep sleep]. And because an object exists in the form of ignorance. And because the sense of "I", which is the locus of Knowledge, does not depend upon an object. Because Knowledge depends upon a locus and an object but the locus does not directly depend upon an object. Moreover how could the locus, which appears prior to the connection with an object on account of the experience: Knowledge depends firstly upon a locus and then upon an object, have a cognition which depends upon the object?

It should not be mistaken that; the sense of "I" is established in

deep sleep because of the reflection on the part of the person risen from sleep: "I slept happily". [reason] Because by this reflection, the existence of the individual soul who was cognized as the sense of "I" at the time of the reflection can be established at the time of deep sleep. But the cognition of that [individual soul] as the sense of "I" cannot be established at that time [during deep sleep]. In the statement: "in another birth, Śikhaṇḍin practised penance for killing Bhīṣma", the mere existence of the one who had been cognized as Śikhaṇḍin in a later birth is seen at the time of the performance of penance in the previous birth. But at that time he was not "Śikhaṇḍin".

3.134.

किं च 'न किञ्चिदहमज्ञासि-

षम्' इति परामर्शेन सुषुप्तिकालेऽहमर्थस्यापि प्रतीतिविषयत्वाभावः सिध्यति । न किञ्चिदिति कृत्स्नप्रतिषेधात् । यत्तु 'न किञ्चिदिति निषेधस्य कृत्स्नविषयत्वे भवदभिमतानुभूतिरपि प्रतिषिद्धा स्यात्' (श्रीभा० पृ० ५० प० ३) इत्युक्तं तत्र । अनुभूतेरपि सुषुप्तौ वेद्यत्वेन प्रतिषेध इष्यत एव । न हि सुषुप्तावनुभूतेरनुव्यवसायविषयत्वमनुभूयते । न किञ्चिदिति निषेधो हि सामान्यमुखप्रवृत्तो घटादीन्हमर्थं ज्ञानमज्ञानं चेति सर्वानेव ज्ञानविषयत्वेन निषेधाति । सुषुप्तौ कस्यापि ज्ञानविषयत्वं नास्तीति यावत् । अत एव 'मामप्यहं न ज्ञातवान्' इत्येवमहमर्थस्यापि तदानीमननुसंधानं प्रतीयते । एतेन 'मामप्यहं न ज्ञातवान्' इत्यस्य 'वर्णाश्रमादिविशिष्टरूपेण न ज्ञातवान्' इत्यर्थकल्पनया यथाकथञ्चिदुपपत्ती रामानुजीयकृता (श्रीभा० पृ० ५० प० १४) परास्ता । एवं च 'सुषुप्तिसमयेऽप्यनुसंधीयमानमहमर्थमात्मानं ज्ञातारमहमिति परामृश्य न किञ्चिदवेदिपमिति वेदने तस्य प्रतिषिध्यमाने तस्मिन्काले प्रतिषिध्यमानाया वित्तेः सिद्धिमनुवर्तमानस्य ज्ञातुरहमर्थस्य चासिद्धिमनेनैव न किञ्चिदहमवेदिपमिति परामर्शेन साध्यंस्तमिममर्थं देवानामेव प्रियः साध्यतु' (श्रीभा० पृ० ५० प० ४) इति ग्रन्थेन कृत उपहासः प्रत्युत स्वस्यैवोपहासाय भवतीति सुधियो विभावयन्तु ।

3.134. Furthermore, by the reflection: "I did not know anything", even the sense of "I" is established as not being an object of cognition at the time of deep sleep. Because there is the negation of everything: "not anything". But what has been said (Śrī.B.Para.43.p.76.):

If the negation "not anything" refers to everything,

even the awareness which you accept must be negated.

That is not so. The negation of even awareness, as something knowable in deep sleep, is certainly accepted. For awareness is not experienced in deep sleep as the object of a perceptual judgement. Because the negation "not anything", which relates to the universality, negates as an object of knowledge indeed everything: pots etc., the sense of "I", knowledge and ignorance. The meaning is that nothing whatsoever is an object of knowledge in deep sleep. For this very reason, the non-remembrance of even the sense of "I" is recognized at that time in the manner: "I did not know even myself".¹¹¹ On account of this, the logical possibility which Rāmānuja somehow or other made for this: "I did not know even myself" through the supposition of the meaning (Śrī.B.Para.43.p.77.)¹¹²: "I did not know [myself] as qualified by caste, stage of life etc.", is refuted. Thus intelligent people must decide whether the ridicule made by the text (Śrī.B.Para.43.p.76.):

In the knowledge "I did not know anything", having reflected that the "I" is the knower, the self, the sense of "I", who has continued existence even at the time of deep sleep, then upon the negation of that, one proves by this very reflection "I did not know anything" that the knowledge being denied at that time is established and that the knower, the sense of "I", who persists is not established. Only a person who is beloved of the gods [i.e. a fool] could establish this meaning

is, on the contrary, for the ridicule only of himself [Rāmānuja].

- 3.135. यत्तु 'सुषुप्तावात्माऽज्ञानसाक्षित्वेनास्त इति मायावादिप्रक्रिया । साक्षित्वं
 च साक्षाज्ज्ञातृत्वमेव । न ह्यजानतः साक्षित्वम् ।
 आत्मसाक्षित्वोपपत्तिः ज्ञातृत्व लोकेवेदयोः साक्षीति व्यपदिश्यते न ज्ञान-
 मात्रम् । स्मरति च भगवान्पाणिनिः 'साक्षाद्द्र-

एरि संज्ञायाम्' (पा०सू०५।२।९१) इति साक्षाज्ज्ञातयेव साक्षिशब्दम् । स चायं साक्षी जानामीति प्रतीयमानोऽस्मदर्थ एवेति कुतस्तदानीमहमर्थो न प्रतीयेत' (श्रीभा० पृ० ५० प० १९) इत्युक्तं तत्रोच्यते—सुषुप्तावात्माऽज्ञानसाक्षित्वेनास्त इति सत्यमेव । परं तु तत्र साक्षित्वम् ' इदमज्ञानम् ' इत्येवमज्ञानविषयकानुसंधानवत्त्वरूपं नास्ति । किं तु ' न किञ्चिदवेदिपम् ' इत्येवंरूपमेव । लोके ह्यभावसाक्षी द्विविधो भवति । चैत्रमैत्रयोर्वाकलहमात्रमभूत् । न केनचित्कोऽपि ताडित इत्यत्र ' चैत्रमैत्रयोर्वाकलहमात्रमेतन्न कोऽपि क्रमपि ताडयति ' इत्येवं वाकलहकाले ताडनाभावानुसंधाता देवदत्तादिस्ताडनाभावसाक्षी भवति । क्वचित्त्वेवं वाकलहकालेऽनुसंधानाभावेऽपि वाकलहकाले ' अयममुं ताडयति ' इत्येवं ताडनानुसंधानं नाभूत् । एतावतैव साक्षी भवति । तथा सुषुप्तौ ' इदमज्ञानम् ' इत्येवमनुसंधानाभावेऽपि ' इदममुकम् ' इत्येवं तदा कस्यापि विषयस्यानुसंधानं नास्ति । एतावतैव तस्याज्ञानसाक्षित्वं सुषुप्तौ । यद्यपि मूलाज्ञानं भावरूपं तथापि तदज्ञानपरिणामविशेषस्य सुषुप्तिस्थस्यावरणशक्तिमत्त्वेनैव सत्त्वादुक्तसाक्षित्वं सूषपादम् । एवमज्ञानसाक्षित्वोपपत्तौ सुषुप्तौ ज्ञातृत्वं नास्त्येवेति तदानीमहमर्थप्रतीतिर्दुरूपपादैव ।

3.135. But what has been said (Śrī.B.Para.43.p.77.):

The doctrine of the exponents of māyā is that in deep sleep the Self remains as the witness of ignorance. To be a witness means just to be a direct knower. Because one who does not know is not a witness. In the world and in the Veda, only a knower is designated as a witness. Not mere Knowledge. The venerable Pāṇini teaches that the word "witness" is only in the sense of a direct knower: "direct (sākṣāt) in the sense that the seer is designated" (Pā.Sū.5.2.91.). And this witness is only the "I" who is recognized [in the cognition]: "I know", so how could the sense of "I" not be recognized at that time [during deep sleep]?

In regard to that, it is said: it is certainly true that: "in deep sleep the Self remains as the witness of ignorance". But the nature of being a witness there [in deep sleep] does not consist in the remembrance which has as its object ignorance in the manner: "this ignorance". But it is only in the manner: "I did not know anything".

For in the world, the witness of what is absent is of two types. Here [for example]: "there was only a quarrel between Caitra and Maitra, nobody was beaten by anybody", Devadatta etc. who remembers the absence of beating at the time of the quarrel: "this was merely a quarrel between Caitra and Maitra and nobody beat anybody" is the witness of the absence of beating. But somewhere, even in the absence of remembrance in this way at the time of the quarrel, there was no remembrance of beating at the time of the quarrel in the manner that: "this one beat that one". The witness is only to this extent. Similarly, in deep sleep, even though there is no remembrance in the manner: "this ignorance", there is no remembrance of any object at that time in the manner: "this is so and so". That [Self] is the witness of ignorance only to this extent in deep sleep.

Although the primary Ignorance is a positive entity, still, the nature of being the witness in the manner which has been told is easy to be demonstrated because the particular modification of that Ignorance which is situated in deep sleep exists only as possessing the power of concealing. Knowership certainly does not exist in deep sleep when there is the logical possibility of being the witness of ignorance in this way. So cognition as the sense of "I" at that time is certainly very difficult to be demonstrated.

comment

In Advaita, the rational demonstration of the nature of the Self rests upon the cornerstone of the analysis of the state of deep sleep. The premise of such reasoning is: only what is not subject to negation is absolutely real.¹¹³ The mode of reasoning is based upon the principle of "continuity and discontinuity" (anvayavyatireka).¹¹⁴ In the state of waking the individual sense of "I" is manifest, while in dream it is partially manifest. During deep sleep, however, the sense of "I" is negated because at that time it is unmanifest. On account of negation, the sense of "I" cannot be the Self. Yet a continuity of existence during deep sleep cannot be denied; for upon waking there is no sense of prior non-being but rather there is a natural sense of the continuity of being even though self-consciousness did not exist prior to waking. This

experience can be explained because the Self, as awareness, remains unchanged through the three states of waking, dream and deep sleep. The Advaitin argues that in deep sleep the mind resolves along with the sense of "I" which is a constituent of the mind. But the Self persists because upon waking there is a recollection such as: "at that time, I did not know anything". Since a recollection depends upon a previous experience, the Advaitin states that the Self exists in deep sleep as the witness of the absence of cognition.

Just as the Self is conditioned by the limiting adjunct of the internal-organ during waking and dream, so too, in deep sleep the Self is conditioned by the limiting adjunct of Ignorance (ajñānāvachchinna-caitanya). The Self, conditioned only by Ignorance at the time of sleep, is known as Prājña.¹¹⁵ If the Self did not have Ignorance as its adjunct, the state of deep sleep would be the same as liberation and there would be no return to the waking state.¹¹⁶

Rāmānuja holds that during sleep the individual sense of "I" persists, though it is not clearly manifest due to the absence of external objects and because it is overpowered by the quality of tamas.¹¹⁷ The Advaitin considers that the experience of deep sleep does not support Rāmānuja's view. Because upon waking there is the apprehension of the total absence of knowledge during deep sleep and so there is no means to demonstrate that the individual "I" exists at that time in a type of muted condition.

From reasoning based upon a comparison of the state of deep sleep with the states of waking and dream, the Advaitin concludes that the sense of "I" is not the Self because it is negated at the time of sleep. The awareness which persists through all the three states constitutes the actual Self.

3.136.

मोक्षदशायां

मुक्तौ नाहंभावः विदेहमुक्तावहमर्थप्रतीतिः सुतरां नास्त्येव । तत्र
ज्ञातृज्ञेयभाव एव नास्ति कुतोऽहमर्थप्रतीतिः ।

जीवन्मुक्तदशायां तु यद्यप्यहमर्थो भासते तथापि स इतरदृष्ट्यैव । तद्दृष्ट्या तु भासमानोऽप्ययं जीवेऽहंभावोऽहंकारसंबन्धमूलक एव न स्वाभाविक इति निश्चयान्न तस्य बद्धस्येव बाधको भवति । लोकैः सह व्यवहारस्तु लोकदृष्ट्यैव कर्तव्य इति तथा व्यवहारस्तेषाम् । ननु व्यवहार एव न संभवतीति चेत्किं कारणाभावाद्वा प्रयोजनाभावाद्वा तदसंभवं ब्रूये । नाद्यः । प्रारब्धकर्मणो ज्ञानेनाधिनाशात्पूर्वसंस्कारानुरोधेन मरणपर्यन्तं बुद्ध्याद्युपाधीनां सत्त्वात् । प्रयोजनाभावस्त्विष्ट एव । तथापि लोकसंग्रहायैव केवलं कृपावशतया व्यवहारः । नन्वेवं जनकादीनां यथा व्यवहारो दृश्यते न तथा शुकादीनामिति कुतो भेद इति

चेद्यथा वद्धेष्वपि केचिदेव परेषां सन्मार्गदर्शकाः केचिदुदासीनाः केचिच्च प्रत्यु-
तासन्मार्गदर्शका इति पूर्वसंस्कारानुरोधेन भेदो दृश्यते तथा मुक्तेष्वपि
मरणपर्यन्तं संस्कारस्याविनाशेन भेदो युक्त एव । ये च वद्धावस्थायामसन्मा-
र्गदर्शकास्ते तच्चज्ञानानधिकारिण एवेति ज्ञानिषु जीवन्मुक्तेषु केचित्परेषां
सन्मार्गदर्शकाः केचिदुदासीना इत्येवं द्वैविध्यमेव ।

3.136. In regard to the state of liberation, a cognition as the sense of "I" is indeed all the more non-existent in liberation which is free from the body. There [in liberation free from the body], the relation of knower and known certainly does not exist so how could there be a cognition as the sense of "I"? But in the state of one who is liberated while living, even though the sense of "I" appears, nevertheless that [sense of "I"] is only according to the vision of another person. But according to the vision of that [liberated person] there is no negating factor for him [that there is the appearance of the sense of "I"] like there is for a bound person [i.e. the bound person may believe that a liberated person should not have the sense of "I"], because there is the ascertainment: though this "I-ness" appears in the individual soul, it is not innate as it is only based upon the connection with the "I-notion". The ordinary relations of those [liberated souls] are as such: the ordinary relations with people must be done only according to the vision of the people.

[objection] Ordinary relations are certainly not possible.

[reply] Do you say there is no possibility of them due to the absence of a cause or on account of the absence of a purpose? It is not the first. Because the accumulated karma which has begun to operate is not destroyed by knowledge, therefore the limiting adjuncts such as the intellect exist until death in accordance with previous mental impressions. But the absence of a purpose is indeed accepted. Still, the ordinary relations are only for the welfare of the world, being solely due to the influence of compassion.

[objection] Just as the ordinary relations are seen in this manner for Janaka etc., they are not seen in that manner for Śuka etc. What is the difference?

[reply] Just as even among bound souls a difference is seen in accordance with previous mental impressions: only some show the right path to others, some are indifferent and some even show the wrong path, so too, even among liberated souls a difference is certainly proper since a mental impression is not destroyed until death. And those who show the wrong path in the state of bondage are certainly not qualified people for the knowledge of the truth. Thus among those who know i.e. those who are liberated while living, there are only two types: some show the right path to others and some are indifferent.

3.137.

इत्थं च वामदेवादीनाम्

‘अहं मनुरभवम्’ इत्यादिरहंभाव उपपन्नो भवति । यथा बालानां भाषयैव तैः सह व्यवहारः प्रौढानां तथैव जीवन्मुक्तानामीश्वरस्य च लोकरीत्यैव व्यवहार इति ‘हन्ताहमिमास्तिस्त्रो देवताः’ (छा० ६ । ३ । २) इत्यादिश्रुतिषु, ‘यस्मात्क्षरमतीतोऽहम्’ (गी० १५ । १८) इत्यादिस्मृतिषु च प्रतिपादितोऽहंभावपूर्वको व्यवहार उपपद्यते । मुमुक्षुदशायामहंभावपूर्वकसंकल्पस्तु न मोक्षदशायामहंभावसाधक इति प्राक् (पृ० ९१ । १०) उपपादितम् । एतेन ‘मोक्षेऽहमर्थाननुवृत्तावात्मनाश एव प्रकारान्तरेण प्रतिज्ञातः स्यात्’ (श्रीभा० पृ० ५१ प० ८) इत्याद्युक्तमपास्तम् । यत्तु ‘स च प्रत्यगात्मा मुक्तावप्यहमित्येव प्रकाशते स्वस्मै प्रकाशमानत्वात्’ (श्रीभा० पृ० ५२ प० १) इत्युक्तं तद्विदेहमुक्तौ नैव संभवति । देहाद्युपाधित्यागेन प्रकाश्यप्रकाशकभावस्यैवाभावात् । जीवन्मुक्तौ तथाचेत्-अस्तु । किं तु तत्रापि परैः सह व्यवहाराय परदृष्ट्यैवाहंभावोल्लेखेन न तस्य पुनः संसारापादकत्वम् । विदेहमुक्तौ तु न कथमपि भेदप्रतिभासः ॥ १४ ॥

3.137. The sense of "I-ness" such as: "I was Manu" (Brh.1.4.10., cited in Śrī.B.Para.45.p.79.) etc. is logically possible for Vāmadeva etc. in this manner. Just as for children, the ordinary relations of adults with them is only through language, in just the same manner, the relations on the part of people liberated while living and on the part of the Lord are only

according to the way of the world. Thus the conventional expression preceded by "I-ness", which has been taught in the sacred texts: "Indeed, I [having entered] these three deities" (Ch.6.3.2.) etc. and in the traditions: "Because I transcend the perishable" (G.15.18.) etc., is logically possible.

It was demonstrated previously (3.110.) that a resolve which is preceded by "I-ness" in the state of the person who is desirous of liberation does not establish "I-ness" in the state of liberation. On account of this, what has been said (Śrī.B.Para.44.p.78.)¹¹⁸:

If there is no persistence of the sense of "I" in liberation, the destruction of the Self would only be stated in another manner etc., is set aside.

But what has been said (Śrī.B.Para.44.p.78.):

The inner-self manifests only as "I" even in liberation. Because it is luminous to itself.

That is certainly not possible in liberation free from the body. Because the relation of illumined and illumining certainly does not exist due to the abandoning of the limiting adjuncts such as the body. If [you say] that it is so in liberation while living, [we reply] granted. But even there [in the state of liberation while living], that [liberated person] does not again enter into the cycle of transmigration because the mentioning of "I-ness" is to relate ordinarily with others only according to the vision of others. But in liberation free from the body there is no appearance of difference in any way.

3.138. शास्त्रप्रमाणकं ब्रह्म शास्त्रं प्रत्यक्षवाचकम् ।
असत्यादपि सत्या धीः शास्त्रं स्वस्मिन्प्रवर्तते ॥ १५ ॥

3.138. Brahman has scripture as its means of knowledge.

The scripture negates perception. There is a real cognition even from what is unreal. The scripture operates in itself. 15.

- 3.139. 'नेह नानास्ति किञ्चन' (वृ० ४।४।१९, का० ४।११) इत्यादि-
शास्त्रमप्येतदेव ब्रह्माद्वैतं प्रतिपादयति। ननु भेदस्य सर्वथाऽसत्त्वे प्रतिपाद्यप्रतिपाद-
कभावरूपं शिष्यशासित्रादिभावरूपं च भेदं
ब्रह्माद्वैते शास्त्रं प्रमाणम् गृहीत्वा प्रवृत्तं शास्त्रं स्वयमसन्मार्गगतमेव स्यादिति
चेदस्तु । तथासाति कथं शास्त्रं प्रमाणं भवे-
दिति चेदित्यम्—यथा चैत्रमैत्रौ प्रयागं गन्तुं प्रवृत्तौ । तत्र चैत्रोऽग्रतो गतः
पथि मार्गद्वेषे भ्रमेण प्रयागागामिनाऽसत्येन मार्गेण प्रवृत्तो दूरं गतः । तं च
दूरतो दृष्ट्वा तेनैव मार्गेण प्रवृत्तो मैत्रः केनचिन्मार्गज्ञेन 'नायं प्रयागंगाभी
मार्गः' इत्येवं बोधितश्चैत्रस्य सन्मार्गे प्रत्यानयनाय मैत्रः स्वयमसत्यत्वेन
ज्ञातेनापि तेनैव मार्गेण गत्यन्तराभावात्प्रधाव्य चैत्रसमीपं गत्वा तमसत्यान्मार्गा-
न्निवर्तयति तथाऽसत्येन मार्गेण गन्तुं प्रवृत्तान् न केवलं प्रवृत्तानपि त्वतीव
दूरतरं गतान् वद्धाञ्जीवानसत्यान्मार्गान्निवर्तयितुं शास्त्रं जीवप्रतिबोधनाय
तत्समीपे गमनाय गत्यन्तराभावादसत्यमपि भेदं स्वयं गृहीत्वा जीवसमीपे
समागत्य तान् प्रति बोधयति

3.139. Even this very scripture such as: "there is no diversity here whatsoever" (Brh.4.4.19., Kāṭha.2.4.11.) teaches that Brahman is non-dual.

[objection] If difference is entirely unreal, the scripture which has operated accepting difference in the form of the relation between what is to be taught and the teaching and in the form of the relation between student and teacher etc. must itself belong only to the untrue path.

[reply] Let it be so.

[objection] If that is the case, how can the scripture be a means of knowledge?

[reply] In this manner. Caitra and Maitra set out to go to Prayāga. Caitra went in front and due to an error about the division of the path along the way he proceeded along the wrong path which did not go to

Prayāga and he went far away. Having seen him in the distance, Maitra proceeded along that same path and he was informed by someone familiar with the path: "this path does not go to Prayāga". Maitra, in order to bring back Caitra to the right path, set out himself by that same path even though it was known to be wrong as there was no other recourse and going near to Caitra he turns him back from the wrong path. Similarly, the scripture, to turn back the bound souls -who had set out to go along the wrong path and not only just set out but had gone a great distance- from the wrong path; in order to teach the souls, it has itself accepted difference, though unreal, as there is no other recourse for going near to them and having come near to the souls it teaches them.

comment

See the statement of Śāṅkara, at the conclusion of the comment to 1.2.

3.140.

। उपदेष्टा हि तादृशो विरलः । यः स्वनिष्ठान् दोषान् विख्याप्योपदिशति । अत्र हेतुस्तु दोषज्ञानेनोपदेश्यो दोषेष्वौदासीन्यं कृत्वाऽन्यं सर्वं तदीयं मार्गमनुसरोदिति । तथा प्रतिपाद्यप्रतिपादकभावरूपं शिष्य-शासित्रादिभावरूपं च भेदं वस्तुतोऽसत्यमपि गृहीत्वा सन्मार्गप्रदर्शनाय प्रवृत्तं शास्त्रं स्वस्मिन्नसत्यत्वरूपं दोषं ' वेदा अवेदाः ' (वृ० ४।३।२२) इति स्वमुखे-नैव प्रख्याप्याद्वैतं बोधयति । तत्र हेतुर्मुमुक्षोः शास्त्रीयमार्गानुसरणम् । तत्त्वज्ञानिना तु शास्त्रमप्यसत्यत्वेन भावनीयमेव । अन्यथाऽद्वैतभावना स्थिरा न स्यात् । तथा च शास्त्रस्य मोक्षद्वारपर्यन्तमेव गतिर्न तु मोक्षावस्थायाम् । प्रमाणशिरो-मणोर्वेदस्येयं स्थितिस्तत्र का वार्ताऽन्येषां प्रमाणानाम् । सर्वेषां प्रमाणानां प्रमाणत्वं मोक्षद्वारपर्यन्तमेवेति । शास्त्रप्रमाणसिद्धं चैतदद्वैतं युक्त्याप्यनुसृतं भवति । घटशरावादिविशेषाणां मृत्सामान्यपूर्वकत्वस्य लोके दृष्टत्वात्सर्वविशेषाणां मूल-भूतं निर्विशेषं ब्रह्म सिध्यति । तदेवं शास्त्रस्य निरस्तनिखिलविशेषवस्तुबोधित्वं निश्चितं भवतीति तेन सकलभेदावलम्बि प्रत्यक्षं बाधितं भवति । एतेन 'शास्त्रस्य निरस्तनिखिलविशेषवस्तुबोधित्वनिश्चये सति भेदवासनाया दोष-त्वनिश्चयो भेदवासनाया दोषत्वनिश्चये सति शास्त्रस्य निरस्तनिखिलविशेष-वस्तुबोधित्वनिश्चयः' (श्रीभा० पृ० ५४ प० ११) इत्यन्योन्याश्रयापाद-नमसंगतं वेदितव्यम् ।

3.140. A teacher of such a kind is rare: one who teaches, having announced the faults which belong to himself. But the reason for this can be taught

through the knowledge of the fault, i.e. having become indifferent to the faults, one would follow all other paths belonging to him. Similarly, the scripture has operated to show the true path having accepted difference in the form of the relation between what is to be taught and the teaching and in the form of the relation between student and teacher etc., even though in reality it is unreal, and having announced the fault in the form of unreality with respect to itself, by its own mouth: "the Vedas are not Vedas" (Brh.4.3.22.), it communicates non-duality. The reason there is that a person desirous of liberation follows the path belonging to the scripture. But a person who knows the truth certainly considers even the scripture as unreal. Otherwise the understanding of non-duality would not be firm. Thus the scope of the scripture only extends as far as the door to liberation, but not in the state of liberation. This is the position of the Veda which is the crest-jewel of the means of knowledge, what to talk of the other means of knowledge? All means of knowledge have the status of being a means of knowledge only extending as far as the door to liberation.

This non-duality, which is established by the scripture which is the means of knowledge, is conformed to by reasoning as well. Because distinctions such as pots, earthenware vessels etc. are seen in the world to be preceded by their universal which is clay, Brahman is established as free from distinction, the basis of all distinctions.

Thus the scripture is ascertained as communicating an entity from which all distinctions are removed. So on account of that, perception, which depends upon all kinds of difference, is negated. Due to this, the effecting of mutual dependence (Śrī.B.Para.46.p.82.):

there is the ascertainment that the innate impression of difference is a defect when the scripture is ascertained as communicating an entity from which all distinctions are removed and there is the ascertainment

that the scripture communicates an entity from which all distinctions are removed when the innate impression of difference is ascertained as a defect must be understood as incongruous.

comment

In the Mahāpūrvapakṣa (Para.19.p.30f.), the Advaitin states that the reality of the perception of difference is sublated by the non-dual statements in the Upaniṣad texts. The criterion which is given for the relation between sublated and sublating is that while the former can be accounted for in another way (saṁbhāvyaṁānānyathāsiddhi), the latter cannot be accounted for in any other manner. Scripture, which is the means of knowledge in non-empirical matters (cf., comment to 1.2.), sublates perception because it operates subsequent (para) to perception and negates the erroneous conclusion of real duality which is based upon perception. Thus perceptual duality can be accounted for in another way i.e. as apparent, but the non-dual texts cannot be accounted for in any other manner. The Advaitin maintains that the conception that duality is real is based upon a "defect" (doṣa) called Ignorance which is in the form of a beginningless, innate impression of difference.

Rāmānuja responds (Para.46.p.82.) by stating that the Advaitin has committed the error of mutual dependence: the innate impression of difference can only be established as a defect when the sacred texts have been ascertained to teach non-duality and the latter can only be ascertained when the innate impression of difference is proved to be a defect.

The Advaitin replies that there is no mutual dependence because while the innate impression of difference is established as a defect on the basis of the non-dual texts, the latter are ascertained as "communicating an entity from which all distinctions are removed" solely through their own meaning. The method of reasoning is as follows. It is axiomatic that the Veda is a means of knowledge free from error. Because Vedic passages such as: "there is no diversity here whatsoever" (Brh.4.4.19.) teach that non-duality is true and duality is false, it is ascertained that this duality which is of an apparent nature is produced from some "defect". Advaitins consider this defect to be Ignorance assisted by the beginningless, innate impression of difference.¹¹⁹

3.141. यत्तु 'यदि भेदवासनामूलत्वेन प्रत्यक्षस्य विपरीतार्थत्वं

शास्त्रमपि तन्मूलत्वेन वृथा स्यात्' (श्रीभा० पृ० ५४ प० १३) इति दोषा-
पादनं तदयुक्तम् । मोक्षद्वारपर्यन्तमेव शास्त्रप्रामाण्यापेक्षणात् । पश्चाच्छास्त्रवैयर्थ्येऽपि
न क्षतिः । किं च शास्त्रस्य भेदवासनामूलकत्वेऽपि न विपरीतार्थत्वम् । विपरी-
तार्थत्वं नाम वस्तुतोऽसत्यस्यार्थस्य सत्यत्वेन ज्ञापकत्वम् । यथा लौकिकस्य
घटादिप्रत्यक्षस्य । शास्त्रं तु न किञ्चिदपि तथा ज्ञापयति । भेदवासना तु शास्त्रप्र-
वृत्त्यर्थमपेक्षते । प्रतिपाद्यप्रतिपादकभावसंबन्धं शिष्यशासित्रादिभावरूपसंबन्धं
चान्तरेण शास्त्रप्रवृत्त्ययोगात् । संबन्धप्रतीतिश्च भेदवासनामूलकत्वात् ।
तथा च शास्त्रस्य प्रवृत्त्यर्थमगत्या भेदवासनापेक्षत्वेऽपि न विपरीतार्थत्वम् ।

3.141. But the effecting of the defect (Śrī.B.Para.46.p.82f.)¹²⁰;

If perception is of a contrary nature because it is
based upon the innate impression of difference, the
scripture would also be to no purpose because it is
based upon that [innate impression of difference]

is not correct. Because the requirement of the validity of the scripture
only extends as far as the door to liberation. There is no impairment
even though the scripture is subsequently useless.

Furthermore, even though the scripture is based upon the innate
impression of difference, it does not have a contrary nature. What is
known as a "contrary nature" is making known an object which in reality
is unreal, as being real. Like the ordinary perception of pots etc. [is
of a contrary nature]. But the scripture does not make known anything
whatsoever in that manner. But the innate impression of difference is
required¹²¹ for the sake of the operation of the scripture. Because the
operation of the scripture is impossible without the connection of the
relation between what is to be taught and the teaching and the connection
in the form of the relation between student and teacher etc. And because
the cognition of a connection is based upon the innate impression of
difference. So even though the scripture requires the innate impression
of difference as there is no other recourse for its operation, it is not
of a contrary nature.

3.142. न च 'यः सर्वज्ञः' (मु० १ । १ । ९) इत्यादिश्रुतेः सत्यत्वेना-
संमतसगुणब्रह्मज्ञापकत्वेन विपरीतार्थत्वमिति वाच्यम् । सगुणब्रह्मप्रतिपादक-
श्रुतीनां निर्गुणब्रह्मज्ञापन एव तात्पर्यतः पर्यवसानात् । एकपदे निर्गुणब्रह्म-
साक्षात्कारासंभवेन ।

‘ असत्ये कर्मणि स्थित्वा ततः सत्यं समीहते ’

इति न्यायेन प्रथमतः श्रुतीनां कर्मज्ञापने प्रवृत्तिः । ततः सगुणब्रह्मज्ञापने । ततो
निर्गुणब्रह्मज्ञापने । नैतावता कर्मप्रतिपादनेन सगुणब्रह्मप्रतिपादनेन वा श्रुतेर्विपरी-
तार्थत्वम् । श्रोतृमुखबोधाय स्थूलारुन्धतीन्यायेन लोकानामपि तथा प्रवृत्तेर्दृष्टत्वात् ।
सगुणब्रह्मवादिनाऽपि 'अन्नं ब्रह्मेति व्यजानात्' (तै० ३।२) इत्यादिश्रुतेरीदृश्येव
गतिः शरणीकरणीया । न ह्यन्नं ब्रह्म कस्यापि

द्वैतप्रत्यक्षं शास्त्रब्रह्म्यम् संमतम् ।

3.142. It should not be said that: the sacred text: "He who is all knowing" (Mu.1.1.9.) etc. has a contrary nature because it makes known Brahman who possesses qualities and who is not accepted as real. [reason] Because the sacred texts which teach about Brahman who possesses qualities are ascertained as having their purport only in communicating Brahman free from qualities. For there is no possibility of the direct apprehension of Brahman free from qualities in a mere instant. According to the maxim: "having stood on the untrue path, then one endeavours to gain the true", the operation of the sacred texts is firstly in teaching ritual action. Then in teaching Brahman who possesses qualities. Then in teaching Brahman free from qualities. The sacred text does not have a contrary nature just because of teaching ritual action or just because of teaching about Brahman who possesses qualities. Because an operation in that manner is seen even on the part of the people, for the easy comprehension of the listener according to the maxim of the "large Arundhati",¹²² Even an exponent of Brahman possessing qualities must resort to this very course since there is the sacred text: "he knew food to be Brahman" (Tai.3.2.) etc. For nobody accepts food to be Brahman.

3.143. एवं च दोषमूलत्वेन संभाव्यमानान्य-
थासिद्धिप्रत्यक्षमनन्यथासिद्धेन पश्चादुपस्थिति-

केन परेण चाद्वैतशास्त्रेण वाध्यते । यत्तु 'दोषमूलत्वे ज्ञाते सति परत्वमकिंचित्करम् । रज्जुसर्पज्ञाननिमित्तभये सति भ्रान्तोऽयमिति परिज्ञातेन केनचिन्नायं सर्पो मा भैषीरित्युक्तेऽपि भयानिवृत्तिदर्शनात् । शास्त्रस्य च दोषमूलत्वं श्रवणवेलायामेव ज्ञातम्' (श्रीभा०पृ०५४प०१८) इति तन्न । भेदानामनेकविधत्वेन शास्त्रं स्वोपजीव्यभेदेतरान् सर्वान् भेदान् दूरीकर्तुं प्रभवत्येव । शास्त्रोपजीव्यभूतो भेदस्त्वितरान्दूरीकृत्य सद्यः स्वयमेव निवर्तते । 'वेदा अवेदाः' (बृ०४।३।२२) इति शास्त्र एवोक्तत्वात् । यथा कलुषजले स्वच्छतासंपादनाय प्रक्षिप्तं कतकरजो मलेन सह स्वयमभोगच्छति तद्वत् ।

3.143. Thus perception, whose establishment in a different way is made possible due to it being based upon a defect, is negated by the scripture of non-duality which is not established differently and which is later i.e. it applies subsequently. But what [has been said] (Śrī.B.Para.46.p. 83.):

When [scripture] is known to be based upon a defect, the fact that it is later does not prove anything. Because when there is fear caused by the knowledge of a snake upon a rope, no cessation of fear is seen even upon being told: "this is not a snake, do not be afraid" by some person who is recognized as: "this one is confused". And that the scripture is based upon a defect is known at the very time of listening.

That is not so. Because differences are of many kinds, the scripture is certainly able to remove all differences other than the difference which depends upon itself. But the difference which depends upon the scripture, having removed the others, ceases instantly just of itself. Because in the scripture itself it is said: "the Vedas are not Vedas" (Brh.4.3.22.). For example the powder of the cleaning nut¹²³, which is tossed into dirty water to bring about clarity, goes down of itself along with the dirt. It is like that.

comment

The Upaniṣad texts which have their purport in non-duality are said to negate the truth of perceptual duality because they operate subsequent

(para) to perception. Texts such as: "there is no diversity here whatsoever" (Brh.4.4.19.) pre-suppose the existence of duality and subsequently negate it. Advaitins consider that the Upaniṣad statements operate as the final means of knowledge, because when the truth of duality is negated, nothing is able to subsequently negate the knowledge of oneness revealed by the Upaniṣad passages. (See comment to 1.9.)

3.144.

न हि मार्गदर्शकेन सर्वथा निर्दुष्टेनैव भाव्यमित्यस्ति कश्चिन्नियमः । पङ्कुरपि वधिराऽपि चान्धस्य मार्गदर्शको भवति । मलविशेषेणैव कतकरजसा जलस्थो मलो दूरी क्रियते । तथा चोपदेशकस्योपदेश्यार्थविषयेऽभ्रान्तत्वमपेक्ष्यते । न तु सर्वविषये तदावश्यकम् । भ्रमश्चानेकविधो दृश्यते । स्र्यादिविरहसर्वस्वापहारपिशाचावेशपित्तादीनां निमित्तानामनेकत्वात् । तत्र पित्तजो भ्रमो न वस्तुविषयकः किं तु तद्रूपविषयकः । पीतः शङ्ख इति भ्रमो हि न शङ्खविषयकः किं तु तदीयपीतरूपविषयक एव । तथा च पित्तजभ्रमवता भ्रान्तोऽयमिति परिज्ञातेनापि केनचित् 'नायं सर्पो मा भैषीः' इत्युक्ते भयनिवृत्तिर्दृश्यत एव । वस्तुविषये तस्याभ्रान्तत्वात् ।

3.144. There is certainly no rule that: the one who shows the path must indeed be free from defect in every way. Even a lame man and even a deaf man is the guide for a blind man. The dirt contained in the water is removed by the powder of the cleaning nut which is itself a particular type of dirt. Thus the teacher is required to be free from error concerning the matter which is to be taught. But it is not necessary in respect of everything.

Error is seen to be of many kinds. For the causes are numerous, such as separation from women etc., the loss of all capital, demonical possession, bile etc. In regard to those, the error caused through bile does not relate to the object but it relates to the colour belonging to that [object]. Because the error that: "the conch-shell is yellow" does not relate to the conch-shell but only relates to its yellow colour. So the cessation of fear is certainly seen upon being told: "this is not a snake, do not be afraid" by some person even though he is recognized as: "this one is confused" due to having error caused through bile. Because he

is not mistaken in respect of the object.

3.145. एवं चाद्वैतशास्त्रं प्रवृत्तौ भेदापेक्षमपि प्रतिपाद्याद्वैतविषये निर्दुष्टत्वात्प्रमाणभावमर्हति । स्मृतीतिहासादिपुरुषत्रयसां मूलप्रमाणभूतायाः सृष्ट्यादौ परमेश्वरेण स्मर्यमाणाया अनादिसिद्धायाः श्रुतेर्दोषलेशोऽपि न संभवति । प्रत्यक्षं तु संभाव्यमानदोषम् । रज्जुसर्पादौ तथानुभवात् । रामानुजीयैरप्येवमेव स्वीकार्यम् । इतरथा चिदचितोः परमात्मशरीरत्वं श्रुतिप्रतिपादितत्वेन तेषां संमतमपि प्रत्यक्षेण तथाऽननुभवात्कथं विश्वसनीयं स्यात् । तथा तैः सर्वत्र सत्ख्यात्यङ्गीकारादसतः प्रतीत्यर्थं यद्यपि दोषानपेक्षा तथापि रज्जुसर्पादिप्रतीतौ सतो रज्ज्वादेः प्रतीत्यभावो दोषमूलकस्तेरुक्त एवेति प्रत्यक्षं संभाव्यमानदोषमित्यपि तेषां संमतमेव । एतेन ' अपि चेदं शास्त्रमसंभाव्यमानदोषं प्रत्यक्षं तु संभाव्यमानदोषमिति केनावगतं त्वया ' (श्रीभा० पृ० ५५ प० १) इत्याद्युक्तमपास्तम् । उभयोः समत्वात् । तदुक्तमभियुक्तैः—

‘ यश्चोभयोः समो दोषः परिहारोऽपि तत्समः ।

नैकस्तत्र नियोक्तव्यस्तादृगर्थविचारणे ’ इति ।

तदेवं प्रतिपाद्यविषये लेशतोऽप्यसंभाव्यमानदोषेण शास्त्रेण प्रतिपादितमद्वैतमेव तत्त्वं पर्यवसाने यद्यपि सिद्धं तथापि मोक्षद्वारपर्यन्तं भेदप्रतिभासस्य सत्त्वेन तावत्पर्यन्तं व्यावहारिकः प्रमाणप्रभेयभावोऽव्याधित एव ।

3.145. Thus the scripture of non-duality, though dependent upon difference for its operating, can be a means of knowledge because it is free from defect in respect of the non-duality which is to be taught. Even a trace of a defect is not possible for the sacred text: which is established as beginningless and which is taught by the supreme Lord at the beginning of creation and which is the primary means of knowledge for the words of men i.e. the traditions, legendary histories etc.

But perception has a possible defect. Because it is experienced to be so in the case of the snake upon the rope etc. Even Rāmānuja must accept it in this very manner. Otherwise, how could the sentient souls and insentient matter be relied on as being the body of the supreme Self? Because it is not experienced to be so through perception, though they [Viśiṣṭādvaitins] accept it since it is taught by the sacred text. So too, although there is no requirement of a defect for the purpose of the

cognition of what is unreal -since they accept the "apprehension of the real" (satkhyāti) everywhere- still, in the case of the cognition of the snake upon the rope etc., they certainly say that the absence of the cognition of the real rope etc. is based upon a defect. Thus they too certainly accept that perception has a possible defect. On account of this, what has been said (Śrī.B.Para.46.p.83.):

Moreover, by what means do you know that this
scripture has no possible defect whereas
perception has a possible defect?

etc. is set aside. Because both are equal. That has been told by the learned people:

The defect being the same for both, the
confutation is also the same for them.

Upon the examination of such a meaning,
one [of the two] should not be accused
[of having defective logic].

Thus even though in the final conclusion it is established that non-duality alone is the reality taught by the scripture which is without even a trace of a possible defect concerning what is to be taught, still, because the appearance of difference exists extending as far as the door to liberation, the ordinary relations pertaining to the means of knowledge and the objects of knowledge are certainly not negated until then [liberation].

- 3.146. शास्त्रविषयस्य सदद्वितीयस्य ब्रह्मणः पश्चात्तनवाधादर्शनेन निर्विशेषानुभूति-
मात्रं ब्रह्मैव तु परमार्थः । यत्तु ' एतदयुक्तम् । अवाधितस्यापि दोषमूल-
स्यापारमार्थ्यनिश्चयात् ' (श्रीभा० पृ० ५५ प० १४) इत्युक्तं तत्र शास्त्रस्य
क्रिया विधया दोषमूलत्वं केन वा प्रकारेण तस्य प्रामाण्यं तत्सर्वमनुपदमेवोक्त-
मिति न पुनरिहोच्यते । एतेन ' विवादाध्यासितं ब्रह्म मिथ्याऽविद्यावदुत्प-
न्नज्ञानविषयत्वात्प्रपञ्चवत् । ब्रह्म मिथ्या मिथ्याज्ञानविषयत्वात्प्रपञ्चवत् ।
ब्रह्म मिथ्याऽसत्यहेतुजन्यज्ञानविषयत्वात्प्रपञ्चवदेव ' (श्रीभा०पृ०५५प०२१)

इत्येवमुक्ताः प्रयोगाः प्रत्युक्ताः। हेतोरप्रयोजकत्वाद्बिचारित्वाच्च । असत्यादपि
सत्यप्रतीतेर्लोके दर्शनात् ।

3.146. Brahman, pure awareness free from distinction, is alone the highest reality because the object of the scripture, i.e. Brahman which is existence without a second, is not seen to be subsequently negated.¹²⁴ But what has been said (Śrī.B.Para.46.p.84.):

That is not correct. Because what is based upon a defect is ascertained as not absolutely real, even though it is not negated.

In regard to that, "in what way is the scripture based upon a defect and in what manner does it have validity?", all that has been told just preceding so it is not mentioned again here. On account of this, the syllogisms told in this manner are refuted (Śrī.B.Para.46.p.85.):

(1) The Brahman under dispute is false. Because it is the object of knowledge produced for one who is possessed of Ignorance. Like the phenomenal world.

(2) Brahman is false. Because it is the object of false knowledge.¹²⁵ Like the phenomenal world.

(3) Brahman is false. Because it is the object of knowledge produced by an unreal cause. Just like the phenomenal world.

Because the reason is not the criterion [for establishing the proposition]. And because there is deviation. For it is seen in the world that there is a real cognition even from what is unreal.

comment

The reason does not establish the proposition because Advaitins do not accept that Brahman free from distinction can be an "object of knowledge". They accept that Brahman possessing a limiting adjunct, i.e. sagunabrahman, is an object of knowledge and is ultimately false. But even there, Brahman only becomes an object of knowledge due to the

limiting adjunct and so only the adjunct is false, not Brahman who is qualified by the adjunct.¹²⁶

3.147.

स्वप्नं हस्त्यादिज्ञान-
असत्यादपि सत्यप्रतीतिः मसत्यमपि परमार्थशुभाशुभप्रतिपत्तेः कारणं
भवति । यत्तु ' स्वप्नज्ञानस्यासत्यत्वाभावात् ।
तत्र हि विषयाणामेव मिथ्यात्वम् । तेषामेव हि बाधो दृश्यते न ज्ञानस्य ' (श्रीभा० पृ० ५६ प० ६) इत्युक्तं तत्र । स्वप्नस्य हस्त्यादिप्रत्यक्षज्ञानस्य
जागृतावभावात् । प्रतिबुद्धो हि स्वप्नान्हस्त्यादीन्स्वप्नं हस्त्यादिप्रत्यक्षज्ञानं
चा स्मरत्येव केवलम् । न त्वनुभवति । यद्यपि स्वप्ने जायमानं ज्ञानं
स्मरणात्मकमेव जागृतिस्थस्मरणस्येव स्वप्नज्ञानस्यापि संस्कारसापेक्षत्वात् ।
तथापि तत्स्मरणं भिन्नम् । जागृतावनुभूतार्थस्य स्वप्नार्थस्य वा जागृतौ जाय-
मानं च स्मरणं भिन्नम् । उभयोः स्मरणत्वेन साध्येऽपि स्वप्नज्ञानं स्मरणात्मकं
तदानीं स्मरणत्वेन न प्रतीयते । जागृतौ जायमानं स्मरणं तु स्मरणकालेऽपि
स्मरणत्वेन प्रतीयते इति विशेषात् । तथा च स्वप्नज्ञानस्य जागृतावभावादसत्य-
त्वमेव । रामानुजीयैः स्वप्ने प्रत्यक्षज्ञानस्यैव स्वीकाराच्च । किंच स्वप्नं ज्ञानं न
ज्ञानत्वेन शुभाशुभप्रतिपत्तिहेतुः । किं तु तत्तद्विषयविशेषसहितत्वेनैव । तादृशं
विषयविशेषसहितं च तज्ज्ञानं जागृतौ न दृश्यते इति सुतरामसत्यमेव । किंच
स्वप्नज्ञानस्य सत्यत्वे तस्यासत्येभ्यः स्वप्नहस्त्यादिभ्य एवोत्पत्तेरसत्यात्सत्य-
प्रतीतेरवर्जनीयत्वमेव ।

3.147. Even though the knowledge of elephants etc. which belongs to a dream is unreal, it is the cause for the ascertainment of what is really auspicious or inauspicious.¹²⁷ But what has been said (Śrī.B.Para.47.p.85.):

Because the knowledge belonging to a dream is not unreal. For it is only the objects which are false there. Because negation is seen for them alone, not for the knowledge.

That is not so. Because the perceptual knowledge of elephants etc. which belongs to a dream does not exist in the waking state. Because the person who has awoken merely just remembers the dream elephants etc. and the perceptual knowledge of elephants etc. which belongs to the dream. But he does not experience [the elephants etc.].

Even though the knowledge arising in dream only consists of the

nature of recollection -because just as recollection in the waking state depends upon a mental impression, so also the knowledge which belongs to dream- still, that [dream] recollection is different. And the recollection arising in the waking state of an object experienced in the waking state or of an object which belongs to a dream is different. Although both are similar in being recollection, the knowledge which belongs to dream and which consists of the nature of recollection is not recognized as recollection at that time. But the recollection arising in the waking state is recognized as recollection even at the time of the recollection. That is the distinction. Thus the knowledge which belongs to a dream is certainly unreal because it does not exist in the waking state. And because Rāmānuja accepts only perceptual knowledge in dream.

Furthermore, the knowledge which belongs to dream is not the cause for the ascertainment of what is auspicious or inauspicious in being of the nature of knowledge, but only through being associated with the particular object respectively. And that knowledge is not seen in the waking state to be associated with the particular object in that manner. So [the knowledge belonging to dream] is all the more unreal. Moreover, if the knowledge which belongs to a dream is real, then it certainly cannot be avoided that there is a real cognition from what is unreal, because the production of that [knowledge] is only from the dream elephants etc. which are unreal.

comment

The context for this discussion is the Advaitins view that the scripture is not ultimately real, though it reveals true knowledge. Brahman alone is ultimately real. The scripture has a "relative eternity" (pravāhanityatā) in so far as the Lord reveals the same Veda at the beginning of each cycle of creation.¹²⁸ Although the Veda too is ultimately within the operation of māyā, Advaitins consider that the Veda reveals the true knowledge of Brahman. Thus true knowledge can arise from what is unreal. The illustration cited in support of this (Śrī.B.Para.47.p.85.) is that while the knowledge which arises in dream is false, since it is

found to be so upon waking, it can nonetheless give rise to the ascertainment of real auspicious or inauspicious future events.¹²⁹ Hence the real can arise from the unreal.

To disprove this proposition, Rāmānuja seeks to show that the illustration of dream does not lend support to the Advaitins views. Rāmānuja maintains that the dream knowledge is not unreal, only the dream objects are unreal. Thus the real arises only from the real because the ascertainment of a real auspicious or inauspicious event is based upon the real dream knowledge. The discussion continues, centred upon the use of the illustration of dream.

3.148. यत्तु 'हस्त्यादीनामभावे कथं तद्बुद्धयः सत्या भवन्तीति । नैतत् । बुद्धीनां सालम्बनत्वमात्रनियमात् । अर्थस्य प्रतिभासमानत्वमेव ह्यालम्बनत्वेऽपेक्षितम् । प्रतिभासमानता चास्त्येव दोषवशात् । स तु बाधितोऽसत्य इत्यवसीयते । अबाधिता हि बुद्धिः सत्यैव' (श्रीभा० पृ० ५६ प० १६) इत्युक्तं तन्न । सालम्बनत्वमात्रनियमादित्यत्र सालम्बनत्वं न साश्रयत्वं तदाभिमतम् । बुद्धेः साश्रयत्वोपपादनस्य विषयप्रतिभासानपेक्षणात् । त्वया त्वर्थस्य प्रतिभासमानत्वमेव ह्यालम्बनत्वेऽपेक्षितमित्युच्यते । किंच सालम्बनत्वमात्रनियमादित्यत्र मात्रपदेन सविषयत्वं व्याचर्यते न वा । आद्ये ' न च निर्विषया संवित्काचिदस्ति । अनुपलब्धेः' (श्रीभा० पृ० ३६ प० १०) इति त्वदुक्तिरिरोधः । अन्त्ये 'हस्त्यादीनामभावे कथं तद्बुद्धयः सत्या भवन्ति' इति प्रश्नस्योचरमेतन्न घटते ।

3.148. But what has been said (Śrī.B.Para.47.p.86.):

[objection by Advaitin] In the absence of the elephants etc., how can the cognitions of them be real?

[reply by Rāmānuja] This is not so. Because cognitions as a rule merely require a support. Indeed only the manifestation of an object is required for being a support and the manifestation certainly exists on account of the defect. But that [object] which is negated is determined to be unreal. The cognition which is indeed not negated is certainly real.

That is not so. You accept the possession of a support and not the

possession of a locus here: "because of the rule of merely requiring a support". Because for demonstrating that a cognition possesses a locus there is no requirement for the manifestation of an object. Whereas you say: "indeed only the manifestation of an object is required for being a support".

Furthermore, by the word "merely" here: "because of the rule of merely requiring a support", is the possession of an object excluded or not? In the first case, there is contradiction with your own statement (Śrī.B.Para.34.p.57.): "there is no awareness whatsoever which is without an object, on account of its non-apprehension". In the last case, this is not a possible answer to the question: "in the absence of the elephants etc., how can the cognitions of them be real?".

comment

Abhyankar attempts to demonstrate that the explanation of a "support" for cognitions is vague and untenable. A "support" (ālambana) can mean a locus or an objective support. If Rāmānuja intends the word in the sense of a locus then there is no requirement for a dream object. For example, in the cognition: "I experience" there is a locus but no object. So Rāmānuja uses the word in the sense of an objective support. However the use of the word "merely" in the statement: "because of the rule of merely requiring a support" must exclude something. Abhyankar seeks to show that whatever is excluded involves Rāmānuja in contradiction.

- 3.149. अथ सालम्बनत्वं सविषयत्वमेवेति चेत्सालम्बनत्वमात्रनियमादित्यत्र मात्रपदेन साश्रयत्वं व्यावर्त्यते विषयसत्यत्वापेक्षा वा व्यावर्त्यते । आद्ये 'संविन्नाम काचिभिराश्रया निर्विषया वाऽत्यन्तानुपलब्धेर्न संभवति' (श्रीभा० पृ० ४० प० ४) इत्युक्तिविरोधः । अन्ये सत्यस्यार्थस्याथावेऽप्यर्थप्रतिभासमात्रेण बुद्धेः सविषयत्वं चेत्स प्रतिभासः सत्योऽसत्यो वा । आद्येऽसत्यादर्थात्सत्या प्रतीतिरङ्गीकृता स्यात् । विषयस्य प्रतीतिकारणत्वानङ्गीकारे त्वसत्यापि घटादौ सदा घटादिज्ञानं स्यात् । अन्ये त्वसत्यात्प्रतिभासात्सत्या शुभाशुभप्रतिपत्तिहेतुभूता बुद्धिरङ्गीकृता स्यात् । किं च 'अर्थस्य प्रतिभासमानत्वमेव सालम्बनत्वेऽपेक्षितम्' (श्रीभा० पृ० ५६ प० १८) इत्युक्तिर्न संगच्छते । यतः प्रतिभास एव बुद्धिर्न तु तदतिरिक्ता काचित् । अनुपलब्धेः । किं च 'स तु बाधितोऽसत्य इत्यवसीयते' (श्रीभा० पृ० ५७ प० १) इत्युक्तिः सत्ख्यातिवादिनस्तव मते न संगच्छते ।

3.149. But if the possession of a support just means the possession of an object, then by the word "merely" here: "because of the rule of merely requiring a support" is the possession of a locus excluded or is the requirement of a real object excluded? In the first case, there is contradiction with the statement (Śrī.B.Para.37.p.62.): "something known as awareness which is without a locus or an object is not possible, on account of total non-apprehension". In the last case, if a cognition possesses an object due to the mere manifestation of the object even though the real object does not exist, is that manifestation real or unreal? In the first case, a real cognition from an unreal object must be accepted. But if the object is not accepted as the cause of the cognition, then there should always be the knowledge of a pot etc. even when the pot etc. do not exist. Whereas in the last case, a real cognition which is the cause for the ascertainment of what is auspicious or inauspicious must be accepted from an unreal manifestation.

Furthermore, the statement (Śrī.B.Para.47.p.86.): "indeed only the manifestation of an object is required for being a support" is not correct. Because the cognition is itself the manifestation, it is not something different from that. Because there is no apprehension [of the manifestation of the object as being different from the cognition]. Moreover, the statement (Śrī.B.Para.47.p.86.): "but that [object] which is negated is determined to be unreal" is not correct according to your view, that of an exponent of the "apprehension of the real".

3.150. असत्यात्सत्यप्रतिपत्तेरिदमपरमुदाहरणं रेखारूपादसत्यादक्षरात्सत्याक्षरप्रतिपत्तिर्दृश्यते । यद्यपि रेखा सत्यैव तथापि न सा रेखात्वेन वर्णबुद्धिहेतुः । किं तु वर्णात्मकतयैव । वर्णात्मता त्वसत्यैव । यत्तु 'वर्णात्मताया असत्याया उपायत्वायोगात् । असतो निरुपाख्यस्य ह्युपायत्वं न दृष्टमनुपपन्नं च' (श्रीभा० पृ० ५७ प० ५) इत्युक्तं तन्न । असत्यस्योपायत्वायोगे कश्चिद्धेतुरस्ति न वा । न चेत्किं तथा केवलोक्त्या । अस्ति चेत्को हेतुः । काप्यदर्शनं हेतुश्चेन्न । अत्रैव दर्शनात् । स्वप्ने च तथा दर्शनस्यानुपपत्तेर्वोक्तत्वात् । 'न हि दृष्टेऽनुपपन्नं नाम' इति न्यायेनानुपपत्तेरप्यभावात् । नन्वत्रासत्यादेव सत्या प्रतिपत्तिर्जातेति कथं निश्चि-

तमिति चेत्—असत्यान्नैव जातेति निश्चयस्त्वयापि कथं कृतः । तस्मादत्र तथा-
दर्शनविषय एव वादः प्रस्तुत इति 'असतो निरुपाख्यस्य ह्युपायत्वं न दृष्ट-
मनुपपन्नं च' इत्युत्तरं न संगतं भवति । निरुपाख्यमपि शशशृङ्गादि तत्कल्प-
नाया हेतुर्भवत्येव ।।

3.150. This is another example of a real ascertainment from what is unreal: the ascertainment of a real letter [i.e. a sound like "a", "i" etc.] is seen to be from a letter which is unreal i.e. which is in the form of a line [i.e. the written character]. Although the line is certainly real, still, it is not the cause for the cognition of the letter through being a line, but only through being of the nature of the letter. But being of the nature of a letter is certainly unreal.¹³⁰ But what has been said (Śrī.B.Para.47.p.86.):

[That is not so], because the nature of being a letter, which is unreal, cannot be the means [for the apprehension of the letter]. Because what is unreal and indefinable is not seen to be a means nor is it logically possible [to be a means].

That is not so. Is there some reason why what is unreal cannot be a means, or not? If there is not, what is the point of that mere statement [i.e. without logical grounds]? If there is, what is the reason? If [you say] the reason is that it is not seen anywhere, [we reply] that is not so. Because it is seen here itself [in the case under discussion]. And in dream, because the fact that it is seen in that manner has been mentioned just previously. The logical impossibility too does not exist, according to the maxim: "because when it is seen, it is certainly not logically impossible".¹³¹

[objection] How is it ascertained here that a real knowledge is produced from what is indeed unreal?

[reply] How have you also made the ascertainment that it is certainly not produced from what is unreal? Therefore the dispute which is under

discussion here is only concerning whether it is seen in that manner, so the answer: "because what is unreal and indefinable is not seen to be a means nor is it logically possible to be a means" is incongruous. Even the indefinable horn of a hare etc. is certainly the cause for its imagination.

3.151.

अथ 'पिण्डविशेषे देवदत्तादिशब्दसंकेतवच्चक्षुर्ग्राह्यरेखा-
विशेषे श्रोत्रग्राह्यवर्णविशेषसंकेतवशाद्रेखाविशेषो वर्णविशेषबुद्धिहेतुरिति सत्यादेव
सत्यप्रतिपत्तिः । रेखायाः संकेतस्य च सत्यत्वात्' (श्रीभा० पृ० ५७प० ११)
इत्युच्यते तर्हि 'अयं कवर्णोऽयं खवर्णः' इत्येवं रेखाविशेषे वर्णतादात्म्यानुभव-
विरोधः । किं च पिण्डविशेषे देवदत्तादिशब्दसंकेतवदिति त्वदुक्तदृष्टान्तेऽप्य-
सत्यात्सत्या प्रतिपत्तिरवर्जनीया । यतो देवदत्तादिशब्दाः शब्दस्वरूपेण
सत्या अपि तत्तत्पिण्डविशेषतादात्म्यतयाऽसत्या एव । तादृशा एव ते
तत्तत्पिण्डविशेषबोधका भवन्ति । अन्यथा किमिति घटपदान्न पटप्रति-
पत्तिः । अस्मात्पदादयमर्थो बोद्धव्य इतीश्वरसंकेतोऽपि शब्दार्थयोस्तादात्म्यारोपा-
भिप्रायक एव । भगवान्पाणिनिरपि 'वृद्धिरादैच्' (पा० सू० १ । १ । १)
इत्यादिसंज्ञासूत्रेषु शब्दार्थयोः सामानाधिकरण्येन प्रयोगं कुर्वन्तादात्म्यारोपमेवा-
भिप्रेति । लोके च क्वचिच्चिञ्चादिशब्दोच्चारणे मुखे रसोत्पादो दृश्यते । यद्यपि
वह्निशब्दोच्चारणे मुखं न दहते तथाप्यारोपितस्यार्थक्रियाकारित्वनियमाभा-
वान्न दोषः । शब्दनित्यत्ववादिनश्चोच्चारिताद्भवनिविशेषादसत्याच्छब्दान्नित्यश-
ब्दप्रतिपत्तिं मन्वाना असत्यात्सत्यप्रतिपत्तिं स्वी कुर्वन्त्येव । यत्तु 'रेखागवयादापि
सत्यगवयबुद्धिः सादृश्यनिवन्धना' (श्रीभा० पृ० ५७ प० १५) इत्युक्तं
तत्र । रेखागवयं प्रदर्श्य सत्यगवयं बोधयन् कश्चिदेतत्सदृश इत्युपदिशति । कश्चि-
ञ्चायं गवय इत्युपदिशति । तत्र द्वितीयेऽसत्यात्सत्यप्रतिपत्तिरस्त्येव । गवय-
तादात्म्यविशष्टरेखाविशेषस्यासत्यत्वात् ।

3.151. But if it is said (Śrī.B.Para.47.p.87.)¹³²:

Just as there is the convention of using the word
"Devadatta" etc. in relation to a particular physical
form, a particular line is the cause for the cognition
of a particular letter on account of the convention
that a particular letter which is apprehended by the
ear [is associated] with a particular line apprehended
by the eye. So there is a real ascertainment from what
is indeed real. Because the line and the [phonetic]

convention are real.

Then there is contradiction with the experience of the identity of a letter with a particular line, in the manner: "this is the letter 'k', this is the letter 'kh' ".

Furthermore, that there is a real ascertainment from what is unreal cannot be avoided even in the illustration which you have told: "just as there is the convention of using the word "Devadatta" etc. in relation to a particular physical form". Because the words "Devadatta" etc., though they are real in the nature of being a word, they are certainly unreal as identified with the respective particular physical form. Only in that manner [through the imposition of identity] do they make known the respective particular physical form. Otherwise, why is there no ascertainment of cloth from the word *pot*? Even the convention on the part of the Lord: "this meaning is to be understood from this word" only has the intention of the imposition of identity between the word and the meaning. The revered Pāṇini too, who brings about the usage between the word and the meaning through grammatical apposition in the sūtras dealing with technical terms such as: "ā, ai and au are called vr̥ddhi" (P.S.1.1.1.), intends only the imposition of identity.

And in the world, an appearance of emotion is seen on the face upon pronunciation of words like: kvacit, ciñcā etc. Even though the face is not burnt upon pronunciation of the word "fire", nevertheless there is no defect because there is no rule that what has been imposed causes an action having an effect. And the exponents of the eternity of sound, who consider that there is the ascertainment of an eternal sound from an unreal sound which is a particular sound that has been pronounced, certainly accept a real ascertainment from what is unreal.

But what has been said (Śrī.B.Para.47.p.87.):

The cognition of a real ox is even from the outline of an ox, being based upon similarity.

That is not so. Having shown the outline of an ox, someone making known a real ox teaches: "it is similar to this". And somebody teaches: "this is an ox". There is certainly a real ascertainment from what is unreal in the second case there. Because the particular outline, qualified by identity with the ox, is unreal.

- 3.152. किं च न शास्त्रस्य गगनकुसुमवदसत्यत्वम् । प्रागद्वैतज्ञानात्सद्बुद्धिवोधयत्वात् ।
 उत्पन्ने तत्त्वज्ञाने ह्यसत्यत्वं शास्त्रस्य । न तदा
 शास्त्रस्य न तुच्छत्वम् शास्त्रं निरस्तनिखिलभेदचिन्मात्रब्रह्मज्ञानोपायः ।
 यदोपायस्तदाऽस्त्येव 'शास्त्रमस्ति' इति बुद्धिः ।
 यत्त्वेतदुपन्यस्य 'नैवम्' । असति शास्त्रेऽस्ति शास्त्रमिति बुद्धेर्मिथ्यात्वात् । ततो
 मिथ्याभूतशास्त्रजन्यज्ञानस्य मिथ्यात्वेन तद्विषयस्यापि ब्रह्मणो मिथ्यात्वम्
 (श्रीभा० पृ० ५८ प० ६) इत्युक्तं तन्न । यथा 'स्वप्ने हि विषयाणामेव
 मिथ्यात्वम् । तेषामेव हि बाधो दृश्यते न ज्ञानस्य' (श्रीभा० पृ० ५६ प० ६)
 इति ग्रन्थेन विषयाणामसत्यत्वेऽपि तद्विषयकज्ञानस्य सत्यत्वं त्वयैवोक्तं तथात्र
 शास्त्रस्यासत्यत्वेऽपि शास्त्रमस्तीति ज्ञानस्य सत्यत्वमेव स्यात् ।

- 3.152. Furthermore, having stated this [the Advaitins position] (Śrī.B. Para.48.p.88.):

The scripture is not unreal like a flower in the sky.
 Because prior to the knowledge of non-duality it should
 be understood as something which exists. Indeed when
 the knowledge of the truth has arisen, the scripture
 [is seen to be] unreal. Then the scripture is not the
 means for the knowledge of Brahman which is pure
 awareness, from which all difference has been removed.
 When it is the means, then it certainly exists and
 there is the knowledge that: "the scripture exists".

But what has been said [by way of reply] (Śrī.B.Para.48.p.88.)¹³³:

It is not so. Because when the scripture does not
 exist, the knowledge that: "the scripture exists"
 is false. Then because the knowledge produced by

a scripture which is false is [itself] false, the object of that [knowledge] also, i.e. Brahman, is false.

That is not so. For instance in the text (Śrī.B.Para.47.p.85.): "for it is only the objects which are false in dream. Because negation is seen for them alone, not for the knowledge" you yourself have said that even though the objects are unreal the knowledge relating to them is real. Similarly here, even though the scripture is unreal the knowledge that: "the scripture exists" would certainly be real.

3.153.

मिथ्याभूतज्ञानवि-
षयत्वेन ब्रह्मणो मिथ्यात्वापादनमपि न युक्तम् । न हि ब्रह्म कस्मिंश्चिदपि
ज्ञाने विषयभूतं भवति । निराश्रयनिर्विषयनिर्विशेषानुभूतिमात्रं हि ब्रह्म । शास्त्रं
तु दूरत एव स्थित्वा केवलं तादृशब्रह्मस्वरूपप्रकाशमार्गं प्रदर्शयति । न तु
स्वजन्यज्ञाने ब्रह्म विषयी करोति । मार्गश्चाविद्यानिरासोपायः । सोपाधिक-
ब्रह्मणः शब्दं यत्परोक्षज्ञानं तादृशपरोक्षज्ञानादिकश्चायमुपायः । शास्त्रं तत्प्रद-
र्शित उपायश्चेति द्वयं मिथ्याभूतमप्यविद्यानिरासे समर्थमेव । अविद्याया अपि
मिथ्याभूतत्वात् । कण्टकेन कण्टकोन्मूलनवत् । एतावतैव शास्त्रस्य प्रामाण्यमिति
प्रागुक्तमेव (पृ० १०२) ।

3.153. Establishing the falsity of Brahman on account of being an object of knowledge which is false is also not correct. Because Brahman is not the object of any knowledge whatsoever. For Brahman is pure awareness: free from location, free from an object and free from distinctions. But the scripture, while remaining at a distance, only shows the clear path to the essential nature of such a Brahman.¹³⁴ But Brahman is not an object of the knowledge produced by it. And the path is the means for the removal of Ignorance. Brahman possessing a limiting adjunct is expressed by words, which is mediate knowledge. And this means, is such mediate knowledge etc. The two things: the scripture and the means shown by that [scripture], although false, are certainly able to remove Ignorance. Because Ignorance too is false. Just like the removal of a thorn by a

thorn. It has been indeed previously told (cf., 3.139-140.) that the scripture is valid only to this extent.

3.154.

या च ' यथा धूमबुद्ध्या गृहीतवाष्पजन्याग्निज्ञानस्य मिथ्यात्वेन तद्विषयस्याग्रेरपि मिथ्यात्वम् ' (श्रीभा०पृ०५८प०९) इत्येवं दृष्टान्तोक्तिः साप्यसंगता । अग्निज्ञाने हि न धूमः करणम् । किं तु धूमज्ञानम् ।

' अनुमायां ज्ञायमानं लिङ्गं तु करणं न हि ' (भाषा पारि० ६७)

इत्युक्तत्वात् । लिङ्गज्ञानं च हेतुतावच्छेदकप्रकारकं ज्ञानम् । तच्च धूमेनाग्न्यनुमितौ हेतुतावच्छेदकीभूतधूमत्वप्रकारकं ज्ञानम् । धूमत्वप्रकारकं ज्ञानं च यदि धूमविशेष्यकं तर्हि तत्सत्यमेवेत्यत्र न विवादः । यदि वाष्पविशेष्यकं तर्ह्यपि तदसत्यमिति त्वया सत्ख्यातिवादिना वक्तुमशक्यम् । धूमसदृशे वाष्पे धूमांशानां त्वन्मते विद्यमानत्वात् । किं च 'विषयेन्द्रियादिदोषजन्यं रज्ज्वादौ सर्पादिविज्ञानं सत्यमेव भयादिहेतुः' (श्रीभा० पृ ५६ प० ११) इति वदता त्वया वाष्पेऽपि जायमानं धूमज्ञानं सत्यमेवेति वक्तव्यम् । तथा च धूमज्ञानस्य सत्यत्वे कथं तदग्निज्ञानासत्यत्वस्य कारणं भवेत् । कथं तरां तद्विषयीभूताग्न्यसत्यत्वे हेतुर्भवेत् ।

3.154. The mention of the illustration [in the reply: "because the knowledge produced by a scripture which is false...", cf., 3.152.] (Śrī. B.Para.48.p.88.):

because just as the knowledge of fire, which is produced by mist [wrongly] apprehended with the idea that it is smoke, is false; the fire which is the object of that [false knowledge] is also false

is incongruous as well. Because smoke is not the means for the knowledge of fire. But the knowledge of smoke [i.e. when it is recognized to be smoke then it is a means]. Because it has been told:

The inferential mark being known is certainly not the means for an inference. (Bhā.P.67.)

And the knowledge of the inferential mark is knowledge which has the determining of causality as its qualifying attribute. And that knowledge

has as its qualifying attribute the quality of smoke which is the determining factor of causality in regard to the inferential knowledge of fire by means of smoke. And if the knowledge which has the quality of smoke as its qualifying attribute has smoke as its content then that [knowledge] is certainly real and so there is no dispute in this matter. If [the knowledge which has the quality of smoke as its qualifying attribute] has mist as its content, even then, you who are an exponent of the "apprehension of the real" cannot say: "that [knowledge] is unreal". Because according to your view, portions of smoke exist in mist which is of a similar nature to smoke.

Furthermore, you say (Śrī.B.Para.47.p.86.):

The knowledge of a snake etc. upon a rope etc.,
which is produced by a defect in the object and
in the sense organ etc., is certainly real and
the cause of fear etc.

so the knowledge of smoke which is produced even in respect of mist has to be said to be certainly real. So if the knowledge of smoke is real, how can it be the cause of the unreality of the knowledge of fire? Much less can it be the cause for the unreality of fire which is its object.
comment

Rāmānuja has argued that if the means is false the result must be false, i.e. if the inferential mark (liṅga) is false then what is to be proved (sādhya) by means of the inferential mark should also be false. Abhyankar responds by saying that the Viśiṣṭādvaitins maintain that knowledge is always real and so they are in the untenable position of holding that the means is true but the result can be false.

3.155. अग्नेरसत्यत्वं च न तज्ज्ञानासत्यत्वेन ज्ञायते । 'प्रतीतिकालेऽपि तन्नासीत्' इत्येवं यत्र पश्चाद्बाधो दृश्यते तत्र तद्बाधितं वस्त्वसत्यं भवति । अतो बाधितोऽग्निरसत्य इति निश्चीयते । एवं शुर्वादिना कस्मिंश्चिदर्थं उपदिष्टे शिष्यादिनाऽज्ञातेऽपि 'ज्ञातोऽर्थः' इत्येवमनुव्यवसायरूपा प्रतीतिर्यत्र शिष्यादेर्भवति, पश्चाच्च पुनरुपदिष्टे 'इदानीमयमर्थो ज्ञातो न तु पूर्वम्' इत्येवं पश्चात्प्रतीतिर्भवति तत्र पूर्वज्ञानं 'ज्ञातोऽर्थः' इत्येवमनुव्यवसायविषयीभूतं प्रतीतिकालेऽपि

पश्चाद्वाधदर्शनादसत्यं भवति । रज्जुसर्पादिस्थले सर्पज्ञानं तु स्वरूपमात्रेण सत्यमेव । विषयवैशिष्ट्येन त्वसत्यम् । प्रागुक्तस्थले 'ज्ञातोऽर्थः' इत्येवमनुष्य-सायरूपं ज्ञानमप्येवमेव । तथा च ज्ञानं कचित्स्वरूपेणैवासत्यं क्वचिच्च स्वरूपेण सत्यमपि विषयवैशिष्ट्येनासत्यमिति द्विविधमसत्यत्वम् । धूमबुद्ध्या गृहीतवाष्पजन्याभिज्ञानस्य तु स्वरूपेण सत्यत्वाद्विषयवैशिष्ट्येनैवासत्यत्वं वक्तव्यम् । विषयवैशिष्ट्येनासत्यत्वं च विषयासत्यत्वमूलकम् । तथा चाभिज्ञानासत्यत्वमग्न्यसत्यत्वमूलकमिति न तदग्न्यसत्यत्वमभिज्ञानासत्यत्वमूलकम् । अन्योन्याश्रयापातात् । तथा च 'अभिज्ञानस्य मिथ्यात्वेन तद्विषयस्याप्येवमपि मिथ्यात्वम्' (श्रीभा० पृ० ५८ प० ९) इत्युक्तिरसंगता ।

3.155. The unreality of fire is not known through the unreality of the knowledge of that. Where a negation is subsequently seen, in the manner: "that did not exist even at the time of its cognition", that negated object is unreal. Therefore the fire which is negated is ascertained as unreal. Thus when some matter has been taught by the teacher etc. and there is the cognition on the part of the student etc. in the form of the perceptual judgement: "the matter is understood", even when it is not understood by the student etc., and later when it is taught again there is the subsequent cognition: "now this matter is understood, but not previously" : the prior knowledge which is the object of the perceptual judgement: "the matter is understood" is unreal even at the time of the cognition, because the negation is seen subsequently.

But the knowledge of the snake, in the case of the snake upon a rope etc., is certainly real in its mere essential nature [i.e. as knowledge]. But it is unreal as the particularity of the object. In regard to the case previously mentioned, even the knowledge in the form of the perceptual judgement: "the matter is understood" is just the same [i.e. as knowledge it is real until it is negated, though its object is unreal]. And so unreality is twofold: knowledge is somewhere unreal in its very essential nature [as in the statement: "the matter is understood" when it is known to be negated] and somewhere though real in its essential nature

it is unreal as the particularity of the object. But because the knowledge of fire, which is produced by mist apprehended with the idea that it is smoke, is real in its essential nature, unreality has to be said only as the particularity of the object. And unreality as the particularity of the object is based upon the unreality of the object. So the unreality of the knowledge of fire is based upon the unreality of the fire. But the unreality of fire is not based upon the unreality of the knowledge of fire. Because there would be the occurrence of mutual dependence. And so the statement (Śrī.B.Para.48.p.88.): "because the knowledge of fire is false, the fire which is the object of that is also false" is incongruous.

comment

There would be mutual dependence since the object is said to be false because the knowledge is false. But if it is asked: how do you know the knowledge is false? The reply would be: because the object is false.

3.156. यत्तु 'शास्त्रविषयस्य सदाद्वितीयस्य ब्रह्मणः पश्चात्तन्वाधादर्शनेन निर्विशेषानुभूतिमात्रं ब्रह्मैव परमार्थः' इत्यद्वैतवादिमतं खण्डयता 'पश्चात्तन्वाधादर्शनं चासिद्धम् । शून्यमेव तत्त्वमिति वाक्येन तस्यापि वाधदर्शनात्' (श्रीभा० पृ० ५८ प० १०) इत्युक्तं तन्न । इदं वाक्यं नापौरुषेयम् । श्रुतावदर्शनात् । पौरुषेयवचसां प्रामाण्यं तु श्रुतिमूलकमिति प्रमाणाध्याये जैमिनिना प्रतिपादितम् । तथा चैतदर्थिका श्रुतिर्यावन्न प्रदर्शयते तावदेतद्वाक्यं कथमिव प्रमाणं भवेत् । स्वयमप्रमाणं च तच्छास्त्रप्रतिपादितमद्वितीयं ब्रह्म वाधितुं न प्रभवति । किं च शून्यपदार्थो भावरूपोऽभावरूपो वा । आद्येऽपि विशेषरूपः सामान्यरूपो वा । विशेषरूपत्वे द्रव्यगुणादीनां सर्वविशेषाणां सामान्यपूर्वकत्वात्सर्वसामान्यपराकाष्ठाभूतं ब्रह्म कथं तेन वाधितं भवेत् । सामान्यरूपत्वे तु ब्रह्मैव तदिति नाममात्रे विवादः । अभावरूपत्वे तु तत्र तत्त्वशब्दोक्तिरसंगता । तदेव हि तत्त्वं यदस्तीति वक्तुं शक्यते वाधितं च न भवति । शून्यमस्तीति वक्तुं शक्यते चेद्भावरूपत्वमेव स्यात् ।

3.156. But by way of refuting the view of the exponents of non-duality [who say]: because the object of the scripture, i.e. Brahman which is existence without a second, is not seen to be negated subsequently, Brahman which is pure awareness free from distinction is alone the highest

reality; what has been said (Śrī.B.Para.48.p.88.):

The absence of seeing a negation subsequently is not established. Because the negation is seen even for that [knowledge of Brahman without a second] by the sentence: "reality is only emptiness".

That is not so. This sentence is not unoriginated by mankind. Because it is not seen in the sacred texts. In the chapter on the means of knowledge, Jaimini has taught that the validity of the statements of a human origin is based upon the sacred texts. And so when the sacred text is not shown to have this meaning, how can this sentence be a means of knowledge? And not being a means of knowledge of itself, it is not able to negate the Brahman without a second which is taught by the scripture.

Furthermore, does the meaning of the word "emptiness" signify something existent or non-existent? In the first case too, does it signify a particular or a universal? If it is a particular, because all particulars -substances and qualities etc.- are preceded by their universal, then how could Brahman which is the supreme limit of all the universals be negated by that [particular]? But if it is a universal, that is indeed Brahman, so the dispute is in the mere name. But if it signifies something non-existent, the mention of the word "reality" there is incongruous. Because that alone is reality which can be said as: "it is" and which is not negated. If [you say] that emptiness can be said as: "it is", [we reply] then it can only be something existent.

- 3.157. किं च 'शून्यमेव तत्त्वम्' इति वाक्यं स्वेनेव स्वयं वाधितं भवति न वा । आद्ये वाधितेनानेन वाक्येन कथं ब्रह्म वाधितुं शक्यते । ननु यत्र वस्तुभूतायां रज्जौ सर्पभ्रमो जातः । ततो नायं सर्पो भूदलन-मेतदिति भ्रमः । ततो नेदं भूदलनं किं तु रज्जुरेषेति ज्ञानमभूत्तत्र वाधितेनापि भूदलनेन यथा सर्पो वाध्यते तथा वाधितेनाप्यनेन वाक्येन ब्रह्म वाधितुं शक्यत इति चेन्न । वैपय्यात् । वाधकाले हि वाधकमवाधितमेवापेक्ष्यते । सर्पवाधकाले भूदलनं न वाधितमिति तदा भूदलनेन सर्पो वाधितुं युज्यते ।

अनर्थैव रीत्या 'आत्मा वा अरे' इत्यादिशास्त्रं मिथ्याभूतमपि तत्त्वज्ञानमार्गोपायप्र-
दर्शनकाले न वाधितमिति तन्मार्गं बोधयितुं समर्थमेव । अत्र तु 'शून्यमेव
तत्त्वम्' इति वाक्यं स्वयं स्वेनैव वाधितमिति ब्रह्मवाधकालेऽपि तद्वाधितमेव भव-
तीति न कथमपि तेन ब्रह्मं वाधितुं शक्यते ।

3.157. Furthermore, is the sentence: "reality is only emptiness" itself negated just by itself or not? In the first case, how can Brahman be negated by this sentence which has been negated?

[objection] The mistake of a snake has arisen upon a real rope. Then there is the mistake: "this is not a snake, this is a cleavage in the earth". Then there was the knowledge: "this is not a cleavage in the earth but this is a rope". Just as the snake is negated by the cleavage in the earth which is also negated, so too, Brahman can be negated by this sentence which is also negated.

[reply] No. On account of the dissimilarity. Because at the time of the negation, what negates is required to be indeed not negated. The cleavage in the earth is not negated at the time of the negation of the snake and so at that time the snake is able to be negated by the cleavage in the earth. In this same way, the scripture such as: "My dear, the Self should indeed [be seen]" etc., though of a false nature [i.e. having the same "apparent" status as all empirical things], is not negated at the time of showing the means to the path of the knowledge of reality and so it is certainly able to make known the path. But here, the sentence: "reality is only emptiness" is itself negated just by itself, so it is certainly negated even at the time of the negation of Brahman and hence Brahman can in no way be negated by it.

3.158. नन्वेवं 'नेह नानास्ति किञ्चन' (वृ० ४।४।१९, का० ४।११) इति
शास्त्रस्य स्वस्मिन्प्रवृत्तावपि वाक्यमपि स्वयं स्वेनैव वाधितमिति न तेन
न क्षतिः प्रपञ्चो वाध्येतेति चेन्न । नेदं वाक्यं कस्यचि-
द्वाधकम् । किं त्विह यत्किञ्चिद्दृश्यते तदात्मभिर्न
नाप्तीति बोध्यते । आत्माधिष्ठानकं सर्वमात्मन्येव प्रतिभासत इति यावत् ।
तथा च नेह नानेति वाक्यस्य स्वस्मिन् प्रवृत्तावपि प्रातिभासिकत्वं तस्य

स्यान्न शशशृङ्गवत्तुच्छत्वम् । अतस्तत्प्रपञ्चस्य प्रातिभासिकत्वबोधने समर्थ-
मेव । अथ शून्यमेव तत्त्वमित्यनेनापि प्रातिभासिकत्वमेव बोध्यत इति चेत्त्वद-
संमतवायावादापातः । तुच्छत्वमुच्यते चेत्स्वस्यापि तुच्छत्वं स्यादिति न
तद्वाक्यं ब्रह्मवाधने समर्थम् ॥

3.158. [objection] Even the sentence: "there is no diversity whatsoever here" (Brh.4.4.19., Katha.4.11.) is itself negated just by itself and so the manifest world cannot be negated by that.

[reply] No. This sentence does not negate anything. But it is made known that whatever is seen here is not different from the Self. The meaning is: everything, having the Self as the substratum, appears only in the Self. And so although the sentence: "there is no diversity..." operates in itself, it can have an apparent nature but it is not fictitious like the horns of a hare. Therefore that [sentence] is certainly able to make known the apparent nature of the manifest world.

But if [you say] only the apparent nature [of the world] is made known by this also: "reality is only emptiness", [we reply] that there would be the occurrence of the teaching of māyā which you do not accept. If [you say] that the fictitious nature [of the world] is what is said, [we reply] then even [the statement] itself must be fictitious and so that sentence is not able to negate Brahman.

3.159.

अथैतद्वाक्यं स्वयं स्वेन न वाध्यत इति द्वितीयः

पक्षः स्वी क्रियत इति चेद्वाधाभावे को हेतुः । आत्माश्रय इति चेद्भ्रान्तोऽसि । यत्र वाक्यार्थोपयोगिनी वाक्यस्य प्रवृत्तिस्तत्र स्वस्य स्वस्मिन्प्रवृत्तिरात्माश्रयान्न भवति । प्रवृत्तिर्हि वाक्यार्थोत्तरभाविन्येव । ततश्च वाक्यार्थोत्तरं स्वस्य स्वस्मि-
ञ्जातापि प्रवृत्तिः कथं वाक्यार्थोपयोगिनी भवेत् । वाक्यार्थस्य प्रवृत्तेः पूर्वभाव-
शक्तत्वेनात्माश्रयदोषप्रस्तत्वात् । अतस्तत्र सा निष्फलैव । अत एव व्याकरणेऽ-
णुदित्सूत्रस्य न स्वस्मिन्प्रवृत्तिः । अणुदित्सूत्रं हि संज्ञाशास्त्रम् । संज्ञाशास्त्रस्य
च प्रवृत्तिर्वाक्यार्थोपयोगिन्येव । यत्र त्वन्यत्किञ्चिद्बोधयितुं प्रवृत्तिर्न तु वाक्या-
र्थोपयोगिनी तत्र वाक्यार्थोत्तरं जायमानायाः प्रवृत्तेरन्यत्रेव स्वस्मिन्नप्युपयोगसं-
भयोऽस्तीति प्रवृत्तिर्दुर्वारैव । अन्यस्येव तस्याप्युद्देश्यतावच्छेदकाक्रान्तत्वाविशे-
षात् । अत एव व्याकरणे भगवता पाणिनिना ससजुषो रुः, (षा० सू० ८

२।६६) खरवसानयोर्विसर्जनीयः, (पा० सू० ८।३।१५) प्रत्ययः
 (पा० सू० ३।१।१) इत्यादीनां सूत्राणां स्वस्मिन्नेव प्रवृत्तिः कृता। अनयैव रीत्या
 ' स्वाध्यायोऽध्येतव्यः ' ' नेह नानास्ति किंचन ' (बृ० ४।४।१९ का०
 ४।११) इत्यनयोः श्रुतिवाक्ययोः स्वस्मिन्प्रवृत्तिर्भवति । किंच शून्यमेव
 तत्त्वमिति वाक्येन स्वस्य बाधाभावे शून्यव्यतिरिक्तमेतदेव वाक्यमवशिष्टमस्तीति
 शून्यमेव तत्त्वमिति वाक्यार्थो विरुद्धः स्यात् ॥ १५ ॥

3.159. But if the second view [cf., 3.157.] is accepted, i.e. this sentence is itself not negated by itself, [we ask] what is the reason for the absence of negation? If [you say] self-dependence, [we reply] you are confused. Where the operation of a sentence is helpful for the meaning of the sentence, the operation of itself [i.e. of the statement] in itself is not because of self-dependence. Because the operation [of the statement in the statement] only takes place subsequently to the meaning of the sentence. And therefore even though the operation of itself [i.e. of the statement] has occurred in itself subsequent to the meaning of the sentence, how could it be helpful for the meaning of the sentence? Because [the operation of the statement in the statement] is affected by the defect of self-dependence necessarily prior to the operation of the meaning of the sentence. Therefore that [operation] is indeed useless there [in the sentence].

For this very reason, in grammar, there is no operation of the anūdit sūtra (P.S.1.1.69.) in itself. Because the anūdit sūtra is a treatise dealing with technical terms. And the operation of a treatise dealing with technical terms is only helpful for the meaning of a sentence. But where the operation is to make known something else, but is not helpful for the meaning of the sentence, in that case there is the possibility of the use of the operation which occurs subsequent to the meaning of the sentence even in itself just as elsewhere. So the operation [in itself] is certainly difficult to be avoided. Because like another, that too does not differ in being possessed of the distinguishing

characteristic of what is to be explained. For this very reason, in grammar, the revered Pāṇini made the operation of sūtras such as: "for a final 's' and for the 'ṣ' of sajuṣ, 'ru' is substituted at the end of a word" (P.S.8.2.66.), "a visarga is substituted for 'r' before a hard consonant or when there is a pause" (P.S.8.3.15.) and "an affix" (P.S. 3.1.1.) in itself [i.e. the grammatical rule taught by the sūtra is also operative in the sūtra]. In this very way, the operation of these two sentences of the sacred texts: "one's own portion is to be studied", "there is no diversity here whatsoever" (Bṛh.4.4.19., Kaṭha.4.11.) is in itself.

Furthermore, if there is no negation of itself by the sentence: "reality is only emptiness", this very sentence which is distinct from emptiness is left remaining and so the meaning of the sentence: "reality is only emptiness" would be contradicted.

comment

This passage, of a rather technical nature, is in response to the opponent's statement that the sentence: "reality is only emptiness" does not negate itself because the sentence is self-dependent. The sentence is thought to be self-dependent because it is both what negates (bādhaka) and what is negated (bādhya) and hence it is both the cause and the effect. If the meaning of the sentence is dependent upon the prior operation of the sentence in respect of itself, then when the sentence is understood it is already an effect. And so if what negates is itself negated, it cannot negate since the cause of the effect is included in the effect.

Abhyankar replies that the sentence is not self-dependent because the operation of the sentence in itself only occurs subsequent to the meaning of the sentence being understood. The meaning of the sentence: "reality is only emptiness" is firstly known and then one thinks: "this sentence must also be included in the meaning" and so the operation of the sentence in itself takes place after the meaning is known. Therefore the sentence is not self-dependent and so negates itself.

Rāmānuja now shifts the focus of the discussion to the consideration of scriptural passages from the prasthānatraya: the Upaniṣads, the Bhagavadgītā and the Brahmasūtras and also from the Viṣṇupurāṇa. Abhyankar accordingly takes up the examination of these passages.

- 3.160. यत्तु 'एकविज्ञानेन' (श्रीभा० पृ० ५८ प० १७) इत्यादिना ग्रन्थेन 'सदेव सोम्य' (छा० ६।२।१) इत्यादिश्रुतीनां सविशेषार्थप्रतिपादकत्वं साधितं तत्रोच्यते—

सदेव सोम्याथ परा सत्यं ज्ञानमथापि च ॥

सविशेषब्रह्मपरा नैताः श्रुतय ईरिताः ॥ १६ ॥

3.160. But what has been established by the text (Śrī.B.Para.48.p.89.) beginning with: "by the knowledge of one thing...", is that the sacred texts such as: "My dear, existence alone" (Ch.6.2.1.) etc. teach about an entity possessing distinction. In regard to that, it is said:

These sacred texts: "My dear, existence alone",

"Then there is the higher" and also "real,

Knowledge" are not said to have as their aim

Brahman possessing distinction.16.

- 3.161. 'सदेव सोम्येदमग्र आसीदेकमेवाद्वितीयम्' (छा० ६।२।१) इति च्छान्दोग्योपनिषदि पठ्यते । 'अथ परा यया तदक्षरमधिगम्यते' (मु० १।१।५) इति मुण्डकोपनिषदि पठ्यते । 'सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तं ब्रह्म' (तै० २।१।१) इति तैत्तिरीयोपनिषदि पठ्यते । तत्र सदेवेति श्रुतौ सदेवेति श्रुतेर्निर्विशेषार्थकत्वम् । सदेवेति श्रुतेर्निर्विशेषार्थकत्वम् । यदपेक्षया न किञ्चिदपि सामान्यं यत्र सामान्यस्य परा काष्ठा तत्स्वरूपं हि तत् । अत एवेशं तादृशमिति वक्तुमशक्यम् । अत एव च तदत्यन्तसूक्ष्मं निर्विशेषं सर्वगतम् । इदं दृश्यमानमखिलं जगदग्र उत्पत्तेः पूर्वं सदेवासीदित्यादिरर्थः । इदमग्र आसीदित्युक्त्या जगतः प्रागवस्थाऽनया श्रुत्या बोध्यते ।

3.161. "My dear, this was existence alone in the beginning, one alone, without a second" (Ch.6.2.1.) is cited in the Chāndogyopaniṣad. "Then there is the higher [knowledge] by which that Imperishable is attained" (Mu.1.1.5.) is cited in the Muṇḍakopaniṣad. "Brahman is real, Knowledge, limitless" (Tai.2.1.1.) is cited in the Taittirīyopaniṣad. In the sacred text: "existence alone" an entity which is pure "is-ness" is said by this [word] "existence" (sat). With regard to which [is-ness],

there is no universal whatsoever. Where there is the supreme limit of a universal, the essential nature of that [universal] is indeed that [is-ness]. For this very reason, [is-ness] cannot be said as "such and such". And for this very reason, that [is-ness] is extremely subtle, free from distinction and all pervasive. The first [of the sentences cited] has the meaning: "this" (idam) refers to the entire visible world, "in the beginning" (agre) means prior to origination, "was existence alone" (sad evāsīt). The state prior to the world is made known by this sacred text through the statement: "this was...in the beginning".

3.162.

नन्विदं जगदुत्पत्तेः प्रागवस्थापन्नं
सच्छब्दवाच्यं वस्तु किमात्मैवाथवा तदन्यत् । आद्ये तस्यैवार्यं जगद्रूपेण परि-
णाम इत्यात्मनो विकारित्वापत्तिः । अन्त्ये 'आत्मा वा इदमेक एवाग्र आसीत्'
(ऐ० १ । १) इत्यनेन 'ब्रह्म वा इदमग्र आसीत्' (वृ० १ । ४ । १०)
इत्यनेन च जगदुत्पत्तेः प्रागवस्थाबोधकेन श्रुत्यन्तरेण सह समानार्थत्वं न
लभ्यते । तत्र ह्यात्मशब्दो ब्रह्मशब्दश्चोपात्तः । तदनुरोधेनात्रापि सच्छब्दे-
नात्मैव ग्रहीतुमुचित इति चेदुच्यते—' आत्मा वा इदमेक एवाग्र
आसीत्' (ऐ० १ । १) इति 'ब्रह्म वा इदमग्र आसीत्' (वृ० १ । ४ । १०)
इति च स्पष्टतरं प्रतिपादयन्ती श्रुतिश्छान्दोग्ये सच्छब्दमात्मार्थकमेव प्रयोक्तुम-
र्हतीति निर्विवादम् । आत्मनो विकारित्वं तु नापादनीयम् । 'स वा एष महा-
नज आत्माऽजरोऽमृतोऽभयो ब्रह्म' (वृ० ४ । ४ । २५) इति श्रुत्याऽऽत्मनो
निर्विकारत्वमतिपादनात् । श्रुत्येकशरणं यथाश्रुत्येव सर्वं स्वीकार्यम् ।

3.162. [objection] Is this entity which has acquired the state prior to the origination of the world, and which can be expressed by the word "existence", the same as the Self or is it something different? In the first case, that [Self] alone has this transformation into the form of the world and so the Self would be liable to change. In the last case, the sameness of meaning with another sacred text making known the state prior to the origination of the world is not attained, i.e. with this: "In the beginning, this was indeed the Self, one alone" (Ai.1.1.) and with this: "In the beginning, this was indeed Brahman" (Brh.1.4.10.). Because there the word "Self" and the word "Brahman" are mentioned. In accordance with

that, here too, only the Self is fit to be understood by the word "existence".

[reply] The sacred text teaching very clearly: "In the beginning, this was indeed the Self, one alone" (Ai.1.1.) and "In the beginning, this was indeed Brahman" (Brh.1.4.10.) is required to employ the word "existence" in the Chāndogya only as having the meaning of "Self". So there is no dispute. But the Self being liable to change cannot be established. Because the Self is taught as being free from change by the sacred text: "This great, birthless Self which is undecaying, immortal and without fear, is Brahman" (Brh.4.4.25.). And those who rely solely on the sacred texts must accept everything only according to the sacred texts.

3.163. ननु श्रुतिरपि मिथो विरुद्धमर्थं कथं ब्रूयात् । विरोधे भासमाने त्वन्यतरा गौणार्थप्रतिपादकतया नेया । तत्र निर्विकारत्वश्रुतिगौणार्थकतया नेतुं न शक्यते । विकारित्वेऽनित्यत्वादिदोषप्रसङ्गेन 'नित्यो नित्यानाम्' (श्वे० ६।१३) इत्यादि-
 बहुश्रुतिव्याकोपापत्तेः । किं तु निर्विकारत्वश्रुत्यनुरोधेनात्मनो जगदुपादानकार-
 णत्वश्रुतिगौणार्थप्रतिपादिका भवतु । साक्षाज्जगदुपादानकारणं सूक्ष्मं प्रधानम् ।
 तद्द्वारा परमात्मा जगदुपादानकारणमिति 'यतो वा' (तै० ३ । १ । १) इत्या-
 दीनां जगदुपादानकारणत्वप्रतिपादकश्रुतीनां तात्पर्यम् । न च साक्षाज्जगदु-
 पादानकारणस्य सूक्ष्मस्य प्रधानस्य परमात्मना सह कश्चिदन्वयो येन तद्द्वारा
 परमात्मा जगदुपादानकारणमित्युच्यते इति वाच्यम् । शरीरशरीरिभावरूपसंब-
 न्धस्य रामानुजाङ्गीकृतस्य सत्त्वात् । 'सदेव' (छा० ६ । २ । १) इति प्रकृत-
 श्रुतौ च सच्छब्देनास्पष्टनामरूपं साक्षाज्जगदुपादानकारणं सूक्ष्मशरीरविशिष्टमेवो-
 च्यते इति चेदुच्यते—उपादानकारणं द्विविधम् । परिणाम्युपादानं विवर्तोपादानं
 च । तत्र परिणाम्युपादानकारणत्वमात्मनः स्वी क्रि-
 आत्मा विवर्तोपादानम् यते चेन्निर्विकारत्वश्रुत्या विरोधः स्यान्न विवर्तोपा-
 दानत्वस्वीकारे । एवमविरोधेनोपपत्तावन्यतरस्या
 गौणार्थकत्वकल्पनमन्याय्यम् ।

3.163. [objection] How could the sacred text then tell a mutually contradictory meaning [i.e. that the Self is the material cause and yet is without change]? But when a contradiction appears, one of the two is to be interpreted as teaching a figurative meaning. The sacred text [teaching]

freedom from change cannot be interpreted as having a figurative meaning. Because in being liable to change there is the occurrence of the defect of non-eternity etc. and hence there would be contradiction with many sacred texts such as: "eternal among the eternal" (Śv.6.13.) etc. But in accordance with the sacred texts [teaching] freedom from change, the sacred texts [teaching] that the Self is the material cause of the world must teach a figurative meaning. The purport of the sacred texts which teach the nature of the material cause of the world, such as: "from which [Brahman] indeed..." [Tai.3.1.] etc., is that subtle primary matter (pradhāna) is directly the material cause of the world and by means of that [primary matter] the supreme Self is the material cause of the world.

It should not be said: what connection does the subtle primary matter which is directly the material cause of the world have with the supreme Self, due to which the supreme Self is said to be the material cause of the world by means of that [primary matter]? [reason] Because it is accepted by Rāmānuja that there is a connection which consists in the relation of body and soul.¹³⁵ In the topic under discussion, i.e. "existence alone" (Ch.6.2.1.), the indistinct name and form which is directly the material cause of the world only as qualified by a subtle body, is said by the word "existence".

[reply] A material cause is of two types. The material cause which undergoes transformation and the material cause which is an apparent transformation.¹³⁶ If the Self is accepted as being the material cause which undergoes transformation, there would be contradiction with the sacred texts [teaching] freedom from change, but there is no [such contradiction] upon the acceptance of the material cause which is an apparent transformation. When there is the logical possibility through non-contradiction in this manner, the supposition that one of the two has a figurative meaning is not correct.

किं च जगत्प्रागवस्थाप्रतिपादिकयोः 'आत्मा वा इदमेक एवाग्र आसीत्' (ऐ० १।१) ' सदेव सोम्येदमग्र आसीत्' (छा० ६।२ १) इति श्रुत्योः समानार्थत्वभङ्गस्तदवस्थ एव । आत्मशब्देन शरीरान्तःस्थस्य केवलस्यात्मनो ग्रहणात् । संच्छब्देन च शरीरविशिष्टस्य ग्रहणात् । यद्यपि शरीरशरीरिणोरभेदप्रतीतिलोके निरूढा तथापि सदात्मशब्दयोरेकार्थत्वं नोपपद्यते । तथाहि—आत्मा शरीरी, चिदचिच्च तस्य शरीरम् । एवं शरीरशरीरिभावं स्वीकर्तृणां मतेकः सदात्मशब्दयोरेकोऽर्थः । चिदचिद्रूपशरीरविशिष्टः केवलो वा । विशिष्टश्चेदप्रसिद्ध आत्मशब्दार्थः कल्प्यः स्यात् । शरीरप्रतिसंबन्धयर्थक आत्मशब्द इति हि तेषां मतम् । तथा च यथा पुत्रप्रतिसंबन्धयर्थकः पितृशब्दः पुत्रव्यतिरिक्तमेवार्थं ब्रूते तथात्मशब्दोऽपि शरीरव्यतिरिक्तमेवार्थं प्रतिपादयेत् । न च शरीरात्मनोरवयवावयविभाव एव संबन्धोऽस्त्विति वाच्यम् । जीवात्मनि तथाऽप्रसिद्धेः ।

3.164. Furthermore, the loss of the sameness of meaning [referred to in 3.162.] between the two sacred texts: "In the beginning this was indeed the Self, one alone" (Ai.1.1.) and "My dear, this was existence alone in the beginning" (Ch.6.2.1.) which teach the state prior to the world, is just like before. Because only the Self within the body is understood by the word "Self" and [the Self] qualified by a body is understood by the word "existence". Even though the cognition of non-difference between the body and the possessor of the body is conventional in the world, still, a oneness of meaning between the two words "existence" and "Self" is not logically possible.

To elaborate. The Self [i.e. the supreme Self] is the possessor of a body. The sentient [souls] and the insentient [matter] are its body. In the view of those who accept the body-soul relation in this manner, what is the single meaning for the two words "existence" and "Self"? Is it (a) qualified by a body consisting of the sentient and insentient, or (b) alone [i.e. without qualification]? If [the single meaning of the two words] is "qualified", then a meaning of the word "Self" which is not established has to be imagined. Because their [Viśiṣṭādvaitins] view is that the word "self" is meaningful in relation to a body. And so just as the word "father", which is meaningful in relation to a son, tells the

meaning of indeed being distinct from the son, so too, the word "Self" must also teach the meaning of indeed being distinct from the body. It should not be said that; the connection between the body and the Self must be only the relation that exists between part and whole. [reason] Because it is not known in that manner in respect of the individual self.

3.165. किं च विशिष्टस्यात्मत्वे ज्ञानस्यात्मैकदेशगुणत्वं स्यान्न कृत्स्नात्मगुणत्वम् । न चेष्टापत्तिः । ' यावदात्मभावित्वात्' (ब्र० सू० २ । ३ । ३०) इति सूत्रेण विज्ञानगुणस्य कृत्स्नात्मव्यापित्वस्योक्तत्वात् । ननु यावदात्मभावित्वादित्यनेनात्मवचद्गुणभूतज्ञानस्य नित्यत्वं बोध्यते न तु व्यापित्वमिति चेत्तावतापि विशिष्टस्यात्मत्वे विकारित्वादिदोषप्रसङ्गे दुर्वार एव । किं च विशिष्टस्यात्मत्व आत्मनो ज्ञानगुणकत्वस्य भवत्संमतस्यैकदेशशुचित्वेनोपपत्तावपि 'विज्ञानघनः' (वृ० २।४ । १२) इतिश्रुत्युक्तस्यात्मनो ज्ञानस्वरूपत्वस्यानुपपत्तिः । तच्च भवतापि स्वीकृतमेव । किं च विशिष्टस्यात्मत्वे ' आत्मा वा अरे द्रष्टव्यः ' (वृ० २ । ४ । ५) इत्यादिविध्यानार्थक्यम् । अयत्नसिद्धत्वादात्मदर्शनस्य । आत्मशब्दस्यात्मैकदेश इत्यर्थे तु लक्षणा स्यात् ।

3.165. Furthermore, if that which is qualified is considered to be the Self, Knowledge must be a quality of a part of the Self and not a quality of the whole Self. And that is not a desired conclusion. Because by the sūtra: "Since [the quality of Knowledge] exists wherever the Self is..." (B.S.2.3.30.)¹³⁷ the quality of Knowledge is said to pervade the whole Self.

[objection] By this: "Since [the quality of Knowledge] exists wherever the Self is...", just like the Self is eternal, the Knowledge which is its quality is made known as being eternal, but not the pervasiveness [of that Knowledge].

[reply] Even so, if what is qualified is considered to be the Self, the occurrence of defects such as being liable to change etc. is certainly difficult to be avoided.

Furthermore, if that which is qualified is considered to be the Self, although there is the logical possibility of what you accept, i.e.

that the Self has Knowledge as its quality since [Knowledge] is located in one part, there is no logical possibility that the Self is of the nature of Knowledge, which has been told by the sacred text: "a mass of Knowledge" (Brh.2.4.12.). But you too have certainly accepted that.

Furthermore, if that which is qualified is considered to be the Self, the injunction: "My dear, the Self should indeed be seen" (Brh.2.4.5.) etc. would be meaningless. Because the perception of the Self has been established without effort. But in the meaning of the word "Self" to be: "a part of the Self" there would be implication.

3.166.

अथैतद्विषयपरिजिहीर्षया केवल

एव शरीरान्तःस्थः सदात्मशब्दयोरर्थ इति चेत्प्रतिज्ञाहानिः । श्रुतौ (छा० ६ । १।३) 'एकेनात्मना ज्ञातेनान्यत्सर्वं ज्ञातं भवति' इत्युच्यते । तत्र परमात्मज्ञानेन जीवानां जडानां च ज्ञानं न संभवति । न हि चिदचिद्रूपं शरीरं मृदो घट इव परमात्मनः परिणामः । अत एव मृदादिदृष्टान्तानुरूप्यं च । किं च 'प्रकृतिश्च' (ब्र० सू० १ । ४ । २३) इति सूत्रे प्रतिपादितं परमात्मनो जगत्प्रकृतित्वं केवलस्यात्मत्वे न संभवति । प्रकृतित्वं हि द्विविधम् । विवर्तवादेन परिणामवादेन च । आद्यं प्रातिभासिकसर्पप्रकृतित्वं रज्ज्वाः । अन्त्यं घटादिप्रकृतित्वं मृदः । तत्राद्यं रामानुजमते परमात्मनो न संभवति । रामानुजीयैर्विवर्तवादानभ्युपगमात् । नापि द्वितीयम् । शरीरस्य परिणामेऽपि तदन्तःस्थस्यात्मनः केवलस्य परिणामाभावात् । अन्तःस्थितिमात्रेण प्रकृतित्वं तु दुर्वचम् । मृत्पिण्डान्तःस्थितस्याकाशस्य घटप्रकृतित्वाभावात् । तथा सूक्ष्मशरीरप्रकृतिकस्य स्थूलशरीरस्य जीवप्रकृतित्वं न केनाप्यभ्युपेयते ।

3.166. But with the desire of removing these defects, if [you say] the meaning of the two words "existence" and "Self" is just [the Self] alone who is within the body. [reply] There is loss of the proposition. It is said in the sacred text [i.e. the purport of Ch.6.1.3. is told]; through the one Self being known, all else becomes known. With regard to that, the knowledge of the individual souls and inert objects is not possible through the knowledge of the supreme Self. The body [of the supreme Self] in the form of the sentient and insentient is certainly not a transformation of the supreme Self like a pot from clay. And for this very

reason, there is a lack of congruity with the example of the clay etc.

Furthermore, the supreme Self being the material cause of the world, which is taught in the sūtra: "[Brahman] is the material cause..." (B.S.1.4.23.)¹³⁸, is not possible if that which is alone [i.e. without connection] is considered to be the Self. For a material cause is of two types: according to the teaching of "apparent transformation" and according to the teaching of "[real] transformation". The first, is a rope being the material cause of an apparent snake. The last, is clay being the material cause of pots etc. In regard to those, the first is not possible for the supreme Self according to the view of Rāmānuja. Because Rāmānuja does not accept the teaching of apparent transformation. Nor even is the second [possible]. Because although the body undergoes transformation, there is no transformation of the Self alone who is within that. But being a material cause, on account of being merely internal, is difficult to be said. Because the space which is internal to the ball of clay is not the material cause of a pot. So too, nobody accepts that the individual soul is the material cause of the physical body, which [in fact] has the subtle body as its material cause.

3.167.

किं च केवलस्यात्मत्वे सृष्टेः प्राग्जगत्प्रकृतिभू-
तस्य सूक्ष्मस्य परमात्मशरीरस्य परमात्मव्यतिरिक्तस्य सत्त्वेन 'सदेव सौन्दर्य-
दमग्र आसीत्' (छा० ६।२।१) इतिश्रुतिविरोधः । 'इदं सर्वं यदयमात्मा'
(वृ० २।४।५) इतिश्रुतिप्रतिपादितसामानाधिकरण्यानुपपत्तिश्च । इदंपदेन
परामृष्टस्य दृश्यमानस्य जगतः परमात्मशरीरत्वेऽपि परमात्मस्वरूपत्वाभावात् ।
शरीरशरीरिणोः सामानाधिकरण्येन प्रयोगस्य स्थूलोऽहं कृशोऽहमित्यादौ दर्श-
नेऽपि वस्तुतस्तयोस्तादात्म्याभावात् । सृष्टेः प्रागस्पष्टनामरूपावस्थमत्यन्तसूक्ष्ममपि
जगत्परमात्मशरीरमिति परमात्मनः सकाशाद्ब्रह्मस्तुतो भिन्नमेव त्वदर्शने । न चेदं-
पदस्यैतदन्तर्यामिरूपेऽर्थे लक्षणा । यद्वा सच्छब्दस्यात्मशब्दस्य च तच्छरीररू-
पेऽर्थे लक्षणा । तथा च सामानाधिकरण्यस्योपपत्तिरिति वाच्यम् । लक्षणार्था-
मानाभावाद्द्वैतश्च ।

3.167. Furthermore, if that which is alone [i.e. without connection] is considered to be the Self, there is contradiction with the sacred text:

"My dear, this was existence alone in the beginning" (Ch.6.2.1.) because prior to creation the subtle body of the supreme Self, which is the material cause of the world, exists as distinct from the supreme Self. And there is no logical possibility of the grammatical apposition taught by the sacred text: "all this which is, is this Self" (Brh.2.4.6.). Because although the visible world recalled by the word "this" is the body of the supreme Self, it is not the essential nature of the supreme Self. Although the usage is seen: "I am fat", "I am thin" etc. due to the grammatical apposition between the body and its possessor, there is no identity between the two in reality. Even though the world is in a state of indistinct name and form prior to the creation and is extremely subtle, it is the body of the supreme Self, and so it is certainly different in reality from the supreme Self according to your view.

It should not be said: there is an implied meaning of the word "this" in the sense of "the inner controller of this". Or there is the implied meaning of the word "existence" and the word "Self" in the sense of "the body of that [inner controller]". And so there is the logical possibility of grammatical apposition. [reason] Because there is no authority for an implied meaning. And because there is cumbrousness [in such an explanation].

- 3.168. किं च 'सदेव' (छा० ६ । २ । १) इति वाक्यं हि 'येनाश्रुतं श्रुतं भवत्य-
मतं मतमविज्ञातं विज्ञातम्' (छा० ६ । १ । ३) इति पूर्वप्रतिज्ञातार्थोपपाद-
नायोपात्तम् । तत्र येनेत्यनेन ' तमादेशमप्राक्ष्यः ' (छा० ६ । १ । २) इति-
पूर्ववाक्यस्थस्य तच्छब्दान्वितस्यादेशस्य परामर्शः । आदेशशब्दश्च भावसाधन
उपदेशवाची । कर्मसाधनश्चोपदिश्यमानात्मरूपवस्तुवाची । करणसाधनश्चोप-
देशसाधनीभूतशास्त्रवाची । त्रिधाप्यर्थोपपत्तावपि कर्मसाधन एवात्र ग्रहीतुमु-
चितः । यत उपदेशस्तत्साधनं वोपदेश्यज्ञानं जनयित्वैव सर्वविज्ञानं जनयेत् ।
किं च कर्मसाधने गृहीते सत्येवैतत्तात्पर्यकेण श्रुत्यन्तरस्थेन ' आत्मनि खल्वरे
दृष्टे श्रुते मते विज्ञात इदं सर्वं विदितम्' (वृ० ४ । ५ । ६) इत्यनेन वाक्येन
समानार्थत्वं लभ्यते । तत्र ह्युपदिश्यमानात्मरूपवस्तुज्ञानजन्यं सर्ववेदनमिति
स्पष्टमेवोक्तम् । तदनुरोधेन ' येनाश्रुतम् ' (छा० ६ । १ । ३) इति च्छान्दोग्य-

स्थवाक्येऽपि येनेत्यनेनोपदिश्यमानस्यात्मनो ग्रहण आत्मविज्ञानजन्यं सर्व-
विज्ञानमित्येवं समानार्थत्वमुपपद्यते । कर्मसाधनस्यादेशशब्दस्य ग्रहण एव ह्युप-
दिश्यमानात्मरूपवस्तुनो येनेत्यनेन परामर्शो लभ्यते नान्यथा । अत एव च
' कस्मिन्नु भगवो विज्ञाते सर्वमिदं विज्ञातं भवति ' (मु० १ । १ । ३) इति
मुण्डकश्रुतिस्मृतिसूता भवति । तत्र हि कस्मिन्विज्ञात इत्येवं सर्वविज्ञानसाधनी-
भूतज्ञानकर्मैव पृष्टम् ।

3.168. Furthermore, the sentence: "existence alone" (Ch.6.2.1.) is mentioned to logically demonstrate the meaning of what had been previously stated: "Through which, what is unheard becomes heard, what is not thought becomes thought of, what is unknown becomes known" (Ch.6.1.3.). There [in the above sentence], by this [word] "Through which" there is the recollection of the instruction connected with the word "that" in the previous sentence: "did you ask for that instruction?". The word "instruction" is a functional derivation [i.e. it has the meaning of the verbal root] signifying teaching. And it gives the meaning of the object, i.e. it signifies the entity -the Self- which is being taught. And it is an instrumental derivation signifying the scripture which is the means of instruction. Though there is the logical possibility that the meaning too is in three parts, it is proper here to accept only the derivation which gives the meaning of the object. Because teaching or the means for that can produce the knowledge of everything only by producing the knowledge of what is to be taught.

Furthermore, only when the derivation which gives the meaning of the object is accepted is the sameness of meaning gained with this sentence: "indeed my dear, when the Self is seen, i.e. when it is heard, reflected upon and known, all this is known" (Brh.4.5.6.) which is located within another sacred text and which has this [meaning of the object] as its purport. Because there, it is very clearly told that the knowledge of everything is to be gained from the knowledge of an entity in the form of the Self which is being taught. In accordance with that,

the sameness of meaning in the manner that: the knowledge of everything is to be gained from the knowledge of the Self, is logically possible upon accepting that the Self is what is being taught by this [word] "Through which" even in the Chāndogya sentence: "Through which, what is unheard..." (Ch.6.1.3.). Because only upon accepting that the word "instruction" gives the meaning of the object is the recollection of the entity in the form of the Self which is being taught gained by this [word] "Through which". Not otherwise. And for this very reason, the Mundaka sacred text too: "Revered sir, when what is known does all this become known?" (Mu.1.1.3.) is conformed to. Because there, only the object of the knowledge which is the means for the knowledge of everything has been asked: "when what is known?".

3.169. अथ 'येनाश्रुतं श्रुतम्' (छा० ६।१।३) इत्यत्र यच्छब्दनिर्दिष्टात्साधन-
ज्ञानकर्माभूतादात्मनः सकाशात्साध्यविज्ञानकर्माभूतं श्रुतं मतं विज्ञातमितिशब्दै-
रुक्तं सर्वं वस्तुजातमनन्यदन्यद्वा । अनन्यत्वे न किमप्यनेन वाक्येन प्रतिपादितं
भवति । न हि घटेन विज्ञातेन घटो विज्ञातो भवतीत्युच्यमाने किमप्युक्तं भवति ।
अन्यत्वे तु मिथो भिन्नयोः पदार्थयोर्मध्य एकस्य विज्ञानेनान्यस्य विज्ञानं दुष्क-
रम् । न हि घटेन विज्ञातेन पटो विज्ञातो भवति । मिथः संबद्धयोरपि वस्तुतो
भिन्नयोरेवमेव । न हि देवदत्ते विज्ञाते तत्पुत्रो विज्ञातो भवति । न वा दण्डे
विज्ञाते घटो विज्ञातो भवति । यद्यपि दण्डे घटकारणत्वेन रूपेण ज्ञाते घटो दण्ड-
कार्यत्वेन रूपेण ज्ञातो भवति तथापि न तज्ज्ञानं वस्तुस्वरूपपरिचायकम् ।
स्वरूपपरिचायकं च यज्ज्ञानं तदेव विज्ञानशब्देनोच्यते । स्वरूपपरिचायकं ज्ञानं
हि सर्वज्ञानमूलभूतम् । स्वरूपपरिचयं विनेतरसंबन्धित्वेन ज्ञानासंभवात् । घट-
कारणत्वेन दण्डे ज्ञातेऽपि कम्बुग्रीवादिना स्वरूपेणापरिचितो घटः प्रत्यक्षतो
दृष्टोऽपि न दण्डकार्यत्वेन ज्ञातुं शक्यते । श्रुतौ च विज्ञातं भवतीत्युच्यते । तथा
विदधातुः स्वरूपपरिचायकज्ञानवाच्येव । 'यः सर्वज्ञः सर्ववित्' (मु० १।१।९)
'ब्रह्मविदामोति परम्' (तै० २।१) इत्यादौ तथा दर्शनात् । अत एवोक्त-
वृहदारण्यकश्रुतौ 'इदं सर्वं विदितम्' (वृ० ४।५।६) इत्युच्यते । तदेवं
साधनसाध्यज्ञानकर्मणोरन्यत्वानन्यत्वरूपकल्पद्वयस्यापि वक्तुमशक्यतया 'येना-
श्रुतम्' (छा० ६।१।३) इति श्रुतेः का गतिरिति चेत्—

3.169. [objection] Is the entire collection of things said by the words:
"heard", "thought" and "known", which is the object of the knowledge to

be gained, non-different or different from the Self which is the object of the knowledge which is the means and which is indicated by the word "which" here: "Through which, what is unheard becomes heard" (Ch.6.1.3.)? If it is non-different, nothing whatsoever is taught by this sentence. For nothing whatsoever is told when it is said: through the pot being known, the pot is known.

But if it is different, then between two things which are mutually distinct, by the knowledge of one the knowledge of the other is difficult. For through the pot being known the cloth is not known. The same applies to two things which, though mutually connected, are in reality different. For when Devadatta is known his son is not known. Or when the [potter's] stick is known the pot is not known.

Even though when the stick is known as the cause of the pot the pot becomes known as the effect of the stick, still, that knowledge does not make known the essential nature of the thing. The knowledge which makes known the essential nature is indeed said by the word "knowledge" (viññāna). The knowledge which makes known the essential nature [of a thing] is the basis of all knowledge. Because without knowledge of the essential nature there is no possibility of knowledge by having a connection to another. Even when the stick is known as the cause of the pot, the pot which is not known in its essential nature as having a conch-shaped neck etc. cannot be known as the effect of the stick even though it is seen right before the eyes. And in the sacred text it is said: "[what is unknown] becomes known (viññāta)". So too, the verbal root vid ["to know"] only signifies the knowledge which makes known the essential nature. Because it is seen in that manner in: "The one who is omniscient and all knowing" (Mu.1.1.9.) and in: "The knower of Brahman attains the supreme" (Tai.2.1.) etc. For this very reason, "all this is known" (Brh.4.5.6.) is said in the Brhadāraṇyaka sacred text which was previously cited [cf., 3.168.]. Thus what is the scope of the sacred text:

"Through which, what is unheard..." (Ch.6.1.3.)? Because even the twofold alternative in the form of difference or non-difference between the object of the knowledge which is the means and the object of the knowledge to be gained cannot be stated.

3.170. अत्रोच्यते । साधनज्ञानकर्माभूतादात्मनः सकाशात्साध्यज्ञानकर्माभूतं सर्वं वस्तुतोऽनन्यदेव सदन्यत्वेन प्रतिभाति । अन्यत्वेन प्रतिभानसत्त्वान्न 'घटेन विज्ञातेन घटो विज्ञातो भवति' इति वाक्यस्येवानर्थक्यम् । अन्यत्वेन प्रतिभानकाल एव चोक्तप्रतिज्ञावाक्यार्थापेक्षा न तत्त्वज्ञानोत्तरम् । नाप्यन्यत्वकल्पोक्तो दोषः । सर्ववस्तूनामात्मनः सकाशाद्दस्तुतोऽनन्यत्वेनात्मज्ञानस्यैव घटपटाद्यखिलवस्तुस्वरूपपरिचायकज्ञानत्वात् । यद्यप्यात्मज्ञानेन घटपटादिवस्तूनां कम्बुग्रीवादिमत्त्वादिना तत्तद्वस्तुस्वरूपेण परिचयो न भवति तथापि न दोषः । यतो घटस्य कम्बुग्रीवादिमत्त्वं स्वरूपं यल्लोकदृष्ट्या सत्यतया भासते तन्न परमार्थतः सत्यम् । किं तु सत्यं घटस्वरूपं मृदेव । तथा च दृष्टान्ते 'मृत्तिकेत्येव सत्यम्' (छा० ६ । १ । ४) इत्युक्तम् । तदनुरोधेन दार्ष्टान्तिकेऽपि सर्वस्य वस्तुनः संप्रति भासमानं स्वरूपं न सत्यमित्यास्येयम् । मृत्स्वरूपस्यापि सत्यत्वं तत्कार्यभूतघटाद्यपेक्षया । कारणापेक्षया तु न सत्यत्वम् । मृत्तिकेत्येव सत्यमित्युक्तिस्तु प्रसिद्धचनुरोधेन घटादिकार्यापेक्षया बोध्या ।

3.170. [reply] In this matter, it is said: everything, which is the object of the knowledge to be gained and which exists in reality as certainly non-different from the Self which is the object of the knowledge which is the means, appears as different. Because of the existence of the appearance as being different there is no meaninglessness like there is for the sentence: through the pot being known, the pot is known. The requirement of the meaning of the sentence concerning the declaration which was told [i.e. "Through which, what is unheard..."] is only at the time of the appearance as being different, not after the knowledge of reality.

Nor even is a defect said through the alternative of difference. Since all things are in reality non-different from the Self, therefore only the knowledge of the Self is the knowledge which makes known the

essential nature of all things such as a pot, cloth etc. Although through the knowledge of the Self there is no knowledge of things like a pot, cloth etc. in terms of the essential nature of the respective object such as having a conch-shaped neck etc., still, there is no defect. Because the essential nature of a pot as having a conch-shaped neck etc., which appears as reality according to the ordinary view, is not real in reality. But only the clay, which is the essential nature of the pot, is real. Accordingly, it was said in the example: "the clay alone is real" (Ch.6.1.4.). In accordance with that, in the subject matter of the example too it has to be acknowledged that the essential nature of every thing appearing now is not real. The reality of even the essential nature which is clay is with regard to the pots etc. which are its effects. But with regard to [its] cause, [clay] has no reality. But the statement: "the clay alone is real" must be understood with regard to the effects such as pots etc. in accordance with what is well known.

3.171. एवं स्थिते 'येनाश्रुतम्' (छा० ६ । १ । ३) इति प्रतिज्ञातोऽर्थः श्रुत्या मृदादिदृष्टान्तान्प्रदर्श्य संभवदुक्तिकतां नीतः 'सदेव सोम्येदमग्र आसीत्' (छा० ६ । २ । १) इत्यनेनोपपाद्यते । 'जगत्सत्यं परमात्मनः सकाशाद्भिन्नं परमात्मशरीरभूतम्' इत्येवंवादिनां रामानुजीयानां तु मते सदेवेति श्रुतौ सच्छब्दस्येदंशब्दस्य वा लक्षणया सामानाधिकरण्योपपत्तावपि पूर्वप्रतिज्ञातार्थो नोपपादितो भवति । आत्मज्ञानेन जगत्स्वरूपपरिचायकज्ञानोत्पत्त्यसंभवात् । नापि मृदादिदृष्टान्तानुगुण्यम् । न हि घटो मृदः शरीरम् । यद्यप्यद्वैतवादिमते जगन्न 'ब्रह्मणः परिणामः । ब्रह्मणो निर्विकारत्वात् । किं तु विवर्तः । घटादयस्तु मृदः परिणामाः' इत्येवं दृष्टान्तदार्ष्टान्तिकयोर्वैपन्यं तथापि न क्षतिः । न हि दृष्टान्तदार्ष्टान्तिकयोः सर्वांशेन साम्यमपेक्ष्यते । तथात्वे हि कस्यापि कोऽपि दृष्टान्तो न स्यात् । सर्वांशेन साम्यं हि स्वस्य स्वेनैवायाति न तु परेण । किंतु येनांशेन दृष्टान्तः प्रतिपिपादयिषितस्तेनांशेन साम्यमपेक्ष्यते ।

3.171. When that is so, the meaning which was stated: "Through which, what is unheard..." (Ch.6.1.3.), which has been rendered as a statement having possibility by the sacred text having shown the examples of the

clay etc., is logically proved by this: "My dear, this was existence alone in the beginning" (Ch.6.2.1.). But in the view of Rāmānuja who teaches in this manner: "the world is real, it is the body of the supreme Self and it is different from the supreme Self", even though there is the logical possibility of grammatical apposition of the word "existence" or the word "this" through implication in the sacred text: "existence alone", the meaning which was previously stated ["Through which, what is unheard becomes heard..."] is not logically proved. Because by the knowledge of the Self there is no possibility of the production of the knowledge which makes known the essential nature of the world. Nor even is there congruity with the examples of the clay etc. For the pot is not the body of the clay.

Although according to the view of the exponents of non-duality there is dissimilarity between the example and the subject matter of the example in the manner: the world is not a transformation of Brahman. Because Brahman is without change. But [the world] is an apparent transformation. Pots etc., however, are transformations of clay. Nevertheless, there is no impairment. Because the similarity between the example and the subject matter of the example is not required in all aspects. For if that was so, there could be no example at all about anything. Because a similarity in all aspects occurs for itself [A] with itself [A] alone, but not with another. But the example is required to be similar in that aspect by reason of which one wants to teach it.

- 3.172. प्रकृते तु ' एकविज्ञानेन सर्वाविज्ञानं तत्र हेतुश्च साधनज्ञानकर्मीभूतस्य सत्यत्वं साध्यज्ञानकर्मीभूतस्य त्वसत्यत्वमेवेति ' इत्यस्मिन्नंशे दृष्टान्तो विवक्षितः । ' मृत्तिकेत्येव सत्यम् ' इत्येवशब्दघटितवाक्येन तथा श्रुतितात्पर्यस्य स्पष्टमेव प्रतिपन्नत्वात् । एवं च कार्यगतसत्यांशज्ञानं तदीयोपादानकारणस्वरूपज्ञानाधीनं यथा मृदघटादिषु दृश्यते तथा जगत्सत्यांशज्ञानं जगदुपादानकारणज्ञानाधीनमिति प्रदर्शयितुं जगदुपादानकारणज्ञानाय जगत उत्पत्तेः प्रागवस्था 'सदेव' इति श्रुत्या प्रदर्श्यते । जगति भासमाना येऽखिला विशेषास्तदपनयनपूर्विका या सामा-

न्यावस्थाऽस्तित्वमात्ररूपा सामान्यस्य परा काष्ठा सा सच्छब्देनोच्यते । तदेव च निर्विशेषसन्मात्ररूपं ब्रह्म । एवकारेण च सर्वे विशेषा निरस्यन्त इति निर्विशेषसन्मात्रब्रह्मबोधकमेवैतद्वाक्यम् । यथा यथा जगदुत्पत्तिस्तथा तथा विशेषाः प्रतिभासन्त इति ब्रह्मणः सविशेषत्वमौपाधिकमेव । तत्प्रतिपादकानि सविशेषवाक्यानीति न कापि श्रुतिर्विरुध्यते ।

3.172. But in the topic under consideration, the example is intended to be told in this aspect: by the knowledge of one thing there is the knowledge of everything. And the reason for that is the object of the knowledge which is the means is real, whereas the object of the knowledge to be gained is certainly unreal. Because the purport of the sacred text in that manner is demonstrated very clearly by the sentence connected with the word "alone": "the clay alone is real". Thus in order to show that: "the knowledge of the real portion belonging to the effect is dependent upon the knowledge of the essential nature which is the material cause belonging to that [effect]. Just as it is seen in the case of clay and pots etc., so too, the knowledge of the real portion of the world is dependent upon the knowledge of the material cause of the world"; the state prior to the origination of the world is shown by the sacred text: "existence alone" for the knowledge of the material cause of the world.

Regarding all the distinctions appearing in the world, the state of the universal which is preceded by the removal of those [distinctions] is in the form of pure "is-ness", which is the supreme limit of the universal, and that is what is said by the word "existence". And that alone is Brahman, in the form of pure existence free from distinction. And by the word "alone" [in the sentence: "existence alone..."] all distinctions are removed. Hence this sentence certainly indicates Brahman which is pure existence free from distinction. In whatever manner there is the origination of the world, in that manner distinctions appear. So Brahman possessing distinction is only in relation to a limiting adjunct.

The sentences [denoting] the possession of distinction teach that [i.e. Brahman possesses distinction in relation to a limiting adjunct]. Thus no sacred text whatsoever is contradicted.

3.173. केचित्तु सदेवेत्यत्र सच्छब्देन जगदुपादानकारणमव्याकृतनामरूपावस्थं सूक्ष्मं प्रधानमेवोच्यते । एवशब्देन चाधुना दृश्यमानस्य व्याकृतनामरूपत्वस्य व्यावृत्तिरित्याहुः । तन्न । सच्छब्दो ह्यसधातोः शतृप्रत्ययेन साधितः । तस्य चास्तित्वमात्रं प्रवृत्तिनिमित्तम् । न त्वव्याकृतनामरूपत्वरूपस्तद्विशेषः । न च श्रुतावग्र इत्युच्यते । तस्य चोत्पत्तेः पूर्वमित्यर्थः । तदानीं चास्पष्टनामरूपत्वमेवेत्यग्रेपदसमाभिव्याहारेणाव्याकृतनामरूपत्वरूपविशेषार्थावगतिरिति वाच्यम् । तथाप्येवकारेण व्याकृतनामरूपत्वस्य व्यवच्छेदानापत्तिः । व्युत्पत्तिसिद्धौ ह्ययं नियमो यत्स्वान्वयिपदशक्यतावच्छेदकधर्मानवच्छिन्नमेवैवकारेण व्यवच्छिद्यतेऽपिशब्देन च तदेव समुच्चीयते । न ह्ययं ब्राह्मण एवेत्यत्र प्रकरणादिना देवदत्तादिब्राह्मणविशेषावगतावप्येवकारेण यज्ञदत्तो व्यवच्छिद्यते । तस्यापि ब्राह्मणपदशक्यतावच्छेदकीभूतब्राह्मणत्वरूपधर्मावच्छिन्नत्वात् । तथा प्रकृते व्याकृतनामरूपस्य सत्पदशक्यतावच्छेदकीभूतास्तित्वावच्छिन्नत्वेन कथं तस्य सदेवेत्येवकारेण व्यावृत्तिः । एवं च सच्छब्दोऽस्तित्वमात्रवाचीति. सदेवेति श्रुतेर्निर्विशेषब्रह्मप्रतिपादकत्वं सिद्धम् ।

3:173. But some say: the material cause of the world said by the word "existence" here: "existence alone" is only the subtle primary matter which is in a state of unmanifest name and form. And by the word "alone" there is the exclusion of the manifest name and form seen now. [reply] That is not so. Because the word "existence" (sat) is brought about by the affix śatṛ [i.e. at] to the verbal root asa ["to be"]. The reason for the usage of that [word "existence"] is [to signify] pure "is-ness". But not a distinction of that [existence] in the form of unmanifest name and form. It should not be said: "in the beginning" (agre) is said in the sacred text. The meaning of that is: prior to origination. And at that time, because of the mentioning of the word "in the beginning" [as having the meaning]: "there was only indistinct name and form", there is the understanding of the particular meaning of "unmanifest name and form". [reason] Even so, there is no separation of manifest name and form

by the word "alone" [supra.]. Because this rule is established by etymology: what is separated by the word "alone" is only what has not been qualified by the attribute which determines the reason for the use of the word connected to itself and that [what is separated] is indeed connected by the word "also". Even in the understanding of a particular brāhmaṇa such as Devadatta through the context etc. here: "this one alone is a brāhmaṇa", Yajñadatta is certainly not separated by the word "alone". Because he too is qualified by the attribute of being a brāhmaṇa which determines the reason for the use of the word "brāhmaṇa". Similarly, in the topic under discussion, because manifest name and form is qualified by "is-ness" which determines the reason for the use of the word "existence", how is there exclusion of that [manifest name and form] by the word "alone" [in the sentence]: "existence alone"? Thus the word "existence" signifies pure "is-ness" and so the sacred text: "existence alone" is established as teaching Brahman free from distinction.

3.174. 'अथ परा' (मु० १।१।५) इति श्रुतिरपि निर्विशेषब्रह्मप्रतिपादिकैव ।
 अथ परा यया तदक्षरमधिगम्यते । अत्र पर-
 अथ परेतिश्रुतेर्निर्विशेषा- विद्याप्राप्यमक्षरमित्युच्यते । न क्षरतीत्यक्षरम-
 र्थकत्वम् विनाशि । अक्षरशब्दस्याविनाशित्वं प्रवृत्तिनि-
 मित्तम् । विनाशाभाव इति वावत् । तथा च पर-
 विद्याप्राप्यस्य वस्तुनो निषेधमुखेनैव प्रथमत उल्लेखः । अनेन तद्वस्तु निर्वि-
 शेषमिति सूच्यते । ततः कथंभूतं तद्वस्त्वित्यपेक्षायामाह—

यत्तद्रेश्यमग्राह्यमगोत्रमवर्णमचक्षुःश्रोत्रं तदपाणिपादम् ।

नित्यं विभुं सर्वगतं सुसूक्ष्मं यद्भूतयोनिं परिपश्यन्ति धीराः ॥

अद्रेश्यं प्रत्यक्षागोचरम् । अग्राह्यमनुमानाद्यगोचरं कर्मेन्द्रियागोचरं वा । अगो-
 त्रमनामकम् । अवर्णं नीलादिवर्णरहितम् । अचक्षुःश्रोत्रं ज्ञानेन्द्रियरहितम् ।
 अपाणिपादं कर्मेन्द्रियरहितम् । चक्षुःश्रोत्रशब्देन ज्ञानेन्द्रियाणि पाणिपादशब्देन
 कर्मेन्द्रियाणि चोपलक्ष्यन्ते । एवं चरणद्वयेन प्राप्यवस्तु निषेधमुखेन प्रतिपादितम् ।
 यद्यपि कस्यचिद्वस्तुनो विधिमुखेन वर्णनमीदृशं तादृशमित्येवंरूपेण क्रियमाणं यथा
 वस्तुस्वरूपपरिचायकं भवति न तथा निषेधमुखेन वर्णनमिति विधिमुखेन
 वर्णनमेवादानुचितं तथापि प्रकृते परविद्याप्राप्यस्य वस्तुनो विधिमुखेन वर्णनं

वस्तुतो नैव संभवतीति ध्वनयितुं श्रुतेस्तथा प्रक्रमः । उत्तरार्धे यद्यपि नित्यं विभुमित्येवं तृतीयचरणे विधिमुखेन वर्णनं मुखे भासते तथापि पर्यवसानं निषेधमुख एव । नित्यं कालतःपरिच्छेदरहितम् । विभुं देशतःपरिच्छेदरहितम् । सर्वगतं वस्तुतःपरिच्छेदरहितम् । अनेन त्रिविधपरिच्छेदराहित्यमुक्तम् । अतो नात्र कश्चिद्धर्मो विधिमुखेन बोध्यते ।

3.174. The sacred text too: "Then there is the higher" (Mu.1.1.5.) only teaches that Brahman is free from distinction. "Then there is the higher [knowledge] by which that Imperishable is attained." Here, what is to be gained by the higher knowledge is said as: "Imperishable". Imperishable (akṣara) means it does not perish (na kṣarati), i.e. it is indestructible. Indestructibility is the reason for the use of the word "imperishable". The meaning is: the absence of destruction. And so the mention of the entity to be gained by the higher knowledge is firstly only by way of a negative statement. On account of this, that entity is indicated to be free from distinction.

Then, in the expectation: "of what nature is that entity?", [the sage Aṅgiras] says:

The wise behold that which cannot be seen, cannot be grasped, which is without a source, without colour, without eyes and ears, which has neither hands nor feet, which is eternal, all pervasive, omnipresent, extremely subtle and which is the source of [all] beings (Mu.1.1.6.).¹³⁹

"Cannot be seen" means that it is not within the scope of perception. "Cannot be grasped" means that it is not within the scope of inference etc., or that it is not within the scope of the organs of action. "Without a source" means that it is without a name. "Without colour" means that it is free from colour such as blue etc. "Without eyes and ears" means that it is without the organs of knowledge. "Having neither hands nor feet" means that it is without the organs of action. The organs of knowledge

are implied by the words "eyes and ears" and the organs of action are implied by the words "hands and feet". So in the first two quarters [of the verse] the entity to be gained is taught by way of negative statements. The procedure of the sacred text is to allude thus: although the description of some entity by way of a positive statement which is done in the manner: "such and such" is what makes known the essential nature of the object as it is and the description by way of a negative statement does not do so and hence only the description by way of a positive statement is proper at the beginning, still, in the topic under discussion, the description of the entity to be gained by the higher knowledge is certainly not possible, in reality, by way of a positive statement.

In the latter half, even though the description by way of a positive statement appears at the outset in the third quarter [of the verse]: "eternal", "all pervasive", nevertheless, the final conclusion is only in the manner of a negative statement. "Eternal" means free from the limitation due to time. "All pervasive" means free from the limitation due to location. "Omnipresent" means free from the limitation due to objects. On account of this, freedom from the three types of limitation has been told. Therefore no attribute whatsoever is made known here by way of a positive statement.

3.175.

ननु यद्यद्रेश्यमित्यादिना दृश्यत्वा-
दिविशेषराहित्यमुच्यते; तर्हि तद्वस्तु नैव स्यादिति चेत्तत्राह—सुसूक्ष्ममिति ।
अदृश्यत्वादिषु न तुच्छत्वं हेतुः किंतु सूक्ष्मत्वमित्याशयः । अत्रापि निषेध-
मुखेन प्रवृत्तावेव पर्यवसानम् । अदृश्यत्वे न सूक्ष्मत्वं साक्षाद्धेतुः । किं
त्वदृश्यत्वसमनियतः स्थूलत्वाभावः । दृश्यत्वे स्थूलत्वस्य प्रयोजकत्वात् । तथा
च सुसूक्ष्ममित्यस्य स्थूलत्वरहित्ये तात्पर्यम् । ननु नित्यं विश्रुमित्यत्र निषेध-
मुखेन प्रवृत्तौ पर्यवसानेऽपि विधिमुखेन प्रवृत्तिर्मुखे किमर्थं स्वीकृतेति चेन्न ।
सविशेषेश्वरज्ञानप्रणाड्या निर्विशेषवस्तुसाक्षात्कार इत्येतत्सूचयितुं तत्स्वीका-
रात् । सोपाधिक ईश्वरे तस्याः संभवात् । तदेतद्दर्शयति—यद्भूतयोनिमिति ।
भूतयोर्नि जगत्कारणम् । जगत्कारणत्वादिविशेषवत्त्वेन यदेतद्धीरैर्दृश्यते तद्वस्तु
वस्तुतो निर्विशेषमेवेति तात्पर्यम् । धीरा धैर्यशालिनः । धैर्यं चैवं क्रमेण नि-
र्विशेषवस्तुसाक्षात्कारो भविष्यतीति बुद्धिदाढ्यम् । जगत्कारणत्वादिविशेष-

मारोप्य सविशेषवस्तुध्यानं निर्विशेषसाक्षात्कारोपाय एव । तथा च 'अदृश्यम्'
 'परिपश्यन्ति' इत्यनयोर्न विरोधः । वस्तुतोऽदृश्यमेव वस्त्वारोपेण पश्यन्ति ।
 न तु 'निर्विशेषं वस्तु सर्वथा नास्त्येव' इति भ्रमितव्यम् । अदृश्यमित्यादि-
 श्रुतिविरोधात् । अधीराणामदृश्यं धीराः परिपश्यन्तीति व्याख्यानं तु न चेतसि
 चमत्कारं विधत्ते । यत्तददृश्यमग्राह्यमगोत्रमित्यादिवाक्यप्रवाहस्वारस्यभङ्गपत्तेः ।
 एवं च वस्तु निर्विशेषमिति सिद्धम् । अग्रेऽपि

'यस्मात्परं नापरमस्ति किञ्चिद्यस्मान्नाणीयो न ज्यायोऽस्ति कश्चित्'
 (मु० १ । १ । ७)

इति मन्त्रे निषेधमुखेन निर्विशेषमेव वस्तु प्रतिपाद्यते । यद्यप्ययं मन्त्रः सर्वेषु
 पुस्तकेषु न दृश्यते तथापि केषुचिद्दृश्यत एव । तथा चाथ परेति श्रुतेर्निर्विशेष-
 ब्रह्मप्रतिपादकत्वं सिद्धम् ।

3.175. [objection] If freedom from distinctions such as the quality of being visible etc. is told by: "cannot be seen" etc., then that entity cannot indeed exist.

[reply] He says there: "extremely subtle". The meaning is that fictitiousness is not the reason for not being visible etc., but rather extreme subtlety [is the reason]. Here too, the final conclusion is only in an operation by way of a negative statement. Extreme subtlety is not the direct reason for not being visible. But rather the absence of being gross is invariably concomitant with not being visible. Because being gross is the criterion for visibility. And so the purport of this: "extremely subtle" is freedom from being gross.

[objection] Though the final conclusion is in the operation by way of a negative statement here: "eternal, all pervasive", why has the operation by way of a positive statement been accepted at the outset?

[reply] No. Because there is the acceptance of that [a positive statement] in order to indicate this: the immediate apprehension of the entity free from distinction is through the medium of the knowledge of the Lord who possesses distinction. Because that [operation by way of a positive statement] is possible with regard to the Lord who possesses a limiting adjunct. He [the sage Aṅgiras] shows this: "which is the source

of [all] beings". "The source of [all] beings" means the cause of the world. The purport is: what is seen by the wise as possessing distinctions such as being the cause of the world etc., that entity, in reality, is indeed free from distinction. "The wise" means those who are endowed with steadiness. Steadiness is the firmness of intellect that: in this manner there will be the immediate apprehension of the entity free from distinction in due course. Having superimposed the distinction of being the cause of the world etc., meditation upon the entity possessing distinction is certainly the means for the immediate apprehension which is free from distinction. And so there is no contradiction between these two: "cannot be seen" and "they behold". Due to superimposition they see the entity which, in reality, certainly cannot be seen. But it must not be mistaken that: an entity free from distinction certainly does not at all exist. [reason] Because there is contradiction with the sacred text: "cannot be seen" etc. But the explanation: "the wise behold what cannot be seen by the unwise" does not produce admiration in the mind. Because the result is the loss of the natural flow of the sentence: "that which cannot be seen, cannot be grasped, which is without a source" etc. Thus it is established that the entity is free from distinction.

Even further on, an entity which is certainly free from distinction is taught by way of negative statements in the sacred verse:

There is nothing higher and lower than which,

there is no one smaller or greater than which (Mu.1.1.7.).¹⁴⁰

Although this sacred verse is not seen in all books, nevertheless it is certainly seen in some. And so it is established that the sacred text: "Then there is the higher..." teaches that Brahman is free from distinction.

3.176. 'सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तं ब्रह्म' (तै० २।१।१) इत्यपि श्रुतिर्निर्विशेषब्रह्मपरैव ।
उत्रानन्तशब्दस्याविनाशित्वं प्रवृत्तिनिमित्तम् ।

सत्यं ज्ञानमिति श्रुते- विनाशाभाव इति यावत् । अभावेन च न वस्तुनः
निर्विशेषार्थकत्वम् सविशेषत्वमिति प्राक् (पृ० ७१) उक्तमेव ।

सत्यशब्दादपि न सविशेषप्रतीतिः । तथाहि-सच्छ-
ब्दोऽस्तितामात्रप्रवृत्तिनिमित्तको यत्र सामान्यस्य परा काष्ठा तादृशं निर्विशेषं
सन्मात्रं ब्रूत इति प्रागुक्तमेव । युक्तं चैतत् । 'सदेव सोम्य' (छा० ६।२।१)
इति वाक्यं हि जगत्प्रागवस्थाबोधकम् । जगन्मूलकारणीभूतस्य जगत्प्राग-
वस्थापन्नस्य वस्तुनः सविशेषत्वे तस्य मूलकारणत्वं न संभवति । विशेषाणां
सामान्यपूर्वकत्वेन मूलकारणस्य निर्विशेषस्यावश्यवाच्यत्वात् । अस्तित्वेन तु
न सविशेषत्वं वाच्यम् । तथात्वे तस्य विशेषत्वं यत्सामान्यनिरूपितं तस्यैवास्म-
न्मतेऽस्तिशब्दवाच्यत्वात् । निरूपकाणां ह्ययमस्तिशब्दः सर्वसामान्यभूतवस्तुवा-
चकः ।

3.176. The sacred text too: "Brahman is real, Knowledge, limitless" (Tai.2.1.1.) only relates to Brahman free from distinction. The nature of being indestructible is the reason for the use of the word "limitless" there. The meaning is: the absence of destruction. And it was certainly told previously (3.55.) that a thing does not possess distinction because of the absence [of an attribute]. There is no cognition of the possession of distinction even on account of the word "real" (satya). To explain. It was mentioned just previously (3.172.) that the word "existence" (sat) has pure "is-ness" as its reason for use. Where there is the supreme limit of the universal, it refers to such pure existence free from distinction. This is correct. Because the sentence: "My dear, existence alone" (Ch.6.2.1.) makes known the state prior to the world. If the entity which has gained the state prior to the world, which is the primary cause of the world, should possess distinction, then it is not possible to be the primary cause. Because distinctions are preceded by a universal, therefore the primary cause must be necessarily said as free from distinction. But the possession of distinction cannot be stated by "is-ness". If that was so, its distinction is indicated by the universal, therefore in our view that [universal] alone can be expressed by the word "is". Because among the things which indicate [existence], this word "is" directly expresses the entity which is the universal of

everything.

comment

The statement: "among the things which indicate (nirūpaka) [existence]", refers to expressions like: "the pot is", "the cloth is", "the pot has existence" etc. In such statements, the pot is the substantive (viśeṣya) while existence is the qualifying attribute (viśeṣaṇa) which is universal to all the particulars such as pot and cloth etc.

3.177.

ब्रह्मशब्दोऽपि तथैव । बृंहणाद्ब्रह्म । बृंहणं सर्वव्यापनम् । सामान्येन हि विशेषा व्याप्ता भवन्ति न तु विशेषेण सामान्यम् । तथा च बृहत्त्वेनापि न ब्रह्मणः सविशेषत्वम् । बृहत्त्वस्य विशेषरूपत्वे तादृशविशेषनिरूपकं यत्सामान्यं स्यात्तद्बृहत्त्वाश्रयेण ब्रह्मणा न व्याप्तं स्यादिति ब्रह्मणः सर्वव्यापकत्वासंभवात् । आत्मशब्दोऽप्येवम् । अतति व्याप्नोतीत्यात्मेत्यात्मशब्दव्युत्पत्तेः । एतदभिप्रायेणैव श्रुत्या 'ब्रह्म वा इदम्' (वृ० १।४।१०) 'आत्मा वा इदम्' (ऐ० १।१) इत्यत्र जगत्प्रागवस्थाबोधके वाक्ये ब्रह्मशब्द आत्मशब्दश्च प्रयुक्तः । एवं स्थिते 'ब्रह्मविदाप्नोति परम्' (तै० २।१) इत्युपक्रम्य तादृशब्रह्मणो लक्षणं प्रतिपादयितुं प्रवृत्ता 'सत्यं ज्ञानम्' इति श्रुतिः कथं सविशेषं ब्रह्म बोधयेत् । तथा च सत्यपदस्यासत्याद्वावृत्तमित्यर्थ एव तात्पर्यम् ।

3.177. The word "Brahman" too is exactly the same. "Brahman" has the sense of "expanding". Expanding means pervading everything. Because the distinctions are pervaded by the universal, not the universal by the distinction. And so Brahman does not possess distinction even on account of vastness. If vastness is a distinction, the universal which would indicate such a distinction could not be pervaded by Brahman who is the locus of vastness and thus Brahman has no possibility of pervading everything.

The word "Self" is also the same. Because the etymological derivation of the word "Self" is; the Self (ātman) means "it goes" (atati) in the sense that "it pervades" (vyāpnoti). The word "Brahman" and the word "Self" are used by the sacred text only with this intention [i.e. to denote that they pervade all distinctions and hence are free from distinction] in the sentence which makes known the state prior to the

world: "This was indeed Brahman" (Brh.1.4.10.), "This was indeed the Self" (Ai.1.1.). When that is so, having commenced with: "The knower of Brahman attains the supreme" (Tai.2.1.1.), how could the sacred text: "real, Knowledge" (Tai.2.1.1.) which is engaged to teach the definition of such a Brahman, make known Brahman as possessing attributes? And so the purport of the word "real" is only in the sense of: excluded from what is unreal.

3.178.

किं च सत्यपदस्य

सत्यत्वधर्मविशिष्टार्थबोधकत्वे व्याघातापत्तिः । विशेषाणां हि मिथो व्यावर्तमानत्वान्मिथ्यात्वमिष्यते । यथा घटशरावादीनां तत्सामान्यभूतमृदपेक्षया मिथ्यात्वम् । एतच्च 'मृत्तिकेत्येव सत्यम्' (छा० ६ । १ । ४) इतिश्रुतिसिद्धम् । तथा च सत्यत्वस्य विशेषत्वे तादृशसत्यत्वविशिष्टस्य सविशेषस्य ब्रह्मणो मिथ्यात्वमेव स्यादिति सत्यं ज्ञानमित्युक्तिर्व्याहन्यते । किं च सत्यशब्दस्य सविशेषार्थबोधकत्वे यथा मनुष्यः प्राणिविशेषः प्राणिविशेषान्तरात्पश्वादेः सकाशाद्ब्रह्मावृत्तश्च भवति तथा सत्यं कस्य विशेषः कस्माच्च विशेषान्तराव्यावृत्तं भवति तद्वक्तव्यम् । सद्विशेषः सत्यत्वमिति चेत्कस्मात्सद्विशेषान्तरात्सत्यं व्यावृत्तं भवति । सत्यं हि मिथ्याभूताद्ब्रह्मावृत्तं भवति । मिथ्याभूतं तु न सद्विशेषान्तरम् । मिथ्याभूतस्य सत्त्वाभावात् । एवं च यत्सर्वसामान्यमस्तीत्येव केवलं वक्तुं शक्यते तदेव सत्यमिति केवलास्तित्वसमनियतं सत्यत्वमस्तित्वापरपर्याय एवेति सच्छब्दवत्सत्यशब्दोऽपि न सविशेषार्थबोधकः । अस्तिसत्यशब्दयोः पर्यायत्वं च 'अत्र सत्यमसत्यम् (वि० पु० २ । १२ । ४५) इति ' यदस्ति यन्नास्ति (वि० पु० २ । १२ । ३८) इति प्रक्रान्तस्योपसंहारः (श्रीभा० पृ० १०७ प० १४) इत्युक्तवता त्वयाप्यङ्गीकृतमेव ।

3.178. Furthermore, if the word "real" makes known an entity qualified by the attribute of being real, the result would be a contradiction. Indeed, because the distinctions are mutually excluded, they are considered to be false. Just as a pot, earthenware dish etc. are false with regard to the clay which is their universal. And this is established by the sacred text: "the clay alone is real" (Ch.6.1.4.). And so if "being real" is a distinction, then Brahman possessing distinction, who is qualified by "being real" in that manner, can only be false. Thus the statement: "real,

Knowledge" is contradicted.

Furthermore, if the word "real" makes known an entity possessing distinction, then just as a human being is a particular type of living being and is separated from another type of living being such as an animal etc., so too, it must be told: real is a distinction of what? And from which other distinction is it separated? If [you say] "being real" is a distinction of existence, [we ask] from what other distinction of existence is "real" excluded? For "real" is excluded from what is false. But what is false is not another distinction of existence. Because what is false does not exist. And so the universal of everything is what can be said only as just: "it is" and that alone is real. So "being real", which is invariably concomitant with pure "is-ness", is only another synonym for "is-ness". Hence just like the word "existence", the word "real" too does not make known an entity possessing distinction. You [Rāmānuja] too have certainly accepted that the two words "is" and "real" are synonyms when you said (Śrī.B.Para.70.p.159.): "Here, "real" and "unreal" (Viṣ.P.2.12.45.) is the conclusion of what was begun: "what is" and "what is not" (Viṣ.P.2.12.38.)".

3.179.

ज्ञानशब्दोऽपि

न सविशेषार्थबोधकः । निर्विषया निराश्रया याऽनुभूतिस्तस्याः सन्मात्ररूपत्वस्य प्रागुपपादितत्वात् (पृ० ८०) । किं च ज्ञानपदस्य सविशेषार्थबोधकत्वे किं ज्ञानमेव विशेष उत ज्ञानत्वम् । आद्ये ज्ञानरूपविशेषविशिष्टस्यात्मनो ज्ञानपदात्प्रतीतिर्भाष्या । सा च न संभवति । ल्युट्प्रत्ययस्य कर्तर्यविधानात् । 'अर्शआद्यजन्तो ज्ञानशब्दः' इति विषयवाक्यदीपिकाकारोक्तिस्तु (वि० दी० पृ० ३३) श्रुत्यक्षराननुगुणा । तथा सति ज्ञातृशब्दं ज्ञानवच्छब्दं वा श्रुतिर्निर्दिशेत् । द्वितीये तु ज्ञानपदेन गुणभूतज्ञानग्रहणे ज्ञानत्वरूपो विशेषो गुणभूते ज्ञाने न तु तादृशगुणभूतज्ञानाश्रयत्वेन त्वदभिमते ब्रह्मणीति ज्ञानपदात्सविशेषब्रह्मणः प्रतीतिर्न संभवति । अथ ज्ञानपदेन ब्रह्मस्वरूपभूतं ज्ञानं गृह्यते न तु ब्रह्मगुणभूतमिति चेत्तथा सति ज्ञानपदस्य वैयर्थ्यमेव यात् । 'सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तमिति मिलित्वा पदत्रयात्मकमेकं ब्रह्मलक्षणम् । तत्र ज्ञानपदं नित्यासंकुचितज्ञानार्थकम् । तेन मुक्त्यावृत्तिः । मुक्ता हि मोक्षावस्थातः प्राक्संकुचितज्ञाना एवेति तद्गुणावृत्तिः' (श्रीभा० पृ० १३५०९) इति हि रामानुजीयानामभिप्रेतम् । ज्ञानपदेन स्वरूपभूतज्ञानस्य

ग्रहणे तु मुक्तव्यावृत्तिर्न स्यात् । स्वरूपभूतज्ञानस्य वद्भावस्थायामपि संकोचा-
भावात् । स्वरूपभूतज्ञानस्य संकोचविकासाङ्गीकारे त्वात्मनो विकारित्वापत्ता-
वनित्यत्वादिदोषप्रसङ्गः ।

3.179. The word "Knowledge" too does not make known an entity possessing distinction. Because that -awareness which is free from object and location- was previously demonstrated (3.78,79.) to be of the nature of pure existence. Moreover, if the word "Knowledge" makes known an entity possessing distinction, is Knowledge itself the distinction or Knowledge-ness [i.e. the class of Knowledge, the jāti] ? In the first case, the cognition of the Self qualified by the distinction in the form of Knowledge should occur from the word "Knowledge". And that is not possible. Because the affix lyuṭ¹⁴¹ is not prescribed in the sense of an agent. But the statement of the author of the Viṣayavākyaḍīpikā¹⁴²: "the word "Knowledge" (jñāna) is ac [a] ending, among the class of words beginning with arśas"¹⁴³ does not conform to the letter of the sacred text. If that was so, the sacred text would specify the word "knower" or the word "possessing Knowledge".

But in the second case [i.e. if the class of Knowledge is the distinction], in accepting the word "Knowledge" to mean the Knowledge which is a quality (gunabhūtajñāna), the distinction in the form of Knowledge-ness is in the Knowledge which is a quality but not in Brahman whom you accept as the locus of such Knowledge which is a quality. So the cognition of Brahman possessing distinction is not possible from the word "Knowledge". But if [you say]: the Knowledge which is the essential nature of Brahman (svarūpabhūtaṁ jñāna) is what is understood by the word "Knowledge", not [the Knowledge] which is a quality of Brahman, [we reply] If that is the case, the word "Knowledge" would certainly be meaningless. Because what Rāmānuja has intended [by the word "Knowledge"] is (Śrī.B. Para.86.p.198.)¹⁴⁴:

There is a single definition of Brahman consisting of the group of three words, having connected: "real, Knowledge, limitless". There, the word "Knowledge" has the meaning of Knowledge which is always uncontracted. On account of that, there is the exclusion of the liberated souls. Because prior to the state of liberation, the liberated souls have only contracted Knowledge. Hence there is the exclusion of them.

But in accepting the word "Knowledge" to mean Knowledge which is the essential nature, there cannot be an exclusion of the liberated souls. Because even in the state of being bound there is no contraction of the Knowledge which is the essential nature. But if the Knowledge which is the essential nature is accepted as having contraction and expansion, then the self would be liable to change and the result is the defect of non-eternity etc.

comment

The context of the statement: "the affix lyuṭ is not prescribed in the sense of an agent" is that if the word Knowledge (jñāna) makes known an entity possessing distinction and if the word Knowledge is itself the distinction, then the word Knowledge should make known that entity as qualified by the distinction in the form of Knowledge, i.e. as possessing the attribute of knowership. Abhyankar states that the word "Knowledge" does not denote knowership. The affix lyuṭ (ana)¹⁴⁵ in the formation of the word jñāna (jñā + ana = jñāna) is used in the sense of the verbal root (bhāve): "what is known is knowledge" (jñāyate iti jñānam) or in the sense of the instrument of an action (karana): "knowledge is what is known through which" (jñāyate anena iti jñānam). However the affix is not specifically prescribed in the sense of knowership.

3.180. अद्वैतिनां तु मते सत्यादिवाक्ये त्रीणि लक्षणानि सत्यं ब्रह्म, ज्ञानं ब्रह्म, अनन्तं ब्रह्मेति । यद्यपीदं सत्यादिवाक्यं सामानाधिकरण्येनैकार्थप्रतिपादकं वाच्यवृत्त्या भवति तथापि लक्षणत्रयप्रतिपादनेऽस्य वाक्यस्य तात्पर्यमत्र गम्यते ।

अन्यथैकेन पदेन सिद्धावितरयोर्वैयर्थ्यप्रसङ्गात् । न हि ब्रह्मव्यतिरिक्तं किञ्चिदपि सत्यमस्ति, न च ज्ञानरूपं, नाप्यविनाशि येन पदत्रयसार्थक्यं स्यात् ।

अथानेकलक्षणप्रणयने को हेतुः । उच्यते—लक्षणं हि क्वचिद्व्यावर्तकं भवति । क्वचित्स्वरूपविशेषप्रमितिकृद्भवति । यथा चैत्र गामानयेत्युक्ते तच्छ्रुत्वा चैत्रेणानीतां गां पश्यतोऽत एवायं पशुर्गोशब्दवाच्य इति जानतश्च देवदत्तस्य चतुष्पदत्वादिसाधर्म्यात्पश्चन्तरे गोबुद्धिः स्यात् । तत्र सास्नादिमती गौरिति यल्लक्षणं क्रियते तत्पश्चन्तरव्यावर्तकं भवति । यस्य च न कथमपि गोव्यक्तेर्ज्ञानं तस्यायं पशुर्गोशब्दवाच्य इति ज्ञानाय सास्नादिमती गौरिति लक्षणं क्रियते । तत्तु तस्य स्वरूपविशेषप्रमितिकृद्भवति । यद्यपि व्यावर्तकमपि स्वरूपविशेषप्रमितिकृद्भवति स्वरूपविशेषप्रमितिकृच्च व्यावर्तकं भवतीति नान्योन्यासंकीर्णमेतद्देदद्वयं तथापि लक्षणप्रणयनोद्देश्यभूतस्य व्यावृत्तिव्यवहाररूपस्य प्रयोजनद्वयस्य मिथोऽसंकर एव । तथा च यत्र लक्षणप्रणयने मुख्यत उद्देश्या स्वरूपविशेषप्रमितिस्तत्रानेकलक्षणप्रणयनमपि युज्यत एव । यतस्तस्मादधिकं सौकर्यं भवति । प्रकृते तु ब्रह्मणो रूपाद्यभावेन न कथमपि ब्रह्म प्रत्यक्षेणावगतमिति तत्स्वरूपविशेषप्रमितयेऽनेकलक्षणप्रणयनं सार्थकमेव ।

3.180. However according to the view of the non-dualists, there are three definitions in the sentence "real" etc.: Brahman is real, Brahman is Knowledge, Brahman is limitless. Although this sentence "real" etc. teaches a single meaning through grammatical apposition according to the express sense, still, the purport of this sentence is understood as teaching a threefold definition. Otherwise, if there is accomplishment by one word, the other two would be meaningless. There is certainly nothing whatsoever which is real which is distinct from Brahman, nor [anything] in the form of Knowledge, nor [anything] imperishable: on account of which the group of three words must have meaning.

[objection] What is the reason for espousing more than one definition?

[reply] Because a definition at some place [i.e. in some instance] excludes and at some place it brings about an accurate determination of the essential nature. For example, when it is said: "Caitra, bring the cow", Devadatta who has heard that and who sees the cow brought by Caitra and for this reason knows: "this animal can be expressed by the word

'cow' ", could still have the idea of a cow in another animal on account of similarity in being a quadruped etc. There, the definition which is made: "a cow possesses a dewlap etc." excludes another animal. And for a person who has no knowledge at all of an individual cow, the definition is made: "a cow possesses a dewlap etc." for the knowledge that: "this animal can be expressed by the word 'cow' ". That [definition in the second instance] brings about an accurate determination of the essential nature for that person. Even though excluding too brings about an accurate determination of the essential nature and the accurate determination of the essential nature is what excludes and so this twofold difference is not mutually unconnected, nevertheless, the twofold purpose in the form of exclusion or conventional expression [i.e. definition], which is intended in espousing the definition, is certainly mutually free from confusion. And so where the accurate determination of the essential nature is principally intended in espousing a definition, even espousing more than one definition is certainly correct. Because there is greater facility [in understanding] on account of that. In regard to the topic under discussion, Brahman can in no way be comprehended through perception since Brahman has no form etc. and so espousing more than one definition for the accurate determination of its essential nature is certainly meaningful.

- 3.181. यत्तु 'प्रवृत्तिनिमित्तभेदेनैकार्थवृत्तित्वं सामानाधिकरण्यम् । तत्र सत्यज्ञानादि-
पदमुख्यार्थस्तत्तद्गुणविरोध्याकारप्रत्यनीकाकारैर्वा, एकस्मिन्नेवार्थे पदानां प्रवृत्तौ
निमित्तभेदोऽवश्याश्रयणीयः' (श्रीभा० पृ० ५९ प० ६) इत्युक्तं तन्न । सामा-
नाधिकरण्यस्य प्रवृत्तिनिमित्तभेदघटितत्वनियमे
सामानाधिकरण्यम् प्रमाणाभावात् । सत्यादिपदानामसत्याद्वयावृत्त-
मित्याद्यर्थे तात्पर्यस्यानुपदमेवोक्तत्वेन ब्रह्मणः
सत्यत्वादिधर्मैः सविशेषत्वापादनं दुर्वचमेव । व्यावृत्तेरभावरूपतया न तथा कथ-
मपि सविशेषत्वमित्यपि प्रागुपपादितमेव (पृ० ८६) । यत्तु ' भिन्नप्रवृत्तिनिमित्तानां
शब्दानामेकस्मिन्नर्थे वृत्तिः सामानाधिकरण्यमिति शाब्दिकाः ' (श्रीभा० पृ० ५९
प० १६) इत्युक्तं तन्न । शाब्दिकाग्रेसरैर्नागोजीभट्टैरेव शब्देन्दुशेखरे ' सामा-

नाधिकरण्यं चैकार्थविशेष्यकबोधजनकत्वमेव, न तु प्रवृत्तिनिमित्तभेदगर्भम् । इत्येवं सामानाधिकरण्यस्य प्रवृत्तिनिमित्तभेदघटिततायाः स्पष्टमेव खण्डितत्वात् । व्याकरणप्रहाभाष्यकारैश्च ' नामन्त्रिते सामानाधिकरणे सामान्यवचनम् ' (पा० सू० ८।१।७३) इति सूत्रे सामान्यवचनमित्यस्य ' अघ्न्ये देवि सरस्वति ' इति प्रत्युदाहरणं दत्तम् । तत्र चाघ्न्य इत्यादीनां पर्यायवचनानां प्रवृत्तिनिमित्तभेदाभावेन त्वदुक्तीत्या सामानाधिकरण्यस्याभावाद्द्वयङ्गविकलतापत्तौ प्रत्युदाहरणपरभाष्यासंगतिः स्यात् । तत्रत्यकैयटेनापि ' पर्यायशब्दानामपि सामानाधिकरण्यादविद्यमानवत्त्वनिषेधान्निघातप्रसङ्गः ' इत्युक्तवता प्रवृत्तिनिमित्तभेदाभावेऽपि सामानाधिकरण्यं स्वीकृतम् । एवं च सत्यं ज्ञानमिति श्रुतेर्निर्विशेषार्थप्रतिपादकत्वं सिद्धम् ॥ १६ ॥

3.181. But what has been said (Śrī.B.Para.48.p.89f.):

Grammatical apposition means the reference [of several terms] to a single object with a difference of reason for the application [of the several terms to the one thing]. A difference of reason for the application of the words in the very same object must necessarily be admitted because of the primary meaning of the words "real", "Knowledge" etc. [as denoting qualities] or because of being opposed to what is contrary to those particular qualities [i.e. opposed to "unreal" etc.].

That is not so. Because grammatical apposition is without an authority in respect of a rule involving the difference of reason for application. Establishing Brahman as possessing distinction on account of the attributes such as "real" etc. is certainly hard to be stated, because the purport of the words "real" etc. has been told just above to be in the sense of: "excluded from what is unreal" etc. It was also certainly demonstrated previously (3.95., also 3.55.) that because exclusion is in the form of absence, in no way is there a possession of distinction due to that [exclusion].

But what has been said (Śrī.B.Para.48.p.90.):

The grammarians say that grammatical apposition is

the reference of words, which have different reasons for their application, in the one object.¹⁴⁶

That is not so. Because in the Śabdenduśekhara, the foremost among grammarians, Nāgojībhaṭṭa, has very clearly refuted grammatical apposition as involving a difference in the reason for the application [of the words]: "Grammatical apposition only produces the knowledge which has a single object as the thing to be distinguished, it is not the basis for the difference of reason of application [of several terms to the one thing]".¹⁴⁷

The author of the Vyākaraṇamahābhāṣya has given the counter illustration: "O Aghnye, goddess Sarasvatī" for this [word]: "expressing a common property" in the sūtra: "A preceding vocative, when it expresses a common property, is not to be considered as if non-existent for the purpose of the subsequent vocative which stands in apposition with the former" (P.S.8.1.73.).¹⁴⁸ Because "Aghnye" etc. are synonyms there is no difference of reason for their application and therefore in the way you [Rāmānuja] said there is no grammatical apposition and so upon the occurrence of the deficiency of two members there must be incongruity of the commentary relating to the counter illustration. In that place, Kaiyaṭa¹⁴⁹ too has accepted grammatical apposition even in the absence of a difference of reason for application when he said: "because synonyms too have grammatical apposition, a grave accent is the result on account of the negation of possessing non-existence".¹⁵⁰ Thus the sacred text: "real, Knowledge" is established as teaching an entity which is free from distinction.

comment

Rāmānuja maintains that grammatical apposition (sāmānādhikarānya) requires a difference of reason for the application of each word. Abhyankar controverts this view by showing that grammatical apposition primarily means the reference of the words to a single locus.

According to Rāmānuja, the words "real", "Knowledge" and "limitless"

should be understood in their primary sense as denoting the attributes of Brahman.¹⁵¹ Advaitins, however, consider that these words define Brahman through implication (lakṣaṇā). Implication is only applicable when the express sense is not logically tenable and Advaitins hold that such is the case with regard to the words "real", "Knowledge" and "limitless". The word "real" primarily signifies something existing, however there is no existing object which is limitless. If it is said that space is both real and limitless, space nonetheless does not have the nature of Knowledge. The word "Knowledge" primarily signifies mental states and the latter have both a beginning and an end and they are limited in terms of a division between the knower and the known object. Hence Knowledge is neither real nor limitless.¹⁵² On account of such contradiction in the express meaning, Advaitins maintain that the statement: "Brahman is real, Knowledge, limitless" can only be understood through the implied meaning of the words. For an explanation of the implied meaning, see the comment to 3.47., final paragraph.

3.182.

अद्वितीयश्रुतिर्नैव सहते सद्वितीयताम् ॥

येन केनापि धर्मेण सन्मात्रे परमात्मनि ॥ १७ ॥

3.182. The sacred text [teaching] "without a second" certainly does not allow the possession of duality, through any attribute whatsoever, in the supreme Self who is pure existence. 17.

3.183.

ब्रह्मणो निर्विशेषत्वादेव च तस्याद्वितीयत्वं सिध्यति । सविशेषत्वे तु विशेष-
पस्य द्वितीयस्य सत्त्वात् 'अद्वितीयम्' (छा०
ब्रह्मणोऽद्वितीयत्वम् ६ । २ । १) इति श्रुतिर्विरुद्धा स्यात् । यत्तु
'जगदुपादानस्य ब्रह्मणः स्वव्यतिरिक्ताधिष्ठात्र-
न्तरनिवारणेन विचित्रशक्तियोगप्रतिपादनपरत्वादद्वितीयपदस्य' (श्रीभा० पृ०
६० प० ६) इत्युक्तं तन्न । अस्यार्थस्योपक्रमाननुगुणत्वात् । तथा हि—'येना-
श्रुतं श्रुतं भवत्यमतं मतमविज्ञातं विज्ञातम्' (छा० ६ । १ । ३) इति हि प्रतिज्ञा
प्रस्तुता । तत्राश्रुतं किंचिदस्तु श्रुतं भवतीति नार्थः । तथासति किमनया प्रति-
ज्ञया विशेषोऽर्थ उक्तः स्यात् । मृत्तिकाज्ञानेन पटादिज्ञानासंभवेऽपि घटश-
रावादीनां केषांचिज्ज्ञानसंभवात् । अतोऽश्रुतं सर्वं येन श्रुतं भवतीत्यर्थो वाच्यः ।
मृत्तिकादयोऽर्थास्तु नैवविधाः । तज्ज्ञानेन सर्ववस्तुज्ञानासंभवात् ।

3.183. Because Brahman is indeed free from distinction, it is established as being without a second. But if there is the possession of a distinction, the sacred text: "without a second" (Ch.6.2.1.) would be contradicted since a distinction, which is a second thing, exists. But what has been said (Śrī.B.Para.49.p.91.):

because the word "without a second" aims at teaching the union with various powers for Brahman, who is the material cause of the world, by denying another ruler distinct from Himself.

That is not so. Because this meaning does not conform to the commencement [of the topic]. To elaborate. The proposition was introduced: "Through which, what is unheard becomes heard, what is not thought becomes thought of, what is unknown becomes known" (Ch.6.1.3.). The meaning there is not: some thing which is unheard becomes heard. If that was so, would a particularity, a thing, be said by this proposition? Because even though there is no possibility of the knowledge of cloth etc. through the knowledge of clay, there is the possibility of the knowledge of some things such as pots and earthenware dishes etc. Therefore the meaning must be said as: all that is unheard becomes heard through which. But things such as clay etc. are not like this. Because there is no possibility of the knowledge of all things through the knowledge of that.

3.184.

तथा प्रति-

ज्ञायां येनेत्यत्र यच्छब्दवाच्यमेकमेव किञ्चिद्वस्तु ग्राह्यं न त्वनेकम् । अनेक-
ग्रहणे पूर्ववदेव नात्रापूर्वोऽर्थः कश्चिदुक्तः स्यात् । मृदादिष्वपि संभवात् । मृदो
ज्ञानेन तद्विकारभूतघटशरावादिज्ञानं जायते तन्तुज्ञानेन तद्विकारभूतपटादिज्ञानं
जायत इति प्रसिद्धमेव । अतः प्रतिज्ञायामनया किमप्यधिकं नोक्तं भवेत् । तथा
चैकवस्तुज्ञानेन सर्ववस्तुज्ञानमिति प्रतिज्ञार्थः पर्यवसितः । तत्र चैकवस्तुज्ञानेनेत्यत्र
ज्ञानपदेन सर्ववस्तुज्ञानमित्यत्र च ज्ञानपदेन सत्यमेव ज्ञानं ग्राह्यं नासत्यसाधा-
रणम् । तथासत्यसत्यज्ञानस्य दोषमूलत्वेन प्रतिज्ञायामलौकिकार्थाभिधानं न
स्यात् । मृदादिदृष्टान्तानुरोधाच्च । नहि मृत्तिकायां कार्पासत्वेन ज्ञातायां घटस्य
मृष्मयत्वेन ज्ञानं संभवति । न वा मृत्तिकायां मृत्तिकात्वेन ज्ञातायां घटस्य

पटत्वेन ज्ञानं संभवति । किं तु मृत्तिकायां मृत्तिकात्वेन ज्ञातायां घटस्य मृत्तिका-
त्वेन ज्ञानं भवति । तथा च तत्र मृत्तिकेत्येव सत्यमित्येवं सत्यशब्देन स्पष्ट
एवोद्धेयो दृश्यते ।

3.184. Similarly, the meaning of the word "which" here in the proposition: "Through which" is to be understood as some thing which is one alone, not more than one. In accepting more than one, just like before, some thing previously unknown could not be said here. Because there is the possibility even with regard to clay etc. It is certainly well known that by the knowledge of clay, the knowledge arises about its modifications such as pots, earthenware dishes etc., and that by the knowledge of thread, the knowledge arises about its modifications such as cloth. Therefore nothing additional would be said by this proposition. And so the meaning of the proposition is established as: through the knowledge of the one thing, there is the knowledge of everything.

There [in the previous sentence], by the word "knowledge" here: "through the knowledge of the one thing" and by the word "knowledge" here: "there is the knowledge of everything" the knowledge which is certainly real is to be understood, not [knowledge] which is common to what is unreal. If that was so, because the knowledge which is unreal is based upon a defect, there could be no mention of a supramundane meaning in the proposition. And because there is conformity with the examples of the clay etc. Because when clay is known as composed of cotton there is no possibility of the knowledge of a pot as composed of clay. Or when clay is known as clay there is no possibility of the knowledge of a pot as a piece of cloth. But when clay is known as clay there is the knowledge of a pot as clay. And so the very clear mention is seen there by the word "real" in the manner: "the clay alone is real".

comment

The "knowledge which is certainly real" means the pure awareness which persists in all knowledge and is therefore real. The knowledge

"which is common to what is unreal" refers to the knowledge which is qualified by an object. Such knowledge is unreal because it is based upon the defect of Ignorance (ajñāna). Only the knowledge which is the basis of all knowledge, i.e. awareness as such, is in agreement with the supramundane meaning of the proposition: "through the knowledge of the one thing, there is the knowledge of everything".

In reference to the examples of clay and cotton, the meaning is that unless you know clay you cannot know what is made of clay. When the cause is not known as it is, there is no true knowledge of the effects. When the cause is correctly known there is no false knowledge regarding the effects but only the true knowledge of the effects.

3.185.

यद्यपि मृत्तिकायाः पारमार्थिकसत्यत्वाभावेन तस्या मृत्तिकात्वेन ज्ञानमप्यसत्यमेव तथापि लौकिकप्रतीत्यनुसारेण व्यावहारिकसत्यत्वमवलम्ब्य तादृशा दृष्टान्ता उपात्ताः । लोके हि सत्यत्वं तारतम्येन प्रतीयते । घटस्य पटत्वेन ज्ञानमसत्यम् । घटे पटस्वरूपस्य यावद्दोषं स्थितत्वेनास्थिरत्वात् । तदपेक्षया घटस्य घटत्वेन ज्ञानं सत्यम् । पटस्वरूपापेक्षया घटस्वरूपस्याधिककालस्थायित्वात् । परंतु तादृशं घटस्य घटत्वेन ज्ञानमपि घटस्य मृत्स्वरूपेण ज्ञानापेक्षयाऽसत्यमेव । घटस्वरूपापेक्षया मृत्स्वरूपस्याधिककालस्थायित्वात् । घटोत्पत्तेः प्राग्घटनाशोत्तरं च मृत्स्वरूपस्य स्थितत्वात् । मृत्तिकात्वेन ज्ञानमपि तत्कारणस्वरूपज्ञानापेक्षयाऽसत्यमेव स्यादित्यन्यत् ।

3.185. Although since clay has no absolute reality even the knowledge of that [clay] as being clay is only unreal, still, those examples are mentioned having recourse to conventional reality in accordance with ordinary cognition. Because in the world, reality is recognized in different degrees. The knowledge of a pot as a piece of cloth is unreal. Because the nature of cloth in regard to a pot is impermanent since it only remains as long as there is a defect. With regard to that, the knowledge of a pot as a pot is real. Because with regard to the nature of the cloth, the nature of the pot continues at a later time. But even such a knowledge of a pot as a pot is certainly unreal with regard to the knowledge of the pot as the nature of clay. Because with regard to the nature of the pot, the nature of the clay continues at a later time.

For the nature of the clay remains prior to the origination of the pot and subsequent to the destruction of the pot. Even the knowledge [of clay] as clay would be certainly unreal with regard to the knowledge of the nature of its cause. That is another thing.

3.186. अस्याश्च प्रतिज्ञाया मृदादिदृष्टान्तैः संभवदुक्तिकर्ता प्रदर्श्य पश्चात्तदुपपादनाय 'सदेव सोम्येदमग्र आसीत्, एकमेवाद्वितीयम्' इत्युच्यत इति प्रागुक्तमेव (पृ० १.१४) अयमभिसंधिः—अत्र जगतः प्रागवस्था बोध्यते। प्रागवस्थापन्नमेवोपादान-कारणम्। तदेवावस्थान्तरप्रापद्यमानं कार्यम्। सदेवेतिश्रुत्यर्थः उपादानकारणज्ञानेन च कार्यगतसत्यांशज्ञानं सुलभमिति। अत्र च पूर्वप्रक्रान्तार्थानुरोधात्प्रतिज्ञाघटकेन येनेति यच्छब्देन गृहीतमेकं वस्तु सच्छब्देनोच्यते। तथा 'अश्रुतं श्रुतं भवति' इत्यनेन गृहीतं सर्वं वस्त्वदंपदेन गृह्यते। तच्च स्थूलं वा सूक्ष्मं वा संनिकृष्टं विप्रकृष्टं वा प्रत्यक्षादियोग्यं तदयोग्यं वा सर्वमेव ग्राह्यम्। अन्यथा यद्गृहीतं तस्यात्र सत्कार्यत्वानुक्त्या ब्रह्मज्ञानेन तज्ज्ञानासंभवात्प्रतिज्ञाहानिः स्यात्। विना प्रमाणं संकोचे मानाभावाच्च।

3.186. It was indeed previously mentioned (3.171.) that having shown this proposition to be a statement which has possibility through the examples of the clay etc., for the subsequent proving of that [proposition] it is said: "My dear, this was existence alone in the beginning, one alone, without a second". This is the intended meaning: here, the state prior to the world is made known. The material cause is indeed the state obtained prior [to the world]. That very [material cause], obtaining another state, is the effect. And by the knowledge of the material cause the knowledge of the real portion belonging to the effect is easily gained (cf., 3.172.). In accordance with the meaning previously stated, the single entity understood by the word "which": "Through which", forming part of the proposition ["Through which, what is unheard" etc.], is said by the word "existence". Similarly, every object, which is what is understood by this: "what is unheard becomes heard", is comprehended by the word "this". And that which is gross or subtle, near or remote, capable of perception etc. or incapable of it, is to be understood as

indeed everything [referring to the previous sentence]. Otherwise there would be the failure of the proposition, because what is not understood [by the word "this"] is not said to be the effect of existence here [in the sentence: "My dear, this was existence alone..."] and therefore there is no possibility of the knowledge of that through the knowledge of Brahman. And because without authority there is no proof for a restriction [in the meaning].

3.187.

इदंशब्दश्चात्रोद्देश्यसमर्पकः ।

सच्छब्दो विधेयसमर्पकः । एवकारयुक्तत्वात् । तदुक्तम्—

‘तच्छब्द एवकारश्च स्यादुपादेयलक्षणम्’ इति ।

एकमद्वितीयमिति च पदद्वयं विधेयपरम् । तत्राप्युद्देश्यमिदंशब्दवाच्यमेव । न तु सच्छब्दवाच्यम् । विधेयस्योद्देश्यत्वकल्पनाया अप्रामाणिकत्वात् । यद्यपि सदेव सोम्येदमितीदंशब्दार्थस्य सच्छब्दार्थेन सह तादात्म्यबोधनादिदंशब्दार्थ-मुद्दिश्य विधीयमानमेकत्वमद्वितीयत्वं च सच्छब्दार्थ एव पर्यवस्यति तथापि वाच्यवृत्त्या न सच्छब्दार्थस्य तत्रोद्देश्यत्वं सिध्यति । अग्र इति च विधेयत्रयेऽपि संवध्यते । इदं जगदुत्पत्तेः प्राक्सद्रूपमेवासीत् । तथेदं जगदुत्पत्तेः प्रागेकमेवासीत् । तथेदं जगदुत्पत्तेः प्रागद्वितीयमेवासीदिति । अत्र प्रथमत्राक्ये शून्यवादनिरासद्वारा सत्कारणवादः प्रस्थापितः । इदं सदिति सामानाधिकरण्येन निर्देशात्सत उपादानकारणत्वं च प्रस्थापितम् । द्वितीयेऽनेककारणवादनिरासद्वारैककारणवादः प्रस्थापितः । तृतीयेऽद्वितीयमित्यनेन सविशेषकारणवादनिरासद्वारा निर्विशेषकारणवादः प्रस्थापितः । एवं च कारणस्य भेदत्रयशून्यत्वं सिद्धं भवति ।

3.187. The word "this" presents the subject here. The word "existence" presents the predicate. Because it is connected with the word "alone". That has been told;

The word "that" and the word "alone" (eva) would be the distinctive mark of the predicate.

The two words "one", "without a second" relate to the predicate. There too [in reference to those two words], the subject is only what is expressed by the word "this". Not what is expressed by the word "existence". Because the predicate, which is conceived as being the subject, is not

authoritative. Although being one and being without a second, which are enjoined with reference to pointing out the meaning of the word "this", resolve only in the meaning of the word "existence" on account of making known the identity of the meaning of the word "this" with the meaning of the word "existence": "My dear, this was existence alone", still, according to the expressed sense the meaning of the word "existence" is not established as the subject there. And "in the beginning" (agre) is also connected to the threefold predicate.

(a) This world was existence alone prior to origination. (b) Similarly, this world was one alone prior to origination. (c) So too, this world was indeed without a second prior to origination. In the first sentence, the teaching of an existent cause is established through the refutation of the teaching of Emptiness. And existence is established as the material cause on account of the designation through grammatical apposition: "this [was] existence". In the second, the teaching of a single cause is established through the refutation of the teaching of multiple causes. In the third, by this: "without a second" the teaching that the cause is free from distinction is established through the refutation of the teaching that the cause possesses distinction. Thus the cause is established as being free from the threefold differences.

3.188.

न च द्वितीयत्वं स्वसदृशेनैव केनचिन्न तु स्वगतेन केनचिद्धर्मेणेति कथमद्वितीयपदेन स्वगतभेदव्यावृत्तिरिति वाच्यम् । 'असिद्वितीयोऽनुससार पाण्डवम्' 'ताते चापद्वितीये बहति रणधुरं को भयस्यावकाशः' (वेणीसं० ३ । ७) इत्यादौ स्वगतेनापि सद्वितीयत्वस्य दृष्टत्वात् । एतन्मूलक एव 'अद्वितीयपदं च गुणतोऽपि सद्वितीयतां न सद्ते' इत्यद्वैतवादिनां प्रवादः । भेदत्रयराहित्यं तेजो-विन्दूपनिपद्यपि दर्शितम्—

सजातीयं न मे किञ्चिद्विजातीयं न मे क्वचित् ।

स्वगतं च न मे किञ्चिन्न मे भेदत्रयं भवेत् (तेजो० ३।४७) इति ।

3.188. It should not be said that: "a second" is only by means of

something similar to oneself, but not on account of some attribute belonging to oneself. So how is there an exclusion of the difference belonging to oneself through the word "without a second"? [reason] Because the possession of a second is seen even through something belonging to oneself in: "accompanied by a sword he followed the Pāṇḍava", "when my father, together with a bow, bears the brunt of the battle, what is the occasion for fear?" (Veṅīsam.3.7.) etc. The declaration of the exponents of non-duality that: the word "without a second" does not allow the possession of a second even due to a quality, is only based upon this. The absence of the threefold difference is shown in the Tejobindūpaniṣad also:

There can be no threefold difference for me:
 there is nothing whatsoever belonging to the
 same class as me, there is no member of
 another class anywhere for me and there is no
 internal [difference] whatsoever for me (Tejo.3.47.).

3.189.

तत्र शून्यवादे केवलनिमित्तकारणवादेऽनेककारणवादे सविशेषकारणवादे च प्रतिज्ञाहानिः स्यात् । एकविज्ञानेन सर्वविज्ञानप्रतिज्ञा हि कार्यमात्रं प्रत्येकस्य निर्विशेषस्योपादानकारणत्वे सत्येव सिध्यति नान्यथा । शून्यवादे च भावरूपं कारणमेव नास्तीति कथमेकविज्ञानम् । दूरे तेन सर्वविज्ञानम् । तथा तस्य केवलनिमित्तकारणत्वे कथं तेन सर्वविज्ञानम् । न हि दण्डज्ञानेन घटज्ञानं जायते । तथाऽनेकोपादानकारणवादे तादृशानेककारणान्तर्गतैककारणविज्ञानेन कथं सर्वविज्ञानम् । न हि सुवर्णरजतताम्राद्यनेकधातुभिरारब्धो घट एकस्य सुवर्णस्य ज्ञानेन ज्ञातुं शक्यते । न वा तैर्धातुभिः पृथक्पृथगारब्धा घटा एकस्य सुवर्णस्य ज्ञानेन ज्ञातुं शक्यन्ते । तथा सविशेषकारणवादेऽपि प्रतिज्ञासिद्धिर्न स्यात् । सविशेषं हि वस्तु तेन विशेषेणेदृशमिति वक्तुं शक्यते । ईदृशत्वस्य च तादृशत्वप्रतिद्वन्द्वितया तादृशमन्यत्किंचिदवश्यं वस्तु स्वीकार्यम् । तस्य च तादृशस्य वस्तुनः किञ्चित्कार्यं प्रति कारणत्वे तादृशस्य वस्तुनस्तत्कार्यस्य च ज्ञानमीदृशवस्तुज्ञानेन दुर्लभमिति सर्वविज्ञानं पूर्वप्रतिज्ञातं न संपद्यते । अत्रानेककारणप्रकल्पनया प्राप्तस्य तदन्तर्गतैककारणगतस्य कारणान्तरप्रतियो-

गिकभेदस्यैकमेवेत्यनेन निरासः । अद्वितीयमित्यनेन तूदासीनप्रतियोगिकस्यापि
कारणगतभेदस्य निरासः । स चोक्तरीत्या स्वगतस्यापि भेदस्येति ।

3.189. There would be failure of the proposition in the teaching of Emptiness, in the teaching of only an efficient cause, in the teaching of multiple causes and in the teaching of a cause possessing distinction. Because the proposition of the knowledge of everything through the knowledge of the one is established only when, with regard to the mere effect, one without distinction is the material cause. Not otherwise. In the teaching of Emptiness, a cause which is a positive entity indeed does not exist, so how is there knowledge of the one? The knowledge of everything through [knowing] that is far removed. Similarly, if that [one to be known] is only the efficient cause, how is there the knowledge of everything through that? Because the knowledge of a pot does not arise through the knowledge of a [potter's] stick. So too, in the teaching of multiple material causes, how is there the knowledge of everything through the knowledge of a single cause which is included in such multiple causes? Because a pot made with multiple metals such as gold, silver, copper etc. cannot be known through the knowledge of the single [metal] gold. Or pots made separately with those metals cannot be known through the knowledge of the single [metal] gold.

Similarly, there can be no establishment of the proposition even in the teaching that the cause possesses distinction. Because a thing which possesses distinction can be said to be "like this" [A] on account of that distinction. And because being like this [A] is contrary to being like that [B], something else which is like that [B] must be necessarily admitted to be a thing. If the thing like that [B] is the cause with reference to some effect, the knowledge of the thing like that [B] and its effect is hard to be gained through the knowledge of the thing like this [A]. So the previously proposed knowledge of everything is not accomplished.

By this: "one alone" there is the removal of the difference which has another cause as its counter correlate, which belongs to the one cause and is included in that and which results through the supposition of multiple causes. Whereas by this: "without a second" there is the removal of the difference belonging to the cause even though it has a counter correlate which is not active. And that [removal] is even for the difference belonging to oneself, in the way that was told.

comment

A pot, for example, has many causes such as the pot maker, the stick used in fashioning the pot, etc. The statement: "one alone" removes the idea of multiple causes. The word: "without a second" removes the idea of difference belonging to the cause which is "not active" i.e. which does not have anything to do with causality.

3.190.

एवं स्थिते रामानुजीयोक्तयनुसारेणाद्वितीयपदस्य विचित्रशक्तियोगप्रतिपादनपरत्वे कथमिव तादृशशक्तिज्ञानं प्रतिज्ञासिद्धय उपयुज्यते कथं वा तादृशशक्त्यज्ञाने प्रतिज्ञातार्थहानिः स्यादिति विपश्चित एव विदांकुर्वन्तु । किं च भूतभौतिकस्य सर्वस्य जगतः सत्यत्वं मन्यमानानां विशिष्टाद्वैतिनां मते सच्छब्दवाच्यवस्तुज्ञानेन सर्ववस्तुज्ञानं दुर्लभमेव । मृत्तिकायां मृत्स्वरूपेण ज्ञातायामपि घटस्य घटत्वरूपेण ज्ञानं दुर्लभमेवेति दृष्टान्तासंगतिश्च । घटस्य घटत्वरूपेणासत्यत्वमेवेत्येवं मिथ्यात्ववादिनामद्वैतिनां मते तु मृत्तिकायां मृत्स्वरूपेण ज्ञातायां घटस्य घटस्वरूपापेक्षया सत्येन मृत्स्वरूपेण ज्ञानं सुलभमिति दृष्टान्तसंगतिः । जगत्कारणीभूतसन्मात्रज्ञानेन जगति सत्यस्य सदंशस्य ज्ञानं सुलभमिति प्रतिज्ञासिद्धिश्चेति प्रागुपपादितं नैव विस्मर्तव्यम् ॥ १७ ॥

3.190. When it is so established, wise people should certainly ascertain that if, according to the statement of Rāmānuja, the word "without a second" aims at teaching the union with various powers, how is the knowledge of such powers applicable for the establishment of the proposition? Or how could there be the failure of the meaning which was proposed if there is ignorance of such powers?

Furthermore, according to the view of the Viśiṣṭādvaitins who think that the whole world consisting of the elements and elementals is real, the knowledge of all things is certainly difficult to be gained

through the knowledge of the entity expressed by the word "existence". And there is incongruity with the example: even when clay is known as the nature of clay, the knowledge of a pot as having the nature of potness is certainly difficult to be gained. But according to the view of the Advaitins who are the exponents of falsity in the manner: "a pot is certainly unreal as having the nature of potness", when clay is known as the nature of clay, the knowledge of a pot as the nature of clay - which is real with regard to the nature of a pot- is easily gained and so there is congruity with the example. And there is establishment of the proposition: through the knowledge of the pure existence which is the cause of the world the knowledge of the existence-portion which is the reality in the world is easily acquired. So what has been previously demonstrated should certainly not be forgotten.

3.191.

श्रुतिस्मृतिपुराणेषु दृश्यन्ते या गुणोक्तयः ।
तासां तात्पर्यमन्यत्र श्रुत्यादिष्वेव सूच्यते ॥ १८ ॥

3.191. Statements about qualities are seen in the sacred texts, traditions and legendary histories. The purport of those [statements referring to qualities] is indicated elsewhere in the same sacred texts etc. 18.

3.192. यत्तु 'सर्वनिषेधे हि स्वाभ्युपगता नित्यत्वादयश्च निषिद्धाः स्युः' (श्रीभा०

निर्विशेषब्रह्मणि न
काप्यनुपपत्तिः

पृ० ६० प० १३) इत्युक्तं तत्र । इष्टापत्तेः ।
न हि मायावादिनः कंचिदपि भावरूपं धर्मं ब्रह्म-
ण्यभ्युपगच्छन्ति । नित्यत्वं ह्युत्पत्तिविनाशयोगि-

त्वाभाव एव । अभावेन च न सविशेषत्वमिति प्रागुपपादितम् (पृ० ७१) ।

यत्तु 'सर्वशाखाप्रत्ययन्यायश्चात्र भवतो विपरीतफलः । सर्वशाखासु कारणान्वयिनां सर्वज्ञत्वादीनां गुणानामत्रोपसंहारहेतुत्वात्' (श्रीभा० पृ० ६० प० १४) इत्युक्तं तच्चिन्त्यम् । कारणत्वेनाभिमतं ब्रह्म वस्तुतो निर्विशेषमेव । कारणत्वमपि तत्र कल्पितमेव । तादृशकारणत्वोपयोगिनो गुणाः सर्वज्ञत्वादयोऽपि तत्र कल्पिता एवेति ह्यस्माकं राद्धान्तः । तथा च कल्पितानां गुणानामुपसंहारेऽपि वस्तुतो निर्विशेषत्वस्य बाधाभावेन कथं सर्वशाखाप्रत्ययन्यायस्यात्र विपरीत-

फलत्वम् । प्रत्युत तेन न्यायेन वास्तविकं ब्रह्मणो निर्विशेषत्वं सर्वत्र कारण-
वाक्येषु प्रतीयत एव । यत्तु 'निर्गुणवाक्यं प्राकृतहेयगुणविषयम्' (श्रीभा०
पृ० ६० प० १९) इत्युक्तं तत्प्रागेव (पृ० ६९ प० १८) दत्तोत्तरम् ।
याश्च ब्रह्मणि ज्ञातृत्वादिगुणप्रतिपादिकाः 'न्यः सर्वज्ञः' (मु० १ । १ । ९)
इत्याद्याः श्रुतयः प्रदर्शिताः (श्रीभा० पृ० ६१ प० ४) ता औपाधिकगुण-
पुरस्कारेण प्रवृत्ता इत्यपि प्रागुक्तमेव (पृ० ६९ प० ११) । इतरथा 'निर्गुणम्'
(सू० ७) इतिश्रुतिविरोधः स्यात् ।

3.192. But what has been said (Śrī.B.Para.49.p.91.)¹⁵³:

Indeed, if there is the negation of everything
[by the word "without a second"], [qualities]
such as eternity etc., which you accept, must
be negated.

That is not so. Because it is the desired conclusion. For the exponents
of māyā do not accept any positive attribute whatsoever in Brahman.
"Eternity" is only the absence of possessing origination and destruction.
It was demonstrated previously (3.55.) that there is no possession of
a distinction due to the absence [of possessing a quality].

But what has been said (Śrī.B.Para.49.p.91,92.):

The maxim that all the recensions [of the Veda]
teach the same meaning¹⁵⁴ has a contrary result
for you. Because it is the reason for bringing
together here [in the sentence "existence alone..."]
qualities such as omniscience etc. which are
connected with the cause [of the world] in all the
recensions.

That is questionable. Brahman, who is accepted as the cause, is in
reality indeed free from distinction. Even causality is only superimposed
there [in regard to Brahman]. Because it is our established position that
even qualities such as omniscience etc., which are applicable for such
causality, are only superimposed there [in Brahman]. And so how does
the maxim that all the recensions [of the Veda] teach the same meaning

have a contrary result here? Because even in bringing together qualities which are superimposed, there is no negation in reality of the nature of being free from distinction. On the contrary, according to that maxim, Brahman being free from distinction is certainly recognized to be a fact everywhere in the sentences [which teach] a cause.

But what has been said (Śrī.B.Para.49.p.92.)¹⁵⁵:

a statement [teaching] freedom from qualities relates to the qualities which are to be given up as they pertain to prakṛti [i.e. "nature"].

That has indeed been answered before (3.49.). It has also been previously stated (3.48.) that the sacred texts beginning with: "The one who is all knowing" (Mu.1.1.9.) which are shown (Śrī.B.Para.49.p.92.) to teach the qualities such as knowership etc. in Brahman, are employed as connected with qualities which pertain to a limiting adjunct. Otherwise, there would be contradiction with the sacred text: "free from qualities" (Cū.7.).

3.193.

यत्तु 'निर्गुणवाक्यानां सगुणवाक्यानां च विषयमपहतपाप्मेत्याद्यौपिपास इत्यन्तेन हेयगुणान्प्रतिषिध्य सत्यकामः सत्यसंकल्प इति ब्रह्मणः कल्याण-गुणान्विदधतीयं श्रुतिरेव विविनक्तीति सगुणनिर्गुणवाक्ययोर्विरोधाभावादन्व-तरस्य विध्याविषयताश्रयणमपि नाशङ्कनीयम्' (श्रीभा० प० ६१ प० १७)

इत्युक्तं तदसंगतम् । 'अपहतपाप्मा विजरो

निर्गुणसगुणवाक्ययो-

विमृत्युर्विशोकोऽत्रिजिघत्सोऽपिपासः सत्यकामः

रविरोधः सत्यसंकल्पः (छा० ८ । १ । ५) इति

श्रुतिः सगुणनिर्गुणवाक्ययोर्विषयविवेचिका ।

तत्रापहतपाप्मेत्यादिनाऽपिपास इत्यन्तेन भागेन निर्गुणश्रुतेर्विषयो दर्शितः । सत्यकामः सत्यसंकल्प इति भागेन सगुणश्रुतेर्विषयो दर्शितः । इति हि त्वदभिमतम् । तन्न संभवति । पातकजरामरणादीनां गुणत्वस्य काप्यप्रसिद्धत्वात् । सत्यकाम इत्यादिना च सगुणश्रुतेर्विषयो दर्शित इत्यपि न सम्यक् । सगुण-श्रुतयो हि न सगुणो गुणवानित्यादिशब्दैर्गुणसामान्यपुरस्कारेण गुणान्विदधति । किं तु ज्ञातृत्वदेवतात्वपतित्वादिगुणविशेषपुरस्कारेण । त्वयापि ता एव निर्दिष्टाः । सत्यकाम इत्यत्र च सत्यकामत्वादयो गुणविशेषा एव प्रतिपादिताः । तथा च गुणविशेषप्रतिपादकश्रुतीनां गुणविशेषान्तरप्रतिपादकश्रुत्या कथं विषयप्रदर्शनं भवतीति विपश्चित एव विभावयन्तु ।

3.193. But what has been said (Śrī.B.Para.50.p.93.):

This sacred text (Ch.8.1.5.) certainly distinguishes the scope of the statements [teaching] freedom from qualities and the statements [teaching] the possession of qualities. Having negated the qualities which must be given up beginning with "who is free from sin" and ending with "who is without thirst", it enjoins auspicious qualities for Brahman: "whose desire is true", "whose resolve is true". So because there is no contradiction between the statements [teaching] possession of qualities and freedom from qualities, it must not even be suspected that one of the two depends upon an object which is false.

That is incongruous. For you accept that the sacred text:

[This is the Self], who is free from sin, ageless, without death, without sorrow, who is without hunger and thirst, whose desire is true, whose resolve is true (Ch.8.1.5.)

distinguishes the scope of the statements [teaching] the possession of qualities and freedom from qualities. There, the scope of the sacred text [teaching] freedom from qualities is shown by the part beginning with "who is free from sin" and ending with "who is without thirst". The scope of the sacred text [teaching] the possession of qualities is shown by the part: "whose desire is true", "whose resolve is true".

That is not possible. Because sin, old age, death etc. are not known anywhere as being a quality. It is also not correct that the scope of the sacred text [teaching] the possession of qualities is shown by: "whose desire is true" etc. Because the sacred texts [teaching] the possession of qualities do not enjoin qualities keeping the general quality in the forefront through words such as "possessing qualities", "the

possessor of qualities" etc. But [they enjoin qualities] keeping the particular quality in the forefront such as knowership, divinity, lordship etc. You too have certainly specified those [sacred texts]. In "whose desire is true...", only particular qualities are taught such as the nature of true desire etc. And so wise people must indeed ascertain: how is there a demonstration of an object [of worship] for the sacred texts teaching particular qualities through a sacred text which teaches other particular qualities?

comment

Abhyankar firstly argues that statements such as "who is free from sin" etc. cannot denote freedom from qualities since sin, old age, death etc. are not accepted as qualities of the Self.

Abhyankar then argues that the sacred texts denoting qualities do not state in a general manner that Brahman "possesses qualities" (saguṇa) or is the "possessor of qualities" (guṇavān). For if that was so, qualities could be connected to such statements in the same way as one could say: "think of Mr. X. endowed with these virtues". But the sacred texts denote only particular qualities such as "knowership", "divinity" etc. If for the purpose of worship, the divinity mentioned in the text: "That divinity reflected" (seyam devataikṣata) (Ch.6.3.2.) is connected with qualities such as "whose desire is true" (satyakāmaḥ) (Ch.8.1.5.) then there are just two sets of statements denoting particular qualities. Abhyankar argues that the object of worship is not revealed by merely stating the qualities.

3.194.

किं च सत्यकामः सत्यसंकल्प इति-
श्रुतिप्रतिपादिताः सत्यकामत्वादयो नात्मनः स्वाभाविका गुणाः । यतः- 'कामः
संकल्पो विचिकित्सा श्रद्धाऽश्रद्धा धृतिरधृतिर्हीर्षीर्भीरित्येतत्सर्वं मन एव'
(वृ० १ । ५ । ३) इति श्रुत्यैव कामादीनां मनोवृत्तिविशेषरूपत्वं स्पष्टमभि-
धीयते । ज्ञातृत्वमपि मनोवृत्तिविशेष एव । धीशब्देन ज्ञानाभिधानात् । तथा
च निर्गुणसगुणवाक्ययोरविरोधं 'कामः संकल्पः' इति श्रुतिरेव संपादयती-
त्येव युक्तम् । अत्र साश्रयं सविषयं ज्ञानं मनोवृत्तिविशेषरूपम् । निर्विषयं
निराश्रयं ज्ञानं त्वात्मस्वरूपमेवेति न कथमप्यात्मनः सगुणत्वम् । आनन्दोऽपि
ज्ञानविशेष एव । 'ज्ञानमेव ह्यनुकूलमानन्द इत्युच्यते' (श्रीभा० पृ० ६३
प० १०) इत्युक्तवतस्तवाप्येतत्संमतमेव । तथा च न तेनापि ब्रह्मणः सगुण-
त्वम् ।

3.194. Furthermore, the nature of true desire etc. taught by the sacred text: "whose desire is true, whose resolve is true" are not inherent qualities of the Self. Because the sacred text itself clearly tells that desire etc. are particular modifications of the mind:

Desire, resolve, doubt, faith, lack of faith,
steadiness, lack of steadiness, shame, intelligence
and fear: all this is only the mind (Brh.1.5.3.).

Knowerhip too is only a particular modification of the mind. Because Knowledge [i.e. cognition] is denoted by the word "intelligence". And so it is indeed correct that the sacred text: "Desire, resolve..." certainly brings about the non-contradiction between the statements [teaching] freedom from qualities and the statements [teaching] the possession of qualities. Here, the Knowledge possessing a locus and an object is a particular modification of the mind. But the Knowledge without an object and a locus is indeed the essential nature of the Self. So on no account does the Self possess qualities. Bliss too is only a particularity of Knowledge. You also have certainly accepted this when you said (Śrī.B. Para.51.p.97.): "Because Knowledge which is itself agreeable is said to be bliss". And so Brahman does not possess a quality even on account of that [bliss].

3.195. यत्तु 'आनन्दं ब्रह्मणो विद्वान् (तै० २।९।१) इति ब्रह्मणः कल्याणगुणानन्त्यमत्यादरेण वदतीयं श्रुतिः' (श्रीभा० पृ० ६१ प० २४) इत्युक्तम् । 'ब्रह्म विद्वानित्यनुक्त्वा ब्रह्मण आनन्दं विद्वानित्युक्तत्वाद्ब्रह्मगुणेष्वदरो बोधितः' इति तदभिप्रायः । परं तु नैतावताऽऽनन्दस्य वास्तविकं ब्रह्मगुणत्वं सिध्यति । पुरुषेण धृते स्त्रीवेषे प्रेक्षकाणामत्यादरेणावलोकने प्रवृत्तावपि तस्यौपाधिकत्वमेव दृश्यते ।

3.195. But what has been said (Śrī.B.Para.50.p.94.):

This sacred text: "He who knows the bliss of
Brahman" (Tai.2.9.1.) tells with great attention

that Brahman has limitless auspicious qualities.

The purport of that [text] is that the attention to the qualities of Brahman is made known, because having not said: "He who knows Brahman" it is said: "He who knows the bliss of Brahman". But just by this, bliss is not established as a real quality of Brahman. When a woman's clothes are worn by a man, although the spectators are engaged in looking on with great attention, he is seen as only relating to a limiting adjunct.

3.196.

यत्तु 'सोऽश्रुते सर्वान्कामान्सह ब्रह्मणा विपश्चिता (तै० २ । १ । १)
इति ब्रह्मवेदनफलमवगमयद्वाक्यं परस्य विपश्चितो ब्रह्मणो गुणानन्त्यं ब्रवीति ।
विपश्चिता ब्रह्मणा सह सर्वान्कामानश्नुते ।
ब्रह्मगुणकथने श्रुतेर्न काम्यन्त इति कामाः कल्याणगुणाः । ब्रह्मणा
तात्पर्यम् सह तद्गुणान्सर्वानश्नुत इत्यर्थः ' (श्रीभा० पृ०
६२ प० १) इत्युक्तं तच्चिन्त्यम् । अत्र कोऽयं
गुणवाचकः शब्दः कथं वा तादृशगुणानां ब्रह्मणा संबन्धः । कामशब्दस्तु गुणेषु
न रूढः । ' काम्यन्त इति कामाः ' इति योगं प्रदर्शयतस्तत्राप्येतदभिप्रेतमेव ।
योगपुरस्कारे च न कामशब्दो गुणत्वेन गुणानभिदधाति । काम्यत्वेन रूपेण गुणा-
भिधानेऽपि न गुणा एवात्र ग्रहीतुं शक्याः । गुणतरेषां काम्यानां भोग्यवस्तूनां
संभवात् । अत एवात्र नाक्षेप्तमपि शक्याः । विशेषेण हि सामान्यमाक्षिप्यते न तु
सामान्येन विशेषाः । यद्यपि निर्विशेषं न सामान्यमिति न्यायस्तथापि सामा-
न्येनाद्युक्त एव तत्र विशेष इति न निश्चेतुं पार्यते ।

3.196. But what has been said (Śrī.B.Para.50.p.94.):

The statement making known the result of the knowledge of Brahman: "He attains all desires, together with the wise Brahman" (Tai.2.1.1.) tells that the supreme, wise Brahman has limitless qualities. [the prose order is] vipaścītā brahmaṇā saha sarvān kāmān aśnute. "Desires" are [the objects] longed for, i.e. the auspicious qualities. The meaning is that he attains, together with Brahman, all the qualities of that [Brahman].

That is questionable. Concerning this, what is this word which directly expresses qualities? Or how is there a connection of such qualities with

Brahman? The word "desire", however, is not conventionally used in the sense of qualities. You too have certainly accepted this by showing the etymological connection: "Desires (kāmāḥ) are [the objects] longed for (kāmyante)". When the etymological connection is kept in the forefront, the word "desire" does not directly express qualities in the sense of qualities. Even in the denotation of qualities in the form of what is desirable, qualities certainly cannot be accepted here. Because it is possible for objects of enjoyment to be desirable [things] other than qualities. For this very reason, [qualities] are not even able to be postulated here. Because the universal is postulated through a distinction but not distinctions through the universal. Although there is a rule that there is no universal without a distinction, still, it cannot be ascertained by the universal that "so and so is indeed the distinction there".

3.197.

कथं चात्र ते गुणा ब्रह्मगता
 एवेति निर्णयः । न ह्यत्र ब्रह्मण इति षष्ठ्यन्तं पदं कामान्वितं दृश्यते । कस्य
 कामा इत्याकाङ्क्षा तु नियमेन न जायते । कामशब्दस्य नित्यसाकाङ्क्षत्वा-
 भावात् । ईदृशस्थले पुत्रमाप्नोतीत्येवं नित्यसाकाङ्क्षशब्दप्रयोगेऽपि कर्तुः
 स्वस्यैवेति कल्पनयैवाकाङ्क्षानिवृत्तेन्याय्यत्वाच्च । किं च ब्रह्मगुणा नैव जीव-
 प्राप्या भवन्ति । किं तु ब्रह्मगुणसदृशा गुणाः । एवं चास्थान एवायं संरम्भो
 ब्रह्मणः सगुणत्वसमर्थनाय रामानुजानाम् । यतो न कामशब्दो गुणाभिधायकः ।
 गुणाभिधानेऽपि न तेनाकाङ्क्षा । आकाङ्क्षायामपि न ब्रह्मणः संबन्धः ।
 संबन्धेऽपि न ब्रह्मगुणप्राप्तिसंभव इति । अथ जीवब्रह्मणोरैक्याभिप्रायेण
 ब्रह्मगुणप्राप्तिसंभवश्चेदागतोऽसि मदीयं मार्गम् । तथा चेत्यं श्रुत्यर्थ उचितः ।
 सहेति युगपदित्यर्थे । स ब्रह्मभूतो विद्वान्ब्रह्मस्वरूपेणैव सर्वान्कामान्युगपदश्नुते ।
 ये सुखविशेषा हिरण्यगर्भाद्युपाधिषु भोग्यत्वेनाभिमतास्तेषां सर्वेषां ब्रह्मानन्दा-
 व्यतिरेकाद्ब्रह्मभूतो विद्वान्सर्वानेवानन्दानश्नुते । आनन्दस्वरूपभवनमपि मुमुक्षु-
 दशास्थः कामविशेष एव । तथा चाखण्डानन्दब्रह्मरूपः संपद्यत इति ।

-3.197. How is there the ascertainment that those qualities here indeed belong to Brahman? Because there is no word seen here which ends in the sixth case, i.e. "of Brahman" and is connected with [the word] "desires".

But the expectation "whose desires?" does not invariably arise. Because the word "desire" does not always possess expectancy. Because even in such a case where there is the usage of the word "always possesses expectancy" in the manner; "he obtains a son", the cessation of the expectancy is customary just through the supposition; "only for the agent himself".

Furthermore, the qualities of Brahman certainly cannot be obtained by the individual soul. But qualities which are similar to the qualities of Brahman. Hence this zeal of Rāmānuja for establishing Brahman as possessing qualities is certainly out of place. Because the word "desire" does not denote a quality. Even in the denotation of a quality, there is no expectation due to that. Even in the expectation, there is no connection to Brahman. Even in the connection, there is no possibility of the attainment of the qualities of Brahman.

But if [you say] there is the possibility of the attainment of the qualities of Brahman through the intended meaning of the identity between the individual soul and Brahman, [we reply] you have come to my path. Accordingly, the meaning of the sacred text is correct in this manner: saha is in the sense of "simultaneously" (yugapad). Sa means "he who knows, who is of the nature of Brahman", attains simultaneously all desires on account of being the very nature of Brahman. Since those particular pleasures which are accepted as being able to be experienced in the limiting adjuncts of Hiraṇyagarbha etc. are not distinct from the bliss of Brahman, the one who knows -being of the nature of Brahman- attains indeed all bliss. Even becoming the nature of bliss is only a particular desire [i.e. bliss. kāma = ānanda, supra.] belonging to the state of the person desirous of liberation. And so [in the state of liberation] being the nature of Brahman which is unbroken bliss is arrived at.

3.198.

इयमेव मोक्षावस्था । अस्यामवस्थायां न ज्ञातृज्ञेयभावः । ब्रह्मणो ज्ञानावि-
पयत्वात् । तदुक्तम्—

यस्यामतं तस्य मतं मतं यस्य न वेद सः ।

अविज्ञातं विजानतां विज्ञातमविजानताम् ॥ (के० ११) इति ।

यस्य ब्रह्मामतं ज्ञानाविपय इति निश्चयस्तेन सम्यगवगतम् । यस्य तु ब्रह्म
श्रुतिसंमतं ब्रह्मज्ञान-
स्वरूपम् मतं ज्ञानविपयत्वेनाभिमतं स न वेद । यतोऽ-
स्माभिर्ब्रह्म ज्ञातमस्मिन्निष्ठज्ञानविपयीभूतमित्येवं
विजानतां ब्रह्माविज्ञातमेव । अद्वैते ब्रह्मणि
विपयविपयिभावासंभवात् । अविजानतां ' ब्रह्म न ज्ञानविपयः ' इति विजा-
नतां ब्रह्म विज्ञातमिति श्रुत्यर्थः । साधकावस्थायां तु ज्ञातृज्ञेयभावकल्पनाऽ-
स्त्येव । तदनुसारेण च ' ब्रह्मविदामोति परम् ' (तै० २ । १ । १) इत्यत्र
ब्रह्मविदित्युक्तम् । एतेन ' ब्रह्मणो ज्ञानाविपयत्वे ब्रह्मविदामोति परम् (तै०
२ । १ । १) ब्रह्म वेद ब्रह्मैव भवति (मु० ३ । २ । ९) इति ज्ञानान्मोक्षोपदेशो
न स्यात् ' (श्रीभा० पृ० ६२ प० १०) इत्यपास्तम् ।

3.198. This is indeed the state of liberation. There is no knower-known relation in this state. Because Brahman is not an object of knowledge. That has been told:

For whom it [Brahman] is not thought, for him it is thought. For whom it is thought, he does not know. It is unknown for those who know and it is known for those who do not know (Ke.2.3.).

The meaning of the sacred text is: "for whom" (yasya) Brahman is "not thought" (amatam) i.e. there is the ascertainment: "not an object of knowledge", it is correctly understood by that person. But "for whom" (yasya) Brahman is "thought" (matam) i.e. accepted as being an object of knowledge, "he does not know" (sa na veda). Because Brahman is certainly "unknown" (avijñātam) "for those who know" (vijñāatām) in the manner: "Brahman is known by us as an object of the knowledge depending upon us". Because a subject-object relation is not possible in the non-dual Brahman. Brahman is "known" (viññātam) "for those who do not know" (avijñāatām) i.e. for those who know: "Brahman is not an object of knowledge".

However in the state of being a seeker, the assumption of the

relation of knower and known certainly exists. And in accordance with that, the "knower of Brahman" is told here: "The knower of Brahman attains the supreme" (Tai.2.1.1.). Due to this, [the statement] (Śrī.B.Para.50. p.95.)¹⁵⁶:

if Brahman is not an object of knowledge, there could be no teaching that liberation results from knowledge: "The knower of Brahman attains the supreme" (Tai.2.1.1.), "The one who knows Brahman becomes Brahman indeed" (Mu.3.2.9.)

is refuted.

3.199.

यत्तु 'यतो वाचो निवर्तन्ते । अप्राप्य मनसा सह (तै० २ । ४ । १) इति ब्रह्मणोऽनन्तस्या- परिमितगुणस्य वाङ्मनसयोरेतावदितिपरिच्छेदायोग्यत्वश्रवणेन ब्रह्मैतावदिति ब्रह्मपरिच्छेदज्ञानवतां ब्रह्माविज्ञातममममित्युक्तम् । अपरिच्छिन्नत्वाद्ब्रह्मणः ? (श्रीभा० पृ० ६२ प० १८) इत्युक्तं तत्र ब्रह्मपरिच्छेदज्ञानवतां ब्रह्माविज्ञातमिति सत्यमेव । परं तु तन्न प्रकृतश्रुतित्वात्पर्यम् । विज्ञानतामित्यस्यैतावदिति ब्रह्मपरिच्छेदज्ञानवतामित्यर्थे प्रमाणाभावात् । 'यतो वाचः' इति श्रुतिरपि न तत्तात्पर्यिका । वाङ्मनसयोर्निवृत्तिहेतुत्वेन गुणानन्त्यस्य तत्र श्रुतावनिर्देशात् । अप्राप्येत्यस्य कर्माकाङ्क्षायां वाङ्निवृत्त्यवधित्वेन श्रुतं यच्छब्दानिर्दिष्टं ब्रह्मैव संबन्धुमुचितं न त्वध्याहृतं गुणान्तादिकमिति प्रागुक्तमेव (पृ० ७० प० ३) । त्वयाऽपीयं रीतिः 'प्रतिषेधादिति चेन्न (ब्र० सू० ४ । १२) इति सूत्रे न तस्य प्राणा उत्क्रामन्ति (वृ० ४ । ४ । ६) इति श्रुतौ कस्मादुत्क्रामन्तीत्यपादानापेक्षायामश्रुताच्छरीरात्संबन्धितया श्रुतस्यात्मन एव संनिहितत्वेनापादानतयाऽपि ग्राह्यत्वात् ' (श्रीभा० पृ० ७३४ प० ११) इति वदता स्वीकृतैव । तथा च ब्रह्मणो निर्विशेषज्ञानस्वरूपत्वादेव तस्माद्वाङ्मनसयोर्निवृत्तिः ।

3.199. But what has been said (Śrī.B.Para.50.p.95,96.):

"From which words return, along with the mind, having not reached" (Tai.2.4.1.). Through hearing that the limitless Brahman, who has immeasurable qualities, is incapable of being limited as

"so much" by speech and mind; [we understand that in the Kena text] Brahman is said to be "unknown" (avijñātam) and "not thought" (amatam) for those who have knowledge of the limitation of Brahman in the manner: "Brahman is so much". Because Brahman is without limit.

There [in the Kena text], it is certainly true that Brahman is unknown for those who have knowledge of the limitation of Brahman. But that is not the purport of the sacred text which is under discussion. Because there is no authority for this [word]: "for those who know" as having the meaning: "for those who have knowledge of the limitation of Brahman in the manner: "so much" ".

Even the sacred text: "From which words [return]" does not have that as its purport. Because limitlessness of qualities has not been specified there in the sacred text as the reason for the return of speech and mind. It was indeed previously mentioned (3.51.) that in the expectation of a grammatical object for this [word]: "having not reached", Brahman alone, who is specified by the word "which" and heard as the limit for the return of speech, is proper to be connected. But not the limit of qualities etc. which are elliptically supplied. You [Rāmānuja] too have certainly accepted this way when you said (Śrī.B.Para.518. p.1007.)¹⁵⁷:

because in the expectation of a locus of separation, i.e. "from what do they rise up?" in relation to the sacred text: "his prāṇas do not rise up" (Bṛh.4.4.6.) occurring in the sūtra: "If it is said on account of the denial, no..." (B.S.8.2.12.), the self alone, which is heard as having connection [with the prāṇas], is to be understood even as the locus of separation because it is [more] contiguous than the body which is

not heard [i.e. which is not mentioned in the passage].

And so because Brahman is just of the nature of Knowledge which is free from distinction, the return of speech and mind is from that.

3.200.

तथा च 'न दृष्टेर्दृष्टारं पश्येः' (बृ० ३ । ४ । २) इतिश्रुति-
दृष्टिव्यतिरिक्तं द्रष्टारं प्रतिषेधति । यत्त्वेतच्छ्रुतिव्याख्यानम् ' आगन्तुकचैत-
न्यगुणयोगितया ज्ञातुरज्ञानस्वरूपतां कुतर्कसिद्धां मत्वा न तथाऽऽत्मानं पश्येः ।
अपि तु द्रष्टारमपि दृष्टिरूपमेव पश्येः ' (श्रीभा० पृ० ६३ प० १) इति
तत्किंष्टम् । निषेध्यतावच्छेदकस्य जडत्वस्य श्रुतावनिर्देशात् । द्रष्टृत्वेनैव निषेधे
श्रुतेः स्वारस्यात् । ' विज्ञातारमरे केन विजानीयात् ' (बृ० २ । ४ । १४)
इति विज्ञातृत्वोक्तिस्त्वौपचारिकीति प्रागेवोक्तम् । किं च रामानुजमते विज्ञातृ-
त्वस्य सत्यत्वे विज्ञातारमर इति श्रुत्यर्थो नैव संगतो भवति । किंशब्दो ह्यत्र न
साधनविषयप्रश्नार्थकः । अग्रेऽमुकेन साधनेनेत्युत्तरादर्शनात् । किं त्वाक्षेपा-
र्थकः । विज्ञातृविषयकज्ञानसाधनस्याक्षेपेऽर्थादेव तद्द्वारा तादृशं ज्ञानमप्याक्षिप्तं
भवति । तत्तु रामानुजीयानामनिष्टमेव । तैरात्मनो ज्ञेयत्वाङ्गीकारात् ।

3.200. Accordingly, the sacred text: "You cannot see the seer of seeing" (Bṛh.3.4.2.) negates a seer distinct from seeing. But the explanation of this sacred text (Śrī.B.Para.50.p.96.)¹⁵⁸:

Having thought that ignorance is the essential nature of the knower, [a view] established by fallacious reasoning on account of [the knower] being connected with the adventitious quality of consciousness, [the sacred text tells]: "you must not see the self in that manner, but you must see that even the seer has only seeing as its nature"

is contrived. Because being insentient, which is the determining factor for the negation ["you cannot see..."], has not been specified in the sacred text. For the sacred text is suitable in the negation only of the nature of being a seer. It has certainly been told previously that the expression of knowership: "by what, my dear, can one know the knower?" (Bṛh.2.4.14.) is figurative.

Furthermore, if knowership is real according to the view of Rāmānuja, then the meaning of the sacred text: "[by what], my dear, [can one know] the knower?" is certainly not congruous. Because the word "what" here does not have as its purpose a question relating to a means. Because an answer "by such and such means" is not subsequently seen. But it has the sense of a doubt. Because the means for the knowledge relating to knowership only has its purpose in a doubt, through that, even such knowledge is doubted. But that is certainly undesirable for Rāmānuja. Because he accepts that the self is knowable.

3.201.

निर्विशेषज्ञानस्वरूपे ब्रह्मणि च न लेशतोऽपि भेदस्यावसरः । 'नेह नानास्ति किञ्चन । मृत्योः स मृत्युप्राप्नोति य इह नानात्वनिषेधतात्पर्यम् नानेव पश्यति' (वृ० ४ । ४ । १९) 'यत्र हि द्वैतमिव भवति तदितर इतरं पश्यति । यत्र त्वस्य सर्वमात्मैवाभूत्तत्केन कं पश्येत्' (वृ० ४ । ५ । १५) इत्यादिश्रुतिषु बहुधा भेदनिषेधदर्शनात् । यत्तु 'कृत्स्नस्य जगतो ब्रह्मकार्यतया तदन्तर्यामिकतया च तदात्मकत्वेनैकयात्तत्प्रत्यनीकनानात्वमुक्तश्रुतिषु प्रतिपिध्यते । न पुनः, बहु स्यां प्रजायेय (छा० ६ । २ । ३) इति बहुभवनसंकल्पपूर्वकं ब्रह्मणो नानात्वं श्रुतिसिद्धं प्रतिपिध्यते' (श्रीभा० पृ० ६३ प० २१) इत्युक्तं तच्चिन्त्यम् । तथा हि-भिन्न इति व्यवहारो द्विविधः, इतरप्रतियोगिकभेदमूलकोऽवान्तरभेद-मूलकश्च । आद्यो यथा पृथिवी जलापेक्षया भिन्ना । अत्र च भिन्नशब्दस्य भेदः प्रवृत्तिनिमित्तम् । स चात्र जलप्रतियोगिकः पृथिवीनिष्ठः । द्वितीयो यथा पृथिवी घटपटादिभेदेन भिन्ना । अत्र च भिन्नशब्दस्य न भेदः प्रवृत्तिनिमित्तम् । घट-प्रतियोगिकभेदस्य घटेऽसत्त्वेन पटप्रतियोगिकभेदस्य च पटेऽसत्त्वेन पृथिवीत्वा-वच्छेदेन पृथिव्यां भेदस्यासत्त्वात् । किं त्ववान्तरभेदमूलकमनेकविधत्वमत्र भिन्न-शब्दस्य प्रवृत्तिनिमित्तम् । एतदेव च नानाशब्दस्यापि प्रवृत्तिनिमित्तम् ।

3.201. There is no scope for even a trace of difference in Brahman who is of the nature of Knowledge free from distinction. Because the negation of difference is seen in various ways in the sacred texts:¹⁵⁹ "There is no diversity whatsoever here. He who sees diversity, as it were, here, goes from death to death" (Brh.4.4.19.), "Because where there is duality, as it were, then another sees another...but where everything has become the Self alone for this [knower of Brahman], then what should one

see and through what?" (Brh.4.5.15.) etc. But what has been said (Śrī.B. Para.51.p.98.)¹⁶⁰:

Since the entire world is an effect of Brahman and has that [Brahman] as its inner ruler and because there is oneness on account of [the world] having that [Brahman] as its Self, the diversity which is contrary to that [oneness] is negated in the sacred texts cited. On the other hand, the manifold nature of Brahman which is established in the sacred texts and which is preceded by the resolve to become many: "May I be many, may I be born" (Ch.6.2.3.) is not negated.

That is questionable. To explain. The expression "different" is of two types: (1) based upon difference which has another [thing] as its counter correlate and (2) based upon internal difference. The first is like earth is different with regard to water. Here, difference is the reason for the use of the word "different". And that [difference] is located in earth and has water as its counter correlate. The second is like earth is different due to the difference of pots and cloth etc. Here, difference is not the reason for the use of the word "different". Because the difference which has pot as its counter correlate does not exist in the pot and the difference which has cloth as its counter correlate does not exist in the cloth, therefore difference does not exist in earth as there is the characteristic property of earth-ness. But variety, which is based upon internal difference, is the reason for the use of the word "different" in this case. And this alone is the reason for the use of the word "diversity" too.

3.202.

अनेनैव

रूपेण जगतोऽवलोकनं लोकप्रसिद्धं 'य इह नानैव पश्यति' इति श्रुत्याऽनूद्य
निषिध्यते। श्रुताविहेतीदंशब्देन 'सर्वं खल्विदं ब्रह्म' (छा०३।१४।१) इत्यत्रैव

सर्वस्य जगतः परामर्शात् । नानात्वेनावलोकनस्य निषेधश्चैकत्वेनावलोकने पर्यवस्यति । अवलोकनमात्रनिषेधे तु न श्रुतेस्तात्पर्यम् । तथा सति 'मृत्योः स मृत्युमाप्नोति य इह पश्यति' इत्येव वदेत् । नानापदार्थानामेकत्वेनावलोकनं च तेषामेकोपादानकारणकत्वे सत्येव संभवति । तदेव च 'बहु स्याम्' (तै० २ । ६ । १, छा० ६ । २ । ३) इति श्रुत्या प्रतिपाद्यते । अनुभूयमानमप्येतन्नानाभूतं जगदेकोपादानकारणकर्तृकसंकल्पपूर्वकोत्पत्तिमत्त्वेनाज्ञातेन रूपेण तथा श्रुत्या ज्ञाप्यते । एतेन 'प्रत्यक्षादिसकलप्रमाणानवगतनानात्वं दुरारोहं ब्रह्मणः प्रतिपाद्य तदेव बाध्यत इत्युपहास्यमिदम्' (श्रीभा० पृ० ६४ प० ३) इत्यपास्तम् । जगति नानात्वस्य प्रत्यक्षादिप्रमाणैरवगतत्वाच्च । एतन्नानात्वं ब्रह्मगतत्वेन नैव प्रत्यक्षादिभिरवगम्यत इति चेद्ब्रह्मसंबन्धप्रतिपादन एव श्रुतेस्तात्पर्यं कल्पयितव्यं भवति । स च संबन्धो न 'य इह नानेव पश्यति' इति श्रुत्या निषिध्यते । किं तु नानात्वेनावलोकनमेव निषिध्यत इति किमत्रोपहास्यम् । प्रत्युत 'बहु स्याम्' इति श्रुतिरेकोपादानकारणकत्वं जगतः प्रदर्श्य 'य इह नानेव पश्यति' इतिश्रुतित्वात्पर्यविपर्ययीभूत एकत्वेनावलोकन उपयुज्यत एव ।

3.202. Seeing the world in this very manner [as having variety], which is well known in the world, is negated by the sacred text repeating: "He who sees diversity, as it were, here". Because there is the recollection of the whole world [by the word] "here" in the sacred text, just as there is by the word "this" in: "All this is indeed Brahman" (Ch.3.14.1.). The negation of the seeing as being diverse amounts to seeing as being one. But the sacred text does not have its purport in the negation of mere seeing. If that was so, it would say only: "He who sees here goes from death to death".

Moreover seeing the diverse objects as being one is possible only when they have a single material cause. And that alone is what is taught by the sacred text: "May I be many" (Tai.2.6.1., Ch.6.2.3.). This world, although being experienced as diverse, is made known by that sacred text in a manner which was unknown: as possessing origination preceded by a resolve which has as its agent [one who is] the single material cause. On account of this, [the statement] (Śrī.B.Para.51.p.98.)¹⁶¹:

Having taught that Brahman has diversity, which is

unknown through all the means of knowledge like perception etc. and which is difficult to comprehend, then that very [diversity] is being negated -this is ridiculous

is refuted. And because diversity in the world is known through the means of knowledge such as perception etc.

If [you say]: this diversity is certainly not known through perception etc. as belonging to Brahman. [we reply] The purport of the sacred texts is to be conceived only in teaching the connection to Brahman. And that connection is not negated by the sacred text: "He who sees diversity, as it were, here". But only the seeing as being diverse is negated, so what is ridiculous here? On the contrary, the sacred text: "May I be many", having shown that the world has a single material cause, is certainly applicable for seeing oneness which is the object of the sacred text: "He who sees diversity, as it were, here".

3.203.

किं च रामानुजमते 'य इह नानेव पश्यति' इति-श्रुतिप्रतिपादितो निषेधः सुतरां नोपपद्यते । जगति नानात्वस्य सत्यतया तैरभ्युपगम्यमानत्वात् । ब्रह्मणि नानात्वं नास्तीत्यभिप्रायेण न श्रुतिस्तन्मते योजयितुं शक्या । य इह नानेव पश्यतीत्यत्रेहेत्युक्त्या तादृशार्थाप्रतीतेः । चिदचिद्दूषशरीरविशिष्टे ब्रह्मण्यन्तर्गतचिदचिदन्तर्यामिरूपतत्त्वत्रयभेदेन नानात्वस्य तत्संमतत्वाच्च । अथ यस्य ब्रह्म कारणं न भवति नाप्यन्तर्यामि भवति तादृशं ब्रह्मभिन्नं वस्तु किञ्चिदपि नास्तीत्यभिप्रायश्चेन्नानाशब्दे लक्षणा स्यात् । प्रागुक्तस्य शक्यतावच्छेदकस्याभावात् । नानाशब्दस्य हि न भेदः प्रवृत्तिनिमित्तमित्यनुपदमेवावोचाम । द्वैतशब्दस्यापि न भेदः प्रवृत्तिनिमित्तम् । किं त्ववान्तरभेदमूलकं द्वित्वम् । तादृशजगद्गतद्वित्वकार्यभूतं किञ्चित्कर्तृकं किञ्चित्कर्मकं लोकप्रसिद्धं दर्शनादिकं 'यत्र हि द्वैतमिव भवति तदितर इतरं पश्यति' (बृ० ४ । ४ । १५) इत्यादिनाऽनूद्य 'यत्र त्वस्य सर्वमात्मैवाभूत्तत्केन कं पश्येत्' (बृ० ४ । ४ । १५) इत्यादिना निषिध्यत इति बोध्यम् ।

3.203. Furthermore, the negation taught by the sacred text: "He who sees diversity, as it were, here" is all the more logically impossible according to the view of Rāmānuja. Because he accepts the diversity in

the world as real. In his view, no sacred text can be connected with the intended meaning that there is no diversity in Brahman. Because there is no cognition of such a meaning due to the expression "here" in: "He who sees diversity, as it were, here". And because he accepts diversity on account of the difference of the threefold reality consisting of the sentient, the insentient and the Inner-controller, which [difference] belongs to Brahman who is qualified by a body consisting of the sentient and the insentient.

But if [you say] that the intended meaning [of the text: "He who sees diversity, as it were, here"] is that there is no such object whatsoever different from Brahman, for which Brahman is not the cause or the Inner-controller. [we reply] There must be implication in the word "diversity". Because there is no reason for the usage which was told before [supra., "...he accepts diversity on account of the difference..."]. For we mentioned just previously that difference is not the reason for the use of the word "diversity". Nor is difference the reason for the use of even the word "duality". But duality is based upon internal difference. It is to be understood that having repeated the seeing etc. which is well known in the world as having some agent and some object and which is the effect of the duality belonging to such a world, by this: "Because where there is duality, as it were, then another sees another" (Bṛh.4.5.15.) etc., it is negated by: "But where everything has become the Self alone for this [knower of Brahman], then what should one see and through what?" (Bṛh.4.5.15.) etc.

- 3.204. 'यदा ह्येष एतस्मिन्नुदरमन्तरं कुरुते, अथ तस्य भयं भवति' (तै० २ । ७ । १) इत्यत्र नानात्वदर्शनाद्भयप्राप्तिः प्रतिपादिता । तथा चाभयार्थिनो नानात्वदर्शनं नेष्यत इति सूचितमिति तस्या अपि श्रुतेर्नानात्वदर्शननिषेध एव तात्पर्यम् । यत्तु 'सर्वं खल्विदं ब्रह्म तज्जलानिति नानात्वदर्शनात् शान्तिः शान्त उपासीत (छा० ३ । १४ । १) इति तन्नानात्वानुसंधानस्य शान्तिहेतुत्वमुपदिश्यते ?

(श्रीभा० पृ० ६४ । पृ० ८) इत्युक्तं तच्चिन्त्यम् । तथा हि-इति शान्त उपा-
सीतित्यत्रेतिशब्दः पूर्वोक्तं परामृश्य तस्य शान्तिहेतुत्वं बोधयति । सर्वं स्वलिङ्गं
ब्रह्म तज्जलानिति पूर्वभागे ब्रह्म तज्जलानिति च शब्दद्वयं विधेयसमर्पकम् । इदं सर्वं
जगदुद्दिश्य ब्रह्मत्वं तदुत्पत्त्यादिमत्त्वं च विधीयते । तस्माद्ब्रह्मणः सकाशाज्जायत
इति तज्जम् । लीयत इति लम् । अनिति प्राणितीत्यन् । जगंत उत्पत्तिर्ब्रह्मणः
सकाशादेव । लयश्च ब्रह्मण्येव । तथा चेष्टा च जगतो ब्रह्मणैव । अत्र प्रथमेन विधिना
सर्वस्य ब्रह्मत्वे बोधिते सर्वस्य कथं ब्रह्मत्वमित्याकाङ्क्षायां तदुपपादनाय तज्ज-
लानिति द्वितीयो विधिरारभ्यते । सर्वस्य ब्रह्मैकरूपत्वानुसंधाने च नानात्वानुसं-
धानाभावेन रागद्वेषाभावाच्छान्तिः सुलभा । तथा चात्र नानात्वानुसंधानं नैव
विधीयत इति कुतस्तस्य शान्तिहेतुत्वेनोपदेशः ।

3.204. The attainment of fear has been taught on account of seeing
diversity: "For when he makes the slightest difference in this [Brahman],
then he has fear" (Tai.2.7.1.). And so it is indicated that seeing
diversity is not desired on the part of a person seeking freedom from
fear. Thus the purport of that sacred text too is only in the negation
of seeing diversity.

But what has been said (Śrī.B.Para.51.p.98.)¹⁶²:

The recollection of the manifold nature of that
[Brahman] is taught as the cause of peace: "All
this is indeed Brahman. The origination, absorption
and sustenance [of the world] is due to that [Brahman].
Thus being peaceful, may one contemplate" (Ch.3.14.1.).

That is questionable. To explain. The word "thus" here: "Thus being
peaceful, may one contemplate", having recalled what was previously said,
it makes known that [recollection] to be the cause of peace. The pair of
words "Brahman" and "tajjalān", occurring in the prior portion: "All this
is indeed Brahman. The origination, absorption and sustenance [of the
world] is due to that [Brahman] (tajjalān)", denotes the predicate. With
reference to all this world [which is the subject], the nature of being
Brahman and its having origination etc. from that [Brahman] is enjoined
[as the predicate]. Born from that (tajjam) means it arises from that

Brahman. Lam means "it resolves". An means "it breathes" in the sense that "it lives". The origination of the world is only from Brahman and the dissolution is only in Brahman. So too, the activity of the world is only through Brahman. When everything is made known as being Brahman by the first positive statement here, in the expectation: "how does everything have the nature of being Brahman?", the second positive statement: "The origination, absorption and sustenance [of the world] is due to that [Brahman]" is begun for demonstrating that. And peace is easily acquired upon the recollection that everything is only of the nature of Brahman; because there is no desire and aversion due to the absence of the recollection of diversity. And so the recollection of diversity is certainly not enjoined here. So how could there be the instruction that it is the cause of peace?

3.205.

उद्देश्यसमर्पकसर्वशब्दबोधितं

नानात्वं तु न कुर्वद्रूपतां दधाति । प्रत्युत नानात्वानुसंधाने रागद्वेषसंभवेन प्राग्बिद्यमानापि शान्तिर्व्याह्रियेत । ब्रह्मात्मकत्वेनापि नानात्वानुसंधाने जातुचिद्-द्वेषस्य क्षयसंभवः । रागस्य तु वृद्धिरेव स्यात् । तथा च शान्तिर्दुर्लभैवेति । एतेन 'यदा ह्येवैष एतस्मिन्नदरमन्तरं कुरुते, अथ तस्य भयं भवति' (तै०२।७।१) इति श्रुतावन्तरशब्दस्यावकाशार्थकत्वं गृहीत्वा तत्समर्थनं (श्रीभा० पृ० ६४ प० १५) प्रत्युक्तम् । छिद्रार्थकत्वमध्यन्तरशब्दस्य तथैव निरस्तं वेदितव्यम् । न हि ब्रह्मण्यवकाशं छिद्रं वा कर्तुं कोऽपि समर्थः । दूरे तस्य भयम् । कान्तरं कुरुत इत्याकाङ्क्षायां स्ववाक्योपात्तमेतस्मिन्नित्येव तत्रान्वेतुमर्हति । न तु पूर्ववाक्योपात्ता ब्रह्मणि प्रतिष्ठा । 'एतस्मिन्नदृश्ये....प्रतिष्ठां विन्दते' (तै०२।७।१) इति पूर्ववाक्ये प्रतिष्ठाशब्दस्य सप्तम्यन्तत्वाभावाच्च । सप्तम्यन्तत्वेन विपरिणामे तु क्लेश एव । एतद्वाक्यस्थस्यैतस्मिन्नित्यस्य 'श्रुतानुमितयोः श्रुतसंबन्धो बलीयान्' इति न्यायेनानुवृत्तप्रतिष्ठापदार्थेऽन्वयासंभवश्च ।

3.205. But the diversity made known by the word "all", which denotes the subject, does not present a cause at all.¹⁶³ On the contrary, upon the recollection of diversity, even though peace was existing previously it is thwarted due to the possibility of desire and aversion. Perhaps there is the possibility of the decrease of aversion upon the recollection of

diversity even as consisting of the nature of Brahman. But there would certainly be an increase of desire. And so peace is indeed difficult to be acquired.

On account of this, having taken the word "antara" as having the meaning of "an interval" in the sacred text: "For when he makes the slightest interval in this, then he has fear" (Tai.2.7.1.), the establishing of that [meaning] (Śrī.B.Para.51.p.99.) is replied to. The word "antara" even having the meaning of "a hole" must be understood as refuted in just the same way. Because no one is able to make an interval or a hole in Brahman. So his fear is far away. In the expectation: "where does he make a difference (antara)?", only "in this" -which is mentioned in the sentence itself- can be connected there. But not the "stability" in Brahman which is mentioned in the previous sentence. And because the word "stability" in the previous sentence: "... he finds stability in this invisible..." (Tai.2.7.1.) does not end in the seventh case. But there is certainly trouble in changing it to a seventh case ending. And there is no possibility of the connection of this: "in this" which belongs to this sentence ["For when he makes the slightest difference in this..."] to the meaning of the word "stability" which has persisted [in the sentence: "For when..."] because there is the maxim: "Between what has been heard and what is inferred, the connection with what is heard is stronger".

3.206.

न च श्रुतेऽन्तरपदार्थेऽवकाशे
छिद्रे वैतत्पदार्थस्य ब्रह्मणोऽन्वयो न संभवतीति नात्र तन्न्यायविषयः। उभयत्रान्व-
यसंभव एव तन्न्यायप्रवृत्तेरिति वाच्यम् । अन्तरपदार्थे श्रुते भेदेऽन्वयसंभवात् ।
नहि भेदोऽत्रान्तरपदार्थो न ग्राह्य इत्यत्र किञ्चिन्नियामकमस्ति । किं च पूर्व-
वाक्येऽप्येतस्मिन्निति पदसत्त्वेन तेनान्वितायाः प्रतिष्ठाया उत्तरत्र संबन्धः स्यादि-
त्युत्तरवाक्ये पुनरेतस्मिन्निति पदं श्रुतिर्नैवोच्चारयेत् । तथा च पुनरेतस्मिन्निति
पदं प्रतिष्ठानिवृत्त्यर्थमेवेति श्रुतेरभिप्रायो गम्यते ।

3.206. It should not be said that: the connection of Brahman as being the meaning of the word "this" ["For when he makes the slightest... in this"] is not possible when the meaning of the word "antara" is heard in the sense of "an interval" or "a hole". So there is no scope of that maxim here. Because that maxim is applicable only upon the possibility of a connection in both places. [reason] Because the connection is possible when the meaning of the word "antara" is heard in the sense of "difference". For there is no restrictive rule here: "difference cannot be accepted as the meaning of the word "antara" here".

Furthermore, because the word "in this" is in the previous sentence also, there would be the connection of the "stability" connected with that [previous "in this"] in the latter sentence. So the sacred text certainly need not utter the word "in this" again in the latter sentence. And so the intended meaning of the sacred text is understood as: the word "in this" occurs again only for the purpose of the cessation of "stability".

3.207.

अयं च निर्विशेषब्रह्मवादः सूत्रकारस्यापि संमत एव । तदुक्तं—‘ न स्थानतोऽपि परस्योभयलिङ्गं सर्वत्र हि ’
 निर्विशेषं ब्रह्म सूत्रक- (ब्र० सू० ३ । २ । ११) इति । स्थानमु-
 त्संमतम् पाधिः । परस्य ब्रह्मण उभयलिङ्गं सविशेषानि-
 विशेषलिङ्गं स्वभावतस्तु नास्त्येव, परं तु स्थानतोऽपि नास्ति । यतः सर्वत्र
 ‘ अशब्दम् ’ (का० ३ । १५) इत्यादिश्रुतिष्वपास्तसमस्तविशेषमेव
 ब्रह्मोपदिश्यत इति तदर्थः । न च तर्हि निर्विशेषं ब्रह्मेत्यद्वैतिनां प्रवादः कथ-
 मिति वाच्यम् । सर्वथाऽवाच्यमेव ब्रह्म कथंचिद्वक्तव्यमित्येव तत्र निर्विशेषाद्वै-
 तादिशब्दोक्तिर्निरूपकाणाम् । परमार्थतस्तु न ब्रह्मणो निर्विशेषशब्दवाच्यत्वम-
 द्वैतादिशब्दवाच्यत्वं वा । तदुक्तं दक्षस्मृतौ—

‘ न द्वैतं नापि चाद्वैतमित्येतत्पारमार्थिकम् ’ (दक्षस्म०७।४६) इति ।

यत्तु ‘ परस्य ब्रह्मणः पृथिव्यादिस्थानतोऽपि नापुरुषार्थगन्धः संभवति । यतः सर्वत्र परं ब्रह्म निर्दोषत्वसगुणत्वैतदुभयलिङ्गमभिधीयते ’ इति तत्सूत्र-
 व्याख्यानं तन्न चेतश्चमत्कृतिं विधत्ते । इदं हि निषेधवाक्यम् । तत्र निषेधमे-
 वाध्याहृतं गृह्यत इति कोऽयं न्यायः । तथा च सर्वविशेषरहितमेव ब्रह्म ।
 जगति प्रतीयमाना विशेषास्तु सर्वेऽप्यपारमार्थिका एवेति बोध्यम् ।

3.207. This teaching of Brahman free from distinction is certainly accepted by the author of the sūtras also. That has been told: "There is no twofold characteristic for the supreme, even on account of place, because everywhere [it is taught otherwise]" (B.S.3.2.11.). The meaning of that is: "place" means a limiting adjunct. The "twofold characteristic" (ubhayaliṅgam) i.e. the characteristic of possessing distinction and being free from distinction, "for the supreme" (parasya) i.e. Brahman, certainly does not inherently exist. But it does not exist "even on account of place" [i.e. due to a limiting adjunct] (sthānato'pi). Because "everywhere" (sarvatra) in the sacred texts such as: "Soundless..." (Kaṭha.1.3.15.) etc., Brahman is taught only as having all distinctions set aside.

It should not be said: then how can there be the declaration of the non-dualists that "Brahman is free from distinction"? [reason] An expression by words such as "free from distinction", "non-dual" etc. is for those who ascertain there only that: Brahman, which is indeed utterly inexpressible [directly], has to be said somehow. But in reality, Brahman cannot be directly expressed by the word "free from distinction" or by the word "non-dual" etc. That has been told in the Dakṣasmṛti :

This is in relation to the highest truth: there

is no duality and nor even is there non-duality (Dakṣasm.7.46.).

But the explanation of that sūtra (B.S.3.2.11.), (Śrī.B.Para.401. p.810.)¹⁶⁴:

Not even a trace of imperfection is possible "for the supreme" (parasya) Brahman, "even on account of place" (sthānato'pi) such as earth etc. Because "everywhere" (sarvatra) the supreme Brahman is told as having this "twofold characteristic" (ubhayaliṅgam) of being free from defect and possessing qualities.

That does not bring about admiration in the mind. Because this [sūtra] is

a statement of negation. What rule is this: "what is to be negated there is only what is accepted as being supplied through an ellipsis"? And so Brahman is certainly free from all distinctions. It must be understood that the distinctions which are recognized in the world are all together certainly without absolute reality.

3.208.

यत्तु निर्विशेषज्ञानमात्रमेव परमार्थ इत्यद्वैतवादिमतं खण्डयता सविशेष-
ब्रह्मप्रतिपादकम्

यो मामजमनादिं च वेत्ति लोकमहेश्वरम् (गी० १० । ३)

इत्यादिगीतावाक्यजातमुदाहृतं (श्रीभा० पृ० ६५ प० ७) तत्रोच्यते—

अजत्वं हि न भावरूपो धर्मः कश्चित् । किंतु

निर्विशेषब्रह्मणि गीता- जन्माभावः । एवमनादित्वं मूलकारणाभावः ।
तात्पर्यम् ततश्चाभावरूपाभ्यामाभ्यां कथमात्मनः सविशेष-
षता सिध्यति । यद्यपि ' मत्स्थानि सर्वभूतानि '

(गी० ९ । ४) इत्यादिवाक्येषु भूताधारत्वादयो गुणाः प्रतीयन्ते तथापि ते
प्रकृतिसंबन्धमूलका एव न तु वस्तुभूताः । अत एव—

'अनादित्वान्निर्गुणत्वात्परमात्मायमव्ययः' (गी० १३ । ३१)

इत्येवं निर्गुणत्वं स्पष्टमेव तत्रोक्तम् । तथा—

'असक्तं सर्वभृच्चैव निर्गुणं गुणभोक्तृ च' (गी० १३ । १४)

इत्यत्रापि सर्वभृत्त्वं गुणभोक्तृत्वं च तत्र प्रकृतिसंबन्धमूलकमेव ।

'विकारांश्च गुणांश्चैव विद्धि प्रकृतिसंभवान्' (गी० १३ । १९)

इति गीतावाक्यमेव सगुणवाक्यानां निर्गुणवाक्यानां च विषयं विचिनत्कीति
न कथमपि गुणानां स्वाभाविकत्वमाशङ्कनीयम् ।

3.208. By way of refuting the view of the exponents of non-duality [who consider that]: "pure Knowledge free from distinction is alone the absolute reality", a collection of sentences from the Gītā beginning with: "He who knows me, the great Lord of the worlds, to be unborn and beginningless" (G.10.3.) have been cited (Śrī.B.Para.52,p.100.) as teaching that Brahman possesses distinction. With regard to that, it is said: the nature of being unborn is not some attribute which is a positive entity. But it is the absence of birth. In the same manner, the nature of being beginningless is the absence of having an original cause. And

consequently how is the Self established as possessing distinction on account of these two negative conditions?

Although qualities such as being the support of living beings are recognized in the sentences such as: "All beings dwell in me" (G.9.4.) (Śrī.B.Para.52.p.100.) etc., nevertheless they are only based upon connection with the primary matter (prakṛti) but they are not actually real. For this very reason, freedom from qualities has been very clearly told there: "This supreme Self is without change because of being beginningless and because of being free from qualities" (G.13.31.). Similarly, being the support of all and the enjoyer of qualities here too: "Unattached and indeed the supporter of all, free from qualities and the enjoyer of qualities" (G.13.14.) are only based upon connection with the primary matter. Indeed the sentence in the Gītā: "Know that modifications and qualities are born of the primary matter" (G.13.19.) distinguishes the scope of the sentences [teaching] possession of qualities and the scope of the sentences [teaching] freedom from qualities. So in no way can qualities be suspected as being innate.

3.209. । यदपि सविशेषब्रह्मप्रतिपादकम्

स सर्वभूतप्रकृतिं विकारान्गुणादिदोषांश्च मुने व्यतीतः (वि० पु० ६।५।८३)

इत्यादिवाक्यजातं विष्णुपुराणस्थमुदाहृतं (श्रीभा० पृ० ६५ प० २१)

निर्विशेषं ब्रह्म पुराण- तस्यापि न सविशेषब्रह्मप्रतिपादने तात्पर्यं
संमतम् दृश्यते । भूतातीतत्वादिविशेषाणामौपाधिकत्वात् ।
यतो विष्णुपुराण एव

यत्तदव्यक्तमजरमचिन्त्यमजमव्ययम् ।

अनिर्देश्यमरूपं च पाणिपादायसंयुतम् (वि० पु० ६।५।६६)

प्रत्यस्तमितभेदं यत्सत्तामात्रमगोचरम् ।

वचसामात्मसंवेद्यं तज्ज्ञानं ब्रह्मसंज्ञितम् ॥ (वि० पु० ६।७।५३)

इत्येवमात्मनो निर्विशेषत्वं प्रतिपाद्यते ।

3.209. The collection of sentences beginning with: "O sage, He transcends the primary matter of all beings, its modifications and defects such as

qualities etc." (Viṣ.P.6.5.83.), which are located in the Viṣṇupurāṇa, have been cited (Śrī.B.Para.52.p.101.) as teaching Brahman possessing distinction. Even for that [collection of sentences], no purport is seen in teaching Brahman possessing distinction. Because distinctions such as the nature of transcending beings etc. pertain to a limiting adjunct. Because the Self is taught as being free from distinction in the Viṣṇupurāṇa itself:

That which is unmanifest, undecaying, inconceivable, unborn, changeless, indescribable, formless and which does not possess hands and feet etc. (Viṣ.P.6.5.66.).

In which differences have vanished, which is pure existence, not an object of words and which can be known by oneself -that Knowledge is known as Brahman (Viṣ.P.6.7.53.).

3.210.

भूतयोनित्वमप्यात्मानि न वास्त-
विकम् । जगतो मिथ्यात्वात् । तदुक्तं विष्णुपुराण एव—

ज्ञानस्वरूपमखिलं जगदेतदबुद्धयः ।

अर्थस्वरूपं पश्यन्तो भ्राम्यन्ते मोहसंघने ॥ (वि० पु० १।१४।३९)

विज्ञानं परमार्थो हि द्वैतमिथ्यात्वदर्शिनः । (वि० पु० २।१४।३१)

सोऽहं स च त्वं स च सर्वमेतदात्मस्वरूपं त्यज भेदमोहम् ।

इतीरितस्तेन स राजवर्थस्तत्याज भेदं परमार्थदृष्टिः ॥

(वि० पु० २ । १६ । २४) इति ।

आत्मानि भूतयोनित्वस्य वास्तविकत्वाभावादेव 'भूतयोनिमकारणम्' (वि० पु० ६ । ५ । ६७) इत्यत्र भूतयोनिमित्यनन्तरमकारणमित्युक्तिः संगच्छते । एव च निर्विशेषं ज्ञानमात्ररूपं ब्रह्मेति स्थितम् । तच्च ज्ञानं निर्विषयं निराश्रयं चेति प्रागुक्तमेव (पृ० ७१ प० ४) । सविषयस्य साश्रयस्य ज्ञानस्य स-विशेषत्वावश्यंभावात् । सविशेषस्य विज्ञानस्य परमार्थत्वे द्वैतसत्यत्वदर्शिदृष्ट्यापि तादृशज्ञानस्य परमार्थत्वसंभवेन—

विज्ञानं परमार्थो हि द्वैतमिथ्यात्वदर्शिनः (वि० पु० २।१४।३१)

इति प्रागुदाहृतविष्णुपुराणवचने 'द्वैतमिथ्यात्वदर्शिनः' इति हेतुगर्भोक्तिर-संगता स्यात् ।

3.210. Even the nature of being the source of beings is not an actual reality in the Self. Because the world is false. That has been told in the Viṣṇupurāṇa itself:

The ignorant, seeing this entire world which has Knowledge for its essential nature as being of the nature of objects, are whirled around in the flood of delusion (Viṣ.P.1.4.39.).

Knowledge is indeed the highest reality. The dualists see things falsely (Viṣ.P.2.14.31.).¹⁶⁵

"He is I and he is you and he is everything. This [universe] has the Self as its essential nature. Give up the delusion of difference." That excellent king, instructed by him [the brāhmaṇa], had the understanding of the highest reality and abandoned [the view of] difference (Viṣ.P.2.16.24.).

The statement "not a cause" immediately following "the source of beings" here: "the source of beings, not a cause" (Viṣ.P.6.5.67.) is in agreement only because the nature of being the source of beings has no actual reality in the Self. Thus it is established: Brahman is free from distinction and of the nature of pure Knowledge. And that Knowledge has certainly been previously stated (3.54.) as being without an object and without a locus. Because the Knowledge which possesses an object and a locus necessarily possesses distinction. If the Knowledge which possesses distinction is the highest reality, because there is the possibility that such Knowledge is the highest reality even according to the view of those who see duality as real, then the statement containing the reason: "The dualists see things falsely" in the previously cited text of the Viṣṇupurāṇa: "Knowledge is indeed the highest reality. The dualists see things falsely" (Viṣ.P.2.14.31.) must be incongruous.

3.211. नन्वात्मनि वाग्विषयत्वरूपो विशेषो विष्णुपुराणे प्रतिपाद्यते । यथा (श्रीभा०
पृ० ६६ प० ९)

शुद्धे महाविभूत्याख्ये परे ब्रह्मणि वर्तते ।
मैत्रेय भगवच्छब्दः सर्वकारणकारणे ॥
संभर्तेति तथा भर्ता भकारोऽर्थद्वयान्वितः ।
नेता गमयिता स्रष्टा गकारार्थस्तथा मुने ॥
ऐश्वर्यस्य समग्रस्य वीर्यस्य यशसः श्रियः ।
ज्ञानवैराग्ययोश्चैव षण्णां भग इतीरणा ॥
वसन्ति तत्र भूतानि भूतात्मन्यखिलात्मनि ।
स च भूतेष्वशेषेषु वकारार्थस्ततोऽव्ययः ॥ (वि० पु० ६ । ५ । ७२—
७५) इति ।

अस्यार्थः—भगवच्छब्दस्यावयवार्थं प्रतिपादयन्भकारार्थमाह—संभर्तेति ।
भूधातोर्डेप्रत्यये ' भ ' शब्दः सिध्यति । तस्य ' संभर्ता भर्ता ' इत्यर्थद्वयम् ।
संभरणमुपकरणसंविधानम् । प्रकृत्यादीन्कार्योत्पत्तियोग्यान्यः करोति स संभ-
र्तेत्युच्यते । भर्ता स्वामी । गकारार्थमाह—नेतेति । गमेर्ण्यन्ताड्डप्रत्यये ' ग '
शब्दः सिध्यति । नेता स्थितिकर्ता । गमयिता संहारकर्ता । स्रष्टोत्पत्तिकर्ता ।
गम्धातोर्रुत्पत्तिस्थितिलयार्थकत्वम् । ' भग ' इति समुदितस्याक्षरद्वयस्यार्थमाह-
ऐश्वर्यस्येति । समग्रशब्दः सर्वत्रान्वेति । गुणवच्चेन ख्यातिर्यशः । श्रीर्भाग्यसंपत् ।
वैराग्यमनादरः । वकारार्थमाह—वसन्तीति । वसधातोराधिकरणे कर्तारि वा डप्रत्यये
' व ' शब्दः सिध्यति । भूतात्मनि भूतानामात्मनि । अखिलात्मन्यखिलशरीरके ।
त्यजति हेयगुणानित्यर्थे त्यजधातोः क्तिप्प्रत्यये यकारादिभागस्य पृषोदरादि-
त्वाल्लोपे व्यञ्जनमात्रं तकाररूपमवशिष्यते । स च भगवच्छब्दान्तिमस्तकारः ।
तथा च परमात्मनो भगवच्छब्दवाच्यत्वात्सविशेषत्वं वस्तुत एव स्वीकर्तव्य-
मिति ।

3.211. [objection] A distinction in the Self, in the manner of being an
object of speech, is taught in the Viṣṇupurāṇa. For instance (Śrī.B.
Para.52.p.101,102.):

O Maitreya, the word "Bhagavat" is used to denote
the pure, highest Brahman, known as the one of
mighty powers, the cause of all causes (Viṣ.P.6.5.72.).

The letter "bha" is endowed with a twofold meaning:
"preparer" and "supporter". So too, O sage, the
meaning of the letter "ga" is the "leader", "mover"
and "creator" (Viṣ.P.6.5.73.).

[The two syllables] "bhaga" indicate the six [qualities] in their entirety: sovereignty, heroism, glory, prosperity, knowledge and dispassion (Viṣ.P.6.5.74.).

The meaning of the letter "va" is that beings dwell there in the Self of beings, in the entire Self and he [dwells] in all beings and hence [the meaning of the letter "va"] is "imperishable" (Viṣ.P.6.5.75.).

The meaning of this [is as follows]¹⁶⁶: teaching the meaning of the component parts of the word "bhagavat", he [the sage Parāśara] tells the meaning of the letter "bha" as "preparer". The word "bha" is established in the affix "ḍa"¹⁶⁷ [being added] to the verbal root bhr. The twofold meaning of that [word "bha"] is: "preparer" and "supporter". "Preparation" means arranging the necessary paraphernalia. The "preparer" is said to be the one who makes the primary matter etc. capable of the production of effects. The "supporter" means the master. He [Parāśara] tells the meaning of the letter "ga" as the "leader". The word "ga" is established in the affix "ḍa" [being added] to the verbal root gam which ends in [the causative] "ṇi". "Leader" means the one who causes stability. "Mover" means the one who brings about the destruction [of the cosmos]. "Creator" means the one who brings about the origination [of the cosmos]. The verbal root gam has the meanings of origination, sustenance and destruction.

He tells the meaning of the two syllables which have been united: "bhaga" as "sovereignty". The word "entirety" is connected everywhere. "Glory" means fame through the possession of qualities. "Prosperity" means good fortune. "Dispassion" means indifference.

He tells the meaning of the letter "va" as "they dwell". The word "va" is established in the affix "ḍa" [being added] to the verbal root vas(a) in the sense of the location or in the sense of the agent. "In the Self of beings" means in the Self of [all] beings. "In the entire Self"

means in its entire body. In the addition of the affix "kvip"¹⁶⁸ to the verbal root tyaj(a) in the sense of "he gives up the qualities to be abandoned", the mere consonant, in the form of the letter "t", remains upon the elision of the portion beginning with "y" on account of being included in the group of words beginning with prṣodara.¹⁶⁹ And that letter "t" is the final for the word "bhagavat". And so because the supreme Self can be directly expressed by the word "bhagavat", the possession of distinction must certainly be accepted in reality.

3.212.

मैवम् । 'शुद्धे महाविभूत्याख्ये' (वि० पु० ६ । ५ । ७२) इत्य-
स्मादव्यवहितपूर्वश्लोक एव—

अशब्दगोचरस्यापि तस्य वै ब्रह्मणो द्विज ।

पूजायां भगवच्छब्दः क्रियते ह्यौपचारिकः ॥ (वि० पु० ६।५.७१)

इत्यत्र भगवच्छब्दस्यौपचारिकत्वोक्तेः । 'शुद्धे महाविभूत्याख्ये' इत्यादि-
श्रवणं दृष्टिं पातयतस्तत्र तदव्यवहितपूर्वश्लोक एव कथं दृष्टिमान्द्रमभूदिति मह-
दाश्चर्यम् । एवं च पुराणेष्वन्यत्र वा यदात्मनः सविशेषतया वर्णनं दृश्यते
तद्व्यावहारिकदृष्ट्याऽऽत्मनि भासमानान्विशेषानङ्गीकृत्यैव कृतं न तु तथा पर-
मार्थ इत्यभिनिवेष्टव्यम् । 'आदित्यवर्णम्' (तै० आ० ३ । ११) इत्यादि-
श्रुतिषु प्रतिपादितं रूपमपि व्यावहारिकमेव । तस्य व्यवहारदृष्ट्यैवोपयोगात् ।
व्यावहारिकस्यापि तस्य धारणायां शुभाश्रयत्वं संभवत्येव । विषयान्तरपरि-
हारणैकत्र ध्येयवस्तुनि चित्तस्य स्थिरीकरणं धारणा । तत्र यद्ध्येयं वस्तु स
शुभाश्रय इत्युच्यते । एतेन 'अस्मिन्प्रकरणे संसारैकभेषजतया योगमभिधाय
योगावयवान्प्रत्याहारपर्यन्तांशोक्त्वा धारणासिद्धयर्थं शुभाश्रयं वक्तुं परस्य ब्रह्मणो
विष्णोः' (श्रीभा० पृ० ६९ प० २०) इत्यादिना 'आदित्यवर्णमित्यादि-
वेदान्तसिद्धं मूर्तं रूपं शुभाश्रय इत्युक्तम्' (श्रीभा० पृ० ७० प० ९) इत्य-
न्तेन ग्रन्थेन सविशेषस्य परमात्मनः पारमार्थिकत्वसाधनमपास्तम् । व्यावहारि-
कस्यापि शुभाश्रयत्वाङ्गीकारे बाधकाभावात् ।

3.212. [reply] This is certainly not the case. Because there is the
statement that the word "bhagavat" has a figurative meaning here:

O twice born, the word "bhagavat" is indeed a
figurative expression used in the worship of
Brahman even though that [Brahman] is not an
object of words (Viṣ.P.6.5.71.)

in the very preceding verse contiguous to this: "...the pure, known as the one of mighty powers..." (Viṣ.P.6.5.72.). How did you, while directing your sight upon the series [of verses] commencing with: "...the pure, known as the one of mighty powers...", have feebleness of sight in the very preceding verse contiguous to that? It is a great wonder. Hence it has to be adhered to that the description of the Self as possessing distinction, which is seen in the Purānas or elsewhere, is effected only having accepted that the distinctions appearing in the Self are according to an understanding which pertains to ordinary relations, but it is not so in absolute reality.

Even the colour which is taught in the sacred texts such as: "the colour of the sun" (Tai.Ā.3.11.) only pertains to ordinary relations. Because that is of use only according to an understanding which pertains to ordinary relations. Although that [colour] pertains to ordinary relations it is certainly possible to be an "auspicious locus" for concentration. "Concentration" is fixing the mind at one place in the object of meditation through giving up other objects. The object to be meditated upon there is said to be an "auspicious locus". On account of this, the demonstration that the supreme Self possesses distinction in absolute reality, by the text beginning (Śrī.B.Para.53.p.106.):

In this context [Viṣ.P.6.7.], having declared yoga as the sole remedy for worldly existence and having stated the component parts of yoga up to the withdrawal of the senses from external objects (pratyāhāra), in order to mention an "auspicious locus" for the purpose of the establishment of concentration, [it is taught] that the supreme Brahman, Viṣṇu, [has two forms]...

and ending with (Śrī.B.Para.53.p.106.):

the embodied form, which is established by Vedānta [passages] such as "the colour of the sun" etc., is

said to be the "auspicious locus"

is set aside. Because there is no negating factor in accepting that even what pertains to ordinary relations can be an "auspicious locus".

3.213.

ज्ञानस्वरूपमत्यन्तनिर्मलं परमार्थतः ।

तदेवार्थस्वरूपेण भ्रान्तिदर्शनतः स्थितम् ॥ (वि० पु० १।२।६)

इत्यत्रापि वस्तुतो ज्ञानमात्ररूपं ब्रह्म, तस्यार्थस्वरूपेण दर्शनं भ्रान्तिरित्युक्तम् । अर्थस्वरूपं ज्ञातृस्वरूपं ज्ञेयस्वरूपं च । तथा च साश्रयं सविषयं च यत्सविशेषं ज्ञानस्वरूपं तस्यावास्तविकत्वं सिद्धम् । यत्तु 'ज्ञानस्वरूपमित्यत्रापि ज्ञानव्यतिरिक्तार्थजातस्य कृत्स्नस्य न मिथ्यात्वं प्रतिपाद्यते । ज्ञानस्वरूपस्यात्मनो देवमनुष्याद्यर्थाकारेणावभासो भ्रान्तिरित्येतावन्मात्रवचनात् । न हि शुक्तिकाया रजततयाऽवभासो भ्रान्तिरित्युक्ते जगति कृत्स्नं रजतजातं मिथ्या भवति ' (श्रीभा० पृ० ७१ प० १०) इत्युक्तं तत्र । तदेवार्थस्वरूपेणेत्यत्र पूर्वार्धोपात्तज्ञानप्रतिद्वंद्वितयोपात्तेन सामान्यमुखप्रवृत्तेनार्थशब्देन देवमनुष्यादिविशेषार्थग्रहणासंभवात् । न हि

रज्जुः सर्पस्वरूपेण भ्रान्तिदर्शनतः स्थिता ।

इत्युक्तेः श्वेतसर्पस्य तत्र सत्यत्वमेव, केवलं कृष्णसर्पस्यैव मिथ्यात्वमित्येवं सर्पविशेषस्य सत्यत्वं कोऽपि प्रत्येति । यद्यपि शुक्तिकाया रजततयाऽवभासो भ्रान्तिरित्युक्ते जगति कृत्स्नं रजतजातं मिथ्या न भवति तथापि शुक्तिकायां कस्यापि रजतविशेषस्य सत्यत्वं नास्त्येव । अन्यत्र रजतस्य सत्यत्वं वा मिथ्यात्वं वा प्रमाणान्तरेण किञ्चिदपि सिध्यतु तत्र नास्य वाक्यस्य तात्पर्यम् । यदि तदेवार्थस्वरूपेणेत्यत् ' जगति शुक्तिकैव रजततया प्रतीयते ' इत्युच्यते चेत्त्रापि तात्पर्यं स्यादेव । तथा चात्र जगद्ब्रह्मणोः सामानाधिकरण्येनैक्यप्रतीतेर्ब्रह्मणो ज्ञानस्वरूपस्यार्थाकारता भ्रान्तिरित्युक्ते सत्यार्थजातस्य कृत्स्नस्य मिथ्यात्वमुक्तं भवति ।

3.213. Here too:

[I bow to that Viṣṇu] who is, in reality, of the nature of Knowledge and who is absolutely pure.

That [Viṣṇu] is indeed determined to be a physical entity on account of erroneous vision (Viṣ.P.1.2.6.)

Brahman is in reality of the nature of pure Knowledge and seeing that [Brahman] as the nature of a physical entity is said to be error. The nature of being a "physical entity" is the nature of being a knower and

the nature of what is known. And so the "nature of Knowledge" which possesses distinction and has a locus and an object is established as something not really existing.

But what has been said (Śrī.B.Para.54.p.108.):

Even here [in the passage]: "the nature of Knowledge" (Viṣ.P.1.2.6.), the entire collection of things different from Knowledge is not taught as being false. Because the statement is only to this extent: the appearance of the Self, who is of the nature of Knowledge, in the form of objects such as gods, human beings etc. is erroneous. When it is said that the appearance of the pearl-oyster as silver is error, the entire collection of silver objects in the world is certainly not false.

That is not so. Because here: "That [Viṣṇu] is indeed [determined] to be a physical entity", there is no possibility of accepting the particular meaning "gods, human beings etc." by the word "entity" which has a universal application since it is mentioned as contrary to the Knowledge which was mentioned in the prior half [of the verse].

From the statement: "the rope is determined to be the nature of a snake on account of erroneous vision", no body believes that a particular snake is real in the manner that: "the white snake is certainly real there, only the black snake is indeed false". Although when it is said that the appearance of the pearl-oyster as silver is error, the entire collection of silver objects in the world is not false, still, some particular silver on the pearl-oyster is certainly not real. That the truth or falsity of silver elsewhere can be established to any extent by another means of knowledge is not the purport of this sentence there ["the appearance of the pearl-oyster as silver is error"]. If like "That [Viṣṇu] is indeed [determined] to be a physical entity" it is said: "the pearl-oyster is

indeed recognized in the world as silver" then it would certainly be the purport there also [in relation to the sentence: "the appearance of the pearl-oyster..."]. And so here¹⁷⁰: when it is said that because the world and Brahman are cognized as identical due to grammatical apposition [in the scriptures], Brahman, whose nature is Knowledge, having the form of an object, is erroneous, then the entire collection of objects is said to be false.

3.214.

किं च विष्णुपुराणे प्रारम्भ एव 'जगच्च सः' (वि० पु० १ । १ । ३५)
इत्यत्र सामानाधिकरण्येनैक्यं प्रतिपाद्य जगतो मिथ्यात्वमेव सूच्यते । तथा हि—
यन्मयं च जगद्ब्रह्मन्यतश्चैतच्चराचरम् (वि० पु० १ । १ । ९)

इति मैत्रेयकृतं प्रश्नद्वयम् । यन्मयमिति विकारार्थे मयट् प्रत्ययः । स्वार्थे वा ।
'जगदेतत्कस्य विकारभूतम्' 'जगदेतत्किंरूपम्' इति वाऽयं जगदुपादानकार-
णप्रश्नः । अवशिष्टनिमित्तकारणविषयकश्च 'कस्माच्चैतच्चराचरं जगदुत्पन्नम्'
इति प्रश्नः । तस्य च प्रश्नद्वयस्य

स्थितिसंयमकर्ताऽसौ जगतोऽस्य जगच्च सः (वि० पु० १ । १ । ३५)

इति पराशरप्रोक्तं प्रतिवचनद्वयम् । असौ परमात्माऽस्य जगतः स्थितिसं-
यमकर्तेति जगतो निमित्तकारणमुक्तम् । जगच्च स एवेत्युपादानकारणमुक्तम् ।
परमात्मनो निर्विकारत्वं च श्रुतिशतसिद्धम् 'अविकाराय शुद्धाय' (वि० पु०
१ । २ । १) इत्यत्रैवोत्तरश्लोके पराशरेणानूदितं चेति नात्मनः परिणाम्यु-
पादानता स्वीकर्तुं शक्या किं तु विवर्तोपादानतैवेति भासमानस्य जगतो
मिथ्यात्वं सिद्धम् ।

3.214. Furthermore, the falsity of the world is indeed indicated at the very beginning of the Viṣṇupurāṇa by teaching the identity [of Viṣṇu with the world] through grammatical apposition: "and he is the world" (Viṣ.P.1.1.35.). To explain. A twofold question was put forward by Maitreya: "O Brahman, what does the world consist of, and from what is this [world] consisting of the moveable and the inert?" (Viṣ.P.1.1.9.). The affix mayat in: "consists of what?" is in the sense of modification.¹⁷¹ Or it is used in its own sense [i.e. only as conveying the sense of the word to which it is connected]. This question is about the material cause of the world i.e. "of what is this world a modification?", or "what is

the nature of this world?". And the question: "and from what has this world consisting of the moveable and the inert been produced?" relates to the efficient cause which is remaining. And for that double question, Parāśara has given a twofold answer: "That [Viṣṇu] brings about the sustenance and destruction of this world, and he is the world" (Viṣ.P.1.1.35.). The efficient cause of the world is stated: that supreme Self brings about the sustenance and destruction of this world. The material cause of the world is stated: and he alone is the world.

It is established by hundreds of sacred texts that the supreme Self is free from change and it is repeated by Parāśara in a later verse here itself: "[Salutations to Viṣṇu] who is without change, pure..." (Viṣ.P.1.2.1.). So the Self cannot be accepted as the material cause which undergoes transformation, but only as the material cause which is an apparent transformation. And so the falsity of the world which is appearing is established.

3.215.

यत्तु ' यतश्चैतच्चराचरमिति निमित्तोपादानयोः पृष्टत्वाद्यन्मयमित्यनेन सृष्टि-स्थितिलयकर्मभूतं जगत्किमात्मकमिति पृष्टम् । तस्य चोत्तरं जगच्च स इति । इदं च तादात्म्यमन्तर्यामिरूपेणात्मतया व्याप्तिकृतम् । न तु व्याप्यव्यापकयोर्वैस्त्वैक्यकृतम् । यन्मयमिति प्रश्नस्योत्तरत्वाज्जगच्च स इति सामानाधिकर-ण्यस्य । यन्मयमिति मयण विकारार्थः । पृथक्प्रश्नवैयर्थ्यात् । नापि प्राणमया-दिवत्स्वार्थिकः । जगच्च स इत्युत्तरानुपपत्तेः । तदा हि विष्णुरेवेत्युत्तरमभवि-ष्यत् । अतः प्राचुर्यार्थे तत्प्रकृतवचने मयट् (पा० सू० ५ । ४ । २१) इति मयट् । कृत्स्नं च जगत्तच्छरीरतया तत्प्रचुरमेव । तस्माद्यन्मयमित्यस्य प्रति-वचनं जगच्च स इति सामानाधिकरण्यं जगद्ब्रह्मणोः शरीरात्मभावनिवन्ध-नमिति निश्चीयते ' (श्रीभा० पृ० ७२ प० १७) इत्युक्तं

3.215. But what has been said (Śrī.B.Para.54.p.110.):

because the efficient and the material cause have been asked: "and from what is this [world] consisting of the moveable and the inert?", by this: "consists of what?" it is asked: what is the nature of the world which is

the object of creation, sustenance and destruction?

The answer to that [latter question] is: "and he is the world". This identity is brought about by the invariable association through being the Self [of the world] in the form of its inner ruler. But it is not brought about by the oneness of substance between the pervaded [world] and the pervading [Viṣṇu]. Because the grammatical apposition: "and he is the world" is the answer to the question: "consists of what?". The affix mayat in "consists of what?" does not have the sense of modification. Because a separate question is meaningless [as the material cause was asked in the first question]. Nor even does it have its own meaning [i.e. conveying only the sense of the word to which it connected] as in the case of prāṇamaya [which is taken as meaning prāṇa only] etc. Because there is no logical possibility of the answer: "and he is the world" [for the question would only mean "the world is what?"].

Indeed then, the answer would be: "Viṣṇu alone".

Therefore mayat is in the sense of "abundance" according to: "The affix mayat is used wherever an abundance of a thing is to be expressed" (P.S.5.4.21.). And the entire world certainly has an abundance of that [Viṣṇu] since it is the body of that [Viṣṇu]. Therefore it is ascertained that the grammatical apposition "and he is the world", which is the answer to this: "consists of what?", is based upon the relation of body and soul between the world and Brahman.

3.216.

तच्चिन्त्यम् । यत-
 श्चेति पञ्चमी ह्यध्याहृतां जनिंक्रियामादाय 'जनिकर्तुः प्रकृतिः' (पा० सू० १ ।
 ४ । ३०) इत्यपादानसंज्ञायामुपपादनीया । अथ वा प्रथमप्रकाशनरूपां समु-
 द्रव्यनक्रियामादाय 'भुवः प्रभवः' (पा० सू० १ । ४ । ३१) इत्यपादानसं-
 ज्ञायामुपपादनीया । तेन हि प्रथमप्रकाशाधिकरणस्यापादानसंज्ञा विधीयते । आद्य
 उपादानकारणमात्रविषयकः प्रश्नः स्यात् । सूत्रे प्रकृतिग्रहणात् । प्रकृतिशब्दश्चो-
 पादानकारणमात्रवाची । अन्यथा दण्डादघटो जायत इत्यापत्तेः । पुत्रात्प्र-
 मोदो जायत इत्यत्र तु पुत्रमालोक्येति ल्यब्लोपे पञ्चमी बोध्या । प्रकृतिशब्द-
 स्योपादानकारणमात्रवाचित्वं 'प्रकृतिश्च' (ब्र० सू० १ । ४ । २३) इति
 ब्रह्मसूत्रेऽपि दृश्यते । त्वयापि तत्र तथैवाङ्गीकृतम् । द्वितीये तु निमित्तकारण-
 मात्रविषयकः प्रश्नः स्यात् । प्रथमप्रकाशाधिकरणस्योपादानत्वाभावात् । तन्त्रा-
 वृत्त्याश्रयणेनार्थद्वयकरणे तु न किञ्चित्प्रमाणमुपलभ्यते । तथा च 'यतश्चैतच्च-
 राचरामिति निमित्तोपादानयोः पृष्टत्वात्' इत्यसंगतम् ।

3.216. That is questionable. Because the fifth case "from what" [in the sentence: "and from what is this [world] consisting of the moveable and the inert"] can be logically demonstrated in the technical term denoting the locus of separation [i.e. apādāna, the ablative case]¹⁷²: "The prime cause of the agent of the verb jan 'to be born' is in the ablative case" (P.S.1.4.30.) having accepted that the action of production is elliptically supplied. Alternatively, [the fifth case] can be logically demonstrated in the technical term of the ablative: "The source of the agent of the verb bhū 'to become' is in the ablative case" (P.S.1.4.31.) having accepted that the action of arising is the "first manifestation". Because by that, the technical term of the ablative is enjoined for the locus of the "first manifestation". In the first case [with reference to P.S.1.4.30.], the question ["and from what..."] can relate only to the material cause. Because [the word] "prakṛti" is used in the sūtra. And the word "prakṛti" signifies only the material cause. Otherwise there would be the consequence that: a pot is produced from a [potter's] stick. But in the case of "joy arises from a son", the fifth case is to be understood upon the elision of the affix lyap: "having beheld the son".¹⁷³ In the Brahmasūtra too: "[Brahman is] the material cause (prakṛti) as well..." (B.S.1.4.23.), the

word "prakṛti" is seen to signify only the material cause. You too have accepted it there in that very manner.

But in the second case [with reference to P.S.1.4.31.], the question ["and from what..."] can relate only to the efficient cause. Because the locus of the "first manifestation" is not the material cause.¹⁷⁴ But no authority is known for bringing about the twofold meaning [i.e. "from what" signifies both the efficient and the material cause] by resorting to tantra or āvṛtti. And so [the statement]: "because the efficient and the material cause have been asked: 'and from what is this [world] consisting of the moveable and the inert?' " is incongruous.

comment

The terms "tantra" and "āvṛtti" (repetition) are used in Mīmāṃsā texts to denote the performance of auxiliary rituals. For example, if the same auxiliary ritual is to be performed for two principal rituals, the performance of the auxiliary ritual once only is called tantra.¹⁷⁵ The repetition of the auxiliary ritual, once for each of the principal rituals, is āvṛtti.

Abhyankar states that Rāmānuja cannot demonstrate that the word "from what" signifies both the efficient and the material cause. Because either of the two sūtras: 1.4.30 or 1.4.31. cannot be applied in both senses. Nor would it be correct to apply both of the sūtras to the one word in order to derive the two meanings.

3.217.

‘यन्मयमिति मयण्ण

विकारार्थः । पृथक्प्रश्नवैयर्थ्यात् ’ इत्यप्यसंगतम् । पृथक्प्रश्नस्योक्तरीत्योपपत्तेः । ‘यन्मयमित्यनेन जगत्किमात्मकमिति पृष्टम्’ इत्यप्यसंगतम् । किमात्मकमित्यस्य क आत्मा यस्येत्यर्थः । तत्र चात्मशब्दः शरीरप्रतिसंबन्ध्यर्थकस्त्वदभिमतो न तु स्वरूपार्थकः । मयट्प्रत्ययेन तु शरीरप्रतिसंबन्ध्यर्थो न लभ्यते । प्राचुर्यार्थे मयट्प्रत्ययेऽपि प्राचुर्यमात्मत्वेनैवेति न नियमः । तथा च किमात्मकमित्येव प्रश्नार्थ इति निश्चयाभावेन न तदानुगुण्येनोत्तरार्थनिश्चयः कर्तुं शक्य इति ‘यन्मयमित्यस्य प्रतिवचनं जगच्च स इति सामानाधिकरण्यं जगद्ब्रह्मणोः शरीरात्मभावनिवन्धनमिति निश्चीयते’ इत्यसंगतम् । एतेन जगच्च स इत्युत्तरे शरीरात्मभावमूलकमेव सामानाधिकरण्यमिति सिद्धवद्गृहीत्वा तदनुरोधेन यन्मयमिति मयट्प्रत्ययस्य स्वार्थिकत्वाभावसाधनं परास्तम् । किं च मयट्प्रत्ययस्य स्वार्थिकत्वेऽपि न जगच्च स इत्युत्तरानुपपत्तिः । प्रश्ने यदुद्देश्यं जगत्तस्योत्तरे पुनरुद्दे-

श्यतया निर्देशे बाधकाभावात् । यथा 'सुवर्णं किम्' इति प्रश्ने 'सुवर्णं तेजः'
इति । प्रत्युत मयट्प्रत्ययस्य प्राचुर्यार्थकत्वं एव जगच्च स इत्युत्तरानुपपत्तिः ।
शरीरशरीरिभावेऽपि वस्तुतः सामानाधिकरण्यस्याभावात् ।

3.217. [The statement]: "The affix mayat in 'consists of what?' does not have the sense of modification. Because a separate question is meaningless" is also incongruous. Because a separate question is logically possible in the way that was told (3.214.). [The statement]: "by this: 'consists of what?' it is asked: what is the nature of the world...?" is incongruous as well. The meaning of this: "what is the nature?" is "who is the Self of which [world]?". And the word "Self" there is accepted by you as having the meaning of being connected with a body, not as having the meaning of the essential nature. However the meaning of being "connected with a body" is not obtained through the affix mayat. Even if the affix mayat is used in the sense of "abundance" there is no rule: abundance is only through the nature of being the Self. And so because there is no ascertainment that: " 'what is the nature?' is alone the meaning of the question", the ascertainment of the meaning of the reply on account of its congruity with that [meaning of the question] cannot be done. And so [the statement]: "it is ascertained that the grammatical apposition 'and he is the world', which is the answer to this: 'consists of what?', is based upon the relation of body and soul between the world and Brahman" is incongruous. On account of this, having accepted it to be as though established that the grammatical apposition in the reply: "and he is the world" is only based upon the relation of body and self, the demonstration, in conformity with that [above view], that the affix mayat in "consists of what?" is not used in its own meaning [as conveying only the sense of the word to which it is connected], is refuted.

Furthermore, even though the affix mayat conveys its own meaning there is no logical impossibility for the answer: "and he is the world". Because in the question ["what does the world consist of?"], "world" is the

subject and there is no negating factor in specifying that again as the subject in the reply. Just as in the question: "what is gold?", [there is the reply]: "gold is fire". On the other hand, if the affix mayat has only the meaning of "abundance", there is no logical possibility of the reply: "and he is the world". Because even in the relation of body and the one embodied there is no grammatical apposition in reality.

3.218. यत्तु 'निर्विशेषवस्तुप्रतिपादनपरे शास्त्रेऽभ्युपगम्यमाने सर्वाण्येतानि प्रश्न-प्रतिवचनानि न संगच्छन्ते । तद्विवरणरूपं कृत्स्नं च शास्त्रं न संगच्छते । तथा हि सति प्रपञ्चभ्रमस्य किमधिष्ठानमित्येवंरूपस्यैकस्य प्रश्नस्य निर्विशेषज्ञान-मात्रमित्येवंरूपमेकमेवोत्तरं स्यात्' (श्रीभा० पृ० ७३ प० ६) इत्युक्तं तच्चु-च्छम् । संसारचक्रस्यानादिवासनामूलकत्वेन तद्व्यावृत्त्यर्थं 'ब्रह्म सत्यमन्य-न्मिथ्या' इतिबुद्धिस्थैर्यसंपत्तये पर्यायेण रूपान्तरेण पुनः पुनः प्रश्नकरणस्य सार्थक्यात् । यदपि 'जगद्ब्रह्मणोरेकद्रव्यत्वपरे च सामानाधिकरण्ये सत्य-संकल्पत्वादिकल्याणगुणैकतानता निखिलहेयप्रत्यनीकता च बाध्येत । सर्वा-शुभास्पदं च ब्रह्म भवेत्' (श्रीभा० पृ० ७३ प० १०) इत्युक्तं तदपि न । निर्गुणे गुणवाधनस्येष्टत्वात् । विवर्तवादाश्रयणेन सर्वाशुभास्पदत्वापादनस्या-संभवाच्च । यच्च 'आत्मशरीरभाव एवेदं सामानाधिकरण्यं मुख्यवृत्तम्' (श्रीभा० पृ० ७३ प० १३) इत्युक्तं तदपि न । जगत्पदस्य तदन्तर्यामीत्यर्थे स इत्यस्य तदात्मकमित्यर्थे वा लक्षणायास्तवावश्यवक्तव्यत्वेन मुख्यवृत्तत्वा-भावात् ।

यानि तु 'द्वा सुपर्णा' (मु० ३ । १ । १) इत्यादीनि श्रुतिसूत्रपुराणवच-नानि जीवब्रह्मभेदे प्रमाणत्वेनोपन्यस्तानि (श्रीभा० पृ० ७७ प० १७) तान्यु-क्तरीत्या व्यावहारिकभेदं गृहीत्वैव प्रवृत्तानीति न तद्विरोध आशङ्कनीयः । एवं च निर्विशेषब्रह्माद्वैतं सिद्धम् ।

3.218. But what has been said (Śrī.B.Para.54.p.111.):

if the scripture is accepted as aiming at teaching an entity free from distinction, all these questions and answers do not agree. And the entire scripture which is in the form of an exposition of that [entity free from distinction] does not agree. Because if that was so, for the single question: "what is the substratum of the erroneous world?", there should be only a single

answer: "pure Knowledge free from distinction".

That is worthless. Because the cycle of worldly existence is based upon a beginningless mental impression, therefore formulating questions again and again, successively in a different way, is meaningful for accomplishing the steadiness of intellect: "Brahman is real, what is other is false" which is for the purpose of the removal of that [mental impression].

Although it is said (Śrī.B.Para.54.p.111.):

If the grammatical apposition [in the statement "and he is the world"] relates to the oneness of substance between the world and Brahman, then the nature of being the sole resort of auspicious qualities such as "having true resolve" etc. and the nature of being opposed to everything which should be abandoned would be negated. And Brahman would be the abode of everything impure.

That too is not so. Because in regard to what is free from qualities, the negation of qualities is acceptable. And on account of resorting to the teaching of "apparent transformation" there is no possibility of demonstrating [Brahman] to be the abode of everything impure.

And what has been said (Śrī.B.Para.54.p.111.):

This grammatical apposition has its primary sense only in the relation between a self and its body.

That is also not the case. Because you must necessarily say that there is an implied meaning of the word "world" in the sense of "its inner ruler", or that there is an implied meaning of this "he" in the sense of "[the world] has that [Viṣṇu] as its Self" and therefore there is no primary signification.

But those statements in the sacred texts, sūtras and Purāṇas such as: "Two birds..." (Mu.3.1.1.) etc., which are adduced as the means of

knowledge for the difference between the individual soul and Brahman (Śrī.B.Para.57.p.116f.), are engaged only having accepted the difference pertaining to ordinary relations in the way that has been told. So no contradiction among those [texts] can be suspected. Thus the non-duality of Brahman, free from distinction, is established.

NOTES TO CHAPTER THREE: VIŚIṢṬĀDVAITAMATĀNUPAPATTI.

1. The Siddhāntadarśanam is a sūtra work which attempts to reconcile the view of Sāṅkhya and Vedānta. It is said to have been composed by Vyāsa, though M. Lal Sandal in his introduction to the text dismisses this opinion and suggests that the work was composed after the fourteenth century, cf., M. Lal Sandal (trans), The Siddhānta Darśanam of Vyāsa. The Sacred Books of the Hindus. Vol.xxix. Allahabad. 1925. The text with a commentary by Viśvadevācārya is published in the Ānandāśrama Sanskrit Series. No.134. Poona. 1907.
2. The name of the commentary upon the Siddhāntadarśanam.
3. This explanation is based upon the commentary to the Siddhāntadarśanam, 1.1.7.
4. According to this maxim, when a compound can be resolved either as a karmadhāraya or a tatpuruṣa the former takes precedence. Cf., P.K. Gode and C.G. Karve (ed) Prin. Vaman Sivaram Apte, The Practical Sanskrit-English Dictionary. Revised and enlarged ed. 1957. Kyoto. 1978. p.926. Also, G.A. Jacob, A Handful of Popular Maxims current in Sanskrit literature. Second ed. Reprint. Delhi. 1983. p.80.
5. Cf., B.S.Ś. 2.1.14. p.373, line 5ff.
6. Read adrṣṭe. The avagraha in the text has been added by the translator.
7. In the Gītābhāṣya 6.8, Śaṅkara distinguishes between jñāna and vijñāna in this manner: "jñāna is the thorough knowledge of the things told in the scripture. Vijñāna is bringing about the experience for oneself that what has been known from the scripture is 'indeed in that manner'."
8. The separation of the pot from the name and form is for the purpose of understanding through imagination. According to the Advaitin there is, strictly speaking, no pot separate from the name and form.
9. This is in agreement with Śaṅkara's alternative explanation. Cf., Ch.Ś.8.14.1. p.604, line 4.
10. B.S.Ś.1.1.1. p.27, line 1. Śrī.B.1.1.1. Para.2. p.2.
11. B.S.Ś.1.1.1. p.34, line2.
12. Rāmarāyakavi, Śrī Śaṅkarāśaṅkarabhāṣyavimarsaḥ. Guntur. 1953. p.4.
13. Baudhāyana. Cf., Karmarkar. Introduction. p.xx.
14. This view is put forward in the Śrutaprakāśikā. U. Vīrarāghavācārya (ed.) Brahmasūtra-Śrībhāṣya with Śrutaprakāśikā. Vol.1. Madras. 1967. p.24.
15. Abbreviation of the Śrī.B. text.
16. Cited in the Śrutaprakāśikā, p.24.

17. Rāmarāya, op-cit., p.4, line 15f. p.6, line 25f.
18. U. 1.18.174.
19. ibid., 1.18.199.
20. Adaptation of the Śrī.B. text to convey the meaning more succinctly.
21. This statement is based upon Brh.Ś. 4.4.21. p.928, line 27.
22. "Remembrance is knowledge which is produced only through a mental impression caused by a previous experience." Yatī, Para18. p.11.
23. The latter interpretation is according to Śaṅkara. B.S.Ś. 4.1.12. p.844, line 4.
24. Cf., gloss upon this verse by Śrīdharasvāmin.
25. These are enumerated in J.S. 3.3.14.
26. Slight adaptation of Śrī.B. "teṣām" has been substituted by udgītādyupāsanānām.
27. Vedāntakalpalatikā, op-cit., p.80.
28. Tai.Ś. 2.1. p.285, line 14ff.
29. ibid., line 14.
30. ibid., line 14.
31. The meaning of the maxim is that a positive statement (vidhi) or a negation (niṣedha) resolve in the attribute of the substantive if they are not applicable to the substantive. For example, a positive statement is that "the individual soul is an agent". But according to Advaita, the individual soul is consciousness qualified by the internal-organ. If it is accepted that consciousness, the substantive (viśeṣya), is without agentship then the ascription of agentship must go to the internal-organ which is the attribute (viśeṣaṇa). The example of a negation could be a person qualified by a walking stick. If the person is standing without the stick, then a statement that "the man with the stick is not here" the substantive is negated i.e., the man qualified by the stick. But since the man is there, the negation resolves only in the attribute i.e. the stick.
32. Cf., the commentary of Raṅgarāmānuja. Taittirīya-Aitareya-Chāndogya Upaniṣad Bhāṣya by Śrī Raṅga Rāmānuja Muni with the Parīṣkāra of U. Vīrarāghavācārya. Madras. 1973. p.45.
33. This statement is made by Rāmānuja in the Mahāpūrvapakṣa. Para.24. p.40.
34. Adaptation of the Śrī.B.
35. Suggestion (vyañjana) is considered to be a separate mode of signification in the poetic treatises. The Naiyāyikas include it within implication (lakṣaṇā). Cf., Vedāntakalpalatikā, op-cit., p.77.

36. "the scripture is of an ordinary nature" means that (a) it has no absolute reality like Brahman. (b) It employs methods of reasoning which are in accord with the modes of reasoning established in the world.
37. V.P. p.114.
38. ibid., p115.
39. ibid., p.114. Tai.Ś. 2.1.
40. Tai.Ś. 2.1. p.282, line 10f, line 15; p.283, line 1f, line4f; p.284, line 8; p.285, line 18.
41. ibid., p.285, line 16, 18.
42. The remarks on "purport" are derived from Rāmarāya, op-cit., p.35, line 8f. See also, V.P. p.28.
43. Rāmarāya, ibid., p.36, line 17. For a useful examination of these and related matters see R. Balasubramanian, Some Problems in the Epistemology and Metaphysics of Ramanuja. Madras. 1978. p.19.
44. Rāmarāya, ibid., p.33, line 4f.
45. ibid., p.33, line 6f. Balasubramanian, ibid., p.11f.
46. U. Vīrarāghavācārya, Paramārthaprakāśikā. Madras. 1940. p.93, line 20.
47. Rāmarāya, op-cit., p.31, line 23f.
48. This passage occurs in the Mahāpūrvapakṣa section of the Śrī.B., Para.23.p.37f.
49. The portion: "But if there...with regard to itself" has been added by Abhyankar.
50. Cf., Balasubramanian, Some Problems, op-cit., p.28.
51. Rāmarāya, op-cit., p.42, line 6f. Śrī.B.Para.30.p.50.
52. Rāmarāya, ibid., p.43, line 5f.
53. ibid., p.43, line 23f.
54. Balasubramanian, Some Problems, op-cit., p.36.
55. V.S. Abhyankar (ed), Śrī Bhāṣya-Catussūtrī, with the editor's ṭīkā Samāsokti. Pune. Second ed. 1965. p.66.
56. Śrī.B.Para.30.p.51. Balasubramanian, Some Problems, op-cit., p.37.
57. Śrī.B.Para.31.p.52.
58. Rāmarāya, op-cit., p.45, line 25.
59. ibid., p.45, line 30f.
60. ibid., p.46, line 3f.

61. ibid., p.47, line 14.
62. Cf., 1.2. and comment.
63. V.P. p.12.
64. Slightly adapted. Rāmānuja's use of the word "siddham" refers to the acceptance of the pūrvapakṣin's statement in Para.24. p.39.
65. Slightly adapted to convey the context of the quotation.
66. Rāmarāya, op-cit., p.68. line 13f.
67. Rāmarāya also refers to this matter, ibid., p.72, line 7f.
68. "anubhūteḥ" has been added for clarity.
69. "anubhūti" has been added for clarity.
70. Rāmarāya, op-cit., p.71, line 3f. Also, cf., Śrī.B.Para.26.p.42.
71. "karmanām" in the quotation is better read as "karmanā" which is found in the Karmarkar ed. and the ed. by Vīrarāghavācārya, op-cit., p.160.
72. Cf., V.P. p.99. Also, B. Jhalakīkar (ed.), Nyāyakōśa. Re-edited, V.S. Abhyankar. Poona. 1978. p.677, line 13.
73. The text of this verse cited here and the text of other editions i.e. Mādhavānanda and Röer, are mutually discrepant.
74. Slightly adapted.
75. Slightly adapted.
76. This maxim illustrates the failure to accomplish the desired object and the occurrence of what one strenuously tried to avoid: a person who seeks to avoid paying the road toll takes another path but loses his way in the dark. At day-break he finds himself in the vicinity of the toll-gate he had sought to avoid. Cf., Jacob, Maxims, op-cit., p.26. Also, Gode and Karve, op-cit., Appendix E. p.60.
77. The sixfold modifications of an object are: it originates, exists, grows, modifies, declines and perishes. Cf., B.S.Ś. 1.1.2. p.48, line 2. They are quoted from the Nirukta of Yāska.
78. Cf., Mahāpūrvapakṣa Para.26f. p.42.
79. Rāmarāya, op-cit., p.77, line 22.
80. Slightly adapted.
81. Rāmarāya, op-cit., p.77, line 13.
82. Brh.Ś. 2.4.9. p.762, line 3; 2.4.13. p.767f, line9f.
83. Rāmarāya, op-cit., p.80, line 22f.
84. Cf., B.S.Ś. Adhyāśabhāṣya. p.4f. Also, Sw. Nikhilānanda trans. Drḡ-Drśya-Viveka. Mysore. Fifth ed. 1970. Vs.1f.

85. The illustration of: "the pot does not exist", which was previously discussed, is mentioned by Kaṇḍabhaṭṭa in his comments to verse 16. in the Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇasāra.
86. This verse is cited in the Śrutaprakāśikā, Vīrarāghavācārya (ed.), op-cit., p.144, line 4f.
87. Rāmarāya, op-cit., p.84, line 24f.
88. Rāmānuja maintains that the Advaitins view contradicts the knowledge of the attribute and its possessor which is immediately evident in a cognition such as: "I know". Cf., Śrī.B.Para.37.p.62.
89. Abhyankar has made a word-play upon Rāmānuja's verse: "If the sense of "I" is not the self, the self would not be inner...".
90. P.S. 5.4.50.
91. Cf., 1.34., and comment.
92. Rāmarāya, op-cit., p.90, line 29.
93. ibid., p.91, line 3f.
94. Balasubramanian, Some Problems., op-cit., p.51.
95. Cf., Mahāpūrvapakṣa. Para.27.p.43. Rāmānuja presents a very accurate account of the Advaitins view: "ato manuṣyo 'ham ...".
96. Cf., also Rāmarāya, op-cit., p.92, line 22f.
97. Cf., B.S.Ś. Adhyāsabhāṣya, p.24, line 2f.
98. This is Rāmānuja's pūrvapakṣa.
99. Slightly adapted. Tadvata is explained as dehātmābhimānavata.
100. Rāmarāya, op-cit., p.95, line 22.
101. ibid., p.95, line 26.
102. Slightly adapted.
103. P.S. 3.1.133.
104. Rāmarāya, op-cit., p.96, line 16f.
105. ibid., p.96, line 21f.
106. Slightly adapted. The word ātmanah added for clarity.
107. Space has the quality of sound. Air has the qualities of sound and touch. Fire has the qualities of sound, touch and form. Water has the qualities of sound, touch, form and taste. Earth has the qualities of sound, touch, form, taste and smell.
108. Cf., comment to 1.51.
109. Adapted.

110. Cf., text, 2.10.
111. This sentence is Rāmānuja's opponent's objection (Śrī.B.Para.43.p.76. Abhyankar has utilized it as the conclusion of his own argument.
112. Adapted.
113. Cf., comment to 1.19.
114. Cf., comment to 1.10., and fn. 36. in ch.1.
115. Cf., Mā. vs.5. Also, Rāmarāya, op-cit., p.114, line 9f.
116. Rāmarāya, ibid., p.114, line 17f.
117. Śrī.B.Para.42.p.75.
118. Slightly adapted.
119. Rāmarāya, op-cit., p.122., line 11f.
120. Slightly adapted: "tathaiva" changed to "vṛthā".
121. Read as the passive form: "apekṣyate".
122. Cf., comment to 1.2., final para.
123. Cf., Ātmabodha., vs.5.
124. This sentence is given by Rāmānuja as the objection.
125. Vīrarāghavācārya (ed.), op-cit., p.177., reads: "jñānaviṣayatvāt" instead of "mithyājñānaviṣayatvāt".
126. Rāmarāya, op-cit., p.129., line 24f.
127. This sentence is based upon Rāmānuja's opponent's objection.
128. Cf., fn. 186 in ch.1.
129. Cf., B.S.Ś. 3.2.4.
130. This sentence is based upon Rāmānuja's opponent's objection.
131. Cf., Bṛh.Ś. 4.3.6. p.865., line 15.
132. Slightly adapted. The first sentence of the quotation is a prima facie view. In the following sentence, Rāmānuja shows that it is in accord with his own position.
133. Slightly adapted.
134. Cf., comment to 3.47.
135. Cf., comment to 2.3.
136. Cf., comment to 1.17.

137. "And there is no fault, since [the quality of Knowledge] exists wherever the Self is, because that is seen" (B.S.2.3.30.). In keeping with the topic, the translation of the sūtra follows the Viśiṣṭādvaita interpretation.
138. "[Brahman] is the material cause, since this is not in conflict with the declaration and the examples" (B.S.1.4.23.).
139. In the verse cited, the words: "that which is imperishable" (tad avyayam) have been omitted.
140. This mantra has not been located in the texts consulted.
141. P.S.7.1.1. See comment to 3.179.
142. This text has not been located.
143. The statement is an attempt to bring the word "jñāna" under the class of words beginning with arsas. However it does not appear in the list supplied by Vasu. Cf., P.S.5.2.127. The meaning of that sūtra is: "The affix ac (a) is used in the sense of possession (matup) after the words 'arsas' etc.".
144. The text is adapted.
145. P.S.7.1.1.
146. In Kaiyyaṭa's commentary upon the Mahābhāṣya (P.S.1.2.42.), grammatical apposition is defined as: bhinna-pravṛttinimittaprayuktasya anekasya śabdasya-ekasminnarthe vṛtṭiḥ sāmānādhikaraṇyam ucyate.
147. Nāgeśabhaṭṭa, Bṛhat-śabdenduśekhara. Saraswati Bhavana Granthamala. Vol.87. Pt.1. Varanasi. 1960. p.655.
148. Patañjali, Vyākaraṇa-mahābhāṣyam. With the Pradīpa of Kaiyyaṭa and the Uddyota of Nāgojibhaṭṭa. Rohatak. 1961. p.352. The context is that sūtra 8.1.72. states that a preceding vocative is treated as though it does not exist so that the following word receives the accent it would have taken had the vocative not existed. Sūtra 8.1.73. prevents the operation of the previous sūtra in the case where two vocatives are in grammatical apposition and the second qualifies the first. In this situation the second vocative loses its accent. Patañjali then gives a counter example: "O Aghnye, goddess Sarasvatī" to show that if the vocatives are in grammatical apposition but are synonyms, the rule does not apply and the second vocative retains its accent. Abhyankar cites this example to show that grammatical apposition does not depend upon a difference of reason for the application of the words to a certain thing, for then even synonyms would not have grammatical apposition.
149. Kaiyyaṭa is the name of the principal commentator upon the Mahābhāṣya.
150. Vyākaraṇa-mahābhāṣya, op-cit., 8.1.73. p.352.
151. Śrī.B.Para.48.p.89,90.
152. Rāmarāya, op-cit., p.157, line 3f.

153. Slightly adapted: "siṣādhayiṣitā" is omitted.
154. "Sarvaśākhyāpratyayanyāya", cf., Jacob, Maxims, op-cit., 111.p.143.
155. Slightly adapted.
156. Slightly adapted.
157. Slightly adapted: "kasmād utkrāmanti" has been added.
158. Slightly adapted.
159. Rāmānuja has cited these texts as his pūrvapakṣa, Śrī.B.Para.51.p.97.
160. Slightly adapted: "uktaśrutiṣu" has been added.
161. Abhyankar reads: "anavagatanānātvam". Karmarkar reads: "avagatanānātvam". Thibaut's translation follows the latter reading while the translation by Rangacharya and Aiyangar follows the former reading. "Anavagatanānātvam" would appear to be more correct in view of the subsequent discussion. The edition by Vīrarāghavācārya reads: "anavagataṁ nānātvam" which would confirm Abhyankar's reading.
162. Slightly adapted.
163. "Kurvadrūpatā" is used in Buddhist thought to designate the cause that exists just prior to the effect. For example, because everything is momentary in nature, the seed that gives rise to the sprout is different at every moment. The seed which exists just before the production of the sprout is the "kurvadrūpa". Cf., Nyāyakośa, op-cit., p.238. In the topic it means "not a cause at all".
164. Adapted, without deviation of the meaning.
165. The reading in the Viṣ.P. is: "dvaitino' tattvadarśinaḥ".
166. This explanation is based upon the Śrutaparakāśikā. Cf., Vīrarāghavācārya, op-cit., p.123, 124.
167. P.S.3.2.101.
168. The affix "kvip" modifies the verbal root while adding no form of its own, cf., Abhyankar and Shukla, A Dictionary, op-cit., p.135.
169. P.S.6.3.109.
170. Abhyankar restates Rāmānuja's pūrvapakṣa as his conclusion. Cf., Śrī. B.Para54.p.108.
171. P.S.4.3.143.
172. P.S.1.4.24., 2.3.28.
173. The fifth case is used in the position of the object when the affix lyap (ya) is elided. For example: prāsādam āruhya prekṣate = prāsādāt prekṣate. Cf., S.C. Vasu. Siddhānta Kaumudī of Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita. Delhi. 1970 [?]. p.358.

174. In the sentence: "the Gaṅgā originates from the Himālaya", the word "Himālaya" is the "first manifestation".
175. Cf., Nyāyakośa, op-cit., p.319, line2f.

4.1.

सर्वं चेदं जगद्भिरिसमुद्रादिकं प्रातिभासिकमविद्याकार्यत्वान्मिथ्यैव । याश्चा-
विद्यावादे (१) आश्रयानुपपत्ति (२) तिरोधानानुपपत्ति (३) स्वरूपा-
नुपपत्ति (४) अनिर्वचनीयत्वानुपपत्ति (५) प्रमाणानुपपत्ति (६) निवर्त-
कानुपपत्ति (७) निवृत्त्यनुपपत्तिरूपाः सप्तविधा अनुपपत्तयो विशिष्टाद्वैतवा-
दिभिः प्रदर्शिताः (श्रीभा० पृ० ८३ प० ८) ता अविचारितरमणीया एव न
तु क्षोदक्षमाः । तथा हि—

4.1. All this world, consisting of mountains and oceans etc., is of an
apparent nature and is certainly false because it is the effect of
Ignorance. The exponents of Viśiṣṭādvaita have shown seven types of
logical fallacy in regard to the teaching of Ignorance: [1] the logical
fallacy concerning the locus, [2] the logical fallacy of "concealing",
[3] the logical fallacy concerning its essential nature, [4] the logical
fallacy of being indeterminable, [5] the logical fallacy concerning a
means of proof, [6] the logical fallacy of an agent for its cessation and
[7] the logical fallacy of its cessation. Those [types of logical fallacy]
can only be pleasing on account of not being investigated, but they are
incapable of withstanding scrutiny. To explain:

4.2.

ब्रह्मशक्तेरविद्याया आश्रयाद्युपपद्यते ॥
तिरोधानं स्वरूपं च तथाऽनिर्वचनीयता ॥

4.2. Commencing with the "locus", the "concealing" and the
"essential nature" and likewise being "indeterminable"
are [all] logically possible for Ignorance which is the
power of Brahman. 19.

4.3.

अद्वैतिनां मतेऽविद्याया जीव एवाश्रयः । जीवस्यैवाहमज्ञ इत्येवं प्रत्ययात् ।
यद्यप्यविद्यारूपा शक्तिः परमात्मन इति सोऽपि
अविद्याया आश्रयोपपत्तिः तस्या आश्रयस्तथापि तत्र न तस्याः कार्यकारि-
त्वम् । यत्तु जीवावस्थायाः अविद्यापारिकल्पित-
त्वेनाविद्योत्तरकालभवत्वान्न तस्या जीव आश्रयः संभवतीत्युक्तं (श्रीभा० पृ०

८३ प० ९) तन्न । न ह्यत्राविद्याजीवत्वयोरन्योन्याश्रयदोषोऽस्ति । यथा तव मते परमात्मशरीरभूतस्य जीवस्य कर्मणैव संकुचितस्वरूपस्य सतः कर्माश्रयत्वम् । न ह्यसंकुचितस्वरूपस्य मुक्तस्येव कर्माश्रयत्वं संभवति । बीजाङ्कुरन्यायेनानादित्वान्न दोषश्चेत्तुल्यं ममापि । तव मते जीवः संकुचितस्वरूपः सन्कर्म करोत्यसंकुचितस्वरूपो वा । नाद्यः । स्वरूपसंकोचस्य कर्मजन्यत्वेन कर्मकरणात्प्राक्तसंकोचासंभवात् । न द्वितीयः । स्वस्वरूपसंकोचकारके कर्मणि प्रवृत्तेरसंभवात् । न हि कश्चिज्ज्ञानी शक्तः सन्नात्मनो बन्धनागारं कृत्वा हठादनुप्रविशति । यच्च 'नापि ब्रह्माश्रित्य । तस्य स्वयंप्रकाशज्ञानरूपत्वेनाविद्याविरोधित्वात्' (श्रीभा० पृ० ८३ प० १०) इत्याद्युक्तं तत्त्वविद्याया ब्रह्माश्रितत्वस्यास्माभिरनभ्युपगमादेव निरस्तम् । न हि जीवदशापन्नत्वेनानवभातं ब्रह्माविद्याया आश्रय इत्यस्माभिरङ्गीक्रियते ।

4.3. [1] According to the view of the non-dualists, the individual soul alone is the locus of Ignorance. Because the individual soul alone has the cognition: "I am ignorant". Although the supreme Self has the power in the form of Ignorance and so that [supreme Self] too is the locus of that [Ignorance], still, that [Ignorance] does not cause any effect there [in the supreme Self].

But what has been said (Śrī.B.Para.59.p.125.)¹:

because the state of the individual soul has been superimposed by Ignorance, the individual soul cannot possibly be the locus of that [Ignorance] since [the soul] comes into being at a time subsequent to Ignorance.

That is not so. Because there is no defect of mutual dependence here between Ignorance and the individual soul. For instance according to your view, the individual soul, who is the body of the supreme Self and whose nature is contracted just because of karma, is [nonetheless] the locus of karma. For being the locus of karma [i.e. the locus of good and bad unseen results] is impossible for a nature which is uncontracted such as a liberated soul. If [you say] there is no defect because [the connection between the soul and karma] is beginningless according to the

maxim of the seed and the sprout, [we reply] then it is the same for me also.

According to your view, does the individual soul perform karma while having a nature which is [already] contracted or while having a nature which is uncontracted? Not the first, because the contraction of its nature is produced by karma and therefore there is no possibility of the contraction of that [nature] prior to doing karma. Nor the second, because there is no possibility of engaging in karma which causes the contraction of one's own nature. Indeed, no wise person who is able makes a prison house for himself and enters it unless it be under duress.²

What has been said (Śrī.B.Para.59.p.125.) beginning with:

Nor even depending upon Brahman, because that [Brahman] is of the nature of self-luminous Knowledge and therefore is contrary to Ignorance.

That too is refuted. Because we certainly do not accept that Ignorance is dependent upon Brahman. For we do not accept that Brahman, who is unmanifest as having gained the state of an individual soul, is the locus of Ignorance.

comment

For the Advaitin, the metaphysical principal of Ignorance (avidyā) is necessary in order to account for the appearance of the phenomenal world (see comment to 1.33.). Rāmānuja contends that if avidyā has no independent existence, which the Advaitin must accept, then it must depend upon something else. Rāmānuja asks whether the individual soul (jīva), or Brahman, is its locus. He argues that both alternatives are untenable. The jīva cannot be the locus of avidyā since the jīva is itself a product of avidyā. The effect cannot exist prior to the cause in order to serve as the locus for the cause. Moreover, Brahman cannot be the locus of avidyā because Brahman is of the nature of Knowledge i.e. self-luminous awareness, and avidyā is what is opposite to knowledge and is considered to be sublated by knowledge and hence avidyā cannot have what is contrary in nature as its locus.

In his reply Abhyankar upholds the view espoused by Maṇḍanamīśra and

Vācaspati that the jīva is the locus of avidyā.³ He then argues that there is no mutual dependence in the manner that the jīva is due to avidyā and avidyā exists because of the jīva. Because neither can be ascertained to have a beginning just as in the case of the seed and the sprout. Abhyankar points out that the Viśiṣṭādvaita criticism of the jīva as the locus of avidyā does not carry weight because the Viśiṣṭādvaitin has the same difficulty explaining the connection between karma and the existence of a body. There is no possibility of karma without a body, but without karma a body is not possible.⁴ The Viśiṣṭādvaitins seek to avoid this mutual dependence through the postulation of a beginningless series. Advaitins maintain that the same explanation can be employed in the case of the jīva and avidyā.

According to the view of Sureśvara and the Vivaraṇa, Brahman is the locus of avidyā.⁵ This view is acceptable because Brahman is of itself not opposed to avidyā. Brahman, as the witness-consciousness (sākṣicaitanya) of all mental states, illumines both knowledge: "I know" and ignorance: "I do not know" and so because Brahman is not opposed to ignorance there is no untenability in Brahman being the locus of avidyā.⁶

Advaitins distinguish between the consciousness which is the essential nature of Brahman (svarūpajñāna), which is not opposed to avidyā, and consciousness in the form of a cognition i.e. a mental modification (vṛttijñāna), which is contrary to avidyā and hence is required in order to remove avidyā. Rāmānuja argues against this distinction. He says it is not correct to distinguish between the cognition: "Brahman is of the nature of Knowledge" which is considered to negate avidyā and the Knowledge which is the essential nature of Brahman. Because both kinds of Knowledge are of the same nature i.e. the nature of illumination which is Brahman. If a mental modification is opposed to avidyā, the consciousness which is the nature of Brahman should also be opposed to avidyā.

Rāmānuja's objection attempts to blur the important distinction between consciousness per se and the consciousness occurring in a cognition. Consciousness per se merely illumines the presence and absence of all particular cognitions such as memory etc. Consciousness is opposed to neither knowledge nor ignorance since it illumines both. Cognition, however, is consciousness in a specific "form" which is conditioned by the content of the cognition. A valid cognition is opposed to ignorance since it is a matter of experience that: "previously I did not know this, now I know it". A cognition is contrary to ignorance when both ignorance and knowledge have the same content (viṣaya).⁷ Ignorance, like knowledge,

is about some thing for upon inquiry it can be ascertained that: "I do not know this". If ignorance and knowledge have the same content then they are brought into opposition and the ignorance of the particular thing is sublated by the knowledge of that thing, just as one may say: "I did not know the pot, now I know it". So too, the ignorance and the knowledge of Brahman have the same content, i.e. Brahman and so the ignorance of Brahman can be sublated by a particular cognition arising from the appropriate means of knowledge.

Rāmānuja also argues (Śrī.B.Para.59.p.126.) that a cognition such as: "Brahman is of the nature of Knowledge" would invalidate the Advaitins position that Brahman, being experience per se, is not the object of another experience. However, what the Advaitin means by the "knowledge of Brahman" is that the true nature of Brahman is experienced, but Brahman is not experienced as an object. For if Brahman is experienced there would be the contradiction between the experiencing agent and the object of experience which is none other than the Self.⁸ Even in nirvikalpa-samādhi there is no objective experience of Brahman. The wise person remains as Brahman alone due to the absence of any experience of duality and because of that reason it is said: "he experiences Brahman".⁹

4.4.

यच्च तिरोधानानुपपत्तिं समर्थयितुं 'प्रकाशतिरोधानं नाम प्रकाशोत्पत्ति-
प्रतिबन्धो, विद्यमानस्य विनाशो वा' (श्रीभा० पृ० ८५ प० ५) इत्यादि-
ग्रन्थेन तिरोधानशब्दार्थं विकल्प्य दूषणमुक्तं तच्च-
अविद्यया तिरोधानोपपत्तिः च्छम् । वास्तविकस्य तिरोधानशब्दार्थस्यानाक-
लनात् । प्रकाशतिरोधानं नाम सत् एव प्रकाश-
स्यानवभासो न तु प्रकाशनाशः । न हि मेघैः सूर्यप्रकाशे तिरोहिते प्रकाशो
नष्ट इति कोऽपि प्रत्येति ।

4.4. [2] In order to establish the logical fallacy of "concealing", the refutation has been said by dividing the meaning of the word "concealing" in the text (Śrī.B.Para.60.p.128.):

What is known as the concealing of light, is the
obstruction to the origination of light or the
destruction of existing [light].

That is worthless. Because there is no understanding of the real meaning of the word "concealing". What is known as the concealing of light, is the

non-manifestation of the light which is indeed existing but not the destruction of light. For nobody believes that when the light of the sun is concealed by clouds the light is destroyed.

comment

In Rāmānuja's third objection, which will be discussed below, he seeks to prove that the Advaitin cannot explain the ontological status of avidyā. Rāmānuja asks whether avidyā is real (paramārtha) or unreal (aparamārtha). The Advaitin cannot accept the first alternative since it would result in duality. Rāmānuja then attempts to demonstrate that the second alternative too cannot be accepted. Briefly, he argues that the Advaitin considers the unreal world to consist of the three factors of seer, seen and seeing. If avidyā is unreal then it should be in the form of one of these factors. But if avidyā is either the seer, the seen, or the unreal seeing which is conditioned by the seer and the seen, then it too would require a cause to account for it and that too would require a cause and so there would be an infinite regress.

4.5.

यच्च स्वरूपानुपपत्तिसमर्थने 'निर्विषया निराश्रया स्वप्रकाशेयमनुभूतिः
स्वाश्रयदोषवशादनन्ताश्रयमनन्तविषयमात्मानय-
अविद्यास्वरूपोपपत्तिः नुभवतीत्यत्र किमयं स्वाश्रयदोषः परमार्थभूत
उतापरमार्थभूत इति विवेचनीयम्' (श्रीभा० पृ०
८५ प० ८) इत्याद्युक्तं तन्न मनोरमम् । यतो मायावेदान्तिनामस्माकं मते
परमात्मा ज्ञानस्वरूपः ।

ज्ञानं नैवात्मनो धर्मो न गुणो वा कथंचन ।

ज्ञानस्वरूप एवात्मा नित्यः सर्वगतः शिवः ॥ (योग-वृ० पृ० २९२)

इत्युक्तेः । भावरूपाज्ञानं च तच्छक्तिः । न च द्वैतापत्तिः शङ्क्या । शक्तेः शक्तिम-
दपेक्षया पृथगस्तित्वाभावात् । शक्तेः प्रातिभासिकत्वेन वस्तुतः सत्यत्वाभावाच्च ।

4.5. [3] What has been said (Śrī.B.Para.60.p.128.) for establishing the logical fallacy concerning the essential nature, beginning with:

This awareness, which is self-luminous and without an object and a location, on account of a defect [i.e. avidyā] located within itself, it experiences itself as having endless locations and endless objects. It must be discerned here: is this defect which is located in itself

[in awareness] absolutely real or not absolutely real?

That is not pleasing. Because according to our view, that of the māyā Vedāntins, the supreme Self is of the nature of Knowledge. For there is the statement:

Knowledge is certainly not an attribute of the Self, nor is it in any way a quality. The Self, who is only of the nature of Knowledge, is eternal, all pervading, auspicious. (Yoga. vṛ).¹⁰

And the power of that [Self] is Ignorance which is a positive entity. The occurrence of duality should not be suspected, because a power has no separate existence with regard to the possessor of the power. And because the power is of an apparent nature, it has no existence in reality.

4.6.

सैव जगदुपादानकारणम् । इयमेव परिणामविशेषेण प्रकृतिमायातमआदिशब्दै-
र्व्यवहियते । तदुक्तं वशिष्ठस्मृतौ—

तामाहुः प्रकृतिं केचिन्मायामेके परे त्वणून् ' (योगवृ० पृ० २९२) इति ।

अस्या एव प्रधानमहदहंकारपञ्चमहाभूतरूपेण तत्तद्व्यष्टिरूपेण च परिणामः । सत्त्वरजस्तमोरूपाणां त्रयाणां गुणानां साम्यावस्था प्रधानम् । बुद्धिरेव च महत्तत्त्वम् । बुद्धेः स्वभावतः स्वच्छतया तत्र ज्ञानस्वरूपं शुद्धचैतन्यं प्रतिबिम्बते । समष्टिबुद्धौ प्रतिबिम्बितं चैतन्यमीश्वरः । व्यष्टिबुद्धौ प्रतिबिम्बितं चैतन्यं जीवः । ' अज्ञाने प्रतिबिम्बितं चैतन्यमीश्वरः ' इति केचित् । विम्बभूतं ज्ञानं यद्यपि निर्विषयं निराश्रयं तथापि प्रतिबिम्बभूतं जीवरूपमीश्वररूपं च ज्ञानं स्वाश्रयभूतभावरूपाज्ञानवशात्साविषयं साश्रयं च भासते । अज्ञानस्य स्वभावत एव किञ्चिद्विषयकत्वात्किञ्चिन्निष्ठत्वाच्च । यथाऽऽदर्शमलेन तत्प्रतिबिम्बितं मुखं मलीमसं भासते तद्वत् । तथा च प्रतिबिम्बभूतं यज्जीवेश्वररूपं ज्ञानं तदेव स्वाधिष्ठानभूताज्ञानरूपदोषवशादनन्ताश्रयमनन्तविषयं चात्मानमनुभवति न तु विम्बभूतम् । भावरूपाज्ञानस्य च स्वपरिणामे विम्बग्रहणे च न स्वातन्त्र्यम् । नापि शुद्धं ब्रह्म तस्य प्रेरकम् । किं तु स्वाश्रयभूतं शुद्धं ब्रह्मोपजीव्य परिणमते प्रतिबिम्बं च गृह्णाति । यथाऽऽदर्शो न मुखप्रेरणया प्रतिबिम्बं गृह्णाति किं तु स्वभावतः । नैतावता तस्य स्वातन्त्र्यम् । मुखसान्निध्यापेक्षणात् । ज्ञानप्रतिबिम्बभूतश्चायं जीवो येन भावरूपाज्ञानरूपदोषेणानन्ताश्रयमनन्तविषयमात्मानमनुभवति स दोषोऽपारमार्थिक एव । नैतावता तस्यान्यापेक्षा । यथा दीपो घटादिप्रकाशकोऽपि स्वभावत एव स्वमपि प्रकाशयति नान्यं दीपमपे-

क्षते तथाऽयं भावरूपाज्ञानरूपो दोषः स्वभावत एव ब्रह्मोपजीव्य जगत्कल्पकः
स्वकल्पकश्चेति। अतो नानवस्था। एतेन 'मूलदोषान्तरापेक्षयाऽनवस्था स्यात्'
(श्रीभा० पृ० ८५.प० १५) इति प्रत्युक्तम् ।

4.6. That [power] is indeed the material cause of the world. This very [power] is expressed by words such as "prakṛti", "māyā", "tamas" etc. since it is a particular type of modification. That has been told in the Vaśiṣṭasmṛti :

Some call that [power] prakṛti, some call it māyā,
whereas others say it is minute particles (Yoga.vṛ.).

The transformation of this very [power] is in the form of the pradhāna, mahat, ahaṅkāra and the five great elements and it is in the form of their respective aggregates. The subtle primary matter (pradhāna) is the state of equilibrium of the three qualities sattva, rajas and tamas. The mahattattva is indeed the intellect. Because the intellect is translucent by nature, pure consciousness -which is the essential nature of Knowledge- reflects there. The Lord is consciousness reflected in the total intellect. The individual soul is consciousness reflected in an individual intellect. Some say that the Lord is consciousness reflected in Ignorance.

Although the Knowledge which is the Original is without an object and a location, still, the Knowledge which is the reflection -in the form of the individual soul and the Lord- appears to possess an object and a location on account of the Ignorance which is a positive entity which is located in itself [i.e. in the reflection]. Because Ignorance, just by its own nature, has something as its object and is located in something. For example, because of the dirt [i.e. avidyā] on a mirror, the face reflected in that appears to be dirty. It is like that. And so the Knowledge which is the reflection -in the form of the individual soul and the Lord- experiences itself as having endless locations and endless objects on account of the defect in the form of Ignorance which is located within itself [i.e. in the reflection]. But not [the Knowledge] which is the

Original [i.e. consciousness as such does not "experience itself"].

The Ignorance which is a positive entity has no independence in regard to its own transformation and in regard to apprehending the Original. Nor even does the pure Brahman induce that [Ignorance to undergo transformation etc.]. But depending upon the pure Brahman which is its locus, it transforms and apprehends the reflection. A mirror, for instance, does not apprehend the reflection due to the impulse of the face, but naturally. Just because of this, that [mirror] does not have independence. Because there is dependence upon proximity to the face. This individual soul, who is a reflection of Knowledge, experiences itself as having endless locations and endless objects because of the defect in the form of Ignorance which is a positive entity and that defect is certainly without absolute reality. Just because of this, that [Ignorance] does not have dependence upon something else. Just as a light, through illumining pots etc., illumines itself too just of its own accord without depending upon another light, so too, this defect in the form of Ignorance which is a positive entity, depending upon Brahman, it superimposes the world and superimposes itself just of its own accord. Therefore there is no infinite regress. On account of this, [the statement] (Śrī.B.Para.60.p.128.): "there must be infinite regress due to the requirement of another primary defect" has been answered.

- 4.7. यदपि 'अहमज्ञ इत्यत्र ज्ञानप्रागभाव एवानुभूयते' (श्रीभा० पृ० ८९ प० ५) इत्युक्तं तन्न । प्रागभावस्य नियमेन कालपरिच्छिन्नतयैव प्रतीतेः । अथाहमज्ञ इति प्रतीतिरत्यन्ताभावविषयिण्यस्तु 'सामयिकाभावस्यातिरिक्तत्वे तद्विषयिणी वास्तु, न तु भावरूपाज्ञानविषयेति चेन्मै-
भावरूपाज्ञानसाधनम् वम् । न ह्यस्माभिः कोऽप्यभावः पारमार्थिकसत्य-
त्वेनाङ्गी क्रियते । किं तु व्यावहारिकसत्यतया ।
व्यावहारिकसत्यता च कल्पनिकीति यन्मूला सा कल्पना तद्भावरूपाज्ञानमे-
वेति घट्टकुटीप्रभातन्याय आपतति । व्यावहारिकस्य ज्ञानाभावस्य हि मूलं
भावरूपाज्ञानमेव । किं च भवतां रामानुजानां नयेऽहमज्ञ इति प्रतीतिर्या बद्धजी-
वस्य जायते तत्र निषिध्यमानं ज्ञाधात्वर्थभूतज्ञानं किं सामान्यज्ञानं ज्ञानवि-

शेषो वा । नाद्यः । ज्ञानविशेषस्यानिषेधे ज्ञानसामान्यान्तर्गतायास्तादृशप्रतीतिर-
 स्तित्वेन ज्ञानसामान्यनिषेधासंभवात् । सामान्यमन्तरेण विशेषस्थितेरसंभवात् ।
 द्वितीये तज्ज्ञानं किं परमात्मस्वरूपभूतमथ वा परमात्मगुणभूतमाहोस्वित्परमात्म-
 विषयकम् । न प्रथमद्वितीयौ । तथाहि सति मुक्तजीवस्यापि तथा प्रतीतिः
 स्यात् । सा तु न त्वयापीष्यते ।//

4.7. Although it has been said (Śrī.B.Para.62.p.133.)¹¹:

only the prior non-existence of knowledge is
 experienced in the case of "I am ignorant".

That is not so. Because prior non-existence is invariably cognized only as what is limited on account of time. But if [you say]: the cognition "I am ignorant" must relate to absolute non-existence, or if temporary non-existence is different then it could relate to that, but it does not refer to Ignorance which is a positive entity. [we reply] Certainly not. Because we do not accept that there is some "non-existence" which has absolute reality. But [we accept non-existence] as a reality which pertains to ordinary relations. And the reality pertaining to ordinary relations is of a fictitious nature and so the unreal construction which is the basis is only the Ignorance which is a positive entity. Thus the maxim of "day break near the toll-station"¹² occurs. Because the Ignorance which is a positive entity is alone the basis of the absence of knowledge which pertains to ordinary relations.

Furthermore, according to the system of you, Rāmānuja, the cognition that "I am ignorant" occurs for a bound soul. Is the knowledge which is the meaning of the verbal root jñā, which is being denied there, the knowledge which is universal or a particular knowledge? Not the first, because if there is no denial of a particular knowledge then such a cognition which is included in the knowledge which is universal exists, therefore there is no possibility of the denial of the knowledge which is universal. Because without the universal there is no possibility of establishing the particular.

In the second case, is that [particular] knowledge about the essential nature of the supreme Self, or about the qualities of the supreme Self, or does it have the supreme Self for its object? It is not the first and second. Because if that was the case, there would be the cognition in that manner even for a liberated soul and that [type of cognition] is not accepted even by you.

comment

The sense is that if the knowledge being denied in "I am ignorant" refers to the essential nature of the supreme Self or to His qualities, then even a liberated soul would have to say "I am ignorant". Because although a liberated soul can objectify the Lord he can not completely comprehend His essential nature or His endless qualities. Therefore the knowledge which is denied is that which relates to the supreme Self.

4.8.

तृतीये तु परमात्मविषयकज्ञाने नञ्द्योत्यमारोपितत्वं कथंचित्क्लेशेनोपपादनीयं स्यात् । यतो यस्य याथात्म्येन परमात्मविषयकं ज्ञानं जातं स मुक्तो जीवो यस्य वा तादृशं ज्ञानमयाथात्म्येन जातमपि याथात्म्येन जातमित्यभिमानः स बद्धो जीवश्च नाहमज्ञ इति प्रत्येति । किं तु यस्य सुतरां तादृशज्ञानं नास्ति स एव तथा प्रत्येति । तत्र तादृशज्ञानस्यैवाभाव आरोपितत्वं कथमुपपादयितुं शक्येत । घटादिविषयकज्ञाने परमात्मविषयकज्ञानत्वस्यारोप इति तु तयोरत्यन्तवैलक्षण्येन न युक्तिमत् । अस्माकं तु नये परमात्मविषयकज्ञानस्य परमात्मगुणभूतज्ञानस्य चाभावात्परमात्मस्वरूपभूतं ज्ञानमेव ज्ञाधात्वर्थः । तच्च ज्ञानं वस्तुतो निराश्रयं निर्विषयं चेति साश्रयं सविषयं च बद्धजीवस्य जायमानं ज्ञानमारोपितमेवेति सुवचम् । ज्ञाने साश्रयत्वस्य सविषयत्वस्य चाज्ञानकल्पितत्वात् । उपाधिभूतजलगतचाञ्चल्यादेः सूर्यप्रतिबिम्ब इवाज्ञानगतसाश्रयत्वादेः प्रतिबिम्बभूतज्ञान आरोपो युक्तिसहः । आरोपितत्वं नञ्द्योत्यमिति वैयाकरणनिकाये प्रसिद्धम् । किं च भावरूपाज्ञानानङ्गीकारे 'अहमज्ञो न किञ्चिज्जानामि' इति प्रयोगेऽज्ञो न जानामीत्यनयोर्द्वयोरपि ज्ञानाभावार्थकत्वेन पौनरुक्त्यापत्तिरिति ।

4.8. But in the third case, in regard to the knowledge having the supreme Self for its object, what has been superimposed -which is indicated by the negative particle- can be demonstrated somehow with difficulty. Because a liberated soul is one for whom knowledge has arisen having as its object the supreme Self as it really is. And a bound soul

is one who has the false presumption that such knowledge has arisen as it really is, even though it has arisen erroneously, and he believes "I am not ignorant". But for whom such knowledge does not exist to an even greater degree, he alone believes in that manner ["I am ignorant"]. In regard to that [latter case], in the absence of that very knowledge, how is the nature of it being superimposed able to be demonstrated? But the superimposition of the nature of knowledge relating to the supreme Self upon the knowledge relating to pots etc. is not logical because those two are completely distinct.

But according to our system, since there is no knowledge having the supreme Self as its object and since there is no knowledge concerning the qualities of the supreme Self, the knowledge concerning the essential nature of the supreme Self is alone the meaning of the verbal root jñā. And that Knowledge [concerning the essential nature of the supreme Self], is in reality without location and without an object and so the Knowledge which arises for a bound soul and which possesses a location and an object is easily said to be just superimposed. Because the possession of a location and an object in Knowledge is superimposed due to Ignorance. The superimposition of having a location etc., which belongs to Ignorance, upon the Knowledge which is a reflection is reasonable, like [the superimposition] of movement etc. belonging to water -which is the limiting adjunct- upon the reflection of the sun. It is well known in the assembly of the grammarians that the negative particle indicates what is superimposed.¹³ Moreover, in not accepting the Ignorance which is a positive entity there would be the occurrence of tautology in the usage: "I am ignorant, I do not know anything" because even both of these words "ignorant" and "I do not know" have the meaning of the absence of knowledge.

4.9. यच्चानिर्वचनीयत्वानुपपत्तिसमर्थने 'सर्वे हि वस्तुजातं प्रतीतिव्यवस्थाप्यम्'
(श्रीभा० पृ०-८६ प० ६) इत्युक्तं तत्रोच्यते-

अविद्याया अनिर्व- इदं शुक्लमिदं पीतमित्येवं सर्वं रूपं प्रकाशव्यव-
चनीयत्वोपपत्तिः स्थाप्यम् । अन्धकारस्य कृष्णं रूपमपि तथैव ।
यद्यप्यन्धकाररूपनिर्णये साक्षात्प्रकाशापेक्षा नास्ति

तथापि प्रकाशाभावसापेक्षत्वेनाभावप्रतियोगितया प्रकाशापेक्षाऽस्त्येव । अन्य-
त्रास्तित्वे सति यत्र यस्याविद्यमानत्वं तत्र तस्याभावप्रतियोगित्वम् । जगति
सर्वथा प्रकाशास्तित्वाभाव इतरपदार्थानामिवान्धकारस्यापि रूपं जन्मान्धेनेव न
निर्णीयेत । तथा च यथान्धकाररूपं प्रकाशाविषयमपि प्रकाशव्यवस्थाप्यं भवति
तथा सदसद्रूपद्विविधप्रतीत्यविषयस्यापि भावरूपाज्ञानस्य स्वरूपमनिर्वचनीय-
मित्येवं रूपेण प्रतीतिव्यवस्थाप्यं भवत्येव ।

4.9. [4] What has been said (Śrī.B.Para.60.p.129.) for establishing the
logical fallacy of being indeterminable:

indeed the whole totality of things has to be
established according to cognition.

In regard to that, it is said: every colour such as "this is white", "this
is yellow" has to be established by light. Even the black colour of
darkness is just the same. Although there is no direct dependence upon
light for the ascertainment of the colour of darkness, still, because
[the ascertainment of the colour of darkness] depends upon the absence of
light, there is certainly a dependence upon light as the counter-correlate
of its absence. When something exists at some place, where it does not
exist, there is the counter-correlate of its absence in that place. If
there is the total absence of the existence of light in the world, just
as the colour of other objects could not be ascertained so also the
colour of darkness could not be ascertained, just as it could not be
ascertained by one who is blind from birth. And so just as the colour of
darkness, though not an object of light, is able to be established by
light, similarly, the essential nature of the Ignorance which is a
positive entity, though not an object of the twofold cognition in the
form of "existent" or "non-existent", is certainly able to be established
by the cognition in the manner of being "indeterminable".

comment

In regard to the logical fallacy concerning the essential nature of

avidyā (cf. 4.5. and preceding comment), Rāmānuja stated that avidyā has to be determined as either real or unreal. The Advaitin, however, considers that there is a third alternative: avidyā is indeterminable as real or as unreal. In response to this view, Rāmānuja argues that all cognitions are in a twofold form: either a thing exists or it does not exist. When all cognitions are restricted to the form of existent (sat) or non-existent (asat) it is untenable to argue that there can be the cognition of an entity which is distinct from both sat and asat.¹⁴

The Advaitin can respond to Rāmānuja's critique by applying an uncompromising definition of what constitutes real and unreal. What is not cognized at any time is totally unreal, like the horns of a rabbit. What is not negated is real, such as Brahman.¹⁵ On the basis of this definition, avidyā cannot be totally unreal because it is perceived in statements such as "I am ignorant". Nor can avidyā be real since it is sublated by knowledge. Avidyā cannot be both real and unreal because it is a contradiction to hold that the same entity can be simultaneously existent and non-existent. Therefore the ontological status of avidyā is distinct from what is real and unreal (sadasadvilakṣaṇa) and hence it is said to be indeterminable as either real or unreal. The world too, as the effect of the primary avidyā, has an indeterminable status (see comment to 1.42.).

4.10.

यदपि विम्बभूतस्य शुद्धब्रह्मणोऽज्ञानानुभवं वस्तुतो मायावाद्यनाभिमतमपि
मायावाद्यभिमतत्वेन प्रतिपाद्य तन्निरसने महत्तर्कजालं 'नित्यमुक्तस्वप्रकाश-
चैतन्यैकस्वरूपस्य ब्रह्मणोऽज्ञानानुभवश्च न संभवति' (श्रीभा० पृ० ८९
प० ७) इत्यादिग्रन्थेनोक्तं तत्र न किञ्चित्प्रत्युच्यते । मायावादिभिस्तथाऽनभ्यु-
पगमात् ।

4.10. Although the exponents of māyā do not accept that, in reality, the pure Brahman who is the Original has the experience of Ignorance, it is taught as accepted by the exponents of māyā and then for the refutation of that [view which the Advaitins do not accept] a great net of logic has been stated by the text beginning (Śrī.B.Para.62.p.133.):

The experience of Ignorance is not possible for
Brahman whose sole nature is eternal, free, self-
luminous consciousness.

Nothing whatsoever is said by way of reply there. Because the exponents of māyā do not accept it to be so.

4:11.

यत्तु 'अपि चापरमार्थदोषमूलभ्रमवादिना निरधिष्ठानभ्रमासंभवो दुरूप-
पादः । भ्रमहेतुभूतदोषदोषाश्रयवदाधिष्ठानापारमार्थ्येऽपि भ्रमोपपत्तेः । ततश्च सर्व-
शून्यत्वमेव स्यात्' (श्रीभा० पृ० ९१ प० १५) इत्युक्तं तदपरमार्थतुच्छ-

स्वरूपविवेकापलापमूलकम् । तथा हि—यदसत्यं
अधिष्ठानस्य सत्यत्वम् सत्प्रतिभासते तदपरमार्थम् । यन्न कदापि प्रति-
भासते तत्तुच्छमिति हि तयोः स्वरूपविवेकः । तत्र
तुच्छत्वं सर्वशून्यत्वे हेतुः संभवेनापारमार्थ्यम् । त्वया त्वपारमार्थ्यं सर्वशून्यत्वे
हेतुः 'ततश्च' इति शब्देन निर्दिष्ट इति कोऽयं चक्षुषि धूलिप्रक्षेपः । अथ सर्व-
शून्यत्वापादनं मा भूनाम । परं त्वधिष्ठानापारमार्थ्येऽपि भ्रमसंभवेन ब्रह्मणः पारमा-
र्थिकसत्यत्वं मायावाद्यभिमतं न सिध्यतीति चेन्मैत्रम् । अयं हि भावरूपाज्ञानपद-
वाच्यो दोषो ब्रह्मोपजीव्य तच्छक्तिरूपेण स्वयं स्वेनैव कल्पितोऽनादिः । तदे-
वोपजीव्य स्वस्मिस्तत्प्रतिविम्बभूतः स्वाश्रयो जीवः स्वज्ञातृत्वेन कल्पितः । तदे-
वोपजीव्यज्ञानविषयत्वं तन्नारोप्य स्वविषयत्वेन तदेव कल्पितम् । तदेव चोपजीव्य
तदेवाधिष्ठाय तत्संबन्धेन स्वयमाकाशादिप्रपञ्चरूपेण परिणमते । यदि ब्रह्म
तुच्छमपरमार्थिकं वा स्यात्तर्हि किमुपजीव्यास्य दोषस्य प्रवृत्तिः स्यात् । अप्र-
वृत्तौ तु न कदाचिदपि किञ्चिदपि क्वापि दृश्येत । यतश्च दृश्यते जगदतो ब्रह्म न
तुच्छमपरमार्थं वेत्यवश्यं स्वीकार्यम् ।

4.11. But what has been said (Śrī.B.Para.63.p.136.):

Moreover, the exponent of an error being based upon an unreal defect has difficulty in proving the impossibility of error without a substratum. For there is the logical possibility of error even in a substratum which has no absolute reality, just as when the defect which is the cause of error and the locus of the defect [are both unreal]. Therefore everything would only be emptiness.

That is based upon the denial of the discrimination between the nature of being not absolutely real and the nature of being fictitious. To explain. Indeed the discrimination of the nature of those two is thus:

what is unreal and appears to be real is "not absolutely real". What does not appear at any time is "fictitious". With regard to those two, fictitiousness can possibly be the reason for the emptiness of everything, not the nature of being not absolutely real. But by the word "therefore" you specified being not absolutely real to be the reason for the emptiness of everything. So what is this throwing dust into one's eye?

But if [you say]: perhaps there cannot be the demonstration of the emptiness of everything, but the absolute reality of Brahman accepted by the exponents of māyā is not established; for there is the possibility of error even in a substratum which has no absolute reality. [we reply]: Certainly not. Because this defect, which can be expressed by the word "Ignorance" which is something positive, is beginningless and depending upon Brahman it has superimposed itself by itself alone in the form of being the power of that [Brahman]. Depending upon that [Brahman] alone, the individual soul has itself [Ignorance] as its locus and being a reflection of that [Brahman] in itself [in Ignorance] is superimposed as the knower of itself [i.e. the knower of Ignorance, in the manner that: "I am ignorant"]. Having depended upon that alone [i.e. being the knower of Ignorance] and having superimposed there [in Ignorance] the nature of being an object of knowledge, that very [Brahman, who is unknown] is superimposed as the object of itself [of Ignorance. In the statement: "I am ignorant", ignorance is the object of the jīva. In the statement: "I do not know Brahman", Brahman is the object of that ignorance]. And depending upon that alone [Brahman who is the object of Ignorance] and having that [Brahman] alone as its basis, [Ignorance] itself transforms into the manifest world beginning with space on account of the connection [of Ignorance] with that [Brahman]. If Brahman were to be fictitious or not absolutely real, then the operation of this defect would depend upon what? But if there is no operation, nothing whatsoever could be seen

anywhere at any time. And because the world is seen, therefore it has to be necessarily accepted that Brahman is neither fictitious nor without absolute reality.

4.12.

इदं च दोषभूतमनाद्यज्ञानमनुमानेनापि सिध्यति । विवादाध्यासितं प्रमाण-
ज्ञानं स्वप्रागभावव्यतिरिक्तस्वविषयावरणस्वानिवर्त्यस्वदेशगतवस्त्वन्तरपूर्वकम्,
अप्रकाशितार्थप्रकाशकत्वात्, अन्धकारे प्रथमोत्पन्नप्रदीपप्रभावत् । अत्र ज्ञान-
मित्युक्ते ब्रह्मस्वरूपज्ञानस्य वस्त्वन्तरपूर्वकत्वाभावात्तद्व्यावृत्त्यर्थं प्रमाणज्ञान-
मित्येवं पक्षनिर्देशः कृतः । स्वप्रागभावेत्यादिः साध्यनिर्देशः । स्वप्रागभावव्य-
तिरिक्तं स्वविषयावरणभूतं स्वानिवर्त्यं स्वदेशगतं च यद्वस्त्वन्तरं तत्पूर्वकमित्यर्थः ।

4.12. [5]¹⁶ This beginningless Ignorance, which is the defect, is established by inference also (Śrī.B.Para.61.p.131.)¹⁷:

The knowledge gained by a means of proof, which is the subject of dispute, is preceded by another entity which is different from the prior non-existence of knowledge, which conceals the object of knowledge, which is able to be removed by knowledge and which exists at the same place as knowledge.

Because [knowledge] reveals a thing which was not revealed before.

Like the light of a lamp first lit in the midst of darkness.

In regard to [the word] "knowledge" which is mentioned here, because the Knowledge which is the essential nature of Brahman is not preceded by another entity, for the purpose of the exclusion of that [Knowledge], the specification of the subject (pakṣa) was made as: the knowledge gained by a means of proof. The specification of what is to be proved (sādhya) begins with: [preceded by another entity which is different from] the prior non-existence of knowledge. The meaning is: the other entity which

precedes is different from the prior non-existence of knowledge, conceals the object of knowledge, is able to be removed by knowledge and exists at the same place as knowledge.

- 4.13. यच्चत्र भावरूपाज्ञानसाधकानुमाने ' अज्ञानेऽप्यनभिमतज्ञानान्तरसाधनेन विरुद्धत्वाद्देतोः ' (श्रीभा० पृ० ९२ प० २) इत्युक्तं तस्य यद्ययमभिप्रायः—
 “अप्रकाशितार्थप्रकाशकत्वरूपं यं हेतुं पुरस्कृत्य येनानुमानप्रमाणेन भावरूपाज्ञानं मायावादिभिः साधितं स एव हेतुस्तादृशानुमानरूपप्रमाणज्ञानस्य तद्विपर्ययीभूतभावरूपाज्ञानावरकाज्ञानान्तरपूर्वकत्वं साधयेत् । भावरूपाज्ञानस्य पूर्वमप्रकाशितस्य तेनैवानुमानेन प्रकाशनात् । तादृशमज्ञानान्तरं मायावादिनामनभिमतमेव । भावरूपाज्ञानस्यैवान्येनावरणे हि स्वयंसिद्ध एव मोक्ष इति संसारो न स्यात् । अतो हेतुविरुद्धः” इति,

4.13. What has been said here in regard to the inference proving the Ignorance which is a positive entity (Śrī.B.Para.63.p.136f.):

Because the reason is contradictory since it proves another ignorance which is not accepted even in regard to Ignorance.

If this is the intended meaning of that [statement]: the exponents of māyā have demonstrated the Ignorance which is a positive entity through an inference, having introduced as the reason (hetu): revealing a thing which was not revealed before. That very reason would prove that the knowledge gained by a means of proof, in the form of such an inference, is preceded by another ignorance concealing the Ignorance which is a positive entity which is the object of that [other ignorance]. Because the Ignorance which is a positive entity, which was not revealed previously, is revealed by that very inference. The exponents of māyā certainly do not accept another such ignorance. Because if the Ignorance which is a positive entity is concealed by another [ignorance], liberation is indeed established of its own accord and so there would be no worldly existence. Therefore the reason is contradictory.

4.14.

तर्हीत्थं विचार्यते-नार्यं

हेतुर्विरुद्धः । साध्याभावव्याप्तौ हि हेतुर्विरुद्धः । ' मायावादिमतविरुद्ध ' इत्यर्थस्तु
 क्लिष्टः । किं चैतदनुमानस्याप्रकाशितार्थप्रकाशकत्वं नास्ति । अहमज्ञ इति प्रत्य-
 क्षेण भावरूपाज्ञानप्रकाशनात् । किंच भावरूपाज्ञानसाधकप्रमाणज्ञानस्य भाव-
 रूपाज्ञानावरकाज्ञानान्तरपूर्वकत्वे साधितेऽपि न काचित्क्षतिः । अज्ञानान्तरेण भाव-
 रूपाज्ञानमात्रियेत । न तु विनश्यति । तद्विनाशाभावे च कथं स्वयंसिद्धो मोक्षः
 स्यात् । न च भावरूपाज्ञानस्यावरणे तस्याज्ञातत्वात्कथं प्रपञ्चरूपकार्यकारित्वम् ।
 अज्ञातस्यापरमार्थस्य कार्यकारित्वाभावादिति वाच्यम् । अज्ञातस्याप्यपरमार्थस्य
 चन्हयादेर्दाहादि कार्यकारित्वदर्शनात् । तत्कार्यमप्यपरमार्थं स्यादिति त्वन्यत् ।
 किंचाज्ञात एव प्रातिभासिकः सर्पोऽप्रातिभासिकमपि ज्ञानं जनयत्येव । किंच
 व्याहारिकस्यापि कारणस्य न कचिदपि ज्ञातस्यैव कारणत्वम् । यथाऽज्ञातोऽपि
 वह्निः सन्नेव दाहं जनयति । यत्र च व्याघ्रादिर्ज्ञात एव भयं जनयति तत्र न व्याघ्र-
 स्य भयकारणत्वं किंतु व्याघ्रज्ञानस्य । व्याघ्रस्तु ज्ञानद्वारा भयजनकत्वाद्भयहेतु-
 त्वेन लोक उपचर्यते ।

4.14. Then [if that is the interpretation], it is examined in the following manner. This reason is not contradictory. Because a reason is contradictory when it is pervaded by the absence of what is to be proved. But the meaning: "it is contradictory according to the view of the exponents of māyā" is contrived. Moreover, this inference does not reveal a thing which was not revealed before. Because the Ignorance which is a positive entity is revealed through the direct perception: "I am ignorant". Moreover, even though the knowledge gained by a means of proof, which establishes the Ignorance which is a positive entity, is demonstrated to be preceded by another ignorance concealing the Ignorance which is a positive entity, there is no impairment whatsoever. The Ignorance which is a positive entity is concealed by another ignorance, but it is not destroyed. And in the absence of its destruction, how could liberation be established of its own accord?

It should not be said: if the Ignorance which is a positive entity is concealed, because that [Ignorance] is not recognized, how can it be the cause of the effect in the form of the manifest world? Because what is not recognized and what is not absolutely real is not the cause of an

effect. [reason] Because fire etc., though not recognized and not absolutely real, is seen to be the cause of effects such as burning etc. Its effect too must be without absolute reality, but that is another matter. Furthermore, an apparent snake which is indeed not recognized [since it does not exist] certainly produces even knowledge which is not of an apparent nature. Moreover, even a cause pertaining to ordinary relations, though not at all recognized, possesses causality. For example, a fire -which is indeed existing though it is not recognized- produces burning. And where a tiger etc., which is certainly recognized, produces fear, the tiger is not the cause of the fear but rather the knowledge of the tiger. But the tiger is figuratively referred to in the world as the cause of fear since it produces fear by means of knowledge [of its effects].

4.15.

अथायमभिप्रायः ' यथाऽप्रकाशितार्थप्रकाशकत्वेन हेतुना प्रमाणज्ञानस्य वस्त्वन्तरपूर्वकत्वं साध्यते तथा तादृशवस्त्वन्तरस्याज्ञानस्याप्यप्रकाशितप्रपञ्चरूपार्थप्रकाशकत्वेन वस्त्वन्तरपूर्वकत्वापत्तावज्ञानान्तरं सिध्येत् । तच्च मायावाद्यनभिमतमेव । अज्ञानान्तरेण प्रपञ्चस्यैवावरणे मोक्षस्य स्वयंसिद्धत्वात् ' इति, तर्हिपि पूर्ववद्धेतोर्विरुद्धत्वं नास्त्येव । किञ्च भावरूपाज्ञानस्य प्रपञ्चोपादानकारणत्वं न तु प्रपञ्चप्रकाशकत्वम् । न हि मृत्तिका घटप्रकाशिका! 'सर्वत्र हि ज्ञानस्यैव प्रकाशकत्वम् ' (श्रीभा० पृ० ९२ प० ६) इति त्वयैवोच्यते ।

4.15. But if this is the intended meaning [of the statement "Because the reason is contradictory...", supra]¹⁸: just as the knowledge gained by a means of proof is established as being preceded by another entity due to the reason that [knowledge] reveals a thing which was not revealed before, so too, because that other entity, though it is Ignorance, reveals an object in the form of the manifest world which was not revealed before, then in the consequence of it being preceded by another entity, another ignorance would be established. And the exponents of māyā certainly do not accept that. Because if the manifest world is indeed concealed by another

ignorance, liberation is established of its own accord. [refutation] Even then, just as before, the reason is certainly not contradictory. Moreover, the Ignorance which is a positive entity is the material cause of the manifest world but it is not the revealer of the manifest world. The clay certainly does not reveal the pot. You yourself have said (Śrī.B.Para.63. p.137.): "Because everywhere it is Knowledge alone which reveals".

comment

The discussion which follows is in response to Rāmānuja's objection to the example given in the syllogism, i.e. "Like the light of a lamp first lit in the midst of darkness". Rāmānuja states that it is cognition alone which reveals things. The senses only cause the origination of the cognition which reveals the object and the light of a lamp merely assists the senses through the removal of darkness. Rāmānuja maintains that what is meant by "revealing" is not a mere removal of something but the accurate determination of the object, which can only occur through cognition. Abhyankar's statement, while accepting that cognition brings about the accurate determination of the object, seeks to establish Rāmānuja's prima facie view, i.e. the analogy of light with cognition is apt because their nature is similar in so far as they both remove what is contrary to themselves.

4.16. यद्यपि ज्ञानमेवार्थपरिच्छेदकारित्वात्प्रकाशकं तथापि चाक्षुषज्ञान-साधनीभूता प्रभापि प्रकाशिकेत्युच्यते । तस्या अपि ज्ञानस्येव स्वविरोधिनिरासकत्वात् । अप्रकाशकारणनिरासकं हि प्रकाशकमुच्यते । एतदभिप्रायेणैव प्रदीपप्रभा निदर्शिता । इन्द्रियाणि तु विषयसंयोगरूपव्यापारद्वारा ज्ञानजनकानि न तु किञ्चिद्वस्तुनिरासद्वारेति तेषामप्रकाशितार्थप्रकाशकत्वाभावेन वस्त्वन्तरपूर्वकत्वाभावेऽपि न क्षतिः । 'यद्युपकारकाणामप्यप्रकाशितार्थप्रकाशकत्वमङ्गीकृतं तर्हीन्द्रियाणामुपकारकतमत्वेनाप्रकाशितार्थप्रकाशकत्वमङ्गीकरणीयम् । तथा सति तेषां स्वनिवर्त्यवस्त्वन्तरपूर्वकत्वाभावाद्देतोरनैकान्त्यम्' (श्रीभा० पृ० ९२ प० १६) इत्यादि त्वसारमेव । यतो मायावादिभिर्न सर्वेषामुपकारकाणां प्रकाशकत्वमङ्गीकृतं किंतु प्रकाशविरोधिनिरासकानामेवेति ।

4.16. Although Knowledge alone reveals because it brings about the accurate determination of the object, still, the light is also said to reveal as it is the means for optical knowledge. Because that too, like

Knowledge, removes what is contrary to itself. For "revealing" is said to be the removal of the cause of non-revealing. The light of a lamp was specified only with this intended meaning.

The sense organs, however, produce Knowledge by means of the operation consisting of the connection with the sense object. But not by means of the removal of any thing. So because they do not reveal a thing which was not revealed before, there is no impairment even in the absence of being preceded by another entity. But [the statement] (Śrī.B.Para.64. p.137.) such as:

If the auxiliary factors too are accepted as revealing a thing which was not revealed before, then because the sense organs are the most helpful [among those factors] they would have to be accepted as revealing things which were not revealed before. If that is the case, the reason ["Because of revealing a thing which was not revealed before"] is inconclusive because those [sense organs] are not preceded by another entity which they can remove.

That is worthless. Because the exponents of māyā do not accept that all auxiliary factors reveal, but only those which remove what is contrary to revealing.

4.17.

यच्च प्रत्यनुमाननवकप्रदर्शनं (श्रीभा० ९३ पृ० १) तदसंगतम् । इत्थं हि तैः प्रतिप्रयोगाः प्रदर्शिताः— १ अज्ञानं न ज्ञानमात्रब्रह्माश्रयम्, अज्ञानत्वात्, शुक्तिकाद्यज्ञानवत्, ज्ञानाश्रयं हि तत् । २ अज्ञानं न ज्ञानावरणम्, अज्ञानत्वात्, शुक्तिकाद्यज्ञानवत्, विषयावरणं हि तत् । ३ अज्ञानं न ज्ञाननिवर्त्यम्, ज्ञानविषयानावरणत्वात्, यज्ज्ञाननिवर्त्यमज्ञानं तज्ज्ञानविषयावरणं यथा शुक्तिकाद्यज्ञानम् । ४ ब्रह्म नाज्ञानास्पदम्, ज्ञानत्वविरहात्, घटादिवत् । ५ ब्रह्म नाज्ञानावरणम्, ज्ञानाविषयत्वात्, यदज्ञानावरणं तज्ज्ञानविषयभूतं यथा शुक्तिकादि । ६ ब्रह्म न ज्ञाननिवर्त्याज्ञानम्, ज्ञानाविषयत्वात्, यज्ज्ञाननिवर्त्याज्ञानं तज्ज्ञानविषयभूतं यथा शुक्तिकादि । ७ प्रमाणज्ञानं स्वप्रागभावातिरिक्ताज्ञानपूर्वकं न भवति, प्रमाणज्ञानत्वात्, भवदाभिमताज्ञानसाधनप्रमाणज्ञानवत् । ८ ज्ञानं न वस्तुनो विनाशकम्, शक्तिविशेषोपबृंहणविरहे सति ज्ञानत्वात्,

यद्वस्तुनो विनाशकं तच्छक्तिविशेषोपवृद्धितं ज्ञानमज्ञानं च दृष्टं यथेश्वरयोगिप्रभृ-
तिज्ञानं यथा च मुद्गरादि । ९ भावरूपमज्ञानं न ज्ञानविनाश्यम्, भावरूपत्वात्,
घटादिवदिति ।

4.17. The demonstration of nine contrary inferences (Śrī.B.Para.64.p.138f.) is incongruous. Because he [Rāmānuja] has shown the counter syllogisms in this manner:

(1) Ignorance does not have Brahman, which is pure Knowledge, as its locus. Because it is Ignorance. Like the ignorance of a pearl-oyster etc. For that has the knower as its locus.

(2) Ignorance does not conceal Knowledge. Because it is Ignorance. Like the ignorance of a pearl-oyster etc. For that conceals the object.

(3) Ignorance cannot be removed by knowledge. Because it does not conceal the object of knowledge [the Advaitin says Ignorance conceals Brahman who is not an object of knowledge]. Whatever Ignorance can be removed by knowledge, conceals the object of knowledge. Just as the ignorance of a pearl-oyster etc.

(4) Brahman is not the substrate of Ignorance. Because [Brahman] is bereft of knowership. Like a pot etc.

(5) Brahman does not have Ignorance as its concealing factor. Because [Brahman] is not an object of knowledge. Whatever has ignorance as its concealing factor is an object of knowledge. Like a pearl-oyster etc.

(6) Brahman does not possess Ignorance which can be removed by knowledge. Because [Brahman] is not an object of knowledge. Whatever possesses ignorance which can be removed by knowledge, is an object of

knowledge. Like a pearl-oyster etc.

(7) The knowledge gained by a means of proof is not preceded by an Ignorance different from the prior non-existence of knowledge. Because it is knowledge gained by a means of proof. Like the knowledge gained by a means of proof which demonstrates the Ignorance you accept.

(8) Knowledge does not destroy an object. Because it is [only] knowledge when it is bereft of being augmented by a particular power. Whatever destroys an object -whether it is knowledge or ignorance- is seen to be augmented by a particular power. Like the knowledge belonging to the Lord and yogins etc. And like [the ignorance] belonging to a hammer etc.

(9) Ignorance which is a positive entity cannot be destroyed by knowledge. Because it is something positive. Like a pot etc.

4.18.

ये चेमे प्रतिप्रयोगा उक्तास्तेषु प्रथमं चतुर्थं चानुमानं नास्माकं प्रतिकूलम् ।
 तत्रत्यसाध्यस्य ज्ञानमात्रब्रह्मणोऽज्ञानाश्रयत्वाभा-
 प्रत्यनुमाननिरासः वस्यास्माकमपीष्टत्वात् । अज्ञानाश्रयस्तु प्रतिविन्व-
 भूतो ज्ञातृत्वेन प्रकल्पितो जीव इति प्रागेवोक्तम्
 (१४० । ९) । तथा शुद्धं ब्रह्म यद्यपि नाज्ञानेनात्रियते तथापि तदेव ब्रह्मोप-
 जीव्य तच्छक्तिरूपमज्ञानं शक्तिरूपत्वात्तस्मिन्नन्तः प्रविश्येव तस्मिन्ब्रह्मणि ज्ञान-
 विषयत्वमारोप्य स्वविषयत्वं प्रकल्प्य पश्चात्तदात्रियते । यथा जलविनाशयोऽप्यग्निः
 सूक्ष्मरूपेण स्वविरोधिन्यपि जलेऽन्तः प्रविश्य स्वविषयत्वं प्रकल्प्य तस्मिन्स्व-
 गुणमुष्णत्वमारोप्य तत्रत्यं शैत्यमावृणोति तद्वत् । एतेन द्वितीयं पञ्चमं चानुमानं
 निरस्तम् । तृतीये षष्ठे चानुमाने हेतुरसिद्धः । ब्रह्मणि ज्ञानविषयत्वमारोप्यै-
 वाज्ञानेन तदावरणात् । सप्तमे चानुमाने दृष्टान्त एव न संभवति । ' भावरूपा-
 ज्ञानसाधकप्रमाणज्ञानस्य भावरूपाज्ञानावरकाज्ञानान्तरपूर्वकत्वे साधितेऽपि न
 काचित्सक्तिः ' इति प्रागेवोक्तत्वात् (१४० । २६) । अष्टमे चानुमाने सिद्धसाध-
 नम् । न ह्यस्माभिर्ब्रह्मज्ञानं वस्तुनो विनाशकं स्वी क्रियते । आकाशादिप्रपञ्च-

स्यापि परिकल्पितत्वेनास्माकं नयेऽवस्तुत्वात् । किं च हेतुरप्यसिद्धः । ब्रह्मज्ञाने शक्तिविशेषोपबृंहणविरहस्य निश्चेतुमशक्यत्वात् । नवमे चानुमाने सोपाधिको हेतुः । पारमार्थिकत्वस्योपाधित्वात् । यज्ज्ञानविनाशं न भवति तत्पारमार्थिकमस्त्येवेति साध्यव्यापकता । यद्भावरूपं तत्पारमार्थिकमेवेति न नियमः । भावरूपाज्ञाने तन्मूलक आकाशादिप्रपञ्चे च व्यभिचारात् । अतः साधनाव्यापकता ।

4.18. Among these counter syllogisms which have been stated, the first and the fourth inference are not inimical to us. Because what is to be proved there, i.e. Brahman who is pure Knowledge is not the locus of Ignorance, is accepted by us also. It was mentioned just previously (4.11) that the locus of Ignorance is the individual soul who is a reflection and who is superimposed as a knower.

Thus pure Brahman, although not concealed by Ignorance, still, Ignorance, depending upon that very Brahman and being the power of that [Brahman] has as though entered into that [Brahman] because of being a power and having superimposed in that Brahman the nature of being an object of knowledge, and having superimposed the nature of being an object of itself [of Ignorance], subsequently that [Brahman] is concealed. Just as fire, though able to be extinguished by water, enters into water -even though it is contradictory to itself- in a subtle form and having superimposed the nature of being an object of itself and having superimposed its own quality of heat in that [water], it conceals the coldness belonging to that [water]. It is like that. On account of this, the second inference and the fifth inference are refuted.

The reason is not established in the third and the sixth inference. Because that [Brahman] is concealed by Ignorance, only having superimposed upon Brahman the nature of being an object of knowledge. And in the seventh inference, the example is certainly not possible. Because it was stated just previously (4.14.): "even though the knowledge gained by a means of proof, which establishes the Ignorance which is a positive entity, is demonstrated to be preceded by another ignorance concealing the Ignorance which is a positive entity, there is no impairment whatsoever".

In the eighth inference there is proving of what is already established. Because we do not accept that the knowledge of Brahman destroys a [real] object. Because in our system, even the manifest world beginning with space is superimposed and is therefore not a real object. Moreover, the reason too is not established. Because being bereft of augmentation by a particular power cannot be ascertained in regard to the knowledge of Brahman.

In the ninth inference the reason possesses a limiting condition. Because referring to what is absolutely real acts as a limiting condition. There is the pervasion of what is to be proved (sādhya) by: whatever is not able to be destroyed by knowledge certainly possesses absolute reality. There is no rule: whatever is a positive entity certainly possesses absolute reality. Because there is deviation in regard to Ignorance which is a positive entity and in regard to the manifest world beginning with space which is based upon that [Ignorance]. Therefore there is no pervasion of the means (sādhana) [i.e. the reason].

4.19.

किं च

सर्पज्ञानजन्यस्य भावरूपस्यापि भयस्येयं रज्जुरिति ज्ञानेन विनाशो दृश्यत इत्यनैकान्तिकोऽयं हेतुः । अथ सर्पज्ञानस्य भयकारणस्य नाशाद्भयनाशो न तु रज्जुज्ञानादिति चेत्तथाप्यनैकान्तिक एव । सर्पज्ञानस्य भावरूपस्य रज्जुज्ञानेन विनाशदर्शनात् । ननु न सर्पज्ञानस्य रज्जुज्ञानेन नाशः किं तु क्षणिकत्वात्स्वयमेवेति चेन्न । ज्ञानं क्षणिकमिति किं तत्र परमेश्वरेण संदिष्टम् । किं तु विषयादिकारणसंनिधानं यावदवतिष्ठते ज्ञानम् । तथैव प्रतीतेः । न च तथापि सर्पनाशात्सर्पज्ञाननाशो न तु रज्जुज्ञानादिति वाच्यम् । तथापि भावरूपस्य सर्पस्य रज्जुज्ञानेन विनाशादनैकान्तिकत्वं तदवस्थमेव ।

4.19. Furthermore, this reason [in the ninth syllogism] is inconclusive, for the destruction of fear, though it is something positive as it is produced by the knowledge of the snake, is seen to occur through the knowledge "this is a rope". But if [you say]: the destruction of fear is

from the destruction of the cause of fear which is the knowledge of the snake, but not from the knowledge of the rope. [our reply is] Even then [the reason] is certainly inconclusive. Because the destruction of the knowledge of the snake, which is something positive, is seen to occur through the knowledge of the rope.

[objection] There is no destruction of the knowledge of the snake through the knowledge of the rope, but it occurs spontaneously because it is momentary.

[reply] No. Did the supreme Lord indicate to you that "knowledge is momentary"? Rather, knowledge remains as long as there is the presence of the cause such as a sense object etc. Because cognition is just in that manner. It should not be said: still, the destruction of the knowledge of the snake is because of the destruction of the snake, but not because of the knowledge of the rope. [reason] Even then the inconclusiveness is just the same as before, because the destruction of the snake, which is something positive, occurs through the knowledge of the rope.

4.20. यदुक्तम् 'अक्षणिकत्वे च तेषां भयादीनां भयादिहेतुभूतज्ञानसंततावशिषेण सर्वेषां ज्ञानानां भयाद्युत्पत्तिहेतुत्वेनानेकभयोपलब्धिप्रसङ्गश्च' (श्रीभा० पृ० ९३ प० २१) इति तन्मन्दम्। यो हि भयस्याक्षणिकतां स्वी करोति स ज्ञानस्याप्यक्षणिकतामेव स्वी कुर्यादिति ज्ञानसंतत्यभावेनानेकभयोपलब्धिप्रसङ्गस्य दूरनिरस्तत्वात्।

4.20. What has been said (Śrī.B.Para.65.p.140.):

If those fears etc. are not momentary, then the result would be the perception of multiple fears; because in the continuous stream of cognitions which are the cause of fear etc., all the cognitions without exception would be the cause for the origination of fear etc.

That is mediocre. Because the one who accepts that fear is not momentary should accept that Knowledge too is certainly not momentary. And so

because there is no continuous stream of Knowledge, therefore the consequence of the perception of multiple fears is far removed.

4.21. यश्च 'स्वप्रागभावव्यतिरिक्तवस्त्वन्तरपूर्वकमिति व्यर्थविशेषणोपादानेन प्रयोगकुशलता चाविष्कृता' (श्रीभा० पृ० ९४ प० २) इत्यनेन ग्रन्थेन परिहासः कृतः स त्वस्थाने । यद्यपि वस्तुपूर्वकमित्येवोक्तौ भाववाचिवस्तुशब्देनैव सिद्धौ 'स्वप्रागभावव्यतिरिक्त' 'अन्तर' एतच्छब्दवैयर्थ्यं तथापि श्रोतृबोधसौलभ्याय तथोक्तम् । वैशेषिकैरभावस्यापि सप्तपदार्थमध्ये गणनेन तस्यापि वस्तुत्वभ्रमसंभवात् । किं चैवं परपरिहासं जनयता प्रतिप्रयोगनवकप्रदर्शनवेलायां प्रथमेनानुमानेन सिद्धौ चतुर्थानुमानवैयर्थ्यं कथं नालोचितम् । 'अज्ञानं न ब्रह्माश्रयं' 'ब्रह्म नाज्ञानास्पदम्' इत्यत्र शब्दरचनावैलक्षण्यमेव न साध्यभेदः कश्चित् । एवं द्वितीयेन सिद्धौ पञ्चमस्य, तृतीयेन सिद्धौ षष्ठस्य, अष्टमेन सिद्धौ नवमस्य, चानुमानस्य वैयर्थ्यं सुधीभिरूह्यम् ॥

4.21. The ridicule made by this text (Śrī.B.Para.65.p.140.):

[Your] skill in syllogisms has been revealed by the mention of meaningless qualifications: "preceded by another entity which is different from the prior non-existence of knowledge"

is, however, out of place. Although these words: "different from the prior non-existence of knowledge" and "another" are meaningless when the statement is just: "preceded by an entity" which is established only by the word "entity" which signifies something positive, still, it is told in that manner for the facility of comprehension on the part of the listener. Since the Vaiśeṣikas count even non-existence among the seven categories, therefore there is the possibility of confusing even that as an entity.

Furthermore, how is it that [you], who are causing the ridicule of another in this manner, did not see at the time of showing the nine counter syllogisms that the fourth inference is meaningless since it is established by the first inference? There is only a difference in the arrangement of the words here: "Ignorance does not have Brahman as its

locus" and "Brahman is not the substrate of Ignorance". There is no difference at all concerning what is to be proved. It should be investigated in this manner by intelligent people: the fifth inference is meaningless since it is established by the second, the sixth is meaningless since it is established by the third and the ninth is meaningless since it is established by the eighth.

4.22.

यदापि 'मिथ्याभूतार्थस्य मिथ्यैवोपादानं भवितुमर्हतीत्येतदपि न विलक्षण-
त्वात् (ब्र० सू० २।१।४) इत्येतदधिकरणन्यायेन परिहियते' (श्रीभा० पृ०
९४ प० ६) इत्युक्तं तत्रोच्यते—

मिथ्यार्थप्रकृतिर्मिथ्या जगद्धि प्रातिभासिकम् ॥

भ्रमस्थले तु सर्वत्र सत्ख्यातेनैव संभवः ॥ २० ॥

4.22. Although it has been said (Śrī.B.Para.65.p.140.):

This [view of the Advaitin] too: "the material cause of a thing which is false ought to be indeed false", is refuted by the reasoning in this section [beginning with the sūtra]: "No, on account of the dissimilarity" (B.S.2.1.4.).

In regard to that, it is said:

The material cause of a false thing is false. The world is indeed of an apparent nature. In the case of error, there is certainly no possibility of the "apprehension of the real" anywhere.20.

4.23.

'मिथ्याभूतस्य जगत उपादानं मिथ्यैव भवितुं योग्यम्' । तदेव भावरूपाज्ञान-
नम् ? इति हि मायावादिनाशयः । यदि
जगदज्ञानमूलकम् 'कार्यकारणयोः सर्वथा वैलक्षण्येनैव भवितव्यम्'
इति तदधिकरणतात्पर्यं स्यात्किं मिथ्याभूतस्य
जगतस्तत्सलक्षणं मिथ्याभूतं भावरूपाज्ञानं न कारणं संभवतीत्यधिकरणविरोधः
स्यात् । किंतु किंचिद्वैलक्षण्येऽपि न कार्यकारणभावहानिरित्येव तदधिकरण-
तात्पर्यम् । तथा च कार्यकारणयोः सालक्षण्यं यावच्छक्यमुपपादनीयमेव ।

मिथ्याभूतार्थस्य मिथ्यैवोपादानं भवितुमर्हतीत्यर्हतिशब्दं प्रयुञ्जानैर्मायावादि-
भिरयमाशयः प्रकटीकृत एव । त्वयापि हि सूक्ष्मचिदचित्प्रकारकं ब्रह्म कारणं
स्थूलचिदचित्प्रकारकं ब्रह्मैव कार्यमिति वदता कार्यकारणयोः सालक्षण्यं
संपादितमेव ।

4.23. The intended meaning of the exponents of māyā is that: the material cause of the false world is capable only of being false. That [material cause] is indeed Ignorance which is a positive entity. If the purport of that section would be: "in every way there can only be dissimilarity between the cause and the effect", then the Ignorance which is a positive entity, and which is something false, cannot possibly be the cause of the false world as it has the same characteristic as that [world]. So there would be contradiction with that section.

But the purport of that section is only: "even though there is some dissimilarity there is no loss of a cause-effect relation". And so the possession of the common characteristics between the cause and the effect must certainly be demonstrated as far as possible. The exponents of māyā made this intention very clear by using the word "it ought": "the material cause of a thing which is false ought to be indeed false". Indeed, you too have certainly established the possession of common characteristics between the cause and the effect by saying: "Brahman is the cause, having the subtle sentient beings and insentient matter as its modes, and Brahman is indeed the effect, having the gross sentient beings and insentient matter as its modes".

4.24. यदपि 'प्रतीयमानमेव हि प्रतीतिभ्रान्तिबाधविषयः' (श्रीभा०पृ०९४प०१०) इत्युक्तं तन्मायावादिनामपि संमतमेव । न तदनिर्वचनीयजगदङ्गीकारे बाधकं भवति । अथ प्रतीयमानमेवेत्यस्य 'अन्यत्र सत्यत्वेन' इति शेषं पूरयित्वाऽन्यत्र सत्यत्वेन प्रतीयमानमेवान्यत्र प्रतीत्यादिविषयो भवतीत्यर्थः क्रियते तदा यद्यपि मायावादिनां मतेऽन्यत्र जगतः सत्यत्वेन प्रतीयमानत्वाभावादनिर्वचनीयत्वेनाभिमतस्य जगतः प्रतीत्यादिविषयत्वं न संभवति तथाप्येवमुच्यते— शुक्त्याद्यज्ञानं हि रजतसंस्कारसहकृतमनिर्वचनीयरजतं जनयति । तादृश-संस्कारोत्पत्तावन्यत्र सत्यत्वेन प्रतीतेरपेक्षा दृश्यते । शुक्त्याद्यज्ञानविषये

भवतु नामैवम् । मूलाज्ञानस्य तु ब्रह्मशक्तिरूपत्वेन ब्रह्मोपजीव्य प्रवृत्तत्वेन
नान्यस्य कस्याप्यपेक्षा । किंचानादौ संसारे जीवानामनादित्वेन संस्कारोऽपि
विद्यत एव ।

4.24. Although it has been said (Śrī.B.Para.65.p.141.):

For only what is perceived is an object of cognition,
error and sublation.

The exponents of māyā too certainly accept that. That is not a negating factor in the acceptance of the world as indeterminable. But having completed the remainder of this "only what is perceived" [with the words] "as real elsewhere", the meaning is constructed as: "only what is perceived as real elsewhere is the object of cognition etc. elsewhere [at another place]. Then even though the world, which has been accepted as indeterminable, cannot possibly be an object of cognition etc. since according to the view of the exponents of māyā the world is not perceived as real elsewhere, still, it is explained in this manner: the ignorance of the pearl-oyster etc. certainly produces the indeterminable silver, being assisted by the mental impression of silver. The requirement of a cognition being real elsewhere is seen in regard to the origination of such a mental impression. It must be so in the case of the ignorance of the pearl-oyster etc. But because the primary Ignorance is the power of Brahman there is no requirement of any other thing since it acts in dependence upon Brahman. Moreover, even a mental impression certainly exists since the individual souls are beginningless in the beginningless cycle of worldly existence.

comment

Abhyankar fills out Rāmānuja's rather enigmatic statement: "only what is perceived is an object of cognition, error and sublation" by adding the phrase: "as real elsewhere". The argument would then mean that the erroneous cognition of something, such as silver upon a pearl-oyster, is possible only if real silver has been previously experienced. Because of the prior experience of real silver there is the production of the mental impression

of silver and on account of the mental impression the pearl-oyster can be erroneously perceived as silver. But in the case of the world, this is not possible. For if the world is superimposed upon Brahman, like silver upon the pearl-oyster, the prior experience of a real world would be necessary in order to generate the mental impression of a world which could be superimposed upon Brahman. But according to the Advaitin, the prior experience of a real world is not possible.

The Advaitin agrees that a prior impression is required, but disputes that such an impression must be of something real. According to the Advaitin, even a false mental impression is sufficient: if a nightmare occurs after seeing a horror movie, the impression of the film is required even though the film is itself unreal.

4.25.

यदपि 'शुक्तिरजतादिभ्रान्तिस्थलेऽनिर्वचनीयरजतकल्पनेऽप्यन्यस्यान्यथाव-
भासस्यावर्जनीयत्वात्' इत्युक्तम् (श्रीभा० पृ० ९४ प० १६) तत्तुच्छम् ।
शुक्तिरजते हि रजतं प्रतीयते । ततः पश्चान्नेदं रजतमिति बाधोऽनुभूयते ।
बाधश्चायम् 'इदानीमिदं न रजतम्' इत्येवं किञ्चित्कालावच्छिन्नो नानुभूयते ।
किं तु प्रागर्षादं रजतं नासीदिति सामान्यत एव । तथा च बाधः प्राग्विद्यत
एव । केवलं पश्चादनुभूयते । एवं च तत्र रजतस्य पारमार्थिकं
व्यावहारिकं वा सत्त्वं क्षणमपि नास्तीति सत्त्वेनानिर्वचनीयत्वम् । एवं शशशृ-
ङ्गदसत्त्वेत्क्षणमपि न प्रतीयते । प्रतीयते च । अतोऽसत्त्वेनानिर्वचनीयत्वम् ।

अनिर्वचनीय-
रव्यातिः

ईदृशस्य च रजतादेः प्रातिभासिकं क्षणं सत्त्वम-
गत्या कल्पनीयम् । अन्यथाऽसता रजतरूपेण
शुक्तिः कथं भासेत । अन्यस्यान्यथावभासायो-
गात् । इदं च रजतं प्रातिभासिकेन रूपेण निर्व-

चनीयमेव ।

4.25. Although it has been said (Śrī.B.Para.65.p.141.)¹⁹:

because the appearance of one thing in another manner
cannot be avoided, even in the imagination of the
indeterminable silver in the case of the error of silver
on a pearl-oyster etc.

That is worthless. Because silver is recognized in the silver on the
pearl-oyster. Then subsequently the sublation is experienced: "this is not
silver". And this sublation is not experienced as limited by a certain
time in the manner: "this is not silver now". But [it is experienced]

only in a general way: "this silver did not exist even before". And so the sublation certainly exists before. Only it is experienced later. So the silver there [on the pearl-oyster] has no reality, even for an instant, whether pertaining to absolute reality or to ordinary relations and hence it is indeterminable as being real. So too, if it is non-existent like the horns of a rabbit it would not be recognized even for an instant. But it is recognized. Therefore it is indeterminable as being unreal. On account of no other recourse, the silver etc. of this kind must be supposed to have a momentary existence of an apparent nature. Otherwise how could the pearl-oyster appear in the form of non-existing silver? Because there is no possibility of the appearance of the one thing in another manner. And this silver is certainly determinable in the manner of having an apparent nature.

comment

Rāmānuja maintains that the appearance of one thing as something else has to be accepted. He says (Śrī.B.Para.65.p.141f.) that all the different explanations of erroneous cognition must admit that one thing appears in another manner: in asatkhyāti the non-existent appears as existent, in ātmakhyāti the "self" appears as something external, in akhyāti some thing, such as "silver", is apprehended as the attribute of something else, such as "this".

The Advaitin considers it is incorrect to hold that one thing appears in another manner, such as a pearl-oyster appearing as silver. Because the silver does not exist. Nor can it be said that there is the non-appearance of what exists. Because the cognition is only "this is silver", but at that time there is no cognition in the manner: "I do not have the cognition of the pearl-oyster".

4.26.

यद्यपीदं रजतं प्रतीतिवेलायां प्रातिभासिकमित्येवं न भासते तथापि न क्षतिः । विद्यमानेषु प्रकारेषु मध्ये केषांचिद्भानं सर्वेषामपि ख्यातिवादिना-मिष्टमेव । शुक्तिरजतप्रतीतौ शुक्त्यंशाभानस्य सर्वैः स्वीकृतत्वात् । न ह्ययमन्य-स्यान्यथावभासः । अविद्यमानेन रूपेणावभासो हि सः । न तु विद्यमानस्या-नवभासः । एतेन 'कल्प्यमानं हीदमनिर्वचनीयम् । न च तदानीमनिर्वचनी-यमिति प्रतीयते । अपि तु परमार्थरजतमित्येव' (श्रीभा० पृ० ९४ प० १८)

इति परास्तम् । अनिर्वचनीयत्वेनाभानेऽप्यन्यथावभासाभावात् । न च सत्य-
 रजतमित्यवभासादन्यथावभास इति वाच्यम् । सत्यत्वस्य शुक्तौ विद्यमान-
 त्वात् । न च रजतासंबद्धस्य शुक्तिगतसत्यत्वस्य रजतसंबद्धत्वेन भानाद-
 न्यथावभास इति वाच्यम् । शुक्तिगतस्यापि सत्यत्वस्य रजतसंबद्धत्वात् ।
 रजतं हि न केवलाविद्यापरिणामः । नापि केवलशुक्तेः । किं त्वविद्याद्वारा शुक्ते-
 रेवेति । शुक्तेश्च शुक्तित्वेनाज्ञानमेवाविद्या । इदंत्वेन तु शुक्तेर्ज्ञानं प्रत्युत प्राति-
 भासिकरजतोत्पत्तौ कारणमेव । एवं ज्ञातृनिष्ठरजतसंस्कारादीनि च यथायथं
 कारणानि बोध्यानि ।

4.26. Although this silver does not appear to have an apparent nature at the time of its cognition, still, there is no impairment. Among the modes which exist, the non-appearance of some [modes] is certainly accepted by all the exponents of "apprehension" (khyāti) without exception. Because in regard to the cognition of silver upon the pearl-oyster, everyone accepts the non-appearance of the portion which is the pearl-oyster. This is certainly not the appearance of one thing in another manner. Because that appearance is in a form which does not exist. Nor is it the non-appearance of what exists. On account of this, [the statement] (Śrī.B.Para.65.p.141.):

Indeed this [silver] which is assumed [by you] to be
 indeterminable is not recognized as "indeterminable"
 at that time but only as real silver

is refuted. Because even though [a thing] does not appear as indeterminable, it does not appear in another manner.

It should not be said; there is the appearance in another manner because of the appearance that the silver is real. [reason] Because the reality exists in the pearl-oyster. It should not be said; there is the appearance in another manner because the reality belonging to the pearl-oyster, which is unconnected to the silver, appears to be connected to the silver. [reason] Because the reality, though belonging to the pearl-oyster, has been connected to the silver. For the silver is not a transformation of Ignorance alone. Nor even of the pearl-oyster alone.

But only of the pearl-oyster by means of Ignorance. And the non-cognizance of the pearl-oyster as a pearl-oyster is indeed Ignorance. But the knowledge of the pearl-oyster as "this" is, rather, certainly the cause for the origination of the apparent silver. Thus the mental impression of silver belonging to the knower, and so forth, must be known respectively to be the causes.

4.27.

एवं प्रातिभासिकरजतोत्पत्तौ सिद्धायां ' तस्य जन्मकारणं वक्तव्यम् ' (श्रीभा० पृ० ९५ प० ८) इत्युपक्रम्य रजतप्रतीतिं रजतोत्पत्तिकारणत्वेन मायावादिभिः काप्यनुक्तामपि तत्कारणत्वेन प्रकल्प्य ' निर्विषया जाता तदुत्पाद्य तदेव विषयी करोतीति महतामिदमुपपादनम् ' (श्रीभा० पृ० ९५ प० १०) इत्येवं परिहसद्भिः स्वस्यैवात्मोपहासपात्रतां नीयते । एवं तदुत्तरमिन्द्रियाणां तद्गतदोषाणां दुष्टानामिन्द्रियाणां च प्रातिभासिकरजतोपादानकारणत्वेन प्रकल्पनं तत्खण्डनं च विफलमेव । मायावादिभिस्तथाऽनङ्गीकारात् । इन्द्रियगतदोषाणां निमित्तकारणत्वं त्विष्यते एव । उपपद्यते च तत् । इन्द्रियगतदोषाणामिन्द्रियकिरणादिवारा शुक्त्यादिविषयसंबन्धसंभवात् । एवं मायावाद्यनभिमतप्रनेकथा प्रकल्प्य विस्तारेण सोपपत्तिकं तत्खण्डनमभिमतविषये तु पङ्क्त्यैक्या तदर्धेन वा यत्किंचिदुत्तरप्रदानमित्येवमपूर्वोऽयं खण्डनप्रकारो दृश्यते ।

4.27. Thus when the origination of the apparent silver has been established, [Rāmānuja] commencing [with the statement] (Śrī.B.Para.65.p.142.): "the cause of the origination of that [silver] must be told", has assumed that the cognition of silver is the cause of that [origination of silver] -even though the exponents of māyā have not said anywhere that [the cognition of silver] is the cause of the origination of silver- and so he is led to be the receptacle of his own ridicule through jokes in this manner (Śrī.B.Para.65.p.142.):

[The cognition] originated without an object and
having produced that [object] makes that its object
-this is the reasoning of great people.

In the same way, the answer [given in the Śrībhāṣya] to that, which is

the supposition that the sense organs, their [inherent] defects, or defective sense organs are the material cause of the apparent silver and the refutation of that, are certainly worthless. Because the exponents of māyā do not accept [such a supposition] to be true.

But the defects belonging to the sense organs are certainly accepted as the efficient cause. And that is logically possible. Because the defects belonging to the sense organs have the possibility of being connected to the sense object, such as the pearl-oyster etc., by means of the visual rays etc. of the sense organs.

Thus [Rāmānuja], having supposed on many occasions what the exponents of māyā do not accept, there is an elaborate logical refutation of that, but in regard to what is accepted, some answer is given in one line or in a half of it. So this is a new mode of refutation which is seen.

4.28.

यदपि 'अपूर्वमनिर्वचनीयमिदं वस्तुजातं रजतादिवुद्धिशब्दाभ्यां कथमिव विषयी क्रियते न घटादिवुद्धिशब्दाभ्याम् । रजतादिसादृश्यादिति चेत्तर्हि तत्सदृशमित्येव प्रतीतिशब्दौ स्याताम्' (श्रीभा० पृ० ९५ प० १६) इत्युक्तं तदसंगतम् । यतोऽत्र सादृश्यज्ञानस्य नोपयोगः । किं तु वस्तुसत्सादृश्यं रजतसंस्कारमुद्बोधयति । उद्बुद्धश्च स संस्कारस्तां शुक्तयविद्यां रजतरूपेणैव परिणामयति न घटादिरूपेणेति । एतदग्रे 'रजतादिजातियोगादितिचेत्सा किं परमार्थभूतोतापरमार्थभूता वा' (श्रीभा० पृ० ९५ प० १९) इत्यादि कुतर्कजालं मायावेदान्तिभिर्नैव स्वीकृतमिति न तत्र किञ्चित्प्रत्युच्यते ।

4.28. Although it has been said (Śrī.B.Para.66.p.142.):

How does this new and indeterminable collection of things become an object through the idea and the word "silver" etc. and not through the idea and the word "pot" etc? [Advaitin]; Because of the similarity to the silver etc. [Viśiṣṭādvaitin]; Then the cognition and the word should be only: "similar to that".

That is incongruous. Because there is no application here for the knowledge of similarity. But the similarity existing in relation to the object awakens the mental impression of silver. And that awakened mental impression transforms that ignorance of the pearl-oyster only into the form of silver, not into the form of a pot etc. In the sequel to this, the māyā Vedāntins certainly do not accept the net of fallacious reasoning beginning (Śrī.B.Para.66.p.142.):

If [you say] that [the similarity] is because of the connection with the generic characteristics of silver etc., then is that [generic characteristic] real or unreal?

So nothing is said by way of reply there.

4.29.

या च रामानुजीयैः

‘यथार्थं सर्वविज्ञानमिति वेदविदां मतम्’ (श्रीभा० पृ० ९६ प० ४)
 इत्यादिग्रन्थेन सर्वत्र सत्ख्यातिः स्वीकृता तत्रेत्यं विचार्यते । ख्यातिः
 प्रतीतिः । सा च सर्वत्र सत एव न काप्यसत इति तदर्थः । तत्र सत इत्यस्य
 प्रातिभासिकरूपेणापि सत इत्यर्थे सत्ख्यातिरस्माकमिष्टैव । न तु तथा तैरङ्गी-
 क्रियते । यदि पारमार्थिकेनैव रूपेण सत इत्यर्थ-
 सत्ख्यात्यनुपपत्तिः स्तदा मरीचिकायां जलप्रतीतिर्न स्यात् । ननु
 त्रिवृत्करणेन पञ्चीकरणेन वा पृथिव्यां जलांशस्य
 सत्त्वमस्त्येवेति चेत्सत्यम् । त्रिवृत्कृते विशिष्टे पदार्थे जलत्वं नास्त्येव । तदीयैकदेशे
 जलांशे यद्यपि जलत्वं वर्तते तथापि न तज्ज्ञातुं शक्यते । त्रिवृत्करणं हि पृथग्विभा-
 गानर्हः संश्लेषः । त्रिवृत्करणात्प्राग्भूतानामतिसूक्ष्मतया प्रत्यक्षायोग्यत्वेन त्रिवृ-
 त्करणोत्तरमपि तत्रत्यकेवलजलप्रत्यक्षासंभवात् । किं चायं जलांशोऽतिसूक्ष्मोऽपि
 दूरतोऽपि च गृह्यते समीपस्थेन गृह्यते इति न युक्तिसहम् । ‘इन्द्रियदोषेण तेजः-
 पृथिव्योरग्रहणमदृष्टवशाच्चांशुन एव ग्रहणम्’ (श्रीभा० पृ० ९९ प० ८) इति
 तदुक्तिस्तु तन्मतश्रद्धालुभिरेवास्थेया

4.29. Rāmānuja has accepted in all places the "apprehension of the real" (satkhyāti) according to the text beginning (Śrī.B.Para.66.p.143.):

The view of those who know the Veda is that all knowledge is true.

In regard to that, it is being investigated in the following manner. The meaning of that [sentence: "R. has accepted in all places the 'apprehension of the real'..."] is: "apprehension" (khyāti) means cognition. And that [apprehension] is everywhere only of what is real, nowhere is it of the unreal. If the meaning of this: "of what is real" is: "of what is real, though in a form which is apparent", then we certainly accept the "apprehension of the real". But he [Rāmānuja] does not accept it in that manner. If the meaning is: "of what is real, in a form which is indeed absolutely real", then there could be no cognition of water in a mirage.

[objection] A portion of water certainly exists in the earth due to the threefold combination or due to the fivefold combination.²⁰

[reply] True, [but] the nature of water certainly does not exist in an object qualified according to the threefold combination. Although the nature of water exists in the portion of water belonging to a part of that [object], still, it is not able to be known. Because the threefold combination is a union which is incapable of separate division. Because the elements are not able to be perceived prior to the threefold combination as they are extremely subtle, therefore even after the threefold combination there is no possibility of the perception of only the water which belongs there [in that combination].

Furthermore, it does not stand to reason that this portion of water, though extremely subtle and though far away, is apprehended, while it is not apprehended by those who are nearby. But only those who have faith in that view could accept the statement about that (Śrī.B.Para.67.p.147.)²¹:

there is no apprehension of fire and earth on account of the defect of the sense organ and because of some unseen factor there is apprehension only of the water.

4.30.

। किं च समीपगतस्य 'नेदं जलम्' इति प्रती-
तिर्जायते । तत्र च सत एव जलस्यासत्त्वेन प्रतीतिरित्यन्यथावभासोऽवर्जनीय
एव । एतेन 'शुक्तौ त्रिवृत्करणेन तेजोशस्य सत्त्वात्तस्य रजतरूपेण प्रतीतिः'
इति निरस्तम् । किं च स तेजोशो रजतरूपेणैव कुतो ज्ञायते ।
विद्युत्सूर्यादिरूपेणापि तस्य भानं स्यात् । मिश्रणात्प्राक् तेजोशस्य विद्युत्सूर्या-
दिसर्वसाधारणत्वात् । न च त्रिवृत्कृतस्य तेजसो रजतरूपेण परिणतस्य केचि-
दंशाः शुक्तौ मिश्रिता भासन्त इति वाच्यम् । तत्र तेषां सत्त्वे प्रमाणाभावात् ।
न च रजतप्रतीतिरेव प्रमाणमिति वाच्यम् । तस्याः प्रतीतेः सत्ख्यातित्वसिद्धौ
हि शुक्तौ रजतांशसत्त्वं सिध्यति । रजतांशसत्त्वसिद्धौ हि तस्याः प्रतीतेः सत्ख्या-
तित्वं सिध्यतीत्यन्योन्याश्रयात् । न च शुक्तौ रजतसादृश्यानुभवाद् रजतांशसत्त्व-
कल्पनमिति वाच्यम् । शुक्तौ रजतगुणसदृशचाकचक्यादिगुणवत्त्वेन सादृश्यो-
पपत्तेः । न हि सदृशे वस्तुनि सदृशवस्त्वंशा विद्यन्त एवेति नियतिकृतनियमोऽ-
स्ति ।

4.30. Furthermore, for the one who has gone near, the cognition arises:
"this is not water". And in regard to that, there is the cognition of the
water which [Rāmānuja considers] is indeed real, as unreal and so the
appearance in another manner certainly cannot be avoided.²² On account of
this, [the statement]²³: "because a portion of fire exists in the pearl-
oyster due to the threefold combination, there is the cognition of that
[fire] in the form of silver" is refuted.

Furthermore, why is that portion of fire known only in the form
of silver? It could also appear in the form of lightning, the sun etc.
Because prior to combining, the portion of fire is common to everything:
lightning, the sun etc. It should not be said: some portions of fire which
have undergone the threefold combination and have transformed into the
form of silver appear as combined in the pearl-oyster. [reason] Because
there is no means of proof for their existence there [in the pearl-oyster].
It should not be said: the cognition of silver is itself the means of proof.
[reason] Because there is mutual dependence: for when that cognition is
established as having the nature of the "apprehension of the real" the
existence of the portion of silver in the pearl-oyster is established, and

when there is the establishment of the existence of the portion of silver, that cognition is established as having the nature of the "apprehension of the real". It should not be said: there is the assumption that a portion of silver exists in the pearl-oyster because of the experience of the similarity to silver. [reason] Because there is the logical possibility of similarity in regard to the pearl-oyster since it possesses the quality of lustre etc. which is similar to the quality of silver. There is certainly no rule brought about by the restriction: portions of a similar thing indeed exist in the similar object.

4.31. किं च देवदत्तीयवस्त्रालंकारादिसदृशे चैत्रीयवस्त्रालंकारादौ देवदत्तस्य स्वकीयत्वभ्रमो भवति । तत्र देवदत्तीयवस्त्राद्यवयवानां चैत्रीयवस्त्रादिषु नैव प्रवेश इति तत्र कथं सत्ख्यातिः । देवदत्तीयवस्त्रादिषु विनष्टेष्वपि विनाशमजानतो देवदत्तस्य परकीयवस्त्रादिषु दृष्टेषु स्वकीयत्वभ्रमो दृश्यते । अत्यन्तसदृशयोर्द्वयोः कार्षापणयोरप्येकस्यावयवा अन्यावयवसदृशा न तु त एवेत्यावालवृद्धं प्रत्ययः प्रसिद्धः । सोमाभावे च पूतीकग्रहणं श्रुतिचोदितं सोमनिष्ठगुणसदृशगुणवत्त्वान्न तु सोमावयवसद्भावात् । व्रीह्यभावे नीवारग्रहणमप्येवमेव । किंच दुग्धसदृशे गङ्गाजले दुग्धावयवसत्त्वे कस्मिंश्चिद्द्रवते दुग्धत्यागे गङ्गाजलमपि त्याज्यं स्यात् । शुद्धमप्यन्नं रूपतो मांससदृशं चेत्तदवयवसत्त्वात्त्याज्यं स्यात् । अमृतसदृशमद्यप्राशनद्वैत्यानाममरत्वापत्तिश्चेति बहुव्याकुली स्यात् ।

4.31. Furthermore, Devadatta has a confusion of ownership with regard to the clothes and ornaments etc. belonging to Caitra, which are similar to the clothes and ornaments etc. belonging to Devadatta. In that matter, there is certainly no penetration of the parts of the clothes etc. belonging to Devadatta in the clothes etc. belonging to Caitra. So how can there be the "apprehension of the real" in that instance? Even when the clothes etc. belonging to Devadatta have been destroyed, Devadatta, not knowing about their destruction, is seen to have confusion of ownership when the clothes etc. belonging to another are seen. The knowledge is well known from a boy to an old man that even between two exceedingly similar

kārṣāpaṇa coins the parts of one are similar to the parts of the other but they are not those very [parts]. And the taking of the Pūtīka ²⁴ plant when there is no Soma is enjoined by the sacred texts because it possesses qualities similar to the qualities existing in the Soma, but not because of the actual existence of parts of the Soma. The taking of wild rice when there is no cultivated rice is also due to the same reason. ²⁵

Moreover, if in the water of the Gaṅgā, which is similar to milk, portions of milk exist, then when milk is given up in some vow even the water of the Gaṅgā must be given up. If even pure food is similar to meat in form then it must be given up because parts of that [meat] exist in it. And the demons would be deathless on account of feeding upon spirituous liquor which is similar to the nectar of immortality. Thus there would be much confusion.

4.32.

यदपि ' स्वप्ने च प्राणिनां पुण्यपापानुगुणा भगवतैव तत्तत्पुरुषमात्रानुभाव्यास्तत्तत्कालावसानास्तथाभूताश्चार्थाः सृज्यन्ते ' (श्रीभा० पृ० ९७ प० १२) इत्यादिग्रन्थेन स्वप्ने सत्ख्यातिसिद्धये तत्रत्या रथादयः पदार्थाः परमेश्वरेण सृष्टाः परमार्थसत्या एवेत्युक्तं तच्चिन्त्यम् ।
स्वप्नेऽर्थाः प्रातिभासिकाः यतो जगति सर्वस्यार्थजातस्यादृष्टं साधारणकारणम् । तथा च न तादृशः कश्चन पदार्थो यस्मात्सकाशात्कस्यापि प्राणिनः सुखं दुःखं वा नोत्पन्नम् । देवदत्तीयस्वप्ने परमेश्वरेण ये पदार्थाः सृष्टास्तन्मध्ये यस्माद्देवदत्तस्य सुखं दुःखं वा नोत्पन्नं स पदार्थः परमेश्वरेण कस्यादृष्टेनोत्पादितः । अनुभूयन्ते चोदासीना बहवः पदार्थाः स्वप्ने ।
तथा च

प्रयोजनमनुद्दिश्य न मन्दोऽपि प्रवर्तते ।

इति न्यायान्नैव ते पदार्थाः परमेश्वरेण सृष्टाः किंतु जीवेन कल्पिताः ।
कल्पना चेयं स्मृतिविशेषरूपा ।

4.32. For the establishment of the "apprehension of the real" in dream, what has been said by the text beginning (Śrī.B.Para.66.p.145.):

in dream, the Lord himself creates, in accordance with the merit or demerit of living beings, corresponding objects capable of being experienced only by the respective

person and lasting for various periods of time

is that the objects such as chariots etc. existing there [in dream] are created by the supreme Lord and are certainly real. That is questionable. Because fate is the common cause for all things in the world. And so there is no such object whatsoever from which happiness or sadness is not produced for some living being. Among those objects which the Lord created in Devadatta's dream from which happiness or sadness was not produced for Devadatta, by whose fate did the Lord produce that object? And many objects of an indifferent nature are experienced in dream. And so according to the maxim: "even a fool does not engage [in an action] without aiming at a result"²⁶, those objects are certainly not created by the supreme Lord but rather they are superimposed by the individual soul. And this superimposition is a particular type of memory.

4.33.

मायामात्रं तु (ब्र० सू० ३ । २ । ३) इति सूत्रे स्वप्नस्थपदार्थानां मायामात्रत्वं सूत्रकारैः कण्ठरवेणोक्तम् । मायाशब्दो ह्यनिर्वचनीयवाचीति प्रसिद्धमेव । अनिर्वचनीयत्वं च तत्तत्पुरुषमात्रानुभाव्यत्वे साति तत्तत्कालावसानत्वमेव । स्वप्नस्थपदार्थानां तत्तत्पुरुषमात्रानुभाव्यत्वं तत्तत्कालावसानत्वं च स्वीकृतवद्भिरपि रामानुजीयैः ' मायाशब्दस्यानिर्वचनीयवाचित्वं न दृष्टम् (श्रीभा० पृ० ६०२प० २) इत्युच्यते इति कोऽयमनिर्वचनीयशब्दे द्वेषः । ' मायामात्रमाश्चर्यकारकत्वम्, जीवस्य कात्स्न्येनानभिव्यक्तस्वरूपत्वात्तस्याश्चर्यकारकसृष्टिकर्तृत्वासंभवात्परमेश्वरकर्तृत्वैव स्वप्नसृष्टिः ' इत्यर्थे तु सूत्राक्षरास्वारस्यम् । यतो ' मायामात्रं तु ' इत्युच्यते न तु ' ईश्वरकृतिस्तु ' इत्युच्यते । किं चानभिव्यक्तस्वरूपत्वं कस्येत्याकाङ्क्षायां यस्य मायामात्रत्वं तस्येति प्रत्यासत्त्या लभ्यते एव । तत्परित्यज्य जीवानामित्यध्याहृत्य जीवानां कात्स्न्येनानभिव्यक्तस्वरूपत्वादित्यर्थकरणं सूत्रकृतोऽनभिमतमिति स्पष्टमेव । शुक्तिरजतादयोऽपि स्वप्नस्थपदार्थवत्तत्तत्पुरुषमात्रानुभाव्यास्तत्तत्कालावसानाश्चेति मायिका एव ।

4.33. The author of the sūtras has loudly expressed that the objects belonging to dream are merely māyā, in the sūtra: "But mere māyā..." (B.S. 3.2.3.).²⁷ It is well known that the word "māyā" signifies what is indeterminable. And the nature of being indeterminable means just lasting

for various periods of time when [an object] is capable of being experienced only by each respective person. Even though Rāmānuja has accepted that the objects belonging to dream are capable of being experienced only by the respective person and last for various periods of time, he has said (Śrī.B.Para.68.p.151.): "the word māyā is not seen to signify what is indeterminable". So what is this dislike toward the word "indeterminable"? But there is no suitability with the words of the sūtra ["But mere māyā..."] in the meaning (Śrī.B.Para.395.p.801f.)²⁸: " 'mere māyā' (māyāmātram) means producing a wonder. Because the individual soul 'has a nature which is not entirely manifest' (kārtsnyenānabhivvyaktasvarūpatvāt) [in the state of worldly existence] and therefore that [soul] has no possibility of being the agent of the creation producing a wonder. The creation in dream has the supreme Lord alone as its creator". [reason] Because it is said: "But mere māyā". But it is not said: "But the creation of the Lord".

Furthermore, in the expectation: "what has an unmanifest nature?", [the answer] is only gained through the contiguity: what is merely māyā [i.e. the state of dream, which is the topic], that [has an unmanifest nature]. Having given up that, and having supplied the ellipsis "of the individual souls", the construction of the meaning as: "because the individual souls have a nature which is not entirely manifest" is very clearly not accepted by the author of the sūtras. Even the silver upon a pearl-oyster etc. are capable of being experienced only by the respective person and last for various periods of time, just like the objects belonging to dream, and hence they are certainly unreal.

4.34.

किं च स्वप्नस्थपदार्थास्तत्तत्पुरु-
षमात्रानुभाव्यांस्तत्तत्कालावसानांश्च सृजतोऽचिन्त्यशक्तेः परमात्मनः शक्तिः
शुक्तिरजतादिसृष्टौ न कथंचिदपि प्रतिबद्धा भवेदिति स्वप्नस्थपदार्थवच्छुक्तिर-
जतादीनां परमार्थसत्यत्वं रामानुजीयैः कुतो न स्वी क्रियते । स्वप्नस्थपदार्थानां
जीवकल्पितत्वे ' स हि कर्ता ' (वृ० ४ । ३ । १०), ' य एष सुप्तेषु ' (का० २

३।८) इतिश्रुतिविरोधस्तु न । जीवानां परमात्मनः सकाशाद्भेदाभावात् । स्वप्नस्थपदार्थानां शुक्तिरजतादीनां च जीवकल्पितत्वेऽपि परमात्मनः सर्वत्र साधारणकारणत्वेन तत्रापि कारणत्वावश्यंभावाच्च ।

4.34. Furthermore, the power of the supreme Self, whose inconceivable power creates the objects belonging to dream which are capable of being experienced only by the respective person and which last for various periods of time, can in no way be restricted in regard to the creation of silver upon a pearl-oyster etc. So why does Rāmānuja not accept that the silver upon a pearl-oyster etc. are absolutely real like the objects belonging to dream? But there is no contradiction with the sacred texts: "For he is the agent" (Brh.4.3.10.), "The one who [is awake] in those who are asleep" (Kaṭha.2.5.8.) if the objects belonging to dream are superimposed by the individual soul. Because the individual souls are not different from the supreme Self. Although the objects belonging to dream and the silver upon a pearl-oyster etc. are superimposed by the individual soul, because the supreme Self is the common cause everywhere, therefore he must necessarily be the cause there as well.

4.35.

जपाकुसुमसमीपवर्तिस्फटिकस्थले रक्तः स्फटिक इति प्रतीतौ न रक्तिमा
मायिकः कल्प्यते । तस्य जपाकुसुमे सत्त्वात् ।
प्रातिभासिकस्योदाहरणान्त- आरोप्यासंनिकर्षस्थल एव प्रातिभासिकवस्तु-
राणि त्पत्त्यङ्गीकारात् । किं तु तस्य रक्तिन्नः स्फटिक-
समवायो मायिक इत्यनिर्वचनीयख्यातिरेव । एवं
पीतः शङ्ख इति प्रतीतौ पित्तद्रव्यगतपीतिन्नः सत्त्वे बोध्यम् । तदनङ्गीकारे तु
पीतिमापि मायिकः कल्प्यते । रामानुजीयानां मते तु स्फटिकासमवेतस्य रक्तिन्नः
शङ्खासमवेतस्य पीतिन्नश्च तत्समवेतत्वेन भानादन्यथाख्यातिरपरिहार्या स्यात् ।

4.35. In the case of a crystal in proximity to a red flower, the redness occurring in the cognition: "the crystal is red" is not assumed to be unreal. Because that [redness] exists in the red flower. For the origination of a thing having an apparent nature is only accepted in the case where there is no proximity to what is to be superimposed. [refutation] But that redness is unreal as having inherence in the crystal and so there is only

"the apprehension of the indeterminable".

It should be understood in the same manner in the cognition: "the conch-shell is yellow" if the yellow colour belonging to the substance bile exists. But if that is not accepted, even the yellow colour is assumed to be unreal. But according to the view of Rāmānuja, "the apprehension in another manner" cannot be avoided because the redness which is not inherently connected to the crystal and the yellow colour which is not inherently connected to the conch-shell appear to be inherently connected to them.

comment

For Rāmānuja's explanation of perceptual error, see 2.41. and comment.

4.36.

यदप्यलातचक्रप्रतीतौ सत्ख्यातिसिद्धये 'अन्तरालाग्रहणाच्चक्रप्रतीतिरुपपद्यते'
(श्रीभा० पृ० ९९ प० १०) इत्युक्तं तत्रेत्यं विवेचनीयम् । वास्तविके चक्रेऽ-
न्तरालाभावादन्तरालाग्रहणम् । अलातचक्रेऽन्तरालसत्त्वेऽपि शैद्यत्तदग्रहणं
वर्तते इति सत्यम् । परं तु किमन्तरालाग्रहणमेव चक्रप्रतीतिरुत्तान्तरालाग्रहणादन्या
चक्रप्रतीतिः । नाद्यः । अन्तरालाग्रहणं ह्यन्तरालप्रतीत्यभावः । स च चक्रप्रतीतिरूपः
कथं भवेत् । न हि घटप्रतीत्यभाव एव पटप्रतीतिः । अत एव भारापगमे सुखी
संवृत्तोऽहमित्यत्र दुःखाभावे सुखमुपचर्यते इत्युच्यतेऽभियुक्तैः । किं च चतुष्कोणेऽ-
न्तरालप्रतीत्यभावेऽपि न चक्रप्रतीतिः । द्वितीये त्वलातचक्रे चक्रस्य वस्तुतोऽ-
भावादनिर्वचनीयचक्रोत्पत्तिरभ्युपेया स्यात् । दर्पणे मुखप्रतीतौ सत्यस्यैव
स्वमुखस्य प्रतीताद्यपि तस्य दर्पणासंबद्धस्य तत्संबद्धत्वेन प्रतीतिसिद्धये संबन्ध-
स्यानिर्वचनीयस्योत्पत्तिरभ्युपेयैव ।

4.36. Although it has been said (Śrī.B.Para.67.p.147.)²⁹ for the establishment of "the apprehension of the real" in the cognition of a fire-brand circle:

the cognition of a circle is logically possible

because there is no apprehension of the intervals.

In regard to that, it should be investigated in the following manner. It is true that there is no apprehension of intervals in a circle which actually exists because the intervals do not exist and though the intervals

do exist in a fire-brand circle they are not apprehended because of the rapidity of movement. But is the cognition of a circle just the non-apprehension of the intervals, or is the cognition of a circle something other than the non-apprehension of the intervals? Not the first. Because the non-apprehension of the intervals is the absence of the cognition of intervals and how could that [absence of the cognition of intervals] be in the form of the cognition of a circle? For the cognition of a cloth is not just the absence of the cognition of a pot. For this very reason, the learned people say that the happiness in the absence of sorrow here is figurative: "I have become happy upon the removal of my burden". Moreover, there is no cognition of a circle in a square even though there is the absence of the cognition of intervals. But in the second case, the origination of an indeterminable circle has to be accepted because the circle in the fire-brand circle does not in reality exist.

In regard to the cognition of a face in a mirror, even though one's own face in the cognition is certainly real, because that [face] which is unconnected to the mirror has become connected to it, the origination of an indeterminable connection must indeed be accepted to establish the cognition.

4.37.

दिङ्मोहेऽप्येवम् । तथा हि—दिग्भेदानां पूर्वादीनां सर्वत्र सापेक्षैव नियमेन प्रतीतिरमुकापेक्षया पूर्वं इति । अत एव प्राङ्मुखोऽन्नानि भुञ्जीतेत्यादिव्यवस्था सिध्यति । अन्यथा दिग्भेदानां सर्वेषां सर्वत्र सत्त्वेन तदसंगतिः स्यात् । तथा च यदपेक्षया या पूर्वा तस्यास्तदपेक्षयैवोत्तरात्वज्ञाने पूर्वस्यामुत्तरात्वस्य सत्त्वेऽपि तदपेक्षोत्तरात्वस्याभावेन तदपूर्वमनिर्वचनीयं कल्पनीयमेव । एतेन 'दिगन्तर-प्रतीतिर्यथार्थैव' (श्रीभा० पृ० ९९ प० १७) इति परास्तम् ।

4.37. It is the same in the case of the confusion about direction also. To explain. The cognition of the different directions such as east etc. certainly has, as a rule, dependence everywhere, i.e. the east is with regard to a certain thing. For this very reason, the rule is established:

"one should eat food while facing the east". Otherwise, because all the different directions exist everywhere, there would be incongruity of that [rule]. And so what is east is with regard to which [e.g. person A], for that [east], when there is the knowledge of it being north with regard to that very [person A] -even though the nature of north exists in the east [with regard to another person]- because there is the absence of being north with regard to that [person A], the new occurrence can only be conjectured as indeterminable. On account of this, [the statement] (Śrī. B.Para.67.p.148.): "the cognition of another direction is certainly true" is refuted.³⁰

4.38.

यत्तु ' द्विचन्द्रज्ञानादावप्यङ्गुल्यवष्टम्भतिमिरादिभिर्नायनतेजोगतिभेदेन सामग्रीभेदात्सामग्रीद्वयमन्योन्यनिरपेक्षं चन्द्रग्रहणद्वयहेतुर्भवति । तत्रैका सामग्री स्वदेशविशिष्टं चन्द्रं गृह्णाति । द्वितीया तु किञ्चिद्वक्रगतिश्चन्द्रसमीपदेशग्रहणपूर्वकं चन्द्रं स्वदेशवियुक्तं गृह्णाति । अतः सामग्रीद्वयेन युगपद्देशद्वयविंशिष्टचन्द्रग्रहणे सति ग्रहणभेदेन ग्राह्याकारभेदादेकत्वग्रहणाभावाच्च द्वौ चन्द्राविति भवति प्रतीतिविशेषः । देशान्तरस्य तद्विशेषणत्वं देशान्तरस्य चागृहीतस्वदेशचन्द्रस्य च निरन्तरग्रहणेन भवति ' (श्रीभा०पृ०९९प०१९) इत्युक्तं

4.38. But what has been said (Śrī.B.Para.67.p.148.):

Even in the case of the knowledge of a double moon etc., two sets of means which are mutually independent are the cause for the double apprehension of the moon: because there is the difference of the sets of means due to the difference of the movement of the light of the eye by pressing with the finger, or through cataract etc. One set of means apprehends the moon qualified by its own location. Whereas the second, moving somewhat at a tangent, apprehends the moon separated from its own location after apprehending a location near to the moon. Therefore, due to the two sets of means, when there is the apprehension of the moon qualified by the two locations simultaneously there is the particular [cont. next page]

cognition; "two moons" because there is a difference of the form to be apprehended due to the difference in apprehending and because there is no apprehension of unity. The other location being an attribute of that [moon] is due to the uninterrupted apprehension of the other location and of the moon which is not apprehended in its own location.

4.39.

तदनुभवविरुद्धम् । यथा गृहे

भित्त्यादौ नागदन्ते स्थितं वस्त्रमङ्गुल्यवष्टब्धनेत्रेण दृष्टं चेन्न केवलं तद्वस्त्रं द्वितीयं दृश्यते तदधिकरणीभूतो नागदन्तोऽपि द्वितीयो दृश्यते । तदाश्रया भित्तिः, तद्गृहं, तदाश्रयीभूता भूमिश्च द्वितीया दृश्यते । एवं साभ्रं सनक्षत्रमाकाशमित्येवं सर्वे जगद्द्वितीयं दृश्यत इति ह्यनुभवः । तथा च 'द्वितीया तु किञ्चिद्वक्रगतिश्चन्द्रसमीपदेशग्रहणपूर्वकं चन्द्रं स्वदेशवियुक्तं गृह्णाति' इति न संभवति । चन्द्रसमीपदेशग्रहणमेव द्वितीयसामग्र्या न भवति, दूर एव स्वदेशवियुक्तचन्द्रग्रहणम् । एवं 'देशान्तरस्य चन्द्रविशेषणत्वमगृहीतस्वदेशचन्द्रस्य देशान्तरस्य निरन्तरग्रहणेन भवति' इत्यपि न संभवति । वास्तविकश्चन्द्रस्तदधिकरणीभूतो देशस्तत्समीपो देशश्चेत्येतन्मध्य एकस्यापि द्वितीयसामग्र्या ग्रहणाभावात् । अतो द्वितीयसामग्र्या गृह्यमाणं सर्वं जगदनिर्वचनीयमेवेत्यकामेनापि स्वीकार्यमेव । एवं च यच्छ्रीशंकराचार्यचरणैर्बौद्धमतखण्डने 'सर्वथानुपपत्तेश्च' (ब्र० सू० २ । २ । ३२) इति सूत्रे 'यथायथायं वैनाशिकसमय उपपत्तिमत्त्वाय परीक्ष्यते तथातथा सिकताकूपवद्विदीर्यत एव, न काञ्चिदप्यत्रोपपत्तिं पश्यामः' इत्युक्तं तदेवात्र रामानुजमतविचारे स्मृतिपथमारोहति ।

4.39. That is contrary to experience. For example if a cloth placed upon a peg on the wall etc. in a house is seen with an eye pressed by a finger, not only is that cloth seen as double but even the peg which is its locus is seen as double. The wall which is the locus of that [peg], that house and the earth which is the locus of that [house] are seen as double. Thus there is indeed the experience that the whole world; the space along with the clouds and constellations, is seen to be double. And so [the statement supra.]: "Whereas the second, moving somewhat at a tangent, apprehends the moon separated from its own location after apprehending a location near to

the moon" is not possible. There is certainly no apprehension of a location near to the moon by the second set of means, so the apprehension of the moon separated from its own location is certainly far off the mark. So too, [the statement supra.]: "The other location being an attribute of the moon is due to the uninterrupted apprehension of the moon which is not apprehended in its own location and [the uninterrupted apprehension] of the other location" is also not possible. Because even one among these: the actually existing moon, the location which is its locus and the location near to that [moon], is not apprehended by the second set of means. Therefore the whole world which is apprehended by the second set of means must certainly be accepted, even by someone not desirous of doing so, as indeed indeterminable.

Hence what the venerable Śrī Śaṅkarācārya has said in respect of the sūtra: "And because of the logical impossibility in every way" (B.S. 2.2.32.) while refuting the views of the followers of the Buddha:

the more this doctrine of the Buddhists is examined for its possession of logical tenability, the more it indeed breaks down like a well in sandy soil. We do not see any logical tenability at all here.³¹

That certainly strikes the memory upon the examination of Rāmānuja's view here.

4.40.

तदेवमनिर्वचनीयं

वाध्यं तदितरद्वाधकामिति वाध्यवाधकभावस्य सामञ्जस्येनोपपत्तिर्भवति । एतेन ' वाध्यवाधकभावः सर्वानुभवविषयतया तद्रहिततया चोपपद्यते ' (श्रीभा० पृ० १०१ प० ६) इत्येवं यथाकथंचिद्वाध्यवाधकभावोपपत्तिकल्पनमपास्तम् । किंचाज्ञानां शिष्याणां बहूनामप्यनुभवविषयीभूतोऽर्थो दोषज्ञस्य गुरोरेकस्याप्यनुभवविषयीभूतेनार्थेन वाध्यत इति प्रसिद्धं लोके । एवं चानिर्वचनीयत्वरूपं मिथ्यात्वमेव वाध्यत्वे प्रयोजकं भवति । जगति दृश्यमानं च सर्वमेतदनिर्वचनीयमेव । अनिर्वचनीयाज्ञानमूलकत्वात् ॥ २० ॥

4.40. Thus there is the logical possibility of the relation of negated

and negating since it is correct that: what is indeterminable is to be negated and what is other than that is the negating factor. On account of this, the supposition somehow or other of the logical possibility of the relation of negated and negating (Śrī.B.Para.68.p.150.):

The relation of negated and negating is logically possible on account of being an object of the experience of everyone and on account of being devoid of that

is set aside. Moreover, it is well known in the world that a thing which is the object of the experience of even many ignorant students is negated by something which is the object of the experience of even a single teacher who knows about the defect. Thus falsity, in the manner of being indeterminable, is alone the criterion for what is to be negated. And all this which is seen in the world is certainly indeterminable. Because its basis is indeterminable Ignorance.

4.41.

श्रुत्यादिकमविद्यायां प्रमाणं स्याद्यथायथम् ।
सत्याधिष्ठानधीस्तत्र स्यादविद्यानिवर्तिका ॥ २१ ॥

4.41. The sacred texts etc. would, accordingly, be the means of knowledge about Ignorance. There [in regard to Ignorance], the knowledge of the real substratum would remove Ignorance.21.

4.42.

मूलभूतमज्ञानं च 'एतं ब्रह्मलोकं न विन्दन्त्यनृतेन हि प्रत्यूढाः'(छा०८।३ ।
२) इत्यादिश्रुतिसिद्धम् । अनृतशब्देनानिर्वचनीयमज्ञानमुच्यते । यत्तु ' ऋत-
मिति कर्मवाचि । ऋतं पिबन्तौ (का० २ । १)
भावरूपाज्ञाने प्रमाणम् इति वचनात् । ऋतं कर्म फलाभिसंधिरहितं
परमपुरुषाराधनवेषं तत्प्राप्तिफलम् । अत्र तद्व्य-
तिरिक्तं सांसारिकफलं कर्मानृतं ब्रह्मप्राप्तिविरोधि । एतं ब्रह्मलोकं न विन्दन्त्य-
नृतेन हि प्रत्यूढा इति वचनात् ' (श्रीभा० पृ० १०१ प० ११) इत्युक्तं

तन्न । ऋतशब्दस्य सत्यवाचितया प्रसिद्धत्वात् । अमरसिंहोऽपि ' सत्यं तथ्य-
मृतम् ' (अमरको० १ । ६ । २२) इत्याह । तथा चानृतमसत्यम् । तच्च
ब्रह्मलोकाज्ञाने कारणं भावरूपमेतदज्ञानमेव । अनृतेन प्रत्यूढा इति वेदनाभावे
हेतुगर्भं विशेषणम् । अज्ञानं चैतन्न ज्ञानाभावरूपम् । किं तु ज्ञानाभावापेक्ष-
याऽतिरिक्तं भावरूपम् । इतरथा कार्यकारणयोरैक्येन वेदनाभावहेतुत्वेनानृतो-
क्तिरसंगता स्यात् ।

4.42. The Ignorance which is the basis [of the indeterminable world] is established by sacred texts such as: "they do not find this world which is Brahman, for they are enveloped by the untrue" (Ch.8.3.2.) etc. Indeterminable Ignorance is spoken of by the word "untrue" (anṛta). But what has been said (Śrī.B.Para.68.p.150.):

Rta signifies [virtuous] actions. For there is the statement: "both drinking the rta" (Kaṭha.1.3.1.).

Rta is action which is free from attachment to the result, which has as its apparel the worship of the highest Person and has the attainment of Him as its result. Here [in the passage "enveloped by the untrue"], anṛta is action which is different from that [rta], which has the cycle of worldly existence as its result and which is contrary to the attainment of Brahman. For there is the statement: "they do not find this world which is Brahman, for they are enveloped by the untrue".³²

That is not so. Because the word "rta" is well known as signifying what is true. Amarasimha, too, says: "true (satyam), real (tathyam), rtam" (Amara.1.6.22.). And so anṛta means untrue. And that [anṛta] is indeed this Ignorance which is a positive entity and the cause of the ignorance of the world which is Brahman [i.e. the Self]. The distinction containing the reason for the absence of knowing is: "enveloped by the untrue". And this Ignorance is not [just] the absence of knowledge. But it is a positive entity which is different with regard to the absence of knowledge.

Otherwise, the mention of anṛta as the cause for the absence of knowing would be incongruous since there is oneness of cause and effect.

comment

Rāmānuja does not accept ignorance to be something positive, but he considers it to be the mere absence of knowledge (ahaṃ jñānābhāvavān). Abhyankar states that if Ignorance is not admitted to be something positive in nature then the word "anṛta" could not be specified as the reason for the absence of knowledge: "they do not find..., for they are enveloped by the untrue (anṛta)". Because if anṛta is itself just the absence of knowledge then there is no distinction between the cause -which is the absence of knowledge- and the effect which is also the absence of knowledge. It would be equivalent to saying that the effect is the cause of the effect.

4.43.

ऋतं पिवन्तावित्यत्रापि न ऋतशब्दस्य कर्मवाचित्वम् । ऋतं पिवन्तो कर्मफलमुपभुञ्जानावित्यर्थः । तत्र ऋतशब्दस्य कर्मवाचित्वेऽपि कर्मफलार्थे लक्षणापत्तेः । सत्यवाचिकृतशब्दस्य तु कर्मफलरूपेऽर्थे प्रवृत्तिः सूपपादा । ' नाभुक्तं क्षीयते कर्म ' इत्युक्तरित्या कर्मफलस्यावश्यकत्वेनावश्यं भाविरूपसत्यत्वस्य कर्मफले सत्त्वात् । किंच त्वन्मते ऋतशब्दो विशेषकर्मवाची सामान्यकर्मवाची वा । नाद्यः । ऋतामिति कर्मवाचीति सामान्यतस्त्वदुक्तिविरोधात् । किंच कर्मविशेषग्रहणे फलाभिसंधिपूर्वकं गृह्यते तदपूर्वकं वा । आद्येऽनृतशब्देन फलाभिसंधिसहितं सांसारिकफलं कर्म गृह्यत इति त्वदीयसिद्धान्तासंगतिः स्यात् । ऋतशब्देनैव तादृशकर्मग्रहणेऽनृतशब्देन तद्विरुद्धस्य कस्यचिद्ग्रहणापत्तेः । द्वितीये तु ' ऋतं पिवन्ताविति वचनात् ' इति त्वदीयो हेतुरसंगतः स्यात् । ऋतं पिवन्ताविति कर्मफलोपभोगप्रतिपादनेन फलाभिसंधिपूर्वस्यैव कर्मणस्तत्र ग्रहणात् ।

4.43. Here too: "both drinking the ṛta", the word "ṛta" does not signify action. "Both drinking the ṛta" means that both are experiencing the results of action. Because even though the word ṛta signifies action there, it has an implied meaning in the sense of the results of action. The usage of the word "ṛta", which signifies what is true, is easy to demonstrate in the sense of the results of action. Because the result of action is inevitable according to the way which was told: "action does not waste away without [the result] being experienced" and therefore what is true, in the manner of what will inevitably occur, exists in the result of action.

Furthermore, according to your view, does the word "rta" signify a particular action or does it signify action in general? Not the first. Because there is contradiction with your own general statement: "rta signifies [virtuous] actions". Moreover, in accepting a particular action, is it understood to be preceded by attachment to the result or not preceded by that? In the first case, there would be incongruity with your own conclusion: action which is accompanied by attachment to the result and which has the cycle of worldly existence as its result is understood by the word "anrta". Because in understanding such a type of action just by the word "rta", there would be the consequence of understanding something contrary to that by the word "anrta". But in the second case [if it is not preceded by attachment to the result], your reason [for showing that the word "rta" means action]: "For there is the statement: 'both drinking the rta' " would be incongruous. Because only action preceded by attachment to the result is understood there [in regard to the reason] since there is the teaching of the experience of the result of action: "both drinking the rta".

4.44.

ऋतशब्दस्य सामान्यकर्मवाचित्वे त्वनृतशब्देन त्वदभीष्टं कर्मविशेषग्रहणं कथं सिध्येत् । न ह्यकर्मशब्दात्कर्मविशेषरूपमर्थं कोऽपि प्रत्येति । सामान्यपुरस्कारप्रवृत्तस्य शब्दस्य विशेषे तात्पर्यं हि प्रकरणादिभ्योऽवगम्यते न तु तथात्र किञ्चिद्दृश्यते । 'ब्रह्मलोकवेदनाभावरूपफलोत्पादनसामर्थ्यस्य फलाभिसंधिपूर्वककर्मणि सत्त्वेन तादृशं कर्मानृतशब्देन प्रतिपाद्यते । तदर्थं च ऋतशब्देन फलाभिसंधिरहितं कर्म विवक्षितम् ' इति तु सर्वथाऽनुचितम् । नञ्समभिव्याहृतपदे विशेषार्थपरत्वस्य व्युत्पत्तिविरोधात्काप्यदृष्टत्वाच्च । प्रतियोगिवाचकपदप्रवृत्तिनिमित्तस्यैव नञर्थान्वयितावच्छेदकत्वात् । अत एवैकस्मिन्घटे विद्यमाने तदतिरिक्तानामखिलानां घटानां तत्रासत्त्वेपि घटो नास्तीति न प्रयोगः । अन्यथा ब्राह्मणविशेषे देवदत्तादावब्राह्मणपदप्रयोगप्रसङ्गः स्यात् । किञ्चानृतशब्देन सकामकर्मग्रहणे सुपुत्रस्य कर्माभावेन प्रतिबन्धकाभावात्त्वन्मते तदाऽहमर्थस्फुरणाच्च तदा स्वात्मभूतस्य ब्रह्मणो ज्ञानं कुतो नोदेति ।

4.44. But if the word "rta" signifies action in general, then how could the understanding of a particular action, which is what you accept by the

word "anṛta", be established? For no one believes that a thing which is a particular action is from the word "not an action". Because the purport of a word used along with a general meaning is understood from the topic etc. to be used in a particular meaning. But nothing is seen in that manner here.

But [the statement]:

Because the capacity of producing a result, i.e. the absence of the knowledge of the world which is Brahman, exists in an action preceded by attachment to the result; such an action is taught by the word "anṛta". And for the sake of that [knowledge of the world which is Brahman], the action which is free from attachment to the result is intended to be said by the word "ṛta"

is altogether incorrect. Because in the case of a word mentioned along with a negative particle, the intention of a particular meaning is contrary to the derivation. And because it is not seen anywhere. Because the reason for the use of a word expressing a counter correlate is just that it distinguishes the state of being related to the meaning of a negative particle [i.e. it does not give a qualified meaning]. For this very reason, when one pot exists, even though all pots other than that do not exist at that place, there is no usage: the pot does not exist. Otherwise, there could be the usage of the word "abrāhmaṇa" in regard to a particular brāhmaṇa such as Devadatta etc. Moreover, if by the word "anṛta" there is the understanding of an action accompanied by desire, because the person who is asleep has no obstruction due to the absence of action and because according to your view the sense of "I" is manifest at that time, then why does the knowledge of Brahman, who is [the persons] own Self, not arise?

4.45.

नासदासीयसूक्तमपि (तै० ब्रा० २।८।९।३।४) सदसदनि-
र्वचनीयजगन्मूलभूताज्ञाने प्रमाणम् । तत्र हि तम आसीदिति तमः-
शब्देनाज्ञानमुच्यते । तस्य च नासदासीन्नो सदासीदिति निषेधद्वयेन सदसद-
निर्वचनीयता लभ्यते । यद्यपि नासदासीन्नो सदासीदित्यनेन सदसतोः प्रलय-
कालेऽसद्भावमात्रमुच्यते तथापि तदानीं तस्मि-
नासदासीयसूक्तम- न्नेव सूक्ते तम आसीदिति प्रतिपादितं यत्तपोऽस्ति
ज्ञाने प्रमाणम् तस्य सत्त्वे नो सदासीदिति निषेधासंगतिः ।
असत्त्वे नासदासीदिति निषेधासंगतिः । अतोऽ-
र्थदेव तत्तमः सदसदनिर्वचनीयं सिध्यति ।

4.45. The Nāsadāsiya hymn (Tai.Brā.2.8.9.3.) is also a means of knowledge for the Ignorance which is the basis of the world which is indeterminable as existent or as non-existent. Because there [in the hymn], Ignorance is expressed by the word "darkness" (tamas): "darkness existed". And for that [Ignorance] the nature of being indeterminable as either existent or non-existent is acquired through the double negation: "non-existence was not, nor was there existence". Although by this: "non-existence was not, nor was there existence" both existence and non-existence are said to have merely a state of non-existence at the time of dissolution, still, at that time, it is taught in that very hymn that darkness exists: "darkness existed". If that [darkness] exists, there is incongruity of the negation: "nor was there existence". If it does not exist, there is incongruity of the negation: "non-existence was not". Therefore, as a matter of course, that darkness is established as indeterminable as either existent or non-existent.

4.46. यत्तु 'नासदासीन्नो सदासीत्तदानीमित्यत्रापि सदसच्छब्दौ चिदचिद्व्यष्टिवि-
षयौ । उत्पत्तिवेलायां सत्त्वच्छब्दाभिहितयोश्चिदचिद्व्यष्टिभूतयोर्वस्तुनोरप्यय-
कालेऽचित्समष्टिभूते तमःशब्दाभिधेये वस्तुनि प्रलयप्रतिपादनपरत्वादस्य
वाक्यस्य नात्र कस्यचित्सदसदनिर्वचनीयतोच्यते' (श्रीभा० पृ० १०१ प०
१५) इत्युक्तं तत्र । सदसच्छब्दयोश्चिदचिद्व्यष्टिविषयकत्वे प्रमाणाभावात् ।
अस्तीति भासमानं सत्, तद्विरुद्धमसदिति हि तयोः शब्दयोरर्थः प्रासिद्धः । किं
च चिद्व्यष्टिभूतानां जीवानामचित्समष्टौ लयोऽत्यन्तासंभवी । उत्पत्तिवाक्ये
चिदचिद्व्यष्टिभूतयोरुत्पत्तिकथनादत्र तयोरेव प्रलयोक्तिरिति कथमवगतं त्वया ।

न तावत् 'सच्च त्यच्चाभवत्' (तै० २ । ६ । १) इत्युत्पत्तिवाक्यमेतत्प्रकरण-
स्थम् । नापि शब्दसाम्यम् । उत्पत्तिवाक्ये हि सत्यच्छब्दौ निर्दिष्टौ । अत्र तु
सदसच्छब्दौ ।

4.46. But what has been said (Śrī.B.Para.68.p.150,51.):

Here too [in the text]: "at that time, non-existence was not, nor was there existence", the two words "existence" and "non-existence" refer to the individual sentient and insentient things. Nothing is told here as having a nature which is indeterminable as either existent or non-existent. Because this sentence aims at teaching that the two entities which are the individual sentient and insentient things and which are denoted by the words "sat" and "tyat" at the time of creation resolve, at the time of absorption, into the entity which can be denoted by the word "darkness" and which is the collective insentient material.

That is not so. Because there is no means of proof that the two words "existence" and "non-existence" refer to the individual sentient and insentient things. For the meaning of those two words is well known: existence is what appears as "it is" and non-existence is what is contrary to that.

Furthermore, the disappearance of the individual souls, who are the individual sentient entities, in the collective insentient material is completely impossible. How do you understand from the description of the origination of the individual sentient and insentient entities in the sentence [denoting] origination that the statement of disappearance here [in the sentence: "at that time, non-existence was not..."] is for those very two? The statement about origination: "It became sat and tyat" (Tai.

2.6.1.) certainly does not belong to this topic. Nor even are the words the same. Because the two words "sat" and "tyat" were specified in the statement about origination. But here the two words are "existence" (sat) and "non-existence" (asat).

4.47.

किंच त्यच्छब्दस्तच्छब्दसमानार्थः । 'तदिति परोक्षं विजानीयात्' इत्युक्तेस्तच्छब्दः परोक्षवस्तुनिदर्शकः । तत्र तच्छब्दो लोकवेदसाधारणस्त्यच्छब्दस्तु केवलं वैदिक इत्यन्यत् । प्रक्रान्तपरामर्शकत्वमपि त्यत्तच्छब्दयोरस्तीति चान्यत् । तथा च सच्च त्यच्चेत्यत्र त्यच्छब्देन परोक्षं वस्तुच्यते । अमूर्तमिति यावत् । अमूर्तत्वपरोक्षत्वयोः प्रायः सहचारात् । सच्छब्दोऽस्तीति भासमानार्थको मूर्ते वस्त्वाचष्टे । अमूर्तार्थकत्यच्छब्दसंनिधानात् । मूर्तत्वसत्त्वयोः प्रायः सहचाराच्च । मूर्ते सत्त्वस्यासंदिग्धत्वात् । एवमुत्पत्तिवाक्य एव सत्यच्छब्दयोश्चिदचिद्व्यर्थकत्वं नास्तीति तदनुरोधात्प्रलयवाक्ये सदसच्छब्दयोस्तदर्थकत्वं दूर एव ।

4.47. Furthermore, the word "tyat" has the same meaning as the word "that" (tat). The word "that" indicates a thing which is remote, for there is the statement: one should understand "that" as something remote. Moreover the word "that" there [having the sense of something remote] is common to the world and to the Veda whereas the word "tyat" solely belongs to the Veda. And moreover the words "tyat" and "that" also have the nature of calling to mind what has preceded. And so a thing which is remote is expressed by the word "tyat" here: "[It became] sat and tyat". The meaning [of tyat] is "formless".³³ Because generally there is an association between being formless and being remote. The word "sat" has the meaning of what appears as "it is" and it makes known a thing which has form. For it has proximity with the word "tyat" which has the meaning of "formless". And because generally there is an association between having form and existing. For there can be no doubt about existence in regard to something which has form. Thus the words "sat" and "tyat" certainly do not have the meaning of individual sentient and insentient things in the case of the statement about origination, so the words "sat" and "asat"

having that meaning in the statement about dissolution, on account of conformity with that [previous meaning], is indeed far off the mark.

4.48.

तस्मिन्नेव सूक्ते 'आनीदवातं स्वधया तदेकम्' इत्यनेन 'तुच्छेनाभ्व-
पिहितम्' इत्यनेन च जगन्मूलभूताज्ञानमुच्यते । एतत्स्पष्टीकरणाय तत्र श्रीम-
त्सायणाचार्यैः कृतोऽर्थो युक्ततरत्वाद्वा संगृह्यते ।

“नासदासीन्नो सदासीत्तदानीम् । आनीदवातं स्वधया तदेकम् ।
तम आसीत्तमसा गूढमग्रे प्रकेतम् । सलिलं सर्वमा इदम् । तुच्छेनाभ्वपिहितं
यदासीत् । तमसस्तन्महिना जायतैकम्” (तै० ब्रा० २ । ८ । ९ । ३।४) ।

यदा पूर्वसृष्टिः प्रलीना, उत्तरसृष्टिश्च नोत्पन्ना तदानो सदासती द्वे अपि नाभू-
ताम् । नामरूपविशिष्टत्वेन स्पष्टं प्रतीयमानं जगत् सच्छब्देनोच्यते । नरवि-
पाणादिसमानं शून्यमसदित्युच्यते । तदुभयं नासीत् । (बाह्यस्वरूपरहितं केवल-
कल्पनामयमपि शशशृङ्गादि तदा नासीदिति नासदासीदित्यस्य तात्पर्यम् ।)
किं तु काचिदव्यक्तावस्थाऽऽसीत् । सा च त्रिस्पष्टत्वाभावान्न सती । जगदुत्पा-
दकत्वेन सद्भावान्नाप्यसती । तत्सर्वोपनिषत्प्रसिद्धं ब्रह्म वस्तु स्वधया स्वस्मिन्ना-
श्रितया सर्वजगत्कारणरूपया मायया सहितमानीत् चेष्टितवत् । नात्र चलनं
चेष्टा । किं तु सद्भावमात्रमित्यभिप्रेत्यावातमिति विशेष्यते । वायुरहितं निश्चल-
मित्यर्थः । तमःशब्देनाविद्यामायाशक्त्यादिशब्दवाच्यं जगद्विकारोपादानं
मूलाज्ञानमुच्यते । यथा तमः पदार्थानावृणोत्येवमिदमपि ब्रह्मतत्त्वमावृणोतीति
तमःशब्देन व्यवहारः । तादृशं जगद्विकारनिष्पादनक्षमं ब्रह्मण्याश्रितं किञ्चित्तम
आसीत् । तेन तमसा सर्वं जगद्गूढम् । यथा मृत्पिण्डे घटो गूढो यथा वा वीजे
वृक्षो गूढस्तद्वत् । अत एव प्रकेतं प्रकर्षेण ज्ञातुमशक्यम् । तथा च मनुना स्मर्यते-

‘आसीदिदं तमोभूतमप्रज्ञातमलक्षणम् ।

अप्रतर्क्यमविज्ञेयं प्रमुत्तमिव सर्वतः’ (मनुस्मृ० १ । ९) इति ।

4.48. In that very hymn, the Ignorance which is the basis of the world is expressed by this: "That one [Brahman], motionless, breathed due to its own nature" and by this: "The world was concealed by falsity". In order to make this clear, the meaning rendered by Śrī Sāyaṇācārya there is included here since it is more correct.

text

At that time, non-existence was not, nor was there existence. ...That one, motionless, breathed due to its own nature. ...Darkness existed. In the beginning,

knowledge was hidden by darkness. All this was indeed water. The world was concealed by falsity. That [world] produced through the greatness of darkness was the One (Tai.Brā.2.8.9.3-4.).

commentary of Sāyaṇācārya

When the previous creation had dissolved and the following creation had not originated, "at that time" (tadānīm) even the two: "existence" (sat) and "non-existence" (asat) were not. The world which is distinctly cognized as qualified by name and form is expressed by the word existence. The non-existent, equivalent to a man's horn etc., is said as non-existence. Both of those "did not exist" (nāsīt). ([Abhyankar's addition]: The purport of this 'non-existence was not' is that even what consists solely of imagination bereft of an externally existing nature, such as a rabbit's horn etc., did not exist at that time.) But some unmanifest condition existed. And that is not existing because it is not clearly evident. Nor even is it not existing, since it exists as the producer of the world...."That" (tat) is Brahman, the reality, well known in all the Upaniṣads.³⁴ "Due to its own nature" (svadhayā) means endowed with māyā which is the cause of the whole world and which depends upon itself [i.e. upon Brahman]. "It breathed" (ānīt) means that it was active. Action here does not mean moving, but it is specified as "motionless" (avātam), i.e. having the purport of: pure existence. It means free from wind, i.e. motionless....The primary Ignorance which is the material cause for the transformation into the world and which can be expressed by the words avidyā, māyā, śakti etc. is said by the word "darkness" (tamas). Just as darkness conceals objects, so too, this also conceals the reality which is

Brahman. Hence there is the expression by means of the word darkness. Some such darkness "existed" (āsīt) depending upon Brahman and capable of producing the transformation into the world. The whole world was "hidden" (gūḍham) "by that darkness" (tamasā). Just as a pot is hidden within a ball of clay or just as a tree is hidden within a seed. It is like that. For this very reason, the "knowledge" (praketaṃ) could not be thoroughly understood. Accordingly, it is mentioned by Manu:

This [world] was of the nature of darkness,
unknown, without characteristics, incomprehensible
by reason, unperceivable, entirely like deep sleep
(Manu.1.5.).

- 4.49. तत्र दृष्टान्तः सलिलमिति । यथा वर्षे पतिता वर्षोपलाः सलिल-
मात्रत्वेनावशिष्यन्ते तथा सर्वं जगदिदं तम आसीत् । तमोमात्ररूपेणावशिष्ट-
मित्यर्थः । अत्र हि काणादादयोऽसत्कार्यवादिनः कारणे पूर्वमविद्यमानमेव
कार्यमुत्पद्यत इत्याहुः । सत्कार्यवादिनस्तु सांख्यादयः पूर्वं विद्यमानमेव कार्य-
मव्यक्तं सत्कारणव्यापारेण व्यक्ती भवतीत्याचक्षते । तत्र सत्कार्यवादिनां मत-
मेव तमसा गूढमिति श्रुत्याङ्गीकृतम् । आ समन्ताद्भ्रत्युत्पद्यत इत्याभु जगत् ।
तदेव तुच्छेनापिहितम् । तत्त्वज्ञानमात्रेण निवर्त्यत्वात्तत्कारणं मूलाज्ञानं तुच्छम् ।
तेनापिहितं प्रलयकाल आच्छादितम् । तादृशं यज्जगदासीत्तज्जगदव्यक्तं सत्पू-
र्वोक्तादज्ञानरूपात्तमसः सकाशान्महिना महत्त्वेनाभिव्यक्तजगद्रूपेणाजायतोत्प-
न्नम् । तदिदमज्ञानिदृष्ट्या जगदाकारेण भासमानमपि परमार्थत एकं ब्रह्मैवेति ।

- 4.49. continuation of Sāyaṇa's commentary

"Water" (salilam) is the illustration there. Just as
hailstones which have fallen in the rain remain as
mere water, so too, "all" (sarvam) the world was "this"
(idam) darkness. The meaning is that [the world]
remained in the form of mere darkness. Indeed here, the
followers of Kaṇāda etc., who are the exponents of the

prior non-existence of the effect in the cause, say that an effect is produced which certainly does not exist previously in the cause. However the followers of Sāṅkhya etc., who are the exponents of the prior existence of the effect in the cause, say that the effect, which is unmanifest, certainly exists previously and becomes manifest through the operation of the cause. In that matter, only the view of the exponents of the prior existence of the effect in the cause has been accepted by the sacred text: 'hidden by darkness'. Abhu means "world", [its derivation is]: ā has the sense of 'completely', bhavati 'it becomes' in the sense that 'it originates'. That [world] was indeed "concealed" (apihitam) "by falsity" (tucchena). The primary Ignorance which is the cause of that [world] is false because it can be removed by the mere knowledge of reality. Concealed by that, means [the world] was covered at the time of the dissolution. "Which" (yat) means the world which was in such a manner. "That" (tat) world, which was unmanifest, "was produced" (ajāyata) i.e. it originated, in the form of the manifest world "through the greatness" (mahinā) "from darkness" (tamasah) which is of the nature of Ignorance and which was mentioned previously. That [world], though appearing in the form of the world according to the view of ignorant people, is in reality "the One" (ekam) Brahman alone.

4.50.

एतदेव सदसदनिर्वचनीयं जगन्मूलभूतमज्ञानं मायाशब्देनोच्यते । मिथ्यात्वे सति विचित्रार्थसर्गकरत्वं मायात्वम् । यत्तु
 मायाशब्दार्थः 'नहि सर्वत्र मायाशब्दो मिथ्याविषयः' (श्रीभा०
 पृ० १०२ प० ४) इत्युक्तं तत्र सर्वत्रेत्यस्य

यथाश्रुतार्थत्वे सर्वत्र मायाशब्दस्य मिथ्यार्थत्वाभावेऽप्यत्र मिथ्यार्थकत्वे न किञ्चिद्भाधकम् । सर्वत्रेत्यस्य कापीत्यर्थे तु प्रसिद्धिविरोधः । ऐन्द्रजालिकप्रदर्शिता-
न्मिथ्याभूतानर्थान्दृष्ट्वा, 'इमे मायिकाः' इतीदानीं बाला अपि व्यवहरन्ति । मीयतेऽ-
परोक्षवत्प्रदर्श्यतेऽनयेति माया । माछाससिभ्यो यः (उणादि० सू० ४।१०९)
इति यप्रत्ययः ।

4.50. This Ignorance, which is the basis of the world and indeterminable as either existent or non-existent, is expressed by the word "māyā". The nature of māyā means bringing about the creation of diverse things while being unreal. But what has been said (Śrī.B.Para.68.p.151.):

For the word "māyā" does not everywhere refer to what is false.

Although the word "māyā" does not have the sense of falsity everywhere, in accord with the meaning heard for this "everywhere" there [in the Śrī.B.], there is no negating factor in it having the meaning of falsity here [in regard to the texts cited in the Śrī.B., which will be discussed below]. But there is a contradiction with what is well-known if this "everywhere" has the meaning of "anywhere". Even boys at the present time use the expression: "these are unreal (māyika)", having seen the false things shown by a magician. Māyā means [something] is formed (mīyate) in the sense that it is made to appear as though perceptible by it [i.e. by māyā]. The affix ya [is due to the unādi sūtra]: "the affix ya comes after the roots mā, cho and ṣas".³⁵

4.51.

देवीपुराणे पञ्चचत्वारिंशद्ध्यायेऽप्यस्याः स्वरूपमुक्तम्—

‘विचित्रकार्यकरणा अचिन्तितफलप्रदा ।

स्वप्नेन्द्रजालवद्भोके तेन माया प्रकीर्तिता ’ ॥ इति ।

तापनीयश्रुतिरप्यत्र प्रमाणम् । विद्यारण्योक्तिरपि—

माया चेयं तमोरूपा तापनीये तदीरणात् ।

अनुभूतिं तत्र मानं प्रतिजज्ञे श्रुतिः स्वयम् (प०द०६।१२५) इति ।

तेन मायासहस्रं तच्छम्बरस्याशुगामिना ।

बालस्य रक्षता देहमेकैकाशेन सूदितम् (वि० पु० १।१९)

इत्यत्रापि मायाशब्दस्यायमेवार्थः। प्रह्लादस्य देहं रक्षताऽऽशुगामिना तेन विष्णुच-
क्रेण शम्बरदैत्यप्रेरितं मायासहस्रमेकैकाशिन नाशितमित्यर्थः। मिथ्यार्थो ज्ञान-
वाध्योऽपि शस्त्रेण च्छेद्यो भवत्येव। शस्त्रधारिणा केनचित्पुरुषेण रज्ज्वां रज्जु-
बुद्ध्या सर्पबुद्ध्या वा छिद्यमानायां दूरस्थो भ्रान्तः पुरुषः सर्पश्छिन्न इत्येव जानाति।

4.51. The essential nature of this [māyā] has also been told in the forty-
fifth chapter of the Devīpurāṇa:

Māyā was declared by him to be like dream and magic
in that it gives unexpected results and brings about
wonderful effects in the world.

The Tāpanīyaśruti too is a means of knowledge about this.³⁶ There is also
the statement of Vidyāraṇya :

This māyā is of the nature of darkness (tamas), for
that has been told in the Tāpanīya. The sacred text
itself has declared empirical experience to be the
proof there (P.D.6.125.).

This is indeed the meaning of the word "māyā" here as well:

The thousand māyās of Śambara were destroyed one
after another by that quickly moving [discus of
Lord Viṣṇu] which is protecting the body of the
boy (Viṣ.P.1.19.20.).

The meaning is that the thousand māyās dispatched by the demon Śambara
were destroyed one by one by that quickly moving discus of Viṣṇu which is
protecting the body of Prahlāda. A false thing, though it can be negated
by knowledge, is certainly able to be cut by a weapon. When a rope is
being cut by some person carrying a weapon -whether he has the idea that
it is a rope or he has the idea that it is a snake- a deluded person
standing at a distance knows only that: "a snake has been cut".

4.52.

किं च यावन्न ज्ञानोदय स्तावन्मिथ्यार्थविनाशो मिथ्याभूतेन शस्त्रेण जायमानो दृश्यते । स्वप्नस्थं काष्ठं स्वप्नस्थपरशुना छिद्यमानं स्वप्ने दृश्यत एव । एतेन 'इन्द्रो मायाभिः पुरुरूप ईयते (वृ० २।५।१९) इत्यत्रापि त्रिचित्राः शक्तयोऽभिधीयन्ते अत एव हि भूरि त्वष्टेह राजतीत्युच्यते । न हि मिथ्याभूतः कश्चिद्विराजते' (श्रीभा० पृ० १०२ प० १७) इत्यपास्तम् । मिथ्याभूता अपि स्वाप्ना हस्त्यश्वादयोऽलं-कृता विराजमानाः स्वप्ने सर्वैरप्यनुभूयन्ते । 'अस्मान्मायी सृजते विश्वमेतत्त-स्मिश्चान्यो मायया संनिरुद्धः' (श्वे० ४ । ९) 'अनादिमायया सुप्तो यदा जीवः प्रबुध्यते' (गौ० १ । १६) 'इन्द्रो मायाभिः पुरुरूप ईयते' (वृ० २ । ५ । १९) 'मम माया दुरत्यया' (गी० ७ । १४) इत्यादौ मायाशब्दो निरु-क्तार्थक एव । न किञ्चित्त्र वाधकं दृश्यते ।

4.52. Furthermore, as long as there is no rise of knowledge, the destruction of a false object is seen to be produced by a weapon which is false. The piece of wood in a dream is certainly seen in the dream to be cut by an axe which [itself] belongs to the dream. On account of this, [the statement] (Śrī.B.Para.68.p.152.):

Here also various powers are spoken of: "Indra is said to be manifold on account of his māyās" (Brh. 2.5.19.). Indeed it is for this very reason that it said: "He shines greatly here, [like] Tvaṣṭṛ" (R.V.6. 47.19.). For no one shines who has a false nature

is set aside. The adorned elephants and horses etc. existing in a dream, though false, are experienced by everyone as shining in the dream. The word "māyā" has only its etymological meaning in: "From this [prakṛti] the māyin [i.e. the possessor of māyā] creates this universe and in that [prakṛti] another [the soul] is bound by māyā" (Śv.4.9.), "When the soul, asleep because of beginningless māyā, awakes..." (Gauḍ.Kā.1.16.), "Indra is said to be manifold on account of his māyās" (Brh.2.5.19.), "my māyā is difficult to transcend" (G.7.14.) etc. No negating factor whatsoever is seen there.

4.53.

तत्त्वमसि (छा० ६ । ८ । ७) इति जीवब्रह्मैक्यश्रुतिरप्युक्ताज्ञाने प्रमाणम् । जीवब्रह्मणोर्वस्तुतो भेदश्चेत्तयोरैक्यं न संभवतीत्यतो भेदस्य काल्पनिकत्वमेव स्वीकार्यम् । तदन्यथानुपपत्त्या तादृशभेदज्ञानजनकत्वेनानिर्वचनीयाज्ञानं सिध्यति । यत्तु ' ऐक्योपदेशस्तु त्वंशब्देनापि जीवशरीरकस्य ब्रह्मण एवाभिधानादुपपन्नतरः ' (श्रीभा० पृ० १०३ प० ४) इत्युक्तं तन्न । त्वमश्रुत्यादेः सकाशात्तज्जीवशरीरकस्य ब्रह्मणः क्वाप्यप्रतीतेः । किं च त्वमहमित्यादेः सकाशाद्ब्रह्मणो जीवविशेष्यतया भानमुत जीवप्रकारतया । आद्ये दुःखी त्वमसीत्यादिप्रयोगानुपपत्तिः । ब्रह्मणो दुःखलेशस्याप्यभावात् । न च ' विधिप्रतिषेधौ विशेषणे पर्यवस्यतः सति विशेष्ये बाधे ' इतिन्यायेन विशेषणीभूते जीवे दुःखित्वं पर्यवस्यतीति वाच्यम् । शाब्दान्वयो विशिष्ट एवेति तदनुसारेण श्रोतुर्बुद्धिः प्रथमं विशिष्टेऽवतरन्ती विशेष्ये बाधिता सती विशेषणे पर्यवस्यतीति तन्न्यायस्वरूपम् । दुःखी त्वमसीत्यत्र तु प्रथममपि न विशिष्टे श्रोतुर्बुद्धिरवतरतीति नात्र तन्न्यायप्रवृत्तिः । किं च विधिप्रतिषेधविषये तथा, न त्वनुवादविषये । तत्र प्रायस्तादृशप्रयोगादर्शनात् । तथा च दुःखिना त्वयेत्यमुक्तमित्यादिप्रयोगासंगतिस्तदवस्थैव । किं च तत्त्वमसीतिमध्यमपुरुषप्रयोगानुपपत्तिः । ' त्वदात्मा ब्रह्मास्ति ' इत्यत्रैव तत्त्वमस्तीति प्रयोगः स्यात् ।

4.53. Even the sacred text [revealing] the identity of the individual soul and Brahman: "you are That" (Ch.6.8.7.) is a means of knowledge about the Ignorance [previously] mentioned. If there is a difference, in reality, between the individual soul and Brahman then the identity of those two is not possible. Therefore it has to be accepted that the difference is only fictitious. Since there is no logical possibility other than that, an indeterminable Ignorance is established as producing such knowledge of difference. But what has been said (Śrī.B.Para.68.p.153.):

But the teaching of oneness is very appropriate because even by the word "you" there is only the mention of Brahman who has the individual soul as His body.

That is not so. Because from [the words] "you", "I" etc. there is no cognition anywhere of Brahman having each individual soul as His body.

Furthermore, from [the words] "you", "I" etc. does Brahman appear

as what is to be qualified by the individual soul, or as the mode [i.e. the attribute] of the individual soul? In the first case, there is no logical possibility of the usage: "you are sorrowful" etc. Because Brahman does not have even a trace of sorrow. It should not be said: the sorrow terminates in the individual soul, who is the attribute, on account of the maxim: "when the substantive is negated, the positive statement and the negation terminate in the distinguishing attribute".³⁷ [reason] The nature of that maxim is that the idea of the listener firstly comes to what is qualified in accordance with that [statement]: "the syntactical relation between words is only in what is qualified", and being negated in regard to the substantive it terminates in the distinguishing attribute. But here in: "you are sorrowful", the idea of the listener does not come to the qualified sense even firstly and so there is no operation of that maxim in this case. Moreover, [the employment of that maxim] is correct in the case of a positive statement and a negation but not in the case of a statement. Because such a usage is generally not seen there [in regard to a statement]. In the same manner, there is incongruity of usage [if you say]: "it was said in this manner by you who are sorrowful" etc. and so the situation is just the same. Furthermore, there is no logical possibility of the use of the second person: "you are That". The usage must be: "That is you" just like here: "Brahman is your Self".

comment

Viśiṣṭādvaitins consider that in the sentence "you are That" (tat tvam asi) both the words "you" and "That" directly denote Brahman. The word "That" refers to Brahman as the omniscient cause of the world. The word "you" signifies Brahman, having the individual soul as His body.³⁸

Abhyankar asks whether the word "you" refers to Brahman as the substantive (viśeṣa) of the individual soul, or whether it refers to Brahman as the mode, i.e. the attribute (viśeṣaṇa) of the soul. In the first case, if the word "you" in the sentence "you are That" refers directly to Brahman, then a statement such as "you are sorrowful" would not be logically possible. For the sorrow too must refer to Brahman. It may

be argued that the idea of the listener firstly apprehends the qualified meaning, i.e. Brahman having the soul as His body. Because there is no logical possibility of the sorrow referring to the substantive, i.e. Brahman, then it must only refer to the individual soul who is the attribute. Abhyankar replies to this argument by stating that when the word "you" is uttered the first apprehension on the part of the listener is certainly not in the qualified meaning of Brahman having the soul as His body.

4.54.

द्वितीये तत्त्वमसीति सामानाधिकरण्यानुपपत्तिस्तद-
वस्थैव स्यात् । प्रकारीभूतात्मनो ब्रह्मसामानाधिकरण्यमिति तु न वाच्यम् ।
न हि घटप्रकारीभूतघटत्वस्य नित्यत्वेन तदभिप्रायेण घटो नित्य इति प्रयोगः
क्वापि दृश्यते । किं च त्वमहमित्यादेरात्मपर्यन्तार्थकत्वं सुतरामनुपपन्नम् । एतौ
हि सर्वनामसंज्ञकौ । सर्वनामशब्दो हि कांचित्पराभृशति । 'तत्त्वमसि श्वेतकेतो'
इत्यत्र त्वमित्यनेन श्वेतकेतुः परामृश्यते । स च परामृश्यमानः पित्रा संबोध्य-
मानो जीव एव न तदन्तर्यामी ।

4.54. In the second case [if Brahman is the attribute of the soul], the logical impossibility of grammatical apposition in: "you are That" would be just the same as before. But it should not be said: the Self, who is the mode [of the individual soul], has grammatical apposition with Brahman. [reason] Because potness, which is the mode [i.e. attribute] of a pot, is eternal, the usage is certainly not seen anywhere that: "the pot is eternal" because it has the intended meaning of that [potness].

Furthermore, it is all the more logically impossible that [the words]: "you", "I" etc. have a meaning which terminates in the Self. Because these two designate pronouns. A word which is a pronoun recalls something. Here in: "Śvetaketu, you are That", Śvetaketu is being recalled by this [pronoun] "you". And the one being recalled and being addressed by the father is only the individual soul, not its inner-controller.

comment

In the second case, Brahman is said to be the attribute of the soul. Abhyankar states that if this is so, there is no logical possibility of grammatical apposition. In the first case -where Brahman is the substantive

qualified by the soul- the word "That" (tat) denotes the subject (uddeśya) and the word "you" (tvam) denotes the predicate (vidheya). The meaning of the sentence is: "That [supreme Self] is you [the supreme Self having the soul as His body]". In the second case, Brahman is the attribute of the soul and so the word "you" becomes the subject and the word "That" becomes the predicate. But in this case the predicate does not convey any additional information. For example, one can say: "the pot is blue" since the predicate furnishes new information, but it is meaningless to say: "the pot is a pot". Similarly, the statement "you are That" is a tautology if it is said: "you [the supreme Self having the soul as His body] are That [supreme Self]".

4.55.

किं च जीवजडशब्दौ निरूपकाणां निष्कर्ष-
कशब्दौ शरीरशब्दवत् । अन्यथा जीवशरीरकः परमात्मा जडशरीरकः परमा-
त्मेत्यादिस्त्वत्संमतः प्रयोगो नोपपद्येत । प्रत्युत जीवः परमात्मा जडः परमा-
त्मेति प्रयोगः स्यात् । तथा च त्वमहमित्यादयो मातापित्रादयो देवदत्तयज्ञद-
त्तादयश्च जीवविशेषवाचकाः शब्दास्तथा पृथिव्यादयो घटादयश्च जडविशेष-
वाचकाः शब्दाः कथमात्मपर्यन्तमर्थं प्रतिपादयितुं शक्नुयुः । एतेन 'अनेन जीवे-
नात्मना' (छा० ६ । ३ । २) इति श्रुतौ जीवशब्दस्यात्मपर्यन्तार्थकत्वमपा-
स्तम् । यस्तु त्वंशब्देन ब्रह्मण एवाभिधाने हेतुरुक्तः 'अनेन जीवेनात्मनानुप्र-
विश्य नामरूपे व्याकरवाणीति सर्वस्य वस्तुनः परमात्मपर्यन्तस्यैव हि नाम-
रूपभाकत्वमुक्तम्' (श्रीभा० पृ० १०३ प० ६) इति स न संभवति । पर-
मात्मनोऽनुप्रवेशपूर्वकमेव नामरूपव्याकरणमिति हि श्रुत्योक्तम् । तथा चानेन
हेतुना परमात्मनस्तत्तन्नामभाक्त्वं कथं सिध्यतीति त एव प्रष्टव्याः । न हि 'पयसि
निगूढं घृतम् , तद्विना पयसो न पयस्त्वम्' इत्येतावता पयःशब्दः पयोन्तर्यामि-
घृतमभिधातुं प्रभवेत् ।

4.55. Furthermore, like the word "body", the two words "individual soul" and "inert matter" are the two determining words among [those] which are indicators [of His body]. Otherwise, the usage you accept: "the supreme Self has the individual souls as His body", "the supreme Self has the inert matter as His body" etc. could not be logically possible. Rather the usage should be: "the individual soul is the supreme Self", "the inert matter is the supreme Self". And so "you", "I" etc., mother and father etc., Devadatta and Yajñadatta etc. are words expressing particular individual souls. So too, earth etc. and pots etc. are words expressing particular

inert things. So how would they be able to teach a meaning which extends as far as the Self? On account of this, [the view that] the word "individual soul" has a meaning which extends as far as the Self in the sacred text: "by this individual self" (Ch.6.3.2.) is refuted. But the reason which was told for denoting only Brahman by the word "you" (Śrī.B. Para.68.p.153.):

[In the text]: "having entered along with this individual self, I shall manifest name and form" (Ch.6.3.2.) it is said that every object possesses name and form only in so far as it terminates in the supreme Self

is not possible. Because it was stated by the sacred text that the manifesting of name and form is indeed preceded by the entry of the supreme Self. And so they [Viśiṣṭādvaitins] must certainly be asked how, on account of this reason, the supreme Self is established as possessing the respective names? For just by this [expression]: "ghee is hidden in milk, without it, milk does not have the nature of being milk" the word "milk" is not able to be called "ghee" which is the "soul" of the milk.

4.56.

यदि परमात्मा सर्ववस्तुत्पादक इत्यतः सर्ववस्तुवाचकशब्दभागपि भवती-
त्युच्यते तर्हि घटोत्पादकः कुलालोऽपि घटशब्दभाक् स्यात् । यद्यस्माच्छब्दाद-
यमर्थो बोद्धव्य इत्येवं सर्वशब्दानां संकेतं परमात्मा कुरुत इत्यतः परमात्मा
सर्वशब्दभाक् स्यात्तर्हि पुत्रादीनां यदृच्छया दित्थादिशब्दसंकेतकारी पित्रादिरपि
तत्तच्छब्दभाक् स्यादित्यास्तां तावत् ।

4.56. If it is said that the supreme Self is the producer of all things and therefore He is also the possessor of the words expressing all things, then even a potter, who produces pots, must be the possessor of the word "pot". If the supreme Self brings about the convention of all words in the manner: "this meaning is to be understood from this word" and on account of this the supreme Self would be the possessor of all words, then

even a father etc., who by chance brings about the convention of a word such as "Dittha" [some name] for his son etc., must be the possessor of such words. Let the matter rest here.

4.57. वायुपुराणे चार्यं ब्रह्मज्ञानवादः स्पष्ट एवोपलभ्यते—

रज्जावर्हिर्मरौ वारि नीलिमा गगने तथा ।
 असद्विश्वमिदं भाति यस्मिन्नज्ञानकल्पितम् ॥
 मूलज्ञाने पु- घटावच्छिन्न एवायं महाकाशो विभिक्षते ।
 राणं प्रमा- कार्योपाधिपरिच्छिन्नं तद्वयज्जीवसंज्ञकम् ॥
 णम् मायया चित्रकारिण्या विचित्रगुणशील्या ।
 ब्रह्माण्डं चित्रमतुलं यस्मिन्भित्ताविवापितम् ॥

(वा. पु. १०४ । ३९ । ४० । ४१ ।) इति ।

देवी भागवते देवीगीतायामपि—

अहमेवासं पूर्वं मे नान्यत्किञ्चिन्नगाधिप ।
 तदात्मरूपं चित्तं वित्परब्रह्मैकनामकम् ॥
 अप्रतर्क्यमनिर्देश्यमनौपम्यमनामयम् ।
 तस्य काचिद्वस्वतः सिद्धा शक्तिर्मायेति विश्रुता ॥
 न सती सा नासती सा नोभयात्मा विरोधतः ।
 एतद्विलक्षणा काचिद्वस्तुभूतास्ति सर्वदा ॥

(दे. गी. १ । २ । ४) इति ।

4.57. This teaching of knowledge about Brahman is found to be very clear in the Vayupurāṇa:

[Like] a snake upon a rope, water in a desert and blueness in the sky, in the same manner, this unreal universe which is superimposed by Ignorance appears in which [Brahman].

This space is divided only being limited by a pot. In the same way, what has the designation of an "individual soul" is limited by the limiting adjunct of the effect [i.e. the body].

The "egg of Brahmā", wonderful, without equal, was deposited, as it were, in a place in which [Brahman]

by māyā who is [like] a painter and whose nature consists of diverse qualities. (Vā.P.104, 39,40,41.)

Also in the Devīgītā in the Devībhāgavata:

O Lord of the mountains, I alone existed before.

There was nothing other than me. At that time, the nature of the Self has only the names:

"consciousness", "awareness", "supreme Brahman".

Of that [supreme Brahman] which is incomprehensible by reason, indescribable, without comparison and free from sorrow, there is some power which is self-established and which is well known as "māyā".

That [māyā] is not existent, nor is it non-existent, nor does it have the nature of both on account of the contradiction. It is something distinct from these and is at all times something substantial. (De.Gī.1.2.4.)³⁹

4.58.

विष्णुपुराणे द्वितीयांशे द्वादशाध्याये चार्यं ब्रह्माज्ञानवादो दृश्यते। तथा हि-
ज्योतीषि विष्णुर्भुवनानि विष्णुर्वनानि विष्णुर्गिरयो दिशश्च ।
नद्यः समुद्राश्च स एव सर्वे यदस्ति यन्नास्ति च विप्रवर्यं [वि. पु. २ । १२ । ३८] ।

विष्णुशब्दः परमात्मवाची । अत्र ज्योतिरादीनां सर्वेषां परमात्मतादात्म्यमुच्यते । ज्योतिरादिजगतः परमार्थत्वे तस्य परमात्मनः सकाशाद्भेदे च तादात्म्यं न संभवतीत्यतो ज्योतिरादिजगतः काल्पनिकत्वमेव वाच्यम् । कल्पना चाज्ञानमूलिकेत्यज्ञानवादः सिध्यति । एवं च ज्योतीषि विष्णुरित्यादि सामानाधिकरण्यं ज्योतिरादीनां बाधार्थमेव ।

4.58. This teaching of Ignorance in relation to Brahman is seen in the Viṣṇupurāṇa in the twelfth chapter of the second part. To elucidate:

O best among the twice-born, the stars are Viṣṇu, the worlds are Viṣṇu, the forests are Viṣṇu and the mountains and the directions, the rivers and the seas.

He alone is everything, what exists and what does not exist (Viṣ.P.2.12.38.).

The word "Viṣṇu" signifies the supreme Self. All the stars etc. are said here as having identity with the supreme Self. If the world consisting of the stars etc. is absolutely real and in the difference of that [world] from the supreme Self, then identity is not possible. Therefore, the world consisting of the stars etc. must be said to be only superimposed. And a superimposition has Ignorance as its basis. Thus the teaching about Ignorance is established. And so the grammatical apposition: "the stars are Viṣṇu" etc. is only for the purpose of the negation of the stars etc. [as having absolute reality].

4.59.

नन्वेतत्तादात्म्यं शरीरशरीरिभावमूलकम् ।
 'यस्य पृथिवी शरीरं यस्यापः शरीरम्' (बृ. ३ । ७ । ३-४) इति श्रुतौ
 यदम्बु वैष्णवः कायः (वि. पु. २ । १२ । ३७) तानि सर्वाणि तद्वपुः
 (वि० पु० १ । २२ । ८४) तत्सर्वं वै हरेस्तनुः (वि० पु० १ । २२ ।
 ३७) इति विष्णुपुराणे च पृथिव्यवादीनां सर्वेषां परमात्मशरीरत्वमुच्यते । यस्या-

विष्णुपुराणाद-
 प्यज्ञानसिद्धिः
 त्मा शरीरम् (श० ब्रा० १४ । ६ । ७ । ३०)
 इति श्रुतौ च जीवस्यापि परमात्मशरीरत्वमुच्यते ।
 लोके च शरीरशरीरिणोस्तादात्म्यं व्यपदिश्यते
 यथाऽयं जीवः कर्मभिर्गौऽरश्वो मनुष्यो देवो वा जात इतीति चेन्न । जीवजडयोः
 परमात्मना सह शरीरशरीरिभावसंबन्धाङ्गीकारेऽपि वस्तुतस्तादात्म्यस्याभा-
 वेन ज्योतीषि विष्णुरित्यादिप्रयोगासंगतेस्तादवस्थ्यात् । तादात्म्यं ह्येकसत्ता-
 कत्वम् । जीवोऽयं कर्मणा गौरश्वो मनुष्यो देवो वा जात इत्यादयः प्रयोगास्तु
 तादात्म्यारोपमूलकाः । न च ज्योतीषि विष्णुरित्यत्राप्यारोपितं तादात्म्यम-
 स्त्विति वाच्यम् । संभवन्त्यामुपपत्तावारोपाङ्गीकारस्यान्यायत्वात् ।

4.59. [objection] This identity is based upon the relation of body and the one embodied. In the sacred text: "whose body is the earth....whose body is water" (Bṛh.3.7.3,4.) and in the Viṣṇupurāṇa: "The water is the body of Viṣṇu" (Viṣ.P.2.12.37.), "all that is His body" (Viṣ.P.1.22.84.), "all that, is indeed the body of Hari" (Viṣ.P.1.22.37.) it is said that everything such as the earth, water etc. is the body of the supreme Self.

And in the sacred text: "whose body is the self" (Ś.Brā.14.6.7.30.) it is said that the individual soul too is the body of the supreme Self. And in the world, the identity between the body and the one embodied is spoken of, as for example: "this individual soul is born, on account of karma, as a cow, a horse, a human being or a god".

[reply] No. Because even upon accepting that the individual souls and inert matter have a connection with the supreme Self consisting of the relation of a body and the one embodied, there remains as before the incongruity of the usage such as: "the stars are Viṣṇu" since an identity does not exist in reality. Because identity means having the same degree of reality. But the usages such as: "this individual soul is born, on account of karma, as a cow, a horse, a human being or a god" are based upon the superimposition of identity. It should not be said: the identity must be superimposed here too: "the stars are Viṣṇu". [reason] Because when the logical tenability is possible, an acceptance of superimposition is not correct.

4.60. किंच जीवजडयोः परमात्मना सह शरीरशरीरिभावो न प्रमाणपदवीमारो-
हति । शरीरं हि कर्मजन्यफलभोगायतनं लोके
जीवजडयोर्नात्मशरी- प्रसिद्धम् । न चेश्वरस्य कर्मजन्यफलभोगाः
रत्वम् संभवन्ति । तथा च यस्य पृथिवी शरीरमित्यादौ
शरीरादिशब्दाः स्वरूपार्थकाः । दृश्यते हि शरीर-
शब्दः स्वरूपार्थकः शिलापुत्रकस्य शरीरमिति । यथा—तानि सर्वाणि तद्वपुः,
यदम्बु वैष्णवः कायः, तत्सर्वं वै हरेस्तनुः, इति विष्णुपुराणे कायवपुस्तनुशब्दा
अपि स्वरूपार्थका एव । विष्णुपुराण एवाशेषमूर्तिः (वि० पु० २ । १२ ।
३९) इत्यत्र स्वरूपपर्यायत्वेन प्रसिद्धस्य मूर्तिशब्दस्य प्रयोगदर्शनात् । अत
एव विष्णुपुराण एव विश्वरूपो यतोऽव्ययः (वि० पु० १ । २२ । ६८) द्वे
रूपे ब्रह्मणस्तस्य मूर्ते चामूर्तिमेव च (वि० पु० १ । २२ । ५३) इत्यत्र
रूपशब्दोक्तिः संगच्छते । ' विष्णुशक्तिः परा प्रोक्ता ' (वि० पु० ६ । ७ ।
६१) इत्यादौ शक्तिविभूतिशब्दावपि स्वरूपविशेषार्थकावेव । अन्यथा
' अशेषमूर्तिः ' ' विश्वरूपः ' इत्यादिविष्णुपुराणस्थवाक्यैरेकवाक्यता न स्यात् ।
एतेन तदेकधार्यं तदेकनियाम्यं तदेकशेषं शरीरमिति शरीरशब्दार्थनिर्वचनं
रूपशक्तिविभूतिशब्दानां तादृशार्थकत्वेन गतिकल्पनं चापास्तम् । भोगायतन
एव शरीरशब्दस्य लोके प्रसिद्धत्वात् । तदेवं बाधार्थेन ज्योतीषि विष्णुरिति
सामानाधिकरण्येन जगत्कल्पनामूलभूतमज्ञानं सिद्धम् ।

4.60. Furthermore, the relation of a body and the one embodied -on the part of the individual souls and inert matter with the supreme Self- does not admit of any proof. Because the body is well known in the world as the place for the experience of the results born of karma. And the Lord cannot possibly have the experiences of the results born of karma. And so words such as "body" etc. in: "whose body is the earth" etc. have the meaning of the essential nature. Because it is seen that the word "body" has the meaning of "essential nature" [in expressions like]: "the body of the grinding-stone" [i.e. the grinding-stone itself]. For instance the words "kāya", "vapu" and "tanu" too [which all denote body] in the Viṣṇupurāna: "all that is His body", "The water is the body of Viṣṇu", "all that, is indeed the body of Hari" only have the meaning of the essential nature. Because the word "form" (mūrti), which is well known as a synonym of "essential nature", is seen as having this usage here in the Viṣṇupurāna itself: "the entire form [of the world is not absolutely real]" (Viṣ.P.2.12.39.). For this reason, the mention of the word "form" (rūpa) agrees here in the Viṣṇupurāna itself: "the form of the universe, because He is unchanging" (Viṣ.P.1.2.68.), "That Brahman has two forms [i.e. a twofold nature], formful and formless" (Viṣ.P.1.22.53.).

Even the two words "power" (śakti) and "greatness" (vibhūti) in: "The supreme power of Viṣṇu has been told" (Viṣ.P.6.7.61.) etc. only have the meaning of the particular essential nature. Otherwise, there could be no consistency in meaning with statements in the Viṣṇupurāna such as: "the entire form", "the form of the universe" etc. On account of this, the etymological interpretation of the meaning of the word "body": a body is that which is solely to be supported, solely to be controlled and which is solely a part, -which is the supposition for the scope of the words "form", "power" and "greatness" as having such a meaning- is refuted. Because the word "body" is well known in the world only as the place for

experience. Thus the Ignorance which is the basis of the superimposition of the world is established due to the grammatical apposition: "the stars are Viṣṇu" which has the meaning of negation.

4.61.

किं चात्र चरणत्रयेण ज्योतिरादीन् कांश्चित्प्रसिद्धान्पदार्थविशेषान्निर्दिश्य
किमनया विशेषोक्त्येत्यभिप्रायेण चतुर्थचरणे
सर्वं परमात्मरूपम् यदस्ति यन्नास्ति तत्सर्वं स एवेत्युक्तम् । 'यदस्ति'
भावरूपेण प्रतीयमानं चेतनं जीवजातमचेतनं
घटादि च । 'यन्नास्ति' अभावरूपेण प्रतीयमानमस्तीति यन्न प्रतीयते शशशृ-
ङ्गादि मनोराज्यकल्पितं राज्यादि च । यद्यपि शशशृङ्गादीनां स्वरूपमेव नास्तीति
कथं तस्य परमात्मस्वरूपत्वं तथापि शशशृङ्गादीनां बाह्यस्वरूपाभावेऽपि बौद्धपरि-
कल्पितमान्तरं स्वरूपमस्त्येव । अत एव शशशृङ्गादिपदानामर्थवत्त्वात्प्रातिपदि-
कसंज्ञा व्याकरणे प्रतिपाद्यते । शशशृङ्गं नास्तीतिनिषेधप्रतियोगिनः प्रसिद्धि-
श्चात् एव । बाह्यस्वरूपेण नास्तीति हि तदर्थः । एतदुक्तं भवति—यदस्तीत्येवं
बाह्यं परिदृश्यते तत्सर्वं परमात्मैवेति किं वक्तव्यम् । यन्नास्ति बाह्यार्थपूर्वभाव्या-
न्तरं केवलं बुद्धिपरिकल्पितं च तदपि स एवेति । अनेन परमात्मनो विलक्षण-
वैभवशालित्वमुक्तं भवति ।

अन्तर्बहिश्च तत्सर्वं व्याप्य नारायणः स्थितः' (म० ना० १३ । १)

इति श्रुतावप्येतदेवोच्यते । आन्तरकल्पनोत्तरं च तत्तद्योग्यसा-
धनसामग्रीसत्त्वे क्वचित्तादृशाकारं बाह्यस्वरूपं दृश्यते यथा घटप्रासादादिषु ।
कुम्भकारो रथकारश्च प्रथमतो घटाकारं प्रासादाकारं च बुद्धावाकलय्य पश्चात्ता-
दृशाकारं घटं प्रासादं च निर्मिमीते । क्वचित्तु बाह्यस्वरूपं न दृश्यते यथा शश-
शृङ्गादिष्वित्यन्यत् । बाह्यस्वरूपेणासत् केवलं बुद्धिकल्पितं च शशशृङ्गाद्यज्ञा-
नमूलकमेवेत्यज्ञानं सिध्यति ।

4.61. Furthermore, having specified some particular things which are well known such as the stars etc. by the three sections of the verse, in the fourth section it was said: "what exists and what does not exist, all that is He alone" with the intended meaning that: what is the need of this statement of particulars? "What exists" is recognized as something which is an actual entity: the entire class of individual souls, which are sentient, and pots etc. which are insentient. "What does not exist" is recognized as something which is not an actual entity, i.e. what is not recognized as "it exists" such as the horns of a rabbit etc. and a kingdom

etc. which is imaginary, a "castle in the air". Although the horns of a rabbit etc. certainly do not have an essential nature and so [it could be asked]: "how does that [non-existent essential nature] have the supreme Self as its essential nature?", still, even though the horns of a rabbit etc. do not have an externally existing essential nature, an internal essential nature certainly exists which is a mental superimposition. For this very reason, because words such as "horns of a rabbit" etc. are meaningful, the technical term "word-stem" (prātipadika)⁴⁰ is taught in grammar. And for this very reason, the counter correlate of the negation "the rabbit's horn does not exist" is well known. For the meaning of that is: it does not exist as an externally existing essential nature. This is what is said: the external thing which is visible in the manner "what exists", all that is the supreme Self alone. So what can be said? What does not exist means something internal which is to be conceived prior to the external thing and which is only superimposed by the intellect, that too is He [the supreme Self] alone. On account of this, the supreme Self is said to be endowed with extraordinary greatness. This is indeed what is expressed in the sacred text as well:

Nārāyaṇa remains, having pervaded everything that is
internal and external (M.NĀ.13.5.).

Subsequent to the internal conception, if the apparatus which is the proper means for those respective things exists, then the external nature having such a form is seen somewhere. Just as in the case of a pot or a palace etc. The potter and the carpenter, having firstly considered the appearance of the pot and the appearance of the palace in the mind, subsequently construct the pot and the palace having such an appearance. But somewhere no externally existing nature is seen, just as in the case of a rabbit's horns etc. And that is another thing. The horns of a rabbit etc., which do not exist as an external nature and which are only superimposed by the intellect, have only Ignorance as their basis and so

Ignorance is established.

4.62. किं चासतः परमात्मशरीरत्वं न संभवति । जीवानां हि साक्षात्परमात्मशरीरत्वम् । अचेतनानां तु जीवद्वारैव । ' अनेन जीवेनात्मनाऽनुप्राविश्य नामरूपे व्याकरवाणीति ब्रह्मात्मकजीवानुप्रवेशेनैव सर्वेषां वस्तुत्वं शब्दवाच्यत्वं च ' (श्रीभा० पृ० ११२ प० १९) इति हि भवतैवोच्यते । ' काष्ठलोष्टादिष्वपि चैतन्यमस्त्येव किं त्वनुद्भूतम् ' इति च भवदीयः सिद्धान्तः । तथा चासतो जीवशरीरत्वाभावेन न परमात्मशरीरत्वसंभवः । जीवशरीरत्वं तु न कथमप्यसतः संभवति । भोगाभावात् ।

यत्तु 'यदस्तीत्यत्र चिदंशोऽविनाशित्वेनास्तिशब्दवाच्यः । अचिदंशस्तु विनाशीति नास्तिशब्दाभिधेयः ' (श्रीभा० पृ० १०४ प० ८) इत्युक्तं तन्न । अचेतनानां घटादीनां भावरूपेण प्रतीयमानानां नास्त्यसत्यादिशब्दैः काप्युच्यमानत्वाभावात् । प्रसिद्धिविरुद्धोऽप्ययमर्थः केवलं रामानुजीयैर्वाधार्थं सामानाधिकरण्यमनङ्गीकुर्वद्भिः शरीरशरीरिभावमूलकं सामानाधिकरण्यमिति स्वमतेनास्य श्लोकस्योपपत्तये स्वीकृत इति कथं श्रद्धेयः स्यात् । यदम्बु वैष्णवः कायः (वि० पु० २ । १२ । ३७) इत्यादौ कायादिशब्दा रूपमूर्तिशक्तिविभूत्यादिशब्दैरेकार्थत्वोपपत्तये स्वरूपार्थका इत्यनुपदमेवोक्तम् ।

4.62. Furthermore, the "non-existent" [i.e. the insentient matter] is not possible to be the body of the supreme Self. Because the individual souls are directly the body of the supreme Self. Whereas the insentient things [are the body of the supreme Self] only by means of the individual soul. For you yourself have said (Śrī.B.Para.73.p.167.):

Everything [is taught] as being of the nature of an entity and being expressible through words only on account of the entry of the individual soul who has Brahman as its Self: "having entered along with this individual self, I shall manifest name and form".

And your own established conclusion is: consciousness certainly exists even in a piece of wood or a clod of earth etc., but it is unmanifest. So because the "non-existent" [i.e. the insentient matter] is not the body of the individual soul, there is no possibility of it being the body of the supreme Self. The "non-existent" is in no way possible to be the body of

the individual soul. Because there is no experience [of such a thing].

But what has been said (Śrī.B.Para.69.p.155.)⁴¹:

the sentient portion can be expressed by the word

"it exists" here: "what exists", because it is

imperishable. But the insentient portion is

perishable and so it can be denoted by the word

"it does not exist".

That is not so. Because insentient things such as pots etc., which are perceived as something existing, are not expressed anywhere by words such as "it does not exist", "untrue" etc. Even though this meaning is contradictory to what is well known, Rāmānuja has only accepted it for bringing about the logical possibility of this verse according to his own view that grammatical apposition is based upon the relation of body and the one embodied, for he does not accept that grammatical apposition is for the purpose of negation. So how can [this meaning] be trustworthy? It was mentioned just previously that words such as "body" etc. in: "The water is the body of Viṣṇu" (Viṣ.P.2.12.37.) etc. have the meaning of the essential nature, for the logical possibility of oneness of meaning with the words "form" (rūpa), "form" (mūrti), "power" (śakti), "greatness" (vibhūti) etc.

comment

Rāmānuja maintains that the sentient souls and insentient matter are the body of the Lord which is mentioned in such verses as: "The water is the body of Viṣṇu" (Viṣ.P.2.12.37.). Abhyankar's last sentence restates the position that words such as "body" are used in the sense of "essential nature", i.e. the water etc. are of the nature of Viṣṇu.

4.63. ज्योतींषि विष्णुरित्यनेन श्लोकेन यदुक्तं सर्वं परमात्मैवेति तदुक्तिमात्रेण न सिध्यति किं तु तत्र हेतुः प्रदर्शनीय इत्याह—

ज्ञानस्वरूपो भगवान्यतोऽसावशेषमूर्तिर्न तु वस्तुभूतः ।

ततो हि शैलाब्धिधरादिभेदाज्जानीहि विज्ञानत्रिजृम्भितानि ॥

(वि० पु० २ । १२ । ३९)

अत्र यत इत्यनेन पूर्वश्लोकोक्तार्थेऽयं हेतुरिति बोध्यते । यस्मादयं भगवान्-
 न्परमार्थतो ज्ञानस्वरूपोऽस्ति । अशेषमूर्तिः इदं सर्वं परमात्मैवेत्युक्तरीत्याऽशेष-
 जगत्स्वरूपकस्तु न वस्तुभूतः । एतत्स्वरूपं सर्वं
 प्रपञ्चस्याज्ञानवि- विज्ञानविजृम्भितं मिथ्यैव । विविधं ज्ञायतेऽनेनेति
 जृम्भितत्त्वम् विज्ञानं मूलभूताज्ञानम् । अथवा विज्ञानेऽधिष्ठान-
 भूते ज्ञानस्वरूपे ब्रह्मणि विजृम्भितानि कल्पि-
 तानि । कल्पनामयं वस्तु चाविद्याकार्यं मिथ्याभूतमेव । मिथ्याभूतं वस्तु च
 तत्त्वतोऽधिष्ठानमेवेति ज्योतिरादि सर्वं परमात्मैवेति पूर्वश्लोकोक्तार्थः सिद्धः ।
 अत्र ' न तु वस्तुभूतः, विज्ञानविजृम्भितानि ' इत्येवं जगतो मिथ्यात्वोक्त्या
 मिथ्यावस्तुमूलभूतमज्ञानं दृढीकृतम् ।

4.63. What has been told by this verse: "the stars are Viṣṇu" is that everything is the supreme Self alone. That is not established merely by a statement, but a reason has to be shown there. Hence he [the sage Parāśara] says:

Because the Lord is of the nature of Knowledge, He is all forms but not an object. Therefore you should understand that the distinctions of mountains, oceans, earth etc. are displayed in Knowledge (Viṣ.P.2.12.39.).

By this [word] "because", it is made known that this is the reason for the meaning told in the previous verse ["the stars are Viṣṇu"]. [The meaning is]: because this Lord (bhagavān) is, in reality, of the nature of Knowledge (jñānasvarūpaḥ). All forms (aśeṣamūrṭiḥ) means the entire world is His nature in the way that was told: all this is the supreme Self alone, but He is not an object (na tu vastubhūtaḥ). Everything, having this [Lord] as its essential nature, is certainly false as it is displayed in Knowledge (viññānavijṛmbhitāni). Knowledge (viññāna) means: "diversity is known through which [knowledge]"and it refers to the Ignorance which is the basis [for the appearance of diversity]. Alternatively⁴², [everything] is displayed (vijṛmbhitāni) i.e. superimposed in Knowledge (viññāna) which is the substratum, i.e. in Brahman whose nature is Knowledge. An object consisting of being a superimposition is an effect of Ignorance and is

certainly false. And an object which is false is, in reality, only the [nature of the] substratum. So the meaning told in the previous verse: everything such as the stars etc. is the supreme Self alone, is established. The Ignorance which is the basis of the false objects is firmly established here by the statement concerning the falsity of the world: "but not an object", "displayed in Knowledge".

4.64.

यच्च 'इदमस्त्यात्मकमिदं नास्त्यात्मकम्, अस्य च नास्त्यात्मकत्वे हेतुरयमित्याह-ज्ञानस्वरूपो भगवान्यतोऽसाविति' (श्रीभा० पृ० १०५ प० ५) इति ज्ञानस्वरूप इति श्लोकावतरणमुक्तं तच्चिन्त्यम् । ज्योतीषि विष्णुरिति पूर्वश्लोके हि सर्वं स एवेति विधेयम् । यदस्ति यन्नास्तीति त्वनुवादः । यच्छब्दयोगेनानुवादत्वं स्पष्टीकृतं च । उत्तरवाक्योपात्तो हेतुश्च पूर्ववाक्यगतविधेयांशस्यैव नानुद्यमानांशस्येति वाक्यार्थत्रिदो मन्यन्ते । अत इदमवतरणमयुक्तम् । 'अस्तीति प्रतीयमानमप्यचेतनं घटादि नास्तीत्यनेनोच्यते' इति विपरीतं स्वीकृत्य तत्समर्थनायायं प्रयत्नोऽप्यनूद्यमानांशे हेतुत्वाभिधानमित्ययं विपरीत एवेति व्यर्थ एव

प्रतिकूलतामुपगते हि विधौ विकलत्वमेति बहुसाधनता ॥ इति ।

ज्ञानस्वरूप इति श्लोकोक्तं शैलादिभेदानामज्ञानविजृम्भितत्वमेव स्थिरी करोति—

यदा तु शुद्धं निजरूपि सर्वकर्मक्षये ज्ञानमपास्तदोषम् ।

तदा हि संकल्पतरोः फलानि भवन्ति नो वस्तुषु वस्तुभेदाः ॥

(वि० पु० २ । १२ । ४०)

शुद्धमविद्यारहितम् । निजरूपि भेददर्शनरहितम् । दोषा रागादयः । समन्तात्कल्प्यते भेदोऽनेनेति संकल्पोऽविद्या ।

4.64. The introduction to the verse "the nature of Knowledge" which was told (Śrī.B.Para.69.p.156.):

This [the soul] is of the nature of existence and this

[inert matter] is of the nature of non-existence. And

this is the reason for this [inert matter] having the

nature of non-existence, hence he says: "Because the

Lord is of the nature of Knowledge"

is questionable. Because in the previous verse "the stars are Viṣṇu", the

predicate is: "He alone is everything". But "what exists and what does not exist" is a restatement. The nature of being a restatement is made clear through the use of the word "what". The knowers of the meaning of sentences [i.e. Mīmāṃsakas] consider that a reason mentioned in a later sentence is only for the predicate portion in the previous sentence, not for a portion being restated. Therefore this introduction is incorrect. Having accepted what is the reverse i.e. the insentient pots etc., though they are recognized as "what exists", are expressed by this "what does not exist", this effort too for establishing that -which is the mentioning of the reason for a portion being restated- is certainly contrary and so [this effort] is quite meaningless.

For when fate has become contrary, resourcefulness is reduced to uselessness (Śiśu.9.6.).

He [Parāśara] indeed confirms what was told in the verse "the nature of Knowledge", which is that the different things such as mountains etc. are displayed by Ignorance:

But when Knowledge is pure, natural and free from defects upon the wasting away of all action, then indeed the differences among objects, which are the fruits of the tree of conception, do not exist in things (Viṣ.P.2.12.40.).

"Pure" (suddham) means devoid of Ignorance. "Natural" (nijarūpi) means free from the perception of difference. "Defects" (doṣāḥ) means attachment etc. "Conception" (saṅkalpa) means Ignorance, [the derivation is]: difference is completely (samantāt) conceived (kalpyate) due to this.

- 4.65. यत्त्वेतच्छ्लोकव्याख्यानम् 'समित्येकीकारे । जीवस्य देहेन सहैकीकृत्य कल्पनं संकल्पोऽहं देवोऽहं मनुष्य इत्यादिः । एतन्मूलकमेव कर्म । कर्ममूलका एव कर्मफलभोगाय भोग्यभूता वस्तुभेदाः । ते देहात्मभ्रमनिवृत्तौ वस्तुतो विद्यमाना अपि भोगाय न भवन्तीति' (श्रीभा० पृ० १०५ प० १७) इति ताच्चि-

न्त्यम् । वस्तुभेदानां ज्ञानिदृष्ट्या वस्तुतोविद्यमानत्वाभावात् । किंचायमर्थोऽ-
स्माच्छ्लोकात्स्वरसतो न लभ्यते । उक्तः संकल्पपदार्थोऽप्रसिद्धः । भोगाये-
त्यध्याहारे क्लेशः । निषेध्यतावच्छेदकं च भोग्यत्वमिति तत्प्रदर्शकं मुख्यमेव
भोगायेति पदं कथमध्याहारेणापि लभ्येत । अन्यथा विधौ ' न ' इत्यध्याहा-
रेण विपरीतार्थकल्पने बहुव्याकुली स्यात् ।

4.65. But the explanation of this verse [above] (Śrī.B.Para.69.p.157.)⁴³:

"Sam" [in the word "saṅkalpa"] has the sense of uniting.

The assumption of the individual soul, having united with the body, is the conception (saṅkalpa) that: "I am a god", "I am a human being" etc. Karma alone is the basis of this [wrong conception]. The differences among objects, which are able to be experienced, are for the experience of the result of karma and they indeed have karma as their basis. Those [differences among objects], though existing in reality, do not exist for experience upon the cessation of the error that the body is the self.

That is questionable. Because according to the understanding of one who knows [the truth], differences among objects do not exist in reality. Moreover, this meaning is not acquired in a natural way from this verse. The meaning of the word "conception" (saṅkalpa) which was told is not well known. There is difficulty in supplying the ellipsis: "for experience". The nature of being able to be experienced is the determining factor in relation to what is to be negated [i.e. "they do not exist for experience"] so how can the word "for experience", which indeed principally reveals that [what is to be negated], be acquired just by an ellipsis? Otherwise, in the case of an injunction ["do such and such"] there would be much confusion upon the assumption of a contrary meaning by supplying the ellipsis "not".

4.66.

यत्तु 'वस्तुभेदा न भवन्तीत्यचिद्वस्तुनः कादाचित्कावस्थायोगितया नास्ति-
शब्दाभिधेयत्वम्' (श्रीभा० पृ० १०६ प० २) इत्युक्तं तत्रेत्यमुच्यते—कादा-
चित्कावस्थायोगिनस्तदानीं नास्तिशब्दाभिधेयत्वं लोके न क्वापि प्रतीयते। किंच
वस्तुभेदाः कादाचित्का विनाशिन इति सत्यम्। किंतु तेषां कादाचित्कत्वं
विनाशित्वं वा 'विद्यमाना अपि भोगाय न भवन्ति' इत्युक्त्या कथमभिधी-
यते सूच्यते वेति विपश्चित एव विदांकुर्वन्तु।

4.66. But what has been said (Śrī.B.Para.69.p.157.)⁴⁴:

"the differences among objects do not exist", so
an insentient thing is to be denoted by the word
"it does not exist" because it is connected with
states which are occasional.

In regard to that, it is said in this manner: it is not recognized anywhere
in the world that a thing having connection to an occasional state can be
denoted, at any time, by the word "it does not exist". Moreover, it is
true that the differences among objects, being occasional, are destructible.
But intelligent people must certainly discern: how is the occasional nature
or the destructibility of those [differences] directly expressed or indic-
ated by the statement "though existing, they do not exist for experience"?

4.67.

जगदुपलब्धिप्रकारेणापि वस्तुभेदानामसत्यत्वोपपादनद्वारा पुनरज्ञानं श्लोक-
द्वयेन स्थिरी करोति—

वस्त्वस्ति किं कुत्रचिदादिमध्यपर्यन्तहीनं सततैकरूपम् ।

यच्चान्यथात्वं द्विज याति भूयो न तत्तथा कुत्र कुतो हि तत्त्वम् ॥

(वि० पु० २ । १२ । ४१)

अनेन श्लोकेनार्थस्वभाव उक्तः ।

महीं घटत्वं घटतः कपालिका कपालिका चूर्णरजस्ततोऽणवः ।

जनैः स्वकर्मास्तिमितात्मनिश्चयैरालक्ष्यते ब्रूहि किमत्र वस्तु ॥

(वि० पु० २ । १२ । ४२)

पूर्वश्लोकोक्तार्थस्वभावस्योदाहरणमनेन प्रदर्शितम् ।

4.67. In the [following] two verses he [Parāśara] establishes Ignorance

once again, by means of demonstrating the unreality of the differences among objects even according to the way of experience in the world. The essential meaning is expressed by this verse:

Is there an object anywhere which is without a beginning, middle or an end, which has one constant nature? O twice born, what undergoes a change of state does not have that same condition once again. So where and why is it real? (Viṣ.P.2.12.41.)

The illustration for the essential meaning told in the previous verse is shown by this:

Earth becomes a pot, from the pot come the fragments, the fragments become dust and then minute particles. Say, is there an object here? [Though] it is beheld [as an object] by people whose ascertainment of the Self is impeded by their own karma (Viṣ.P.2.12.42.).

4.68.

ततः परमात्मव्यतिरि-

क्तस्य मिथ्यात्वमुपसंहरति—

तस्मान्न विज्ञानमृतेऽस्ति किञ्चित्कचित्कदाचिद्विज वस्तुजातम् ।
विज्ञानमेकं निजकर्मभेदभिन्नचित्तैर्वहुधाभ्युपेतम् ॥

(वि० पु० २ । १२ । ४३)

अत्र पूर्वाधे विजातीयभेदनिषेधः सूचितः । उत्तरार्धे सजातीयभेदनिषेधः सूचितः । भेददर्शननिमित्ताज्ञानमूलं कर्मेवेति च स्फुटीकृतम् । यत्तु तस्मान्न विज्ञानमृतेऽस्ति किञ्चिदित्यस्य 'विज्ञानव्यतिरिक्तं जडवस्तु केवलास्तिशब्दवाच्यं न भवति' इत्यवतरणमुक्तं (श्रीभा० पृ० १०६ प० २०) तदयुक्तम् । श्लोकात्तादृशार्थाऽप्रतीतेः । न ह्यस्तीत्यस्य केवलास्तिशब्दवाच्यमित्यर्थः । लक्षणाप्रसङ्गात् । किं च जडवस्तुनः केवलास्तिशब्दवाच्यत्वाभावेऽपीदानीमत्र घटोऽस्तीत्येवं कालविशेषदेशविशेषोपाधिकास्तिशब्दवाच्यत्वमस्त्येवेति जडवस्तुनो नास्तिशब्दाभिधेयत्वं न सिध्यति ।

4.68. Then he concludes that what is other than the supreme Self is false:

Therefore, O twice born, other than Knowledge there is no collection of objects whatsoever, anywhere, at any time. Knowledge, which is one, is accepted as manifold by those whose minds are divided by the variety of their own karma (Viṣ.P.2.12.43.).

In the first half here, the negation of difference [in respect of Knowledge] with regard to something belonging to another class is indicated. In the latter half, the negation of difference belonging to its own class is indicated. And it is made clear that karma alone is the basis for the Ignorance which is the cause of the perception of difference.

But the introduction which was stated (Śrī.B.Para.70.p.158.)⁴⁵ for this: "Therefore, ...other than Knowledge there is no [collection of objects] whatsoever":

an inert object, which is different from Knowledge, is not able to be expressed solely by the word "it exists".

That is not correct. Because there is no cognition of such a meaning from the verse. This [word in the verse] "is" certainly does not have the meaning of "able to be expressed solely by the word 'it exists' ". Because there is the consequence of implication. Moreover, although an inert object cannot be expressed solely by the word "it exists", it can certainly be expressed by the word "it exists" which has a particular time and a particular place as its adjunct: "the pot exists here at this time". So it is not established that an inert object can be denoted by the word "it does not exist".

4.69. भेदश्च सर्वो मिथ्याभूतोऽज्ञानकल्पित एव । यतो ब्रह्मणि वस्तुतः स्वगतोऽपि
भेदो नास्तीत्याह—

ज्ञानं विशुद्धं विमलं विशोकमशेषलोभादिनिरस्तसङ्गम् ।

एकं सदैकं परमः परेशः स वासुदेवो न यतोऽन्यदस्ति ॥

(वि० पु० २ । १२ । ४४)

अत्र पूर्वार्धे धर्मधर्मिकृतोऽपि भेदो नास्तीति सूच्यते । उत्तरार्धे एकमित्युक्त्या त्रिविधभेदाभावोऽनूद्यते । सदैकं जन्मवृद्ध्यादिरहितम् । न यतोऽन्यदस्तीत्यनेन जगन्मिथ्यात्वबोधनद्वारा तन्मूलभूतमज्ञानं दृढीकृतम् । उक्तमुपसंहरति—

सद्भाव एवं भवतो मयोक्तो ज्ञानं यथा सत्यमसत्यमन्यत् ।

एतत्तु यत्संव्यवहारभूतं तत्रापि चोक्तं भुवनाश्रितं ते ॥

(वि० पु० २ । १२ । ४५)

अत्रासत्यमन्यदित्यनेन ज्ञानव्यतिरिक्तस्य सर्वस्य मिथ्यात्वं बोध्यते । सर्वमिथ्या चेद्व्यवहारविषयता कथमित्यत आह—एतदिति । तत्रापि चोक्तं मूलकारणमज्ञानमुक्तमित्यर्थः ।

4.69. All difference, being false, is only superimposed by Ignorance. Because even an internal difference does not exist, in reality, in Brahman. Hence he [Parāśara] says:

Knowledge is completely pure, free from taint, free from sorrow, devoid of contact with all [things such as] greed etc. It is one, always one and it is that supreme Lord Vāsudeva other than whom there is nothing (Viṣ.P.2.12.44.).

In the first half here, it is indicated that even the difference caused by the relation of attribute and its possessor does not exist. In the latter half, the absence of the three types of difference is restated by the expression "one". "Always one" means free from [the sixfold modifications] such as birth, increase, etc.⁴⁶ Through making known the falsity of the world by this: "other than whom there is nothing", the Ignorance which is the basis of that [false world] is firmly established.

He sums up what has been said:

I have thus told you what is reality: Knowledge is real, what is other is unreal. And what pertains to ordinary relations, on which the world depends, has been told to you there also (Viṣ.P.2.12.45.).

Here, the falsity of everything different from Knowledge is made known by this: "what is other is unreal". If everything is false, how is there scope for ordinary relations? Therefore he says: "this [which pertains to ordinary relations]". "And...has been told there also" means that the Ignorance which is the primary cause has been told.

4.70.

अत्रेदं बोध्यम्—ज्योतीषीति श्लोके ज्योतिरादिपदान्युद्देश्यसमर्पकाणि ।
 विष्णुपदं विधेयपरम् । ज्योतिरादीनां दृश्यमानस्वरूपेण मिथ्यात्वबोधनाय
 परमात्मतादात्म्यं विधीयते । तादात्म्यविधानं
 विष्णुपुराणवचन-
 तात्पर्यम्
 हुद्देश्यतावच्छेदकरूपेणोद्देश्यस्य मिथ्यात्वबोध-
 नायैव । यद्रजतं सा शुक्तिरिति यथा । तथा च
 ज्योतीषीत्यादिषु पदसु श्लोकेषु ' विष्णुः,
 ज्ञानस्वरूपो भगवान्, शुद्धं निजरूपे, ज्ञानं, विज्ञानमेकं, ज्ञानं विशुद्धम् एकं
 सदैकम् स वासुदेवः, ज्ञानं सत्यम् ' इत्येतानि पदानि प्रथमश्लोकविधेयभूत-
 ज्ञानस्वरूपब्रह्मबोधकानि । तथा ' ज्योतीषी भुवनानि वनानि गिरयो दिशो
 नद्यः समुद्रा यदास्ति यन्नास्ति, न तु वस्तुभूतः शैलादिभेदान् विज्ञानविजृम्भ-
 तानि, संकल्पतरोः फलानि वस्तुभेदाः, विज्ञानमृते वस्तुजातम्, न यतोऽन्यदास्ति,
 असत्यमन्यत् '—इत्येतानि पदानि प्रथमश्लोकगतोद्देश्यभूतमिथ्यावस्तुबोध-
 कानि । श्लोकप्रबन्धात्स्वरसतस्तथैवावर्थावगतेः । एतेन 'ज्योतीषीति प्रथमश्लोके
 यदास्ति यन्नास्तीति प्रक्रान्तस्य सद्भाव एवमिति षष्ठे श्लोके सत्यमसत्यमित्युप-
 संहारः ' (श्रीभा० पृ० १०७ प० १४) इत्यपास्तम् । स्वरसतस्तादृगर्थान्व-
 गमात् । ज्ञानं यथा सत्यामिति सत्यमित्यस्य ज्ञानमित्यनेनान्वितत्वात्तस्य च
 प्रथमश्लोकगतविधेयबोधकत्वात्तेन सत्यमित्यनेन प्रथमश्लोकगतस्य यन्नास्तीत्य-
 स्योद्देश्यभूतस्योपसंहारासंभवात् । तथा च यदास्ति यन्नास्तीति द्वयोरप्यन्यदसत्य-
 मित्यनेनैवोपसंहारः ।

4.70. This is to be understood here: in the verse "the stars [are Viṣṇu]", the words "stars" etc. denote the subject. The word "Viṣṇu" relates to the predicate. Since the stars etc. are of a nature which is visible, their identity with the supreme Self is enjoined to make known their falsity. For the enjoining of identity is only to make known the falsity of the subject in the form of being the determining factor of the state of being the subject. Just as here: "what is silver, that is the pearl-oyster". And so in the six verses beginning with "the stars", these words: "Viṣṇu"

(2.12.38.), "...the Lord is of the nature of Knowledge" (2.12.39.), "... Knowledge is pure, natural" (2.12.40.), "Knowledge, which is one" (2.12.43.), "Knowledge is completely pure... It is one, always one and is that Vāsudeva" (2.12.44.), "Knowledge is real" (2.12.45.) make known Brahman who is of the nature of Knowledge and who is the predicate in the first sentence ["the stars are Viṣṇu..."].

So too, these words: "the stars, worlds, forests, mountains, the directions, rivers, seas, what exists and what does not exist" (2.12.38.), "...but not an object...the distinctions of mountains etc. are displayed in Knowledge" (2.12.39.), "...the differences among objects, which are the fruits of the tree of conception" (2.12.40.), "...other than Knowledge there is [no] collection of objects" (2.12.43.), "...other than whom there is nothing" (2.12.44.), "...what is other is unreal" (2.12.45.) make known the false things which are the subject in the first verse. Because the comprehension of the meaning in that very manner is derived in a natural way from the continuity of the verses. On account of this, [the statement] (Śrī.B.Para.70.p.159.)⁴⁷:

the conclusion: "real", "unreal" occurring in the sixth verse "what is reality" is for what was begun: "what exists and what does not exist" in the first verse "the stars..."

is set aside. Because there is no comprehension of such a meaning in a natural way. Because this [word] "real" is connected grammatically with this [word] "Knowledge": "Knowledge is real" and because that [word "Knowledge"] makes known the predicate in the first verse, therefore there is no possibility of summing up this: "[what exists and] what does not exist" -which is the subject in the first verse- by this [word] "real". And so the summation of even both: "what exists and what does not exist" is only by this: "what is other is unreal".

4.71.

एवं स्थिते ' अत्र निर्विशेषे परे ब्रह्मणि तदाश्रये सदस-
दनिर्वचनीये चाज्ञाने जगतस्तत्कल्पितत्वे वाऽनुगुणं किञ्चिदापि पदं न दृश्यते '
(श्रीभा० पृ० १०८ प० १) इति वचः साहसमात्रमेव । ' ज्ञानस्वरूपो
भगवान्, शुद्धं निजरूपि ज्ञानमपास्तदोषम्, ज्ञानं विशुद्धं विमलं विशोकमशेष-
लोभादिनिरस्तसङ्गम्, एकम् ' इत्येतानि पदानि निर्विशेषे परे ब्रह्मण्यनु-
गुणानि । ' विज्ञानविजृम्भितानि, संकल्पतरोः फलानि ' इत्येतान्यज्ञाने
जगतस्तत्कल्पितत्वे चानुगुणानि । ' विज्ञानमृते न वस्तुजातं, न यतोऽन्यदस्ति,
असत्यमन्यत् ' इत्येतानि च जगतस्तत्कल्पितत्वेऽनुगुणानि बोध्यानि । अज्ञानस्य
जगद्रूपकार्यकरणान्नासत्त्वम् । कार्यस्य जगतो मिथ्यात्वाच्च न सत्त्वमिति
कारणीभूताज्ञानस्य सदसदनिर्वचनीयत्वं फलति । नतु तदत्र प्रत्यक्षतः शब्दे-
नोच्यते । एतेन ' अस्तिनास्तिस्त्यासत्यशब्दानां च सदसदनिर्वचनीयव-
स्त्वभिधानासामर्थ्याच्च ' (श्रीभा० पृ० १०८ प० ६) इति प्रत्युक्तम् ।

4.71. When it is thus established, the sentence (Śrī.B.Para.71.p.160.):

Here [in these verses], no word whatsoever is seen
which is conformable to the supreme Brahman being
free from distinction, and to an Ignorance having
that [Brahman] as its locus and which is indeterminable
as either existent or non-existent, or to the world
being superimposed due to that [Ignorance]

is only mere temerity. These words: "...the Lord is of the nature of
Knowledge", "...Knowledge is pure, natural and free from defects",
"Knowledge is completely pure, free from taint, free from sorrow, devoid
of contact with all [things such as] greed etc. It is one..." are
conformable to the supreme Brahman being free from distinction. These:
"...displayed in Knowledge", "...the fruits of the tree of conception" are
conformable to Ignorance and to the world being superimposed due to that
[Ignorance]. And these: "...other than Knowledge there is no collection
of objects...", "...other than whom there is nothing", "...what is other
is unreal" should be understood as conformable to the world being
superimposed due to that [Ignorance]. Ignorance is not non-existent because
it produces an effect in the form of the world. And it is not existent

because the world which is its effect is false. Thus Ignorance -which is the cause- has the consequence of being indeterminable as either existent or non-existent. But that is not said here directly by a word. On account of this, [the statement] (Śrī.B.Para.71.p.160.):

And because the words "exists", "does not exist", "real" and "unreal" are incapable of directly expressing a thing which is indeterminable as either existent or non-existent

is answered.

4.72.

यत्तु 'अत्र चाचिद्वस्तुनि नास्त्यसत्यशब्दौ न तुच्छत्वमिथ्यात्वपरौ प्रयुक्तौ । अपि तु विनाशित्वपरौ । वस्त्वस्ति किं मही घटत्वमित्यत्र विनाशित्वमेव ह्युपादितं न निष्प्रमाणकत्वं ज्ञानवाध्यत्वं वा' (श्रीभा० पृ० १०८ पृ० ९) इत्युक्तं तन्न । वस्त्वस्ति किं मही घटत्वमित्यत्र शाब्दमर्यादया जडार्थानां प्रतिक्षणमन्यथात्वमुच्यते । तस्माच्च यद्यपि विनाशित्वमुपादितं भवति तथापि न तदुपादाने तत्तात्पर्यम् । तत्रैव श्लोके 'ब्रूहि किमत्र वस्तु' इत्युक्तेः । तथा च प्रतिक्षणमन्यथात्वं वस्तुत्वाभावबोधने हेतुरिति पुराणकाराणां विवक्षितं प्रतीयते । वस्तु, सत्यं, तत्त्वमिति पर्यायाः । तथा च वस्तुत्वाभावः सत्यत्व-भावः, असत्यत्वं, मिथ्यात्वमिति यावत् । ज्योतींषि विष्णुरित्युपक्रमे च ज्योतिरादीनां परमात्मसामानाधिकरण्योक्त्या ज्योतिरादीनां ज्योतिरादिरूपेणासत्यत्वमेव सूचितम् । मध्ये च न तु वस्तुभूतः, विज्ञानविजृम्भितानि, संकल्पतरोः फलानि, इत्यनेनासत्यत्वमेवोक्तं भवति । वस्त्वस्ति किं मही घटत्वमित्यत्र च प्रतिक्षणान्यथात्वरूपं हेतुं प्रदर्श्य तदेव दृढीकृतम् । अन्ते च तस्मान्नेत्यत्र 'विज्ञानमृते न किञ्चिद्वस्तु' इति ज्ञानं विशुद्धमित्यत्र च न यतोऽन्यदस्तीति च स्पष्टमेवोक्तम् । उपसंहारे च सद्भाव एवमित्यत्र ज्ञानं यथा सत्यमसत्यमन्यदित्युक्तम् । तेन चासत्यस्य ज्ञानवाध्यत्वमर्थादुक्तं भवति । तस्माज्जडार्थानां मिथ्यात्वं सिध्यत्येवेत्यास्तां तावत् ।

4.72. But what has been said (Śrī.B.Para.71.p.161.):

And here, with regard to an insentient thing, the two words "does not exist" and "unreal" are not used to denote fictitiousness or falsity but they refer to destructibility. Because only destructibility is

demonstrated here: "Is there an object...?", "Earth becomes a pot", not a thing devoid of proof or which can be sublated by knowledge.

That is not so. The inert objects are said to be in a different state at every moment on account of the extent [of the meaning] pertaining to the words here: "Is there an object...?", "Earth becomes a pot". And therefore even though destructibility is demonstrated, nevertheless their purport does not lie in demonstrating that. For there is the statement in the same verse there: "Say, is there an object here?". And so what the author of the Purāṇa intended to say is recognized as: being in a different state at every moment is the reason for making known the absence of an object.

"Object" (vastu), "real" (satyam) and "truth" (tattvam) are synonyms. And so the absence of the nature of being an object [i.e. the absence of being a really existing thing] is the absence of reality and unreality means being false. And in the beginning: "the stars are Viṣṇu", the stars etc. are certainly indicated as unreal in the form of stars etc. on account of the statement that the stars and so forth have grammatical apposition with the supreme Self. And in the middle [verses], unreality is certainly expressed by this: "...but not an object", "...displayed in Knowledge", "...the fruits of the tree of conception". And here: "Is there an object...?", "Earth becomes a pot", that [unreality] is only confirmed by showing the reason which is the nature of being in a different state at every moment. And in the conclusion, [unreality] has been very clearly told: "...other than Knowledge there is no collection of objects whatsoever" here [occurring in the verse]: "Therefore...no..." (2.12.43.) and "...other than whom there is nothing" here [in the verse]: "Knowledge is completely pure" (2.12.44.). And in summing up it is said: "Knowledge is real, what is other is unreal" here [in the verse]: "...what is reality" (2.12.45.). On account of that, it is said as a matter of course that what is unreal

is able to be sublated by knowledge. Therefore, the falsity of inert objects is certainly established. Let the matter rest here.

4.73.

तेषां च मिथ्याभूताखिलपदार्थानां मूलकारणमविद्या । तस्या निवर्तकं च
 'तत्त्वमसि' (छा० ६ । ८ । ७) अयमात्मा ब्रह्म (बृ० २ । ५ । १९)
 इदं सर्वं यदयमात्मा (बृ० २४ । ४५ । ५७)
 अविद्यानिवर्तको- इत्यादिवेदान्तवाक्यतात्पर्यविषयीभूतं निर्विशेषा-
 पपत्तिः त्मैक्यज्ञानम् । यत्तु 'निर्विशेषब्रह्मज्ञानात्त्वावि-
 द्यानिवृत्तिः । वेदाहमेतं पुरुषं महान्तमादित्यवर्णं
 तमसः परस्तात् । तमेवं विद्वानमृत इह भवति नान्यः पन्था विद्यतेऽयनाय
 (तै० आ० ३ । १३ । १) सर्वे निमेषा जज्ञिरे विद्युतः पुरुषादधि । न
 तस्येशे कश्चन । तस्य नाम महद्यशः । य एनं विदुरमृतास्ते भवन्ति (म० ना०
 १ । ८ । १० । ११) इत्याद्यनेकवाक्यविरोधात् ' (श्रीभा० पृ० ११०
 प० २) इत्युक्तं तत्रोच्यते—यद्यपि ' एवं विद्वान् ' इत्यनेन ' य एनं विदुः ' इत्यनेन च पूर्वोपात्तं सगुणात्मज्ञानमनूद्य तस्यामृतप्राप्तिसाधनत्वमुक्तं तथापि तत्परम्परयैव न साक्षात् । एतच्च प्रागुपपादितम् (पृ० ११६ प० २३) । किं च सविशेषब्रह्मज्ञानेनाविद्यायाः सर्वथा विनाशो न संभवति । विशेषाणामविद्यामूलकत्वात् । सविशेषात्मज्ञानं हि तत्त्वज्ञानस्यान्तरङ्गतरं साधनमिति बोध्यम् ॥ २१ ॥

4.73. [6] Ignorance is the primary cause of all those false objects. And what removes that [Ignorance] is the knowledge of the oneness of the Self which is free from distinction, which is the purport of the Vedānta statements such as: "you are That" (Ch.6.8.7.), "this Self is Brahman" (Brh.2.5.19.), "all this which is, is this Self" (Brh.2.4.6.) etc.

But what has been said (Śrī.B.Para.72.p.163.)⁴⁸:

there is no cessation of Ignorance from the knowledge of Brahman free from distinction. Because of the contradiction with numerous passages such as: "I know this great Person, the colour of the sun, beyond darkness. The one who knows Him in this manner becomes immortal here, there is no other path for going [to immortality]" (Tai.Ā.3.13.1.), "All moments were born

from that Person who is [like] lightning. No one rules over Him, His name is 'great glory'. Those who know Him become immortal" (M.Nā.1.8,10,11.).

In regard to that, it is said: having repeated the knowledge of the Self possessing qualities, which was previously mentioned, although that [knowledge of the Self possessing qualities] was stated as the means for the attainment of immortality by this: "The one who knows...in this manner" and by this: "Those who know Him", still, that is only indirectly, not directly. This was previously demonstrated (3.175.). Moreover, the destruction of Ignorance is not at all possible through the knowledge of Brahman possessing distinction. Because distinctions have their basis in Ignorance. It should be understood that the knowledge of the Self possessing distinction is a more essential means for the knowledge of the truth.

comment

Rāmānuja's sixth objection: the logical impossibility of removing Ignorance (nivartakānupapatti), seeks to demonstrate that the Advaitin has no means to accomplish the removal of Ignorance (avidyā). According to the Advaitin, liberation is only through knowledge. This liberating knowledge is revealed through a special means of knowledge -the Upaniṣad texts- (see comment to 1.2.) whose purport lies in the knowledge that the Self is one and is of the nature of awareness free from all distinctions.

In this objection, Rāmānuja argues that the sacred texts do not reveal Brahman to be free from distinction. Texts such as: "I know this great Person..." (Tai.Ā.3.13.1.) etc. clearly reveal that Brahman possesses distinguishing characteristics. Moreover, Rāmānuja maintains that no texts teach that Brahman is free from distinction and hence they cannot be the means to remove this avidyā which the Advaitins themselves have fabricated. Abhyankar responds to this objection by resorting to the Advaita distinction between a primary and secondary order of texts. For the Advaita method of interpretation, see 1.9. and comment and the comment to 1.48. For the Viśiṣṭādvaita method, see 2.3. and comment and the comment to 2.50.

Rāmānuja's critique and Abhyankar's reply are based upon their different exegetical methods, though they both ascribe to the axiomatic

belief that the sacred texts do not inherently conflict. The Advaita method of interpretation explains statements denoting qualities as referring to the Lord, i.e. the Self having māyā as its limiting adjunct. Advaitins accept statements denying the reality of distinctions as of primary importance. The Viśiṣṭādvaitins maintain that statements denoting qualities are to be accepted just as they are. However they have difficulty explaining statements such as: "free from qualities" (Śv.6.11.) for such expressions do not appear to deny only evil qualities but all qualities in general. If there is mutual concord (samanvaya) among all the sacred texts, then a statement denoting freedom from distinction must be taken as the final revelation since it is necessarily subsequent to a sentence describing qualities.

4.74.

अतो निवृत्तिरप्यस्या अविद्याया न दुर्वचा ॥
अविद्यां तत्त्वतो ज्ञात्वा मुच्यते कर्मबन्धनात् ॥ २२ ॥

4.74.

Therefore the cessation of this Ignorance is also not difficult to state. Having known Ignorance as it is, one is released from the bond of karma. 22.

4.75.

निर्विशेषब्रह्मज्ञानस्याविद्यानिवर्तकत्वात्तेनास्या निवृत्तिर्भवत्येवेति नाविद्यानिवृत्त्यनुपपत्तिः । निर्विशेषब्रह्मज्ञानं चाविद्यायास्तत्त्वतो ज्ञाने सत्येव घटते । अविद्यायास्तत्त्वतो ज्ञानं चाविद्याया अविद्या-
अविद्यानिवृत्त्युपपत्तिः त्वेन ज्ञानम् । तस्मिन्सत्येव सा हातुं शक्यते नान्यथा । तस्या हानं च सुखादिषु मिथ्यात्व-
दृष्टिः । मिथ्यात्वदृष्टिश्च सुखादयो मनोवृत्तिविशेषा नात्मगुणा इति भावना । तादृशभावनादादर्थे च सुखार्थं दुःखनिवृत्त्यर्थं वा न कदापि प्रवृत्तिः संभवति । प्रवृत्त्यभावे च तन्मूलकस्य कर्मणोऽप्यभाव इति कर्मरूपाद्बन्धनान्मुक्तिः सिध्यति ।

4.75.

[7] Because the knowledge of Brahman free from distinction removes Ignorance, there is certainly the cessation of this [Ignorance] by that [knowledge] and so there is no logical fallacy concerning the cessation of Ignorance. And the knowledge of Brahman free from distinction is possible only when there is the knowledge of Ignorance as it really is. And the knowledge of Ignorance as it is, means the knowledge of Ignorance

as Ignorance. Only when that [knowledge] exists is that [Ignorance] able to be removed, not otherwise. The removal of that [Ignorance] is seeing the falsity in pleasure etc. Seeing the falsity means understanding that pleasure etc. are particular mental modifications, not qualities of the Self. And upon the firmness of such understanding, no activity is possible at any time for the sake of pleasure or for the sake of the cessation of pain. And upon the absence of activity there is also the absence of karma which is based upon that. Thus liberation from the bondage in the form of karma is established.⁴⁹

4.76.

विष्णुपुराणेऽप्युक्तम्—

तस्माद्दुःखात्मकं नास्ति न च किञ्चित्सुखात्मकम् ।

मनसः परिणामोऽयं सुखदुःखोपलक्षणः ॥

ज्ञानमेव परं ब्रह्म ज्ञानं बन्धाय चेष्यते ।

ज्ञानात्मकमिदं विश्वं न ज्ञानाद्विद्यते परम् ॥

(वि० पु० २ । ६ । ४७—४८) इति ।

तट्टीकायामप्युक्तम्—मनसः परिणामः स्वप्ननोरथवच्चित्तविलासमात्रम् । किं तर्हि सत्यमित्यत आह—ज्ञानमिति । ज्ञानात्मकं ब्रह्मैव परमार्थ इति शेषः । तर्हि कुतोऽस्य बन्धमोक्षाविति चेत्—अविद्याहंकारादिरूपेण प्रतीयमानं ज्ञानमेव बन्धायेष्यते । विद्यारूपतया तन्निरसनेन ज्ञानमेव मोक्षाय चेष्यते । अविद्या तदध्यस्तं च विद्या तन्निरसनीयं च ज्ञानमेवेत्याह—ज्ञानात्मकमिति । सर्वं विश्वं ज्ञानात्मकमित्यर्थ इति । शिवविष्णुकृतो भेदोऽप्यौपाधिक एव । तदप्युक्तं विष्णुपुराणे—

शंकरो भगवाञ्शौरिः श्रीश्च गौरी द्विजोत्तम (वि० पु० १।८।२२) इति ।

एवं चात्मैक्यज्ञानेनैवाविद्यानिवृत्तिः ।

4.76. That has been told in the Viṣṇupurāṇa also:

Therefore nothing is [of itself] the nature of pain and nothing is [of itself] the nature of pleasure. This is a modification of the mind which is designated as pleasure and pain.

The supreme Brahman is Knowledge alone and Knowledge is required for bondage. This

universe consists of Knowledge. There is nothing beyond Knowledge. (Viṣ.P.2.6.47,48.).

In the commentary upon that too it is said ⁵⁰:

"A modification of the mind" means merely a play of the mind, like dream or a fancy. What then is real? Therefore he says: "Knowledge". The completion of the sense is: "Brahman", who is of the nature of Knowledge, is alone the highest reality. Then [if you say]: for what reason does this [Brahman] have bondage and liberation? [It is told]: "Knowledge", which is recognized in the form of the I-notion etc. due to Ignorance, is certainly "required for bondage". "And" Knowledge is certainly required for liberation because the removal of that [Ignorance] is through knowledge. Ignorance and what is superimposed by that and knowledge and what is to be removed through that are Knowledge alone. Therefore he says: "consists of Knowledge".

The meaning is that the entire universe consists of Knowledge. Even the distinction which is made between Śiva and Viṣṇu is only in relation to a limiting adjunct. That too has been told in the Viṣṇupurāṇa:

O best among the twice born, Śaṅkara [Śiva] is the illustrious Śauri [Viṣṇu] and Śrī [Lakṣmī] is Gaurī [Pārvatī] (Viṣ.P.1.8.22.).

Thus the cessation of Ignorance is only through the knowledge of the oneness of the Self.

-4.77.

यद्यपि 'आत्मा वा अरे द्रष्टव्यः'
(वृ० २ । ४ । ५) इत्यादिश्रुतिषु कर्तृकर्मभेदेन जीवब्रह्मभेदः प्रतीयते तथापि
स औपाधिकः । 'तत्त्वमसि' (छा० ६ । ८ । ७) इतिश्रुतिप्रतिपादि-
तैक्यानुरोधात् । न चोक्तभेदश्रुत्यनुरोधादैक्यमौपाधिकं स्यादिति वाच्यम् ।
यथा 'तत्त्वमसि' इत्यत्र वृत्त्यैवाभेदः प्रतिपाद्यते न तथा 'आत्मा वा अरे

द्रष्टव्यः' इत्यत्र भेदः । तत्र हि वाच्यवृत्त्या द्रष्टृश्यभाव एवोच्यते । तदन्य-
थानुपपत्त्या तु तयोर्भेदकल्पना । तथा च प्रत्यक्षश्रुतेः प्रावल्यादैक्यमेव परमार्थः ।
ऐक्यज्ञाने चार्थादेव भेदज्ञानं निवर्तते इत्यविद्यानिवृत्तिरेव भवति ।

4.77. Although difference between the individual soul and Brahman is recognized due to the distinction between the agent and the object in sacred texts such as: "My dear, the Self should indeed be seen" (Brh.2.4.5.) etc., nevertheless, that [difference] pertains to a limiting adjunct. [That must be so] in accordance with the identity taught in the sacred text: "you are That" (Ch.6.8.7.).- It should not be said: the identity must pertain to a limiting adjunct in accordance with the sacred text just mentioned [which denotes] difference. [reason] In the manner in which non-difference is taught just by the signification [of the words] here: "you are That", difference is not [taught] in the same manner here: "My dear, the Self should indeed be seen". Because there [in the latter sentence], only a seer-seen relation is told by the express signification. But there is the postulation of difference between the two [i.e. the seer and the seen] because there is no logical possibility of it being otherwise. And so because the sacred text which is explicit has predominance, identity alone is the highest truth. And in the knowledge of identity, the knowledge of difference ceases just as a matter of course. So there is certainly the cessation of Ignorance.

4.78.

यतोऽ-

विद्या सृष्टिकालेऽन्वुनः सकाशाद्ब्रह्मद्वन्द्वता स्वयं प्रथमतो भिन्नेव भवति ।
तादृशभेदमूलक एवायमविलः प्रपञ्चः । ततस्तथा
अविद्याकृत्यम् स्वाश्रयत्वेन प्रकल्पितस्तत्प्रतिबिम्बितो जीवोऽपि
परमात्मनः सकाशाद्भिन्नमात्मानं मन्यते । तादृ-
शाविद्यापरिणामभूतं जगच्च परमात्मनः सकाशाद्भिन्नमन्यते । न केवलमेतावदेव,
अपरं च-एकस्मिन्नेव ज्ञानस्वरूपे परमात्मानि ज्ञानरूपेणात्मरूपेण चानेकधा-
भावप्रकल्पनया तस्यैव ज्ञानरूपेण धर्मत्वं विषयित्वं च तथा तस्यैवात्मरूपेण
धर्मित्वं विषयित्वं च प्रकल्प्य भेदं भासयति । तयोश्च धर्मधर्मिणोर्ज्ञानात्मनो-

र्वस्तुतस्तादात्म्यसंबन्धसत्त्वेऽपि तौ वियोजयन्तीव तयोर्मध्ये स्वयं भूत्वा धर्मिणं च तं स्वविषयत्वेनान्तर्भाव्य तमात्मसात्कृत्वा तदात्मसात्करणं स्वकीयं मायात्वं चापह्नुत्य स्वस्यां प्रतिबिम्बरूपेण तं प्रदर्शयन्ती तं स्वप्रतिबिम्बितं जीवात्मानं धर्मभूतज्ञानस्याश्रयत्वेन प्रकल्प्य स्वयं विषयरूपेण साक्षात्परिणामद्वारा च तत्र प्रविशति । ज्ञाने हि विषयित्वस्य कल्पना युक्तेति विषयरूपेण तत्र प्रवेशः सुलभः ।

4.78. Because Ignorance has manifested like bubbles from water at the time of creation, it is firstly as though different [from Brahman] of its own accord. This entire manifest world is only based upon such a difference. For that reason, the individual soul too -who is superimposed by that [Ignorance] as its locus and who is reflected in that [Ignorance]- considers the Self to be different from the supreme Self. And [the soul] considers the world, which is the transformation of such Ignorance, to be different from the supreme Self.

Not only to this extent, moreover: through the false conception of various states -in the form of Knowledge and in the form of the Self- in regard to the supreme Self who is one alone and of the nature of Knowledge, [Ignorance] manifests difference by falsely conceiving that very [supreme Self] to be an attribute and the subject in the form of Knowledge and, in the same manner, by falsely conceiving that very [supreme Self] to be the possessor of the attribute and an object in the form of the Self. Even though those two, the attribute and its possessor, i.e. Knowledge and the Self, exist in reality in a relation of identity, [Ignorance] as though separates the two by itself coming between them. And having included the possessor of the attribute [i.e. the Self] as its object and having made that [Self] its own and having concealed its own false nature in making that [Self] its own, it reveals that [Self] in itself [Ignorance] in the form of a reflection. Having falsely conceived that individual self who is reflected in itself [in Ignorance] as the locus of the Knowledge which is an attribute, [Ignorance] itself enters there [in the soul] in the form of

an object and by way of a direct modification [i.e. in the manner of the mental modification: "I am ignorant"]. Because the assumption of the nature of being the subject is correct in regard to Knowledge, therefore the entry [of Ignorance] there [in the soul] in the form of an object is easily accomplished.

4.79.

यथा कस्यचिद्धनिकस्य गृहे तस्य यथा प्रियं भासते तादृशेन रूपेण कश्चिद्धूर्तः प्रविशति । ततस्तदीयविश्वासस्थानं भूत्वा तदीयं सर्वमात्मसात्कृत्वा स्वकीयं धूर्तत्वं तदीयसर्वस्वस्यात्मसात्करणं चापह्नुत्य तदीयं द्वितीयं बहिश्चरं हृदयमिव प्रियतरो भवति । एवमपहृतसर्वस्वोऽपि धनिकः स्वयं तत्कृत्यमजानानः प्रत्युत पुत्रादपि प्रियतरेण तेन स्वयं कृतार्थं मनीषिणं मन्यमानो विस्फूर्जते । स्वयं तु स्वकीयस्यापि सर्वस्वस्य मध्य एकां कपर्दिकामपि कश्चिद्धिनियोक्तुं तं विना न शक्नोति तद्वत् ।

4.79. For example, a swindler enters into the house of some wealthy person in such a form as appears dear to him. Then, having become his confidant and having made everything belonging to him his own, and having concealed his own fraudulent nature [while] making all that person's wealth his own, he becomes dearer like his [the wealthy person's] second heart which is external. So even though the wealthy person has been deprived of all his wealth, he does not know himself what is to be done about that but on the contrary he appears to consider himself a clever person who has accomplished his object through him who is dearer than even a son. But without him, he [the wealthy person] himself is not able to spend anywhere even a single small coin among all the wealth, even though it belongs to him. It is like that.

4.80.

ज्ञाने च सा विषयरूपेण प्रविष्टा ज्ञानाङ्गिका प्रथमतो बुद्धिरूपेण ततोऽहंकारमहाभूतादिरूपेण च परिणमते । अविद्यायां तत्परिणामभूतबुद्ध्याद्युपाधौ प्रतिविम्बितश्च जीवात्मा प्रतिविम्बप्रापकोपाध्यनुसारेण वर्तते सोऽयं संसारः । एतदेव चाविद्याया अविद्यात्वम् । यदा च पूर्वकृतसुकृतौघवशान्निर्मलान्तःकरणः सद्गुरुणोपदिष्टः सन्नेतदविद्यास्वरूपं याथात्म्येनावगच्छति तदा सद्य एव

मुक्तो भवति । यथा स्वप्न उच्चावचान्भावान्पश्यंस्तेषु रागद्वेषानुसारेणानुकूल्यं प्रातिकूल्यं वा विचिन्तयन्निष्ठप्राप्तयेऽनिष्ठनिवृत्तये च यतमानो गुरुतरसंरम्भां वैदिकीं यागादिक्रियां लौकिकीमायोधनादिक्रियां वाऽऽरम्भाणोऽप्यकस्माज्जा-
गृतश्चेत्सद्य एवैकपदे तत्सर्वं शून्यत्वेन भावयति तद्वदिति बोध्यम् ॥

4.80. And in regard to Knowledge, that [Ignorance] which has entered in the form of an object and which has Knowledge as its component, firstly transforms into the form of the intellect and then into the form of the "I-notion" and the "great elements" etc. The individual self, who is reflected in Ignorance i.e. in the limiting adjunct of the intellect etc. which are the transformations of that [Ignorance], exists in conformity with the limiting adjunct which brings about the reflection. That is this transmigratory existence. And this is indeed the nature that Ignorance has. When a mind, which is free from impurity on account of the traditional instruction carried out previously in a thorough manner, is taught by a true teacher, it understands this nature of Ignorance as it really is and then it is liberated at that very instant. Just as [a person] who sees various things in a dream and considering their pleasantness or unpleasantness in accordance with the desire or aversion for those things, and striving for the attainment of what is desired and for the removal of what is unwanted he even begins a Vedic action such as sacrifice etc., which has a very venerable intensity, or he begins a worldly action such as a battle etc., but if he is awoken suddenly then at that very instant -in a single moment- he considers all that to be fictitious. It should be understood to be like that.

4.81.

तदेवमवि-
द्यासंबन्धेन श्रीभाष्यकृद्भिः प्रदर्शिताः सप्तविधा अनुपपत्तयो निरस्ता वेदि-
तव्याः । एवमन्यदापि सर्वं रामानुजोहितमात्मैक्यविरुद्धं तर्कजालं श्रुत्यादिस्व-
रसविरुद्धमुक्तदिशा निरस्तप्रायमेव । तच्च काप्यनभिनिविष्टयुद्धिभिः सुधीभिः
स्वयमूहमिति शिवम् ॥ २२ ॥

4.81. Thus because of the connection with Ignorance, the seven types of logical fallacy shown by the author of the Śrībhāṣya must be understood to be refuted. In the same manner, even every other web of reasoning conjectured by Rāmānuja, which is contrary to the oneness of the Self and contrary to the natural meaning of the sacred texts etc., has certainly for the most part been refuted according to the manner told. And that can be investigated personally by intelligent people whose minds do not cling anywhere. Thus it is auspicious.

NOTES TO CHAPTER FOUR: AVIDYOPAPATTI.

1. Adapted. The text of the Śrī.B. reads: na tāvajjīvam āsṛitya avidyāparikalpitatvājīvabhāvasya.
2. Śaṅkara also cites this analogy. Cf., B.S.Ś. 2.1.21. p.393, line 16f.
3. For Maṇḍana's position cf., S. Kuppaswami Sastri (ed) Brahmasiddhi by Acharya Maṇḍanamīśra with commentary by Śaṅkhaṇi. Delhi, 2nd ed. 1984. Intro. p.xxviii. Also, R. Balasubramanian. A study of the Brahmasiddhi of Maṇḍana Mīśra. Varanasi. 1983. p.83. For Vācaspati's view, cf., B.S. (Bhāmatī) 1.4.1. p.297, line 12. Also, Rāmasāstrī, op-cit., p.129.
4. Rāmarāya, op-cit., p.282, line 15f.
5. For Suresvara's view, cf., N.S. Ch.3, sambandhokti. For the Vivarana view, cf., Rāmasāstrī, op-cit., p.129.
6. Rāmarāya, op-cit., p.277, line 19. Rāmasāstrī, ibid., p.133.
7. Rāmarāya, ibid., p.278, line 6f.
8. ibid., p.277, line 26.
9. ibid., p.277, line 27.
10. This text has not been located.
11. Adapted, without deviation of meaning.
12. See ch.3, fn. 76.
13. In the Paramalaghumañjūṣā, Nāgeśabhaṭṭa discusses the usage of a negative particle indicating what has been superimposed. See the Paramalaghumañjūṣā of Śrī Nāgeśa Bhaṭṭa with the commentary Jyotsnā by K. Shukla. Baroda. 1961. p.122f. Also, B. Pañcoli (ed.), Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇasāra of Śrī Kaṇḍabhaṭṭa with the commentaries Prabhā and Darpaṇa. Varanasi. 1969. p.346f.

An example of a negative particle indicating what has been superimposed is the compound: "not a Brāhmaṇa" (abrāhmaṇa). This is a Tatpuruṣa compound (nañ tatpuruṣa) containing the negative particle a and the word brāhmaṇa. In such a compound, the latter member is the principal component (cf. Paramalaghu. p.122., Vaiyākaraṇa. p.346, P. S. 2.1.22., note by Vasu.). If the compound meant "different from a Brāhmaṇa" (brāhmaṇabhinnā), then the negative particle, which has the meaning of "different", would be the principal component. For the sake of maintaining the primacy of the latter member, the grammarians say that the negative particle indicates that the latter member is something superimposed. So the compound "abrāhmaṇa" refers to someone such as a Kṣatriya etc. who possess the nature of a Brāhmaṇa which has been superimposed. (āropitabrāhmaṇatvavān kṣatriyādir iti bodhaḥ.).

In the topic under discussion in this section, the third alternative is that the statement "I am ignorant" (aham ajñāḥ) refers to knowledge having the supreme Self as its object. As in the above example, "ajñā" is a negative Tatpuruṣa and so the final member is the

principal component. The final member, jñā, means "one who has knowledge" (jñānavān). The negative particle indicates that the final member has the nature of being superimposed and so the meaning of the compound is: "one who possesses knowledge of the supreme Self which is superimposed" (āropitaparamātmaviṣayakajñānavān). Abhyankar argues that a liberated soul does not say "I am ignorant" and a bound soul, who has erroneous knowledge of the supreme Self, also does not think "I am ignorant". But a bound soul who knows nothing of the supreme Self thinks "I am ignorant". The meaning of "ignorant" (ajñā) is: "one who possesses knowledge of the supreme Self which is superimposed" and such a meaning is not possible because the bound soul has no knowledge of the supreme Self, therefore knowledge can hardly be shown as superimposed.

In regard to the following sentence: "But the superimposition of the knowledge relating to the supreme Self..." the sense is that a bound soul has knowledge about worldly objects such as pots etc. By superimposing the nature of knowledge about the supreme Self upon the worldly knowledge, the statement "I am ignorant" could mean: "one who possesses knowledge qualified by the nature of superimposed knowledge relating to the supreme Self". But that meaning is not possible because superimposition is possible where an object is qualified by similarity. Since the knowledge of pots etc. and the knowledge of the supreme Self are completely distinct, it is not possible to say that there is superimposition of knowledge relating to the supreme Self upon the knowledge relating to pots etc.

14. R. Balasubramanian, "Rāmānuja as a Critic" in Studies in Rāmānuja. Madras. 1980. p.191f.
15. Rāmarāya, op-cit.. p.287, line 14f.
16. The topic of "the logical fallacy concerning a means of proof" is now being discussed in relation to inference. In 4.7. it was introduced with regard to the perceptual cognition "I am ignorant".
17. This inference is given by Rāmānuja as his prima facie argument.
18. This is Abhyankar's explanation which he had previously given in his commentary "Samāsokti" on the Śrībhāṣya-catuḥsūtrī, op-cit., p.158, line 12f.
19. Adapted. The text reads: anyasyānythāvabhāṣasyāvarjanīyatvāt.
20. For the explanation of the "fivefold combination" see 1.37.
21. Abhyankar has modified the sentence to indicate that adraṣṭavaśāt is to be connected with ambuna eva grahaṇam.
22. The sense is that when one ascertains that the water is a mirage the cognition arises: "this is not water", i.e. water does not exist here (atra jalam asat). Even if it is accepted, as Rāmānuja maintains, that there is the appearance in another manner (anyathā-avabhāsa), the statement: "this is not water" means that the cognition of water is being denied and so it is not possible for Rāmānuja to hold the view of satkhyāti that the cognition of the water is real.
23. This appears to be the author's statement describing the

Viśiṣṭādvaitin position rather than a direct quotation.

24. A species of plant serving as a substitute for the Soma plant in rituals. In Śrī. B.Para.66.p.144., Rāmānuja presents a verse (supposedly by Dramiḍācārya, the "Bhāṣyakāra") stating that the Pūtīka plant can be substituted for the Soma plant because it actually contains portions of Soma.
25. Cf. Śrī.B.Para.66.p.144.
26. Cf. Jacob, A Handful of Popular Maxims., op-cit., iii. p.96.
27. The complete sūtra reads: "But [the dream creation is] mere māyā, because its nature is not a manifestation fully [of the totality of attributes found in the waking state]".
28. Adapted. The passage does not deviate in meaning from the Śrī.B. But it has not been indented because it is not a direct quotation.
29. Slightly adapted: "tathā" is changed to "cakrapratīti".
30. According to Rāmānuja, the nature of all the directions exists in every direction. What is east for one person is west or north in regard to others and all such cognitions are true. Abhyankar accepts that a direction is relative to the position of the respective person, but he seeks to argue that a direction is established with regard to something, such as the position of a particular person. If that person is considered to be facing east but he thinks east is north -even though it may be north with regard to another person- then the person facing east is in error with regard to his direction and the object of his error -the nature of being "north"- is something indeterminable. It is not absolutely unreal because the cognition of "north" exists. It is not real because it is subject to sublation by the knowledge that he is facing east.
The statement: "one should eat food while facing the east" is cited by Abhyankar to show that a direction is established with reference to something. If a number of people sat facing the east, then although they face the east with respect to themselves, in relation to their neighbours they are seated to the west, or the north or the south and so with regard to other people they are not directly east. For practical purposes it is established that a certain person is facing east and therefore everybody else too faces east.
31. B.S.Ś. 2.2.32. p.479, line 4f.
32. Read "vindanti" in the place of "vindati".
33. Cf. Tai.Ś. 2.1.6. p.301, line 7f.
34. The Ānandāśrama edition has the word "ekam", from the Tai.Brā. text, after the word "prasiddam". It is omitted here.
35. S.C. Vasu, Siddhānta Kaumudī, op-cit., Vol.2. Upādi affixes. p.287.
36. Cf. Nṛsiṃhottaratāpanīyopaniṣad ch.9. "...sarvatra na hy asti dvaitasiddhir ātmaiva siddho'dvitiyo māyā hy anyad iva...māyā ca tamorūpā..!"

37. See ch.3, fn.31.
38. Cf. Śrī.B.Para.72.p.163f. Also, see text 2.50. and comment.
39. These quotations have not been located.
40. According to Pāṇini, a "word stem" or prātipadika is: "what possesses meaning but is neither a verbal root nor an affix". P.S. 1.2.45. Also, cf. Abhyankar and Shukla, A Dictionary of Sanskrit Grammar, op-cit., p.275.
41. Adapted.
42. This meaning follows the commentator Śrīdharasvāmin who considers Knowledge to be the substratum: "viññāne'dhiṣṭhāne". Cf. Jīvananda-vidyāsāgarabhaṭṭācārya (ed.), Viṣṇupurāṇam with the commentary Svaprakāśa by Śrīdharasvāmin. Calcutta. 1882. p.307, line 14.
43. This is a substantial reconstruction of the Śrī.B. text without a deviation in meaning. Abhyankar's explanation of "sam" in the word "saṅkalpa" is taken from the Śrutaprakāśikā, op-cit., pt.2. (avidyābhāṅgabhāga) p.46, line 11.
44. Slightly adapted.
45. Slightly adapted.
46. The sixfold modifications are mentioned in the Nirukta of Yāska, they are: birth, existence, growth, transformation, decline and death. Śāṅkara refers to them in B.S.Ś. 1.1.2. p.48, line 2f.
47. Slightly adapted.
48. Slightly adapted.
49. This explanation appears to be modelled upon Nyāyasūtra 1.1.2. "Pain birth, activity, faults and misapprehension -on the successive annihilation of these in the reverse order, there follows release", cf. S.C. Vidyābhūṣaṇa (trans.), The Nyāya Sūtras of Gotama. (The Sacred Books of the Hindus. Vol. viii.) Allahabad. 1913. Reprinted, New York. 1974. p.2.
50. Jīvanandavidyāsāgarabhaṭṭācārya, op-cit., p.258, line 9f. In the edition consulted, Śrīdhara's commentary differs to some degree from Abhyankar's quotation, however the meaning is identical.

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